area handbook series 

Nigeria 

a country study 



Nigeria 

a country study 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Helen Chapin Metz 
Research Completed 
June 1991 



On the cover: Bronze head of an oni, or king, of Ife, spiritual 
head of the Yoruba people 



Fifth Edition, First Printing, 1992. 

Library of Congress Cataloging- in-Publication Data 

Nigeria: a country study / Federal Research Division, Library of 
Congress ; edited by Helen Chapin Metz. — 5th ed. 

p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294) (DA 
pam ; 550-157) 

"Research completed December 1990." 
Includes bibliography (pp. 341-361) and index. 
ISBN 0-8444-0738-0 

1. Nigeria. I. Metz, Helen Chapin, 1928- . II. Library of 
Congress. Federal Research Division. III. Series. 
DT515.22.N53 1992 92-9026 
966.9— dc20 CIP 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-157 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared by 
the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under 
the Country Studies — Area Handbook Program sponsored by the 
Department of the Army. The last page of this book lists the other 
published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, 
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national 
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelation- 
ships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural 
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social 
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of 
the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static 
portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make 
up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- 
mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature 
and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not 
be construed as an expression of an official United States govern- 
ment position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to 
adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, 
additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be wel- 
comed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, D.C. 20540 



iii 



Acknowledgments 



The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of the fol- 
lowing individuals who wrote the 1982 edition of Nigeria: A Coun- 
try Study: Robert Rinehart, Irving Kaplan, Donald P. Whitaker, 
Jean R. Tartter, and Frederick Ehrenreich. Their work provided 
the basis of the present volume, as well as substantial portions of 
the text. 

John N. Paden, Robinson Professor of International Studies at 
George Mason University, made an extremely useful critique of 
the entire manuscript, helping the authors and the editor to focus 
their efforts more sharply. Revisions to Chapter 4 were made by 
Richard Joseph and Amy Poteete. 

The authors are grateful to individuals in various government 
agencies and private institutions who gave their time, research 
materials, and expertise to the production of this book. These in- 
dividuals include Ralph K. Benesch, who oversees the Country 
Studies — Area Handbook program for the Department of the 
Army. Special thanks are owed to the Embassy of Nigeria, which 
provided numerous photographs as well as a mounted map of Nige- 
ria with a superimposed head that served as the basis for the cover 
art of this volume. Graphics support was supplied by Greenhorne 
and O'Mara; Harriet R. Blood, who prepared the topography and 
drainage map; Carlyn Dawn Anderson, who designed the illus- 
trations on the title pages of the chapters; and Wayne Home, who 
designed the cover. 

The authors also wish to thank members of the Federal Research 
Division who contributed directly to the preparation of the 
manuscript. These people include Sandra W. Meditz, who reviewed 
all drafts and graphic material and served as liaison with the spon- 
soring agency; Tim L. Merrill, who assisted in preparing maps; 
David P. Cabitto, who provided invaluable graphic assistance and 
supervised graphics productions; and Marilyn Majeska, who 
managed editing and production. Also involved in preparing the 
text were editorial assistants Barbara Edgerton and Izella Watson. 

Individual chapters were edited by Barbara Harrison and Vin- 
cent Ercolano. Catherine Schwartzstein performed the final prepub- 
lication review, and Joan C. Cook compiled the index. Linda 
Peterson of the Library of Congress Composing Unit prepared the 
camera-ready copy, under the supervision of Peggy Pixley. 



v 



Contents 



Page 

Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xiii 

Country Profile XV 

Introduction xxiii 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 

Paul E. Lovejoy 

EARLY HISTORY 4 

Early States Before 1500 6 

The Savanna States, 1500-1800 13 

EUROPEAN SLAVE TRADE IN WEST AFRICA 15 

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: REVOLUTION AND 

RADICAL ADJUSTMENT 19 

Usman dan Fodio and the Sokoto Caliphate 19 

The Yoruba Wars 22 

Abolition of the Slave Trade 22 

Commodity Trade 24 

Royal Niger Company 26 

Influence of the Christian Missions 28 

COLONIAL NIGERIA 29 

Extension of British Control 29 

Lugard and Indirect Rule 31 

Unification of Nigeria 34 

Further Development of Colonial Policy 37 

EMERGENCE OF NIGERIAN NATIONALISM 38 

INDEPENDENT NIGERIA 47 

Politics in the Crisis Years 48 

Civil War 57 

THE FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE 

POSTWAR ERA 61 

The Gowon Regime 62 

The Regime of Murtala Muhammad, 1975-76 68 

Preparation for the Return to Civilian Rule 70 

The Obasanjo Regime, 1976-79 71 

THE SECOND REPUBLIC, 1979-83 73 

RETURN TO MILITARY RULE 76 



vii 



Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 85 

Ronald Cohen and Abe Goldman 

PHYSICAL SETTING 87 

Relief and Main Physical Features 87 

Climate 90 

POPULATION 92 

Census History 93 

Population Estimates and the Demographic 

Transition 94 

ETHNICITY 96 

Regional Groupings 98 

Ethnic Relations 107 

CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY Ill 

Social Structure 112 

Women's Roles 118 

RELIGION 120 

Indigenous Beliefs 121 

Islam 123 

Christianity 128 

URBANIZATION 129 

Historical Development of Urban Centers 130 

Urbanization since Independence 133 

Rural-Urban Linkages 137 

EDUCATION 140 

HEALTH 144 

History of Modern Medical Services 144 

Primary Health Care Policies 149 

WELFARE 152 

Chapter 3. The Economy 155 

E. Wayne Nafziger 

THE COLONIAL ECONOMIC LEGACY 158 

Early British Imperialism 158 

The Colonial Period 158 

Development of National Economic Interests to 

World War II 159 

National Economic Interests in the Postwar 

Period 160 

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 160 

Planning 162 

Government Finance 166 

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 168 

Income Distribution 168 



viii 



Wages and Prices 170 

LABOR 171 

Unemployment 172 

Labor Unions 172 

AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY, AND FISHING 174 

Land Use, Soils, and Land 

Tenure 176 

Crops 178 

Irrigation 179 

Livestock 180 

Forestry 181 

Fisheries 182 

MANUFACTURING 184 

MINING, PETROLEUM, AND ENERGY RESOURCES . . 185 

Oil and Gas 185 

Electric Power 188 

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS 188 

Transportation 188 

Communications 193 

BANKING, FINANCE, AND OTHER SERVICES 193 

FOREIGN TRADE AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 196 

Foreign Trade 196 

Balance of Payments 197 

The Debt Overhang 198 

Structural Adjustment 200 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 203 

Eghosa Osaghae 

THE FIRST REPUBLIC 209 

MILITARY INTERVENTION AND MILITARY RULE ... 214 
The 1966 Coups, Civil War, and Gowon's 

Government 215 

The Muhammad-Obasanjo Government 218 

The Buhari Regime 220 

The Babangida Government 221 

POLITICAL TRANSITIONS AND TRANSITION 

PLANNING 225 

The Second Republic 225 

The Third Republic 229 

FEDERALISM AND INTRAGOVERNMENTAL 

RELATIONS 233 

THE CIVIL SERVICE 238 

INTEREST GROUPS AND NATIONAL POLITICS 241 

Professional Associations 241 



ix 



Trade Unions 241 

The Media 242 

Student Associations 243 

Women's Organizations 243 

Other Interest Groups 244 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 244 

Relations with Neighboring States 246 

Relations with the Rest of Africa 247 

Relations with Major Powers 248 

Relations with International Organizations 250 

Chapter 5. National Security 253 

Joseph P. Smaldone 

NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES AND 

PERCEPTIONS 257 

Local and Bilateral Issues 258 

African and Regional Issues 264 

Global Interests 267 

ARMED FORCES 268 

Early Development 269 

Constitutional and Political Framework 271 

Organization, Mission, and Order of Battle 272 

Arms Procurement and Defense Industries 283 

Recruitment and Conditions of Service 287 

Training 290 

Military Capabilities 294 

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 295 

ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY 295 

Attitudes Toward the Military 295 

Political Role of the Military 298 

Demographic Factors and the Defense Budget 299 

Civic Action and Veterans' Groups 301 

INTERNAL SECURITY 301 

Domestic Security 302 

Human Rights 307 

Internal Security Forces and Organizations 309 

Crime and Punishment 315 

Incidence and Trends in Crime 317 

Security and Anticrime Measures 319 

Appendix. Tables 323 

Bibliography 341 

Glossary 363 



x 



Index 367 

List of Figures 

1 Administrative Divisions of Nigeria as of August 1991 xxii 

2 Yorubaland, Eleventh to Nineteenth Centuries 8 

3 Principal Trans-Saharan Trade Routes, Ninth to 

Seventeenth Centuries 12 

4 The Sokoto Caliphate, Mid-Nineteenth Century 20 

5 British Presence in the Niger Region, 1861-1914 30 

6 Unification of Nigeria, 1914 36 

7 Administrative Divisions, 198 7- August 1991 80 

8 Topography and Drainage 88 

9 Distribution of Principal Ethnic Groups, 1990 102 

10 Transportation System, 1990 190 

11 Executive Branch, According to 1989 Constitution 234 

12 Legislative and Judicial Branches, According to 1989 

Constitution 240 

13 Principal Military Installations, 1990 260 

14 Organization of the Ministry of Defence and of the 

Armed Forces, 1990 274 

15 National Security and Defense Organization, 1990 276 

16 Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1990 296 

17 Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1990 297 



xi 



Preface 



Like its predecessor, this study is an attempt to treat in a con- 
cise and objective manner the dominant historical, social, politi- 
cal, economic, and military aspects of contemporary Nigerian 
society. Sources of information included scholarly journals and 
monographs, official reports of government and international or- 
ganizations, newspapers, and numerous periodicals. Chapter bib- 
liographies appear at the end of the book; brief comments on some 
of the more valuable sources suggested as possible further reading 
appear at the end of each chapter. Measurements are given in the 
metric system; a conversion table is provided to assist those read- 
ers who are unfamiliar with metric measurements (see table 1 , Ap- 
pendix). A glossary is also included. 

Place-names generally have been spelled in accordance with those 
established by the United States Board on Geographic Names and 
the Permanent Committee on Geographic Names for British Offi- 
cial Use, known as the BGN/PCGN system. The spelling of other 
proper names conforms to the current usage in the country (where 
the official language is English) or to the most authoritative avail- 
able sources. 

Nigeria created nine more states on August 27, 1991, bringing 
the total number of states to thirty. The map on the frontispiece 
reflects the 1991 status, whereas the map at the end of chapter 1 
reflects the status of Nigeria from 1987 to August 1991. 

The body of the text reflects information available as of Decem- 
ber 1990. Certain other portions of the text, however, have been 
updated. The Introduction discusses significant events that have 
occurred since the completion of research; the Country Profile in- 
cludes updated information as available; and the Bibliography lists 
recently published sources thought to be particularly helpful to the 
reader. 



xiii 



Country Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: Federal Republic of Nigeria. 

Short Form: Nigeria. 

Term for Nationals: Nigerian(s). 

Capital: Lagos (projected to complete gradual move to Abuja in 
Federal Capital Territory in late 1991). 

xv 



Date of Independence: October 1, 1960. 
Geography 

Size: 923,768 square kilometers. 

Boundaries: Southern limits set by Gulf of Guinea (bights of Benin 
and Biafra); inland frontiers shared with Cameroon (east), Chad 
(northeast), Niger (north), and Benin (west). No demarcation 
reached regarding Nigeria-Chad-Niger-Cameroon boundary in 
Lake Chad, leading to disputes. 

Topography: Five major geographic divisions: low coastal zone 
along Gulf of Guinea; succeeded northward by hills and low 
plateaus; Niger-Benue river valley; broad stepped plateau stretching 
to northern border with highest elevations over 1 ,200 meters; moun- 
tainous zone along eastern border, which includes country's highest 
point (2,042 meters). 

Climate: Tropical with variations governed by interaction of moist 
southwest monsoon and dry northeast winds. Mean maximum tem- 
peratures of 30-32°C (south), 33-35°C (north). High humidity 
in south February- November, June- September in north; low hu- 
midity during dry season. Annual rainfall decreases northward; 
about 2,000 millimeters in coastal zone (Niger Delta averages over 
3,550 millimeters); 500 to 750 millimeters in north. 

Society 

Population: Population and growth estimates varied widely. World 
Bank estimated 1990 population at 119 million; however, 1991 
preliminary census figures published in 1992 gave population to- 
tal of 88.5 million. Growth rate in 1990 estimated about 3.3 per- 
cent; 28 percent of population urban in 1985. 

Ethnic Groups: 250 to 400 or more recognized groups, many divid- 
ed into subgroups of considerable social and political importance. 
Most important ethnolinguistic categories: Hausa and Fulani in 
north, Yoruba in southwest, and Igbo in southeast, all internally 
subdivided. Next major groups: Kanuri, Ibibio, Tiv, and Ijaw. 

Languages: Number of languages estimated at 350 to 400, many 
with dialects. Most important: Hausa, Yoruba, and Igbo. Hausa 
major language in north. English official language used in govern- 
ment, large-scale business, mass media, and education beyond 
primary school. Several other languages also recognized for primary 
education. Classical Arabic of religious significance in north. 



xvi 



Religion: In last officially accepted census (1963), about 47 per- 
cent of population self- identified as Muslims (chiefly adherents of 
Sunni Islam), nearly 35 percent as Christians, and more than 18 
percent as other (almost entirely adherents of indigenous religions). 
Majority of north Muslim; south mainly non-Muslim, primarily 
Christian; middle belt mixed faiths. Mission-related Christian 
churches (Anglican, Roman Catholic, Methodist, and others), Afri- 
can independent churches, and Aladura Church present. 

Education: Universal primary education (six-year program) 
responsibility of state and local governments. Great increase in en- 
rollments (about 12 million in government primary schools, addi- 
tional millions in Muslim and Christian private schools in 1985). 
Responsibility for secondary education shared by federal and state 
governments; also some private schools; 3.7 million in government 
secondary schools in 1985. In 1990 between 150,000 and 200,000 
in thirty-five colleges, universities, and higher technical schools. 

Health: Major prevalent diseases included cerebrospinal meningitis, 
yellow fever, Lassa fever, acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
(AIDS), malaria, guinea worm, schistosomiasis, onchocerciasis, 
and malnutrition among young children. Medical establishments 
owned by federal, state, and local governments and private groups. 
Shortage of medical facilities and physicians in rural areas. Primary 
Health Care Plan launched in late 1980s, including expanded im- 
munization campaign. 

Economy 

Gross National Product (GNP): US$30.0 billion, 1989; US$230 
per capita, 1990. 

Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing: Agriculture represented 39.1 
percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1988. In 1990, 34 mil- 
lion hectares, or 42 percent of arable land under cultivation; 18 
million hectares of pastureland; 20 million hectares of forests. 1991 
drought forced substantial increase in food imports. Cash crops: 
cocoa, palm oil, rubber, cotton, peanuts. Major food crops: cassava, 
yams, taro, sweet potatoes, sorghum, millet, corn, rice. Livestock: 
cattle, goats, sheep, horses, camels, pigs, poultry, representing 2.0 
percent of GDP. Forests used extensively, and government engaged 
in afforestation projects. Fisheries catch did not meet domestic 
needs; modernization projects underway. 

Industry: Constituted 10.0 percent of GDP in 1988. Primary 
processing industries: palm oil, peanuts, rubber, petroleum, wood, 



xvii 



hides and skins. Manufacturing industries: food products, textiles, 
cement, building materials, footwear, chemical products, ceramics, 
small appliances. 

Mining, Petroleum, and Energy: Main items mined: coal, tin, 
columbite for domestic use. Nigeria world's sixth largest oil ex- 
porter; domestic consumption 250,000 barrels per day; 11 percent 
of extracted oil refined domestically. Natural gas constituted more 
than 20 percent of commercial energy sources in 1990. Emphasis 
on expanding hydroelectric power (14 percent of energy consumed 
in 1980s) and oil- and gas-generated electricity. 

Exports: Petroleum, cocoa. 

Imports: Machinery, transportation equipment, chemicals, 
manufactured goods, food, live animals. 

Major Trading Partners: United States, Britain, other Europe- 
an Economic Community countries, Japan, Canada. Nigeria had 
negative trade balance. 

Currency: Naira (N); 1 naira =100 kobo; average exchange rate 
in 1990: N8.04 per US$1.00. 

Transportation and Communications 

Roads: In 1990, 108,000 kilometers of roads, of which 30,000 
kilometers paved, 25,000 kilometers gravel; rest unimproved earth. 
Most state capitals and large towns accessible by paved road. 

Railroads: In 1990, 3,500 kilometers of narrow-gauge (1.067- 
meter) track. Nigerian Railway Corporation declared bankruptcy 
in 1988 and system in serious operational difficulties. 

Civil Aviation: Three airports handled international flights: Mur- 
tala Muhammad International at Lagos, Aminu Kano International 
at Kano, and Port Harcourt. Twenty-nine other airports with paved 
runways. Nigeria Airways parastatal with domestic and interna- 
tional flights. 

Ports: Three major complexes: Lagos (including Apapa and Tin 
Can Island), which handled majority of cargo, Delta (including 
Warri and Sapele on Niger River), and Rivers (including Port Har- 
court); Calabar (on Cross River), major eastern port. Crude oil 
exported through Bonny, near Port Harcourt, and Burutu, near 
Warri. 

Communications: Telecommunications being expanded in 1990; do- 
mestic satellite stem linked all major urban areas; good international 



xvm 



telecommunications system. Also 65 AM radio stations and vari- 
ous television stations. 

Government and Politics 

Government: Federal republic under strong presidential adminis- 
tration. Became parliamentary democracy at independence; under 
military rule 1966 to 1979, 1983- . Constitution of 1979 amend- 
ed February 1984. New constitution promulgated 1989 and sched- 
uled to take effect January 1993; provides for three independent 
branches of government: executive, legislative, judicial. National 
Assembly dissolved in 1983, had not been reinstated as of mid- 1991 . 
Transition to civilian rule scheduled to be completed January 1993. 

Administrative Divisions: Thirty states divided into local coun- 
cils; Federal Capital Territory of Abuja projected to become oper- 
ational as national capital in 1991 as federal departments transfer 
from Lagos. 

Judicial System: Legal system based on English common law modi- 
fied by Nigerian rulings, constitution of 1979, legislative enact- 
ments, and decrees of military government in effect. Draft 
constitution of 1989 to take effect at start of Third Republic. Cus- 
tomary and Muslim sharia law recognized in personal status mat- 
ters. Federal system included Supreme Court, federal courts of 
appeal, and federal high courts. Supreme Court had original juris- 
diction in constitutional disputes. 

Politics: In 1989 two political parties established by government: 
National Republican Convention, slightly right of center, and So- 
cial Democratic Party, slightly left of center. Presidential elections 
scheduled for December 1992. 

Foreign Relations: Nonaligned; active member of United Nations, 
Organization of African Unity, Commonwealth of Nations, and 
Economic Community of West African States. Main principles of 
foreign policy: noninterference in internal affairs and inviolability 
of national borders in Africa. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: In 1990 armed forces totaled at least 94,500; com- 
ponents were army, 80,000; navy, 5,000; and air force, 9,500; no 
organized reserves; service entirely voluntary. 

Major Tactical Units: Army had two mechanized infantry divi- 
sions, one armored division, and one airborne division; air force 



xix 



tactical command had three interceptor/strike squadrons, one mari- 
time reconnaissance squadron, and five transport squadrons. Equip- 
ment inventory over 260 aircraft. Navy equipped with modern fleet 
of frigates, corvettes, transports, and patrol craft; defended ter- 
ritorial waters and was developing amphibious warfare capability. 

Major Military Suppliers: Diversified military procurement 
sources included Italy, Germany, Britain, United States, and 
Eastern Europe. Small but important domestic defense industry. 

Military Costs: Between 1977 and 1987, military spending de- 
creased 80 percent to less than 1 percent of GNP; in 1990 defense 
budget N2.19 billion, or about US$277 million. 

Security Forces: Size of national police (Nigeria Police Force) var- 
iously estimated at between 20,000 and 152,000, organized into 
seven area commands under Nigeria Police Council that included 
president, chief of staff, minister of internal affairs, and police in- 
spector general. Also Port Security Police (total about 12,000) and 
Quick Intervention Force (number not known) in each state. Secu- 
rity services reorganized in 1986 into State Security Service for 
domestic intelligence, National Intelligence Agency for foreign in- 
telligence and counterintelligence, and Defence Intelligence Agency 
for military intelligence. 



xx 



Introduction 



THE MOST POPULOUS COUNTRY IN AFRICA and the 
largest in area of the West African states, Nigeria was an early twen- 
tieth century colony that became an independent nation in 1960. 
A country of great diversity because of the many ethnic, linguis- 
tic, and religious groups that live within its borders, Nigeria is also 
a country with a long past. The history of the peoples that consti- 
tute the present state dates back more than 2,000 years. The earli- 
est archaeological finds were of the Nok, who inhabited the central 
Jos Plateau between the Niger and Benue rivers between 300 B.C. 
and 200 A.D. A number of states or kingdoms with which con- 
temporary ethnic groups can be identified existed before 1500. Of 
these, the three dominant regional groups were the Hausa in the 
northern kingdoms of the savanna, the Yoruba in the southwest, 
and the Igbo in the southeast. 

The European slave trade that occurred in Africa as early as the 
late fifteenth century and that crested between the 1650s and the 
1850s had a significant impact on Nigeria. Britain declared the slave 
trade illegal in 1807 and sent its navy to West African waters to 
enforce the ban. Britain's action led ultimately to British interven- 
tion in Nigeria, which had become a major area for the slave trade. 
Meanwhile, whereas European missionaries were bringing Chris- 
tianity to the peoples of southern Nigeria, Islam had been in- 
troduced along the caravan routes of northern Nigeria. The jihad, 
or holy war, waged within what became the Sokoto Caliphate be- 
tween 1804 and 1808, was instrumental in spreading the Muslim 
faith not only in the north but also into adjacent regions, such as 
the area that came to be known as the middle belt, running from 
the Niger River valley in the west to the Cameroon Highlands in 
the east. 

Initially, the slave trade had been the area's primary attraction 
for the European powers, but other products, including palm oil 
and cocoa, also played a role. To safeguard trade from the insta- 
bility resulting from the ongoing Yoruba wars that began in the 
1830s, Britain established a colony in Lagos as early as 1861. The 
Royal Niger Company was chartered for trading purposes in 1886, 
shortly after the Berlin Conference of 1885 had sought to resolve 
overlapping European colonial activities on the African continent. 
Until 1900 British control of the area was limited to the coastal 
region and Lokoja, at the confluence of the Niger and Benue rivers. 
In that year, Britain named Frederick Lugard high commissioner 



xxiii 



NIGER 



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International boundary 

State or territory boundary 

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GABON ! CONGO 



Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Nigeria as of August 1991 



of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. His tenure, which lasted 
until 1918, stressed indirect British control using local rulers. When 
Northern Nigeria and Southern Nigeria were united in 1914, Lu- 
gard continued as Britain's chief representative. Hugh Clifford, 
who succeeded him as governor from 1919 to 1925, sought to bring 
Western economic development, to build on educational progress 
made in the south, and to introduce new governmental structures 
such as the 1922 constitution and the Legislative Council. 

British rule and economic and educational development produced 
a rising nationalism that was reflected particularly in the organized 
labor movement and the creation of various political parties dur- 
ing World War II. Following the war, Nigeria developed under 
two colonial constitutions, those of 1946 and 1951. They expand- 
ed the Legislative Council and introduced the federal principle, 
combining regional autonomy with federal union and stipulating 
that civil service personnel and personnel in other public spheres 
should reflect the various parts of the country. In 1952-53 a cen- 
sus indicated that 54 percent of the population resided in the north- 
ern part of the country. Because population was the basis for 
allocating revenues as well as political representation, census find- 
ings always aroused considerable controversy as to their accuracy. 
The 1962 census was voided, and the 1963 census has become the 
accepted basis for planning purposes. The 1973 census, which 
claimed that 64 percent of the population lived in the north, was 
subsequently disallowed. (The November 1991 census was conduct- 
ed by restricting movement of the population for two days in 
250,000 enumeration areas. In mid-March 1992 the government 
announced that the overall population was only 88.5 million, con- 
siderably less than anticipated.) 

Nigeria gained its independence on October 1, 1960, and the 
First Republic is generally held to have begun then, although the 
nation actually became a republic on October 1 , 1963. The politi- 
cal scene, unfortunately, was clouded by the trial of two leading 
politicians, who were charged with conspiracy; and widespread po- 
litical abuses and corruption caused the electorate to become dis- 
illusioned. The 1964-65 elections saw very low voter participation, 
followed by increasing violence that led to the death of as many 
as 2,000 persons. After an abortive coup attempt in January 1966, 
the army took over under Major General Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi, 
an Igbo, and a Federal Military Government was formed. Iron- 
si's tenure was short-lived because northern officers staged a coun- 
tercoup in July, in which Ironsi was killed and Lieutenant Colonel 
Yakubu Gowon, a Christian from the middle belt area, took con- 
trol. Tension increased between the infantry, who were mainly of 



xxiv 



northern origin, and the Igbo soldiers in the south. The conflict 
led to the bloody civil war of 1967-70 (also known as the Biafran 
War) that took the lives of about 2 million persons. 

Gowon, who intended that his be an interim rule preparing for 
return to civilian government, concentrated on economic develop- 
ment. In the late 1960s, the discovery of petroleum in commercial 
quantities caused oil to replace cocoa, peanuts, and palm products 
as Nigeria's major foreign exchange earner; and in 1971 Nigeria 
became a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Export- 
ing Countries (OPEC). The economy suffered, however, from the 
1972-74 drought and rising unemployment as farm workers flocked 
into the cities. 

Discontent increased, and in 1975 military forces deposed Go- 
won in a bloodless coup. They brought in Brigadier Murtala Mu- 
hammad, soon to became general, who began demobilizing the 
military, cutting the civil service, and creating new states (the num- 
ber of states eventually came to nineteen) in order to weaken region- 
al ethnic ties. Dissatisfaction within the military over these measures 
led to Murtala Muhammad's assassination in 1976. He was suc- 
ceeded by his next in command, Lieutenant General Olusegun 
Obasanjo, who concentrated on preparing the country for civilian 
rule in accordance with the draft of the constitution, which was 
promulgated in 1979, and the elections held under it. 

The resulting Second Republic lasted from 1979 to 1983 under 
civilian president Shehu Shagari. The weak political coalition 
government, the end of the oil boom, the strain of recession, and 
fraud in the 1983 elections caused the army to step in again at the 
end of December 1983 under Major General Muhammadu Bu- 
hari, who sought to end widespread corruption. The army removed 
Buhari in August 1985, substituting Major General Ibrahim Baban- 
gida and calling the new governing military body the Armed Forces 
Ruling Council. Babangida also attempted to prepare Nigeria for 
civilian government, initially through economic measures. He 
declared a National Economic Emergency in 1986 and undertook 
Nigeria's own version of a rigorous structural adjustment program 
(SAP), as a result of which it received aid from the World Bank 
(see Glossary). 

Economic measures designed to raise the overall standard of living 
of Nigerians had to take into account the pluralistic nature of the 
society. The country contained between 250 and 400 ethnic groups 
(depending on the way they were defined), speaking about 400 lan- 
guages. Of these, the Hausa were the dominant group in the north- 
ern area, followed by the Kanuri; the Nupe and Tiv predominated 
in the middle belt; and the southern area was fragmented: the major 



xxv 



groups being the Yoruba concentrated in the southwest and the 
Igbo in the southeast. Whereas 80 percent of Nigeria's population 
in 1990 lived in farming villages, the country experienced perhaps 
the fastest growing urbanization in the world in the 1970s and had 
the largest total urban population of any state in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The search for employment drew males to the cities, leaving most 
rural areas with a population composed largely of women, chil- 
dren, and the elderly. 

Religion also has been pluralist. The far northern areas of Nigeria 
have commonly been considered Muslim, but the middle belt has 
a mixture of Muslim and Christian adherents. In the south, tradi- 
tionally considered Christian and featuring Protestant and 
Africanized churches, such as the Aladura movement among the 
Yoruba and Roman Catholicism among the Igbo, there was also 
a sizeable Muslim population in 1992. In addition, traditional 
religion, characterized by worship of primordial spirits, dead an- 
cestors, and spirits of places, is practiced, especially in rural areas. 

Education, too, has followed a varied pattern. By 1992, Nigeria 
had a nationwide indigenous system in which English had come 
to be the language of instruction beyond primary school; traditional 
Quranic schools, both in the rural and urban areas of the north; 
and private and parochial schools in the cities, which provided a 
European-style education (such schools were taken over by the 
government in the mid-1970s but allowed to resume private oper- 
ation in 1990). 

Health facilities were uneven in quality as of 1992. Babangida 
launched a Primary Health Care plan in 1987 designed to expand 
immunization and improve inadequate rural health facilities and 
the geographic maldistribution of medical facilities. Significant 
health progress had been made nationally, however, since World 
War II. One of the most challenging health problems of the early 
1990s was the increasing prevalence of acquired immune deficien- 
cy syndrome (AIDS). In the spring of 1992, the minister of health 
announced that about 400,000 Nigerians (nearly 0.5 percent of the 
population) were carriers of the virus that caused AIDS. 

The relatively high percentage of secondary school and univer- 
sity graduates in Nigeria represented both an asset and a liability 
to the economy. Although an educated work force was useful in 
promoting technology and the professions, in the recession of the 
late 1980s, Nigeria had an unemployment rate for secondary school 
graduates of 35 to 40 percent, a potential source of unrest. Efforts 
to decrease unemployment were hampered by the dependence of 
the economy on petroleum. In 1988 oil produced 87 percent of the 
country's export income and 77 percent of total federal revenues. 



XXVI 



This situation made the economy very vulnerable to world oil price 
fluctuations. For example, the fall in oil prices and output in the 
latter 1980s caused a drastic decline in Nigeria's gross national 
product (GNP— see Glossary). GNP went from US$830 per capi- 
ta in 1983 to US$250 per capita in 1989. As a result, in 1989, for 
the first time, Nigeria was listed by the World Bank as a low-income 
country. The fall in the price of oil caused Nigeria not only to in- 
cur a trade deficit but also to begin foreign borrowing, resulting 
in 1989 in the largest public debt of any sub-Saharan state. 

In addition to petroleum, Nigeria's major exports in the early 
1990s continued to be primary products such as cocoa and, to a 
lesser degree, peanuts, cotton, and palm oil products. (In 1990 a 
law was passed banning the export of cocoa beans as of January 
1991 in order to promote domestic processing. This law caused 
concern because despite various projects for establishing process- 
ing plants, Nigeria was unable to process all the cocoa beans 
produced.) The United States replaced Britain in the late 1980s 
as Nigeria's best customer, but Britain remained Nigeria's largest 
single source of imports. 

Babangida's introduction of the SAP in 1986 represented an ef- 
fort to increase domestic production and to institute financial and 
import restrictions that would strengthen the economy. Measures 
taken under the SAP entailed control of the value of the naira (see 
Glossary) by creating the second-tier foreign exchange market, strict 
control of the money supply and credits, a budget deficit limited 
to 4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary), 
privatization of major state-owned companies together with a new 
industrial policy, easing of trade restrictions, and debt reschedul- 
ing. The SAP was still in place in early 1992; the floating of the 
naira against international currencies in March 1992 was a bold 
step but was expected to result in further inflation. 

Babangida's SAP was not Nigeria's first attempt at economic 
planning. Early government planning efforts, beginning in the late 
1940s, had limited results; therefore, in 1990 Nigeria adopted a 
three-year rolling plan system that could readily be modified when 
changed circumstances required. The major goals were to reduce 
inflation, which had averaged 20 percent or more annually between 
1973 and 1984; to maintain the infrastructure — Nigeria had one 
of the best-developed transportation systems in Africa but mainte- 
nance had been poor; to achieve agricultural self-sufficiency, and 
to reduce the SAP burden. As with most other developing coun- 
tries, the share that agriculture contributed to GDP declined. It 
went from 65.7 percent in fiscal year (see Glossary) 1959 to 39.2 



xxvii 



percent in 1988. Moreover, Nigeria's hope of achieving food self- 
sufficiency was at least temporarily dashed when in early 1991 
drought forced Nigeria to increase substantially its food imports. 
Manufacturing's share in GDP gradually rose from 4.4 percent 
in fiscal year 1959 to 10.0 percent in 1988. The growth in manufac- 
turing resulted in part from the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion 
decrees of 1972, 1977, and 1981 that facilitated indigenous majority 
ownership. These decrees were relaxed in 1985, however, to en- 
courage foreign investment and thus stimulate the economy. 

The major goals of economic development were integrating 
agriculture and industry more closely, including privatization or 
commercialization of a number of parastatals and government- 
owned enterprises; improving the infrastructure with particular 
reference to increasing electric power generation, enlarging and 
modernizing communications systems, and performing needed 
maintenance on existing transportation systems; reducing depen- 
dence on oil; and creating an effective national planning body. By 
the end of 1991, privatization measures had taken effect in such 
areas as agriculture, banking, railroads, and telecommunications. 
Nigeria, however, for the most part lacked the capital necessary 
for large-scale development and depended upon foreign loans to 
implement its programs. For example, it received a 1990 Europe- 
an Economic Community grant for rural development and telecom- 
munications of 3.54 billion naira (for value of the naira — see 
Glossary) under the Fourth Lome Convention (see Glossary) and 
a 1991 British loan of £223.3 million to expand the electric power 
system. As a result of such borrowing, at the end of 1991 Nigeria 
owed an estimated US$34 billion in external debt; 44 percent was 
owed to members of the Paris Club and 20 percent to foreign com- 
mercial banks. Throughout 1990 and 1991, Nigeria engaged in 
extensive debt rescheduling with Paris Club countries such as Brit- 
ain, Italy, Japan, and Sweden. 

Among other major development projects that Nigeria was pur- 
suing was the large Ajaokuta steelworks, begun with Soviet fund- 
ing and subsequently funded by the World Bank, due for completion 
at the end of 1992. On a smaller scale was a European currency 
unit (ECU) 48 million loan from the European Investment Bank 
under the Third Lome Convention for the development of palm 
oil refining facilities. In addition, despite its efforts to diversify its 
economy, Nigeria was expanding its oil production. The expan- 
sion came, most notably, through the discovery of an offshore field 
near Akwa Ibom, which was scheduled to increase oil production 
by one-third by 1994. Expansion also resulted from the renova- 
tion of oil refineries at Warri and Kaduna; the development of 



xxviii 



petrochemical plants; an oil condensate project at Oso on the Niger 
Delta coast; and the planned construction, beginning in 1992, of 
facilities to enable the export of liquefied natural gas from Bonny. 

Despite this economic progress, the implementation of the SAP 
led to decreased spending on social programs in the late 1980s. The 
decrease caused some domestic dissatisfaction, which was reflect- 
ed in strikes and student demonstrations. Since achieving indepen- 
dence in 1960, Nigeria has faced a number of incidents reflecting 
domestic discontent; in many instances the incidents were initiated 
by the army or its leaders. Such dissension, of which the most serious 
outbreak was the Biafran civil war, has led to twenty-two years 
of military rule; democratic government under the First Republic 
and the Second Republic was limited to ten years. Sources of mili- 
tary dissatisfaction have arisen not only from the personal ambi- 
tions of various military leaders but also from general dismay at 
the corruption, bribery, favoritism, and inefficiency prevalent in 
the government. Many Nigerians initially saw the army as the most 
effective body to control the country, but with the understanding 
that military rule was an interim measure and that plans must go 
forward for the transition to democratic government. In support 
of this view, a number of organized interest groups, such as profes- 
sional associations, trade unions, student associations, women's 
organizations, and the media have exerted pressures in favor of 
democratic processes. 

The 1989 constitution that Nigeria adopted as the basis for its 
transition to democratic government was modeled on the United 
States federal system. It provided for a president; two legislative 
houses, one based on population and the other on states; and an 
independent judiciary. A timetable was established for a series of 
elections at the local government area, state, and national levels. 
At first, officeholders in any previous government were barred from 
holding office in an attempt to eliminate corruption and undue po- 
litical influence; in mid-December 1991 the ban was lifted, mak- 
ing only Babangida ineligible. 

In 1989 Babangida also rejected the applications of all political 
entities to be recognized as political parties and instead in October 
1989 created two parties: the Republican National Convention, 
"a little to the right of center," and the Social Democratic Party, 
"a little to the left of center." This action, which generated con- 
siderable controversy, was designed to create parties that would 
cross ethnic, religious, regional, and socioeconomic lines. Results 
of the various elections held in 1991 appeared to indicate that previ- 
ously cohesive blocs were indeed being eroded. On August 27, 1991 , 
the number of states was increased from twenty-one to thirty (see 



xxix 



fig. 1). Irregularities in the gubernatorial primaries in October 1991 
in nine states caused the election results to be canceled in Novem- 
ber and new elections to be rescheduled for early December, with 
the final state gubernatorial and state assembly elections occurring 
in mid-December. Although by Nigerian standards the elections 
went relatively smoothly, there was some criticism of the system 
of open balloting by which voters stood behind a photograph of 
their chosen candidate and were counted. 

Among the difficulties involved in encouraging the democratic 
process have been ethnic and religious tensions arising among the 
multitudinous groups in the country. Outbreaks of violence caused 
by religious tensions resulting in losses of life have occurred in the 
past and recurred in the 1980s and 1990s. Most recently, in 1991 
and 1992 they took place in Bauchi, Benue, Kaduna, Kano, Tara- 
ba, and other states. Desire for ethnic self-assertion and for the 
power and financial wherewithal resulting from statehood have 
largely constituted the basis for the creation of new states. Nigeria 
has moved from three regions at independence to four regions in 
1963, twelve states in 1967, nineteen states in 1976, twenty-one 
states in 1987, and thirty states in August 1991 . Government leaders 
including Babangida have endeavored, however, to diversify eth- 
nic representation in a state so as to prevent the dominance of a 
single group. The move of the federal capital from Lagos to Abuja 
in December 1991 resulted not only from the tremendous over- 
crowding and pressure on transportation and other infrastructure 
facilities in Lagos but also from the desire to locate the capital in 
a central area that lacked association with a particular ethnic group. 
Some issues continued to be controversial, such as the impact the 
move to Abuja would have on Lagos. Moreover, the relationship 
of states to the federal government, with particular reference to 
the division of revenues among them, had as of early 1992 not been 
resolved to general satisfaction, nor had the highly controversial 
matter of the establishment of Muslim sharia courts of appeal in 
southern states. 

Despite these domestic difficulties, Nigeria has continued to play 
a prominent role not only in West Africa but also in the world com- 
munity. Nigeria was a prime organizer of the Economic Commu- 
nity of West African States (ECOWAS) and of the ECOWAS 
Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) that stemmed from it. 
ECOMOG provided a peacekeeping force for Liberia to which 
Nigeria contributed 900 personnel in August 1990 as well as leader- 
ship. To reduce the financial burden on Nigeria of participation 
in African peacekeeping forces, Babangida, at the 27th annual meet- 
ing of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), held in Abuja 



xxx 



in June 1 99 1 , again raised the matter of a volunteer pan- African 
defense force, suggesting that such a force be organized on a regional 
basis. 

In 1991-92 Babangida served as president of the OAU, thereby 
enhancing his mediator role. During this period, he met with the 
prime ministers of Chad and Niger and the president of Camer- 
oon concerning border problems between Nigeria and these coun- 
tries. A meeting of the four states in July 1990 had failed to resolve 
the Lake Chad boundary question, and in the summer of 1991 
Cameroon had occupied nine Nigerian border villages or islands. 
Because it had a higher standard of living than its neighbors, Nigeria 
was also facing an influx of workers from surrounding countries. 
In November 1991 , in an attempt to deal with the problem, Nigeria 
announced that it planned to create a frontier force to control ille- 
gal immigration. Nigeria's major role in the African continent was 
particularly highlighted by the visit of South African president 
Frederick W. de Klerk to Nigeria in early April 1992. The visit 
laid a foundation for possible future recognition of a transitional 
South African government by the OAU and other African states. 

Nigeria has sought to play a responsible role in OPEC as well 
as in various United Nations bodies. Nigeria's position toward the 
Arab-Israeli dispute has been influenced by its domestic religious 
divisions. Babangida reinstated Nigeria's diplomatic relations with 
Israel in August 1991, and shortly thereafter invited Palestine Liber- 
ation Organization head Yasir Arafat to visit, greeting him with 
a twenty-one-gun salute reserved for heads of state. The same month 
Babangida suspended Nigeria's membership in the Organization 
of the Islamic Conference. He had initiated membership in 1986 
without any prior consultation, a move that had created a furore 
among Nigerian Christians. Because of its position as a former Brit- 
ish colony, its membership in the British Commonwealth of Na- 
tions, and its position as a world oil producer, Nigeria's national 
interests have led it to align itself primarily with the West, includ- 
ing the European Economic Community. 

Nigeria's role as an African regional leader, peacekeeper, and 
mediator has emerged at the same time that the country's army 
was being drastically reduced from approximately 250,000 person- 
nel during the civil war to about 80,000 in 1991. Additional cuts 
were projected in order to bring the force to approximately 60,000. 
This process, together with a large-scale restructuring of the armed 
forces beginning in 1990 and still underway in early 1992, occurred 
in preparation for the transition to civilian government under the 
Third Republic. 



xxxi 



The size of the armed forces reflected not only Nigeria's expanse 
but also the domestic instability the country had experienced since 
achieving independence in 1960. In the period between 1966 and 
1985, Nigeria underwent no less than six coups d'etat, in addition 
to several attempted coups. (A serious recent failed coup was that 
led by Major Gideon Ockar, a middle belt Christian, in April 1991 . 
He advocated the "excising" from Nigeria of the five northern 
Muslim states — the coup attempt occurred prior to the creation 
of Nigeria's nine additional states — on the grounds that the true 
Nigeria was the Christian southern part of the country.) 

Economic and social conditions worsened in the 1980s, increas- 
ing the discontent resulting from ethnic, sectional, and religious 
cleavages. To these forces for instability were added such factors 
as the potential for foreign subversion, caused in part by the large 
number of illegal workers from other African states; the fluctua- 
tion of oil prices and particularly the impact of decreasing oil in- 
come on the economy; the pressures of the rising foreign debt; and 
the growing Islamism, or Islamic activism (sometimes seen as fun- 
damentalism), as well as increasing Christian fundamentalism. 

Public disenchantment with the military in the 1980s and 1990s 
caused increasing demands for democracy, the elimination of mili- 
tary tribunals, and an end to Decree Number 2, passed during the 
Buhari regime. In 1992 this decree still permitted the jailing of in- 
dividuals for up to six weeks without charge and set limits on free- 
dom of speech and the press. Pressure groups, such as labor unions, 
academic, and student groups, and especially the media, agitated 
for reforms and a greater role in government decision making, par- 
ticularly in the economic field. Such activity led the government 
to jail various individuals on a number of occasions. Another public 
concern was the rising crime rate, especially in urban areas, and 
the marked increase in drug-related crime and international nar- 
cotics trafficking. Numerous jail sentences resulted, leading to over- 
crowding and causing periodic amnesties to empty penal facilities. 

Despite Nigeria's recent history of military domination of polit- 
ics, in April 1992 Babangida appeared committed to turning over 
power to a new civilian government in January 1993. Part of Baban- 
gida' s transition process entailed the demilitarization of the govern- 
ment. Demilitarization was accomplished in part in September 1990 
by retiring from military service all cabinet ministers except for 
Babangida and the minister of defense. The officers continued to 
serve in a civilian capacity. The post of chief of the General Staff 
was likewise eliminated; the incumbent, Vice Admiral Augustus 
Aikhomu, who had also been retired from the military, was named 
vice president. In addition, numerous state military governors were 



xxxn 



retired and replaced by lower-ranking officers; in each state, a 
civilian deputy governor served under the military governor in order 
to become familiar with the duties entailed. In December 1991, 
the newly elected civilian governors took office. 

Serious questions remained, however, as to whether or not 
Babangida's goals for the professionalization of the armed forces 
and the reeducation of the military concerning their subordinate 
role in a forthcoming civilian government were attainable. Con- 
currently, Babangida stressed educating the citizenry about their 
responsibilities for active, knowledgeable participation in govern- 
ment. The question was also raised as to whether or not democra- 
cy could be achieved by a military government that established rules 
for the transition but that simultaneously imposed strict limits on 
the democratic process and sought to silence critics both of the 
domestic political scene and of the government's economic poli- 
cies, particularly the SAP. The House of Representatives elections 
and the Senate elections (which will return two senators from each 
state and one from Abuja to the newly structured sixty-one-member 
Senate) scheduled for November 1992 and the presidential elec- 
tions scheduled for December 1992 would be the final test in the 
transition to the Third Republic slated to occur in January 1993. 



April 15, 1992 Helen Ghapin Metz 



xxxm 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 




Nok terra-cotta head dating from the first millennium B. C. 



Like so many other modern African states, Nigeria 

is the creation of European imperialism. Its very name — after the 
great Niger River, the country's dominating physical feature — 
was suggested in the 1890s by British journalist Flora Shaw, who 
later became the wife of colonial governor Frederick Lugard. The 
modern history of Nigeria — as a political state encompassing 250 
to 400 ethnic groups of widely varied cultures and modes of politi- 
cal organization — dates from the completion of the British conquest 
in 1903 and the amalgamation of northern and southern Nigeria 
into the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria in 1914. The history 
of the Nigerian people extends backward in time for some three 
millennia. Archaeological evidence, oral traditions, and written 
documentation establish the existence of dynamic societies and well- 
developed political systems whose history had an important in- 
fluence on colonial rule and has continued to shape independent 
Nigeria. Nigerian history is fragmented in the sense that it evolved 
from a variety of traditions, but many of the most outstanding fea- 
tures of modern society reflect the strong influence of the three 
regionally dominant ethnic groups — the Hausa in the north, the 
Yoruba in the west, and the Igbo in the east. 

There are several dominant themes in Nigerian history that are 
essential in understanding contemporary Nigerian politics and so- 
ciety. First, the spread of Islam, predominantly in the north but 
later in southwestern Nigeria as well, began a millennium ago. The 
creation of the Sokoto Caliphate in the jihad (holy war) of 1804-8 
brought most of the northern region and adjacent parts of Niger 
and Cameroon under a single Islamic government. The great ex- 
tension of Islam within the area of present-day Nigeria dates from 
the nineteenth century and the consolidation of the caliphate. This 
history helps account for the dichotomy between north and south 
and for the divisions within the north that have been so strong dur- 
ing the colonial and postcolonial eras. 

Second, the slave trade, both across the Sahara Desert and the 
Atlantic Ocean, had a profound influence on virtually all parts of 
Nigeria. The transatlantic trade in particular accounted for the 
forced migration of perhaps 3.5 million people between the 1650s 
and the 1860s, while a steady stream of slaves flowed north across 
the Sahara for a millennium, ending at the beginning of the twen- 
tieth century. Within Nigeria, slavery was widespread, with social 
implications that are still evident today. The Sokoto Caliphate, for 



3 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

example, had more slaves than any other modern country, except 
the United States in 1860. Slaves were also numerous among the 
Igbo, the Yoruba, and many other ethnic groups. Indeed, many 
ethnic distinctions, especially in the middle belt — the area between 
the north and south — were reinforced because of slave raiding and 
defensive measures that were adopted for protection against enslave- 
ment. Conversion to Islam and the spread of Christianity were in- 
tricately associated with issues relating to slavery and with efforts 
to promote political and cultural autonomy. 

Third, the colonial era was relatively brief, lasting only six de- 
cades or so, depending upon the part of Nigeria, but it unleashed 
such rapid change that the full impact was still felt in the contem- 
porary period. On the one hand, the expansion of agricultural 
products as the principal export earner and the corresponding de- 
velopment of infrastructure resulted in severely distorted econom- 
ic growth that has subsequently collapsed. On the other hand, social 
dislocation associated with the decline of slavery and the internal 
movement of population between regions and to the cities necessi- 
tated the reassessment of ethnic loyalties, which in turn have been 
reflected in politics and religion. 

In the three decades since the independence of Nigeria in 1960, 
a period half as long as the colonial era, Nigeria has experienced 
a number of successful and attempted military coups d'etat and 
a brutal civil war, let corrupt civilian governments siphon off the 
profits from the oil boom of the 1970s, and faced economic col- 
lapse in the 1980s. As the most populous country in Africa, and 
one of the ten most populous countries in the world, Nigeria has 
a history that is important in its own right but that also bears scru- 
tiny if for no other reason than to understand how and why this 
nation became as it is today. 

Early History 

All evidence suggests the early settlement of Nigeria millennia 
before the spread of agriculture 3,000 years ago, and one day it 
probably will be possible to reconstruct the high points of this early 
history. Although archaeological research has made great strides 
in identifying some major developments, comparatively litde arch- 
aeological work has been undertaken. Consequently, it is possible 
only to outline some of the early history of Nigeria. 

The earliest known example of a fossil skeleton with negroid fea- 
tures, perhaps 10,000 years old, was found at I wo Elero in western 
Nigeria and attests to the antiquity of habitation in the region. Stone 
tools, indicating human settlement, date back another 2,000 years. 
Microlithic and ceramic industries were developed by pastoralists 



4 



Historical Setting 



in the savanna from at least the fourth millennium B.C. and were 
continued by grain farmers in the stable agricultural communities 
that subsequently evolved there. To the south, hunting and gather- 
ing gradually gave way to subsistence farming on the fringe of the 
forest in the first millennium B.C. The cultivation of staple foods, 
such as yams, later was introduced into forest clearings. The stone 
ax heads, imported in great quantities from the north and used 
in opening the forest for agricultural development, were venerat- 
ed by the Yoruba descendants of Neolithic pioneers as "thunder- 
bolts" hurled to earth by the gods. 

The primitive iron-smelting furnaces at Taruga dating from the 
fourth century B.C. provide the oldest evidence of metalworking 
in West Africa, while excavations for the Kainji Dam revealed the 
presence of iron working there by the second century B.C. The tran- 
sition from Neolithic times to the Iron Age apparendy was achieved 
without intermediate bronze production. Some scholars speculate 
that knowledge of the smelting process may have been transmit- 
ted from the Mediterranean by Berbers who ventured south. Others 
suggest that the technology moved westward across the Sudan (see 
Glossary) from the Nile Valley, although the arrival of the Iron 
Age in the Niger River valley and the forest region appears to have 
predated the introduction of metallurgy in the upper savanna by 
more than 800 years. The usefulness of iron tools was demonstrated 
in the south for bush cutting and in the north for well digging and 
the construction of irrigation works, contributing in both regions 
to the expansion of agriculture. 

The earliest culture in Nigeria to be identified by its distinctive 
artifacts is that of the Nok people. These skilled artisans and iron- 
workers were associated with Taruga and flourished between the 
fourth century B.C. and the second century A.D. in a large area 
above the confluence of the Niger and Benue rivers on the Jos 
Plateau. The Nok achieved a level of material development not 
repeated in the region for nearly 1,000 years. Their terra-cotta sculp- 
ture, abstractly stylized and geometric in conception, is admired 
both for its artistic expression and for the high technical standards 
of its production. 

Information is lacking from the "silent millennium" (first millen- 
nium A.D.) that followed the Nok ascendancy, apart from evidence 
of iron smelting on Dala Hill in Kano from about 600 to 700 A.D. 
It is assumed, however, that trade linking the Niger region with 
North Africa played a key role in the continuing development of 
the area. Certainly by the beginning of the second millennium A.D. , 
there was an active trade along a north- south axis from North Africa 
through the Sahara to the forest, with the savanna people acting 



5 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

as intermediaries in exchanges that involved slaves, ivory, salt, glass 
beads, coral, cloth, weapons, brass rods, and other goods. 

Early States Before 1500 

Long before 1500, much of present-day Nigeria was divided into 
states, which can be identified with the modern ethnic groups that 
trace their history to the origins of these states. These early states 
included the Yoruba kingdoms, the Edo kingdom of Benin, the 
Hausa cities, and Nupe. In addition, numerous small states to the 
west and south of Lake Chad were absorbed or displaced in the 
course of the expansion of Kanem, which was centered to the north- 
east of Lake Chad. Borno, initially the western province of Kanem, 
became independent in the late fourteenth century. Other states 
probably existed as well, but oral traditions and the absence of ar- 
chaeological data do not permit an accurate dating of their antiquity. 

Yoruba Kingdoms and Benin 

As far as historical memory extends, the Yoruba have been the 
dominant group on the west bank of the Niger. Of mixed origin, 
they were the product of the assimilation of periodic waves of 
migrants who evolved a common language and culture. The Yoruba 
were organized in patrilineal descent groups that occupied village 
communities and subsisted on agriculture, but from about the 
eleventh century A.D., adjacent village compounds, called He, be- 
gan to coalesce into a number of territorial city-states in which loyal- 
ties to the clan became subordinate to allegiance to a dynastic 
chieftain. This transition produced an urbanized political and social 
environment that was accompanied by a high level of artistic 
achievement, particularly in terra-cotta and ivory sculpture and 
in the sophisticated metal casting produced at Ife. The brass and 
bronze used by Yoruba artisans was a significant item of trade, 
made from copper, tin, and zinc imported either from North Africa 
or from mines in the Sahara and northern Nigeria. 

The Yoruba placated a pantheon headed by an impersonal deity, 
Olorun, and included lesser deities, some of them formerly mor- 
tal, who performed a variety of cosmic and practical tasks. One 
of them, Oduduwa, was regarded as the creator of the earth and 
the ancestor of the Yoruba kings. According to a creation myth, 
Oduduwa founded the city of Ife and dispatched his sons to estab- 
lish other cities, where they reigned as priest-kings and presided 
over cult rituals. Formal traditions of this sort have been interpreted 
as poetic illustrations of the historical process by which Ife's rul- 
ing dynasty extended its authority over Yorubaland. The stories 



6 



Historical Setting 



were attempts to legitimize the Yoruba monarchies — after they had 
supplanted clan loyalties — by claiming divine origin. 

Ife was the center of as many as 400 religious cults whose tradi- 
tions were manipulated to political advantage by the oni (king) in 
the days of the kingdom's greatness. Ife also lay at the center of 
a trading network with the north. The oni supported his court with 
tolls levied on trade, tribute exacted from dependencies, and tithes 
due him as a religious leader. One of Ife's greatest legacies to mod- 
ern Nigeria is its beautiful sculpture associated with this tradition. 

The oni was chosen on a rotating basis from one of several 
branches of the ruling dynasty, which was composed of a clan with 
several thousand members. Once elected, he went into seclusion 
in the palace compound and was not seen again by his people. Be- 
low the oni in the state hierarchy were palace officials, town chiefs, 
and the rulers of outlying dependencies. The palace officials were 
spokesmen for the oni and the rulers of dependencies who had their 
own subordinate officials. All offices, even that of the oni, were elec- 
tive and depended on broad support within the community. Each 
official was chosen from among the eligible clan members who had 
hereditary right to the office. Members of the royal dynasty often 
were assigned to govern dependencies, while the sons of palace offi- 
cials assumed lesser roles as functionaries, bodyguards to the oni, 
and judges. 

During the fifteenth century, Oyo and Benin surpassed Ife as 
political and economic powers, although Ife preserved its status 
as a religious center even after its decline. Respect for the priestly 
functions of the oni of Ife and recognition of the common tradition 
of origin were crucial factors in the evolution of Yoruba ethnicity. 
The oni of Ife was recognized as the senior political official not only 
among the Yoruba but also at Benin, and he invested Benin's rul- 
ers with the symbols of temporal power. 

The Ife model of government was adapted at Oyo, where a mem- 
ber of its ruling dynasty consolidated several smaller city-states un- 
der his control. A council of state, the Oyo Mesi, eventually 
assumed responsibility for naming the alafin (king) from candidates 
proposed from the ruling dynasty and acted as a check on his 
authority. Oyo developed as a constitutional monarchy; actual 
government was in the hands of the basorun (prime minister), who 
presided over the Oyo Mesi. The city was situated 170 kilometers 
north of Ife and about 100 kilometers north of present-day Oyo. 
Unlike the forest-bound Yoruba kingdoms, Oyo was in the savanna 
and drew its military strength from its cavalry forces, which estab- 
lished hegemony over the adjacent Nupe and the Borgu kingdoms 
and thereby developed trade routes farther to the north (see fig. 2). 



7 



Nigeria: A Country Study 




Figure 2. Yorubaland, Eleventh to Nineteenth Centuries 

Benin was already a well-established agricultural community in 
the Edo-speaking area, east of Ife, when it became a dependency 
of Ife at the beginning of the fourteenth century. By the fifteenth 
century, it took an independent course and became a major trad- 
ing power in its own right, blocking Ife's access to the coastal ports 
as Oyo had cut off the mother city from the savanna. Political power 
and religious authority resided in the oba (king), who according 
to tradition was descended from the Ife dynasty. The oba was ad- 
vised by a council of six hereditary chiefs, who also nominated his 
successor. Benin, which may have housed 100,000 inhabitants at 
its height, spread over twenty-five square kilometers that were en- 
closed by three concentric rings of earthworks. Responsibility for 



8 



Historical Setting 



administering the urban complex lay with sixty trade guilds, each 
with its own quarter, whose membership cut across clan affilia- 
tions and owed its loyalty directly to the oba. At his wooden, stee- 
pled palace, the oba presided over a large court richly adorned with 
brass, bronze, and ivory objects. Like Ife and the other Yoruba 
states, Benin, too, is famous for its sculpture. 

Unlike the Yoruba kingdoms, however, Benin developed a cen- 
tralized regime to oversee the administration of its expanding ter- 
ritories. By the late fifteenth century, Benin was in contact with 
Portugal (see European Slave Trade in West Africa, this ch.). At 
its apogee in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Benin even 
encompassed parts of southeastern Yorubaland and the small Igbo 
area on the western bank of the Niger. Dependencies were governed 
by members of the royal family, who were assigned several towns 
or villages scattered throughout the realm rather than a block of 
territory that could be used as a base for revolt against the oba. 

As is evident from this brief survey, Yoruba and Benin history 
were interconnected. In fact, areas to the west of Nigeria, in the 
modern Republic of Benin, were also closely associated with this 
history, both in the period before 1500 and afterward. 

The Igbo: A Stateless Society? 

Most scholars have argued that Igbo society was "stateless" and 
that the Igbo region did not evolve centralized political institutions 
before the colonial period. According to this theory, the relatively 
egalitarian Igbo lived in small, self-contained groups of villages or- 
ganized according to a lineage system that did not allow social 
stratification. An individual's fitness to govern was determined by 
his wisdom and his wisdom by his age and experience. Subsistence 
farming was the dominant economic activity, and yams were the 
staple crop. Land, obtained through inheritance, was the mea- 
sure of wealth. Handicrafts and commerce were well developed, 
and a relatively dense population characterized the region. 

Despite the absence of chiefs, some Igbo relied on an order of 
priests, chosen from outsiders on the northern fringe of Igboland, 
to ensure impartiality in settling disputes between communities. 
Igbo gods, like those of the Yoruba, were numerous, but their rela- 
tionship to one another and to human beings was essentially egalitar- 
ian, thereby reflecting Igbo society as a whole. A number of oracles 
and local cults attracted devotees, while the central deity, the earth 
mother and fertility figure, Ala, was venerated at shrines throughout 
Igboland. 



9 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



The weakness of this theory of statelessness rests on the paucity 
of historical evidence of precolonial Igbo society. There are huge 
lacunae between the archaeological finds of Igbo Ukwu, which re- 
veal a rich material culture in the heart of the Igbo region in the 
eighth century A.D., and the oral traditions of the twentieth cen- 
tury. In particular, the importance of the Nri Kingdom, which ap- 
pears to have flourished before the seventeenth century, often is 
overlooked. The Nri Kingdom was relatively small in geographi- 
cal extent, but it is remembered as the cradle of Igbo culture. Fi- 
nally, Benin exercised considerable influence on the western Igbo, 
who adopted many of the political structures familiar to the Yoruba- 
Benin region. 

The Northern Kingdoms of the Savanna 

Trade was the key to the emergence of organized communities 
in the savanna portions of Nigeria. Prehistoric inhabitants, adjusting 
to the encroaching desert, were widely scattered by the third millen- 
nium B.C., when the desiccation of the Sahara began. Trans- 
Saharan trade routes linked the western Sudan with the Mediter- 
ranean from the time of Carthage and with the upper Nile from 
a much earlier date, also establishing an avenue of communica- 
tion and cultural influence that remained open until the end of the 
nineteenth century. By these same routes, Islam made its way south 
into West Africa after the ninth century A.D. 

By then a string of dynastic states, including the earliest Hausa 
states, stretched across the western and central Sudan. The most 
powerful of these states were Ghana, Gao, and Kanem, which were 
not located within the boundaries of present-day Nigeria but which 
nonetheless had an indirect influence on the history of the Nigeri- 
an savanna. Ghana declined in the eleventh century but was suc- 
ceeded by Mali, which consolidated much of the western Sudan 
under its imperial rule in the thirteenth century. Songhai emerged 
as an empire out of the small state of Gao in the fifteenth century. 
For a century, Songhai paid homage to Mali, but by the last de- 
cade of the fifteenth century it attained its independence and brought 
much of the Malian domains under its imperial sway. Although 
these western empires had little political influence on the savanna 
states of Nigeria before 1500, they had a strong cultural and eco- 
nomic impact that became more pronounced in the sixteenth cen- 
tury, especially because these states became associated with the 
spread of Islam and trade. In the sixteenth century, moreover, much 
of northern Nigeria paid homage to Songhai in the west or to Bor- 
no, a rival empire in the east (see fig. 3). 



10 



Historical Setting 



Borno's history is closely associated with Kanem, which had 
achieved imperial status in the Lake Chad basin by the thirteenth 
century. Kanem expanded westward to include the area that be- 
came Borno. Its dynasty, the Sayfawa, was descended from 
pastoralists who had settled in the Lake Chad region in the seventh 
century. The mai (king) of Kanem ruled in conjunction with a coun- 
cil of peers as a constitutional monarch. In the eleventh century, 
the mai and his court accepted Islam, as the western empires also 
had done. Islam was used to reinforce the political and social struc- 
tures of the state, although many established customs were main- 
tained. Women, for example, continued to exercise considerable 
political influence. 

The mai employed his mounted bodyguard, composed of abid 
(slave-soldiers), and an inchoate army of nobles to extend Kanem' s 
authority into Borno, on the western shore of Lake Chad. By tra- 
dition the territory was conferred on the heir to the throne to govern 
during his apprenticeship. In the fourteenth century, however, 
dynastic conflict forced the then-ruling group and its followers to 
relocate in Borno, where as a result the Kanuri emerged as an ethnic 
group in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The civil war 
that disrupted Kanem in the second half of the fourteenth century 
resulted in the independence of Borno. 

Borno's prosperity depended on its stake in the trans- Sudanic 
slave trade and the desert trade in salt and livestock. The need to 
protect its commercial interests compelled Borno to intervene in 
Kanem, which continued to be a theater of war throughout the 
fifteenth and into the sixteenth centuries. Despite its relative po- 
litical weakness in this period, Borno's court and mosques under 
the patronage of a line of scholarly kings earned fame as centers 
of Islamic culture and learning. 

By the eleventh century, some of the Hausa states — such as those 
at Kano, Katsina, and Gobir — had developed into walled towns 
that engaged in trade and serviced caravans as well as manufac- 
tured cloth and leather goods. Millet, sorghum, sugarcane, and 
cotton were produced in the surrounding countryside, which also 
provided grazing land for cattie. Until the fifteenth century, the 
small Hausa states were on the periphery of the major empires of 
the era. 

According to tradition, the Hausa rulers descended from a 
"founding hero" named Bayinjida, supposedly of Middle Eastern 
origin, who became sarki (king) of Daura after subduing a snake 
and marrying the queen of Daura. Their children founded the other 
Hausa towns, which traditionally are referred to as the Hausa bakwai 
(Hausa seven). Wedged in among the stronger Sudanic kingdoms, 



11 



Nigeria: A Country Study 




Figure 3. Principal Trans-Saharan Trade Routes, Ninth to Seventeenth 
Centuries 



each of the Hausa states acquired special military, economic, or 
religious functions. No one state dominated the others, but at var- 
ious times different states assumed a leading role. They were un- 
der constant pressure from Songhai to the west and Kanem-Borno 
to the east, to which they paid tribute. Armed conflict usually was 
motivated by economic concerns, as coalitions of Hausa states 
mounted wars against the Jukun and Nupe in the middle belt to 
collect slaves, or against one another for control of important trade 
routes. 

Commerce was in the hands of commoners. Within the cities, 
trades were organized through guilds, each of which was self- 
regulating and collected taxes from its members to be transmitted 
to the sarki as a pledge of loyalty. In return, the king guaranteed the 
security of the guild's trade. The surrounding countryside produced 
grain for local consumption and cotton and hides for processing. 

Islam was introduced to Hausaland along the caravan routes. 
The famous Kano Chronicle records the conversion of Kano's rul- 
ing dynasty by clerics from Mali, demonstrating that the imperial 
influence of Mali extended far to the east. Acceptance of Islam was 
gradual and was often nominal in the countryside, where folk 



12 



Historical Setting 



religion continued to exert a strong influence. Non-Islamic prac- 
tices also were retained in the court ceremonies of the Hausa kings. 
Nonetheless, Kano and Katsina, with their famous mosques and 
schools, came to participate fully in the cultural and intellectual 
life of the Islamic world. 

Fulbe pastoralists, known in Nigeria as Fulani, began to enter 
the Hausa country in the thirteenth century, and by the fifteenth 
century they were tending cattie, sheep, and goats in Borno as well. 
The Fulani came from the Senegal River valley, where their an- 
cestors had developed a method of livestock management and 
specialization based on transhumance. The movement of cattle 
along north- south corridors in pursuit of grazing and water fol- 
lowed the climatic pattern of the rainy and dry seasons. Gradually, 
the pastoralists moved eastward, first into the centers of the Mali 
and Songhai empires and eventually into Hausaland and Borno. 
Some Fulbe converted to Islam in the Senegal region as early as 
the eleventh century, and one group of Muslim Fulani settled in 
the cities and mingled freely with the Hausa, from whom they be- 
came racially indistinguishable. There, they constituted a devoutly 
religious, educated elite who made themselves indispensable to the 
Hausa kings as government advisers, Islamic judges, and teachers. 
Other Fulani, the lighter- skinned pastoral nomads, remained aloof 
from the Hausa and in some measure from Islam as well, herding 
cattle outside the cities and seeking pastures for their herds. 

The Savanna States, 1500-1800 

The sixteenth century marked a high point in the political his- 
tory of northern Nigeria. During this period, the Songhai Empire 
reached its greatest limits, stretching from the Senegal and Gam- 
bia rivers in the far west and incorporating part of Hausaland in 
the east. At the same time, the Sayfawa Dynasty of Borno assert- 
ed itself, conquering Kanem and extending its control westward 
to Hausa cities that were not under Songhai imperial rule. For 
almost a century, much of northern Nigeria was part of one or the 
other of these empires, and after the 1590s Borno dominated the 
region for 200 years. 

Songhai' s sway over western Hausaland included the subordi- 
nation of Kebbi, whose kanta (king) controlled the territory along 
the Sokoto River. Katsina and Gobir also paid tribute to Songhai, 
while Songhai merchants dominated the trade of the Hausa towns. 
It was at this time that the overland trade in kola nuts from the 
Akan forests of modern Ghana was initiated. Largely because of 
Songhai's influence, there was a remarkable blossoming of Islam- 
ic learning and culture. 



13 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

The influence of Songhai collapsed abruptly in 1591, when an 
army from Morocco crossed the Sahara and conquered the capital 
city of Gao and the commercial center of Timbuktu. Morocco was 
not able to control the whole empire, and the various provinces, 
including the Hausa states, became independent. The collapse un- 
dermined Songhai' s commercial and religious hegemony over the 
Hausa states and abruptly altered the course of history in the region. 

Borno reached its apogee under mai Idris Aloma (ca. 1569-1600), 
during whose reign Kanem was reconquered. As a result of his 
campaigns, several Hausa cities, including Kano and Katsina, be- 
came tributaries. The destruction of Songhai left Borno uncontested 
as an imperial force, and during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries Borno continued to dominate the political history of north- 
ern Nigeria. Now Borno became the center of Islamic learning and 
trade. Its capital at Birni Gazargamu, on the Komadugu Yobe 
River that flows eastward into Lake Chad, was well situated in the 
midst of a prosperous agricultural district. Textile production was 
a mainstay of its economy. Borno also controlled extensive salt 
deposits, which supplied its most important export to the west and 
south. These reserves were located at Bilma and Fachi in the Sa- 
hara, in the districts of Mangari and Muniyo adjacent to Birni 
Gazargamu, and on the northeastern shores of Lake Chad. 

Despite Borno 's hegemony, the Hausa states wrestled for ascen- 
dancy among themselves for much of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. Gobir, Katsina, Zamfara, Kano, Kebbi, and Zaria 
formed various alliances, but only Zamfara ceased to exist as an 
autonomous state, falling to Gobir in the eighteenth century. Borno 
collected tribute from Kano and Katsina, and its merchants domi- 
nated the trade routes that passed through Hausaland. Gradually, 
however, Borno' s position began to weaken. Its inability to check 
the political rivalries of the competing Hausa cities was one exam- 
ple of this decline. Another factor was the military threat of the 
Tuareg, whose warriors, centered at Agades in the center of present- 
day Nigeria, penetrated the northern districts of Borno. They even 
diverted the salt trade of Bilma and Fachi from Birni Gazargamu. 
Tuareg military superiority depended upon camels, which also were 
used to transport salt and dates to the savanna. 

The major cause of Borno 's decline was a severe drought and 
famine that struck the whole Sahel (see Glossary) and savanna from 
Senegal to Ethiopia in the middle of the eighteenth century. There 
had been periodic droughts before; two serious droughts, one of 
seven years' duration, hit Borno in the seventeenth century. But 
the great drought of the 1740s and 1750s probably caused the most 
severe famine that the Sahel has known over the past several 



14 



Historical Setting 



hundred years, including that of the 1970s. As a consequence of 
the mid-eighteenth century drought, Borno lost control of much 
of its northern territories to the Tuareg, whose mobility allowed 
them the flexibility to deal with famine conditions through war and 
plunder. Borno regained some of its former might in the succeed- 
ing decades, but another drought occurred in the 1790s, again 
weakening the state. 

The ecological and political instability of the eighteenth century 
provided the background for the momentous events of the first de- 
cade of the nineteenth century, when the jihad of Usman dan Fo- 
dio revolutionized the whole of northern Nigeria. The military 
rivalries of the Hausa states and the political weakness of Borno 
put a severe strain on the economic resources of the region, just 
at a time when drought and famine undermined the prosperity of 
farmers and herders. Many Fulani moved into Hausaland and Bor- 
no at this time to escape areas where drought conditions were even 
worse, and their arrival increased tensions because they had no 
loyalty to the political authorities, who saw them as a source of 
increased taxation. By the end of the eighteenth century, some Mus- 
lim clerics began to articulate the grievances of the common people. 
Political efforts to eliminate or control these clerics only height- 
ened the tensions. The stage was set for jihad (see Usman dan Fo- 
dio and the Sokoto Caliphate, this ch.). 

European Slave Trade in West Africa 

A desire for glory and profit from trade, missionary zeal, and 
considerations of global strategy brought Portuguese navigators to 
the West African coast in the late fifteenth century. Locked in a 
seemingly interminable crusading war with Muslim Morocco, the 
Portuguese conceived of a plan whereby maritime expansion might 
bypass the Islamic world and open new markets that would result 
in commercial gain. They hoped to tap the fabled Saharan gold 
trade, establish a sea route around Africa to India, and link up 
with the mysterious Christian kingdom of Prester John. The Por- 
tuguese achieved all these goals. They obtained access to the gold 
trade by trading along the Gulf of Guinea, establishing a base at 
Elmina ("the mine") on the Gold Coast (Ghana), and they made 
their way into the Indian Ocean, militarily securing a monopoly 
of the spice trade. Even the Christian kingdom turned out to be 
real — it was Ethiopia; Portuguese adventures there, however, 
turned sour very quickly. Portugal's lasting legacy for Nigeria, in 
the end, was its initiation of the transatlantic slave trade. 

By 1471 Portuguese ships had reconnoitered the West African 
coast south as far as the Niger Delta, although they did not know 



15 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

that it was the delta, and in 1481 emissaries from the king of Por- 
tugal visited the court of the oba of Benin. For a time, Portugal 
and Benin maintained close relations. Portuguese soldiers aided 
Benin in its wars; Portuguese even came to be spoken at the oba's 
court. Gwatto, the port of Benin, became the depot to handle the 
peppers, ivory, and increasing numbers of slaves offered by the 
oba in exchange for coral beads; textile imports from India; 
European-manufactured articles, including tools and weapons; and 
manillas (brass and bronze bracelets that were used as currency and 
also were melted down for objets d'art). Portugal also may have 
been the first European power to import cowrie shells, which were 
the currency of the far interior. 

Benin profited from its close ties with the Portuguese and ex- 
ploited the firearms bought from them to tighten its hold on the 
lower Niger area. Two factors checked the spread of Portuguese 
influence and the continued expansion of Benin, however. First, 
Portugal stopped buying pepper because of the availability of other 
spices in the Indian Ocean region. Second, Benin placed an em- 
bargo on the export of slaves, thereby isolating itself from the growth 
of what was to become the major export from the Nigerian coast 
for 300 years. Benin continued to capture slaves and to employ 
them in its domestic economy, but the Edo state remained unique 
among Nigerian polities in refusing to participate in the trans- 
atlantic trade. In the long run, Benin remained relatively isolated 
from the major changes along the Nigerian coast. 

The Portuguese initially bought slaves for resale on the Gold 
Coast, where slaves were traded for gold. For this reason, the south- 
western coast of Nigeria and neighboring parts of the present-day 
Republic of Benin (not to be confused with the kingdom of Benin) 
became known as the ''slave coast." When the African coast be- 
gan to supply slaves to the Americas in the last third of the six- 
teenth century, the Portuguese continued to look to the Bight of 
Benin as one of its sources of supply. By then they were concen- 
trating activities on the Angolan coast, which supplied roughly 40 
percent of all slaves shipped to the Americas throughout the dura- 
tion of the transadantic trade, but they always maintained a presence 
on the Nigerian coast. 

The Portuguese monopoly on West African trade was broken 
at the end of the sixteenth century, when Portugal's influence was 
challenged by the rising naval power of the Netherlands. The Dutch 
took over Portuguese trading stations on the coast that were the 
source of slaves for the Americas. French and English competition 
later undermined the Dutch position. Although slave ports from 
Lagos to Calabar would see the flags of many other European 



16 



Historical Setting 



maritime countries (including Denmark, Sweden, and Branden- 
burg) and the North American colonies, Britain became the 
dominant slaving power in the eighteenth century. Its ships han- 
dled two-fifths of the transatlantic traffic during the century. The 
Portuguese and French were responsible for another two-fifths. 

Nigeria kept its important position in the slave trade through- 
out the great expansion of the transatlantic trade after the middle 
of the seventeenth century. Slightly more slaves came from the 
Nigerian coast than from Angola in the eighteenth century, whereas 
in the nineteenth century perhaps 30 percent of all slaves sent across 
the Adantic came from Nigeria. Over the period of the whole trade, 
more than 3.5 million slaves were shipped from Nigeria to the 
Americas. Most of these slaves were Igbo and Yoruba, with signifi- 
cant concentrations of Hausa, Ibibio, and other ethnic groups. In 
the eighteenth century, two polities — Oyo and the Aro confederacy — 
were responsible for most of the slaves exported from Nigeria. The 
Aro confederacy continued to export slaves through the 1830s, but 
most slaves in the nineteenth century were a product of the Yoruba 
civil wars that followed the collapse of Oyo in the 1820s. 

The expansion of Oyo after the middle of the sixteenth century 
was closely associated with the growth of slave exports across the 
Atlantic. Oyo's cavalry pushed southward along a natural break 
in the forests (known as the Benin Gap, that is, the opening in the 
forest where the savanna stretched to the Bight of Benin), and there- 
by gained access to the coastal ports. 

Oyo experienced a series of power struggles and constitutional 
crises in the eighteenth century that directly related to its success 
as a major slave exporter. The powerful Oyo Mesi, the council 
of warlords that checked the king, forced a number of kings to com- 
mit suicide. In 1754 the head of the Oyo Mesi, basorun Gaha, seized 
power, retaining a series of kings as puppets. The rule of this mili- 
tary oligarchy was overcome in 1789, when King Abiodun suc- 
cessfully staged a countercoup and forced the suicide of Gaha. 
Abiodun and his successors maintained the supremacy of the 
monarchy until the second decade of the nineteenth century, 
primarily because of the reliance of the king on a cavalry force that 
was independent of the Oyo Mesi. This force was recruited large- 
ly from Muslim slaves, especially Hausa, from farther north. 

The other major slave-exporting state was a loose confederation 
under the leadership of the Aro, an Igbo clan of mixed Igbo and 
Ibibio origins, whose home was on the escarpment between the 
central Igbo districts and the Cross River. Beginning in the late 
seventeenth century, the Aro built a complex network of alliances 
and treaties with many of the Igbo clans. They served as arbiters 



17 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

in villages throughout Igboland, and their famous oracle at 
Arochukwu, located in a thickly wooded gorge, was widely regarded 
as a court of appeal for many kinds of disputes. By custom the Aro 
were sacrosanct and were allowed to travel anywhere with their 
goods without fear of attack. Alliances with certain Igbo clans who 
acted as mercenaries for the Aro guaranteed their safety. As ora- 
cle priests, they also received slaves in payment of fines or dedi- 
cated to the gods by their masters as scapegoats for their own 
transgressions. These slaves thereby became the property of the 
Aro priests, who were at liberty to sell them. 

Besides their religious influence, the Aro established their ascen- 
dancy through a combination of commercial acumen and diplo- 
matic skill. Their commercial empire was based on a set of 
twenty-four-day fairs and periodic markets that dotted the interior. 
Resident Aro dominated these markets and collected slaves for ex- 
port. They had a virtual monopoly of the slave trade after the col- 
lapse of Oyo in the 1820s. Villages suspected of violating treaties 
with the Aro were subject to devastating raids that not only 
produced slaves for export but also maintained Aro influence. The 
Aro had treaties with the coastal ports — especially Calabar, Bon- 
ny, and Elem Kalabari — from which slaves were exported. The 
people of Calabar were Efik, a subsection of Ibibio, whereas Bon- 
ny and Elem Kalabari were Ijaw towns. 

The Ijaw, who occupied the tidal area in proximity to the Igbo, 
had wrested a frugal living from the sale of dried fish and sea salt 
to the inland communities for centuries before the rise of the slave 
trade. Traditionally, they had lived in federated groups of villages 
with the head of the ranking village presiding over general assem- 
blies attended by all the males. During the heyday of the slave trade 
in the eighteenth century, the major Ijaw villages grew into cities 
of 5,000 to 10,000 inhabitants ruled by local strongmen allied with 
the Aro. Their economies were based on the facilities they offered 
to slave traders. They were entrepreneurial communities, receiv- 
ing slaves from the Aro for resale to European agents. Personal 
wealth rather than status within a lineage group was the basis for 
political power and social status. Government typically was con- 
ducted by councils composed of leading merchants and headed by 
an amanyanabo (chief executive), an office that in time became 
hereditary. 

By the end of the eighteenth century, the area that was to be- 
come Nigeria was far from a unified country. Furthermore, the 
orientation of the north and the south was entirely different. The 
savanna states of Hausaland and Borno had experienced a difficult 
century of political insecurity and ecological disaster but otherwise 



18 



Historical Setting 



continued in a centuries-long tradition of slow political and eco- 
nomic change that was similar to other parts of the savanna. The 
southern areas near the coast, by contrast, had been swept up in 
the transatlantic slave trade. Political and economic change had 
been rapid and dramatic. By 1800 Oyo governed much of south- 
western Nigeria and neighboring parts of the modern Republic of 
Benin, whereas the Aro had consolidated southeastern Nigeria into 
a confederation that dominated that region. The Oyo and the Aro 
confederations were major trading partners of the slave traders from 
Europe and North America. 

The Nineteenth Century: Revolution and Radical 
Adjustment 

In the first decade of the nineteenth century, two unrelated de- 
velopments that were to have a major influence on virtually all of 
the area that is now Nigeria ushered in a period of radical change. 
First, between 1804 and 1808, the Islamic holy war of Usman dan 
Fodio established the Sokoto Caliphate, which not only expanded 
to become the largest empire in Africa since the fall of Songhai 
but also had a profound influence on much of Muslim Africa to 
the west and to the east (see fig. 4). Second, in 1807 Britain declared 
the transatlantic slave trade to be illegal, an action that occurred 
at a time when Britain was responsible for shipping more slaves 
to the Americas than any other country. Although the transatian- 
tic slave trade did not end until the 1860s, it was gradually replaced 
by other commodities, especially palm oil; the shift in trade had 
serious economic and political consequences in the interior, which 
led to increasing British intervention in the affairs of Yorubaland 
and the Niger Delta. The rise of the Sokoto Caliphate and the eco- 
nomic and political adjustment in the south strongly shaped the 
course of the colonial conquest at the end of the nineteenth century. 

Usman dan Fodio and the Sokoto Caliphate 

By the late eighteenth century, many Muslim scholars and 
teachers had become disenchanted with the insecurity that charac- 
terized the Hausa states and Borno. Some clerics {mallams) con- 
tinued to reside at the courts of the Hausa states and Borno, but 
others, who joined the Qadiriyah brotherhood, began to think about 
a revolution that would overthrow existing authorities. Prominent 
among these radical mallams was Usman dan Fodio, who, with his 
brother and son, attracted a following among the clerical class. 
Many of his supporters were Fulani, and because of his ethnicity 
he was able to appeal to all Fulani, particularly the clan leaders 
and wealthy cattle owners whose clients and dependents provided 



19 



Nigeria: A Country Study 




Figure 4. The Sokoto Caliphate, Mid- Nineteenth Century 

most of the troops in the jihad that began in Gobir in 1804. Not 
all mallams were Fulani, however. The cleric whose actions actual- 
ly started the jihad, Abd as Salam, was Hausa; Jibril, one of Us- 
man dan Fodio's teachers and the first cleric to issue a call for jihad 
two decades earlier, was Tuareg. Nonetheless, by the time the Hau- 
sa states were overthrown in 1808, the prominent leaders were all 
Fulani. 

Simultaneous uprisings confirmed the existence of a vast under- 
ground of Muslim revolutionaries throughout the Hausa states and 
Borno. By 1808 the Hausa states had been conquered, although 
the ruling dynasties retreated to the frontiers and built walled ci- 
ties that remained independent. The more important of these in- 
dependent cities included Abuja, where the ousted Zaria Dynasty 
fled; Argungu in the north, the new home of the Kebbi rulers; and 
Maradi in present-day Niger, the retreat of the Katsina Dynasty. 
Although the Borno mai was overthrown and Birni Gazargamu de- 
stroyed, Borno did not succumb. The reason, primarily, was that 



20 



Historical Setting 



another cleric, Al Kanemi, fashioned a strong resistance that even- 
tually forced those Fulani in Borno to retreat west and south. In 
the end, Al Kanemi overthrew the centuries-old Sayfawa Dynasty 
of Borno and established his own lineage as the new ruling house. 

The new state that arose during Usman dan Fodio's jihad came 
to be known as the Sokoto Caliphate, named after his capital at 
Sokoto, founded in 1809. The caliphate was a loose confederation 
of emirates that recognized the suzerainty of the commander of 
the faithful, the sultan. When Usman dan Fodio died in 1817, he 
was succeeded by his son, Muhammad Bello. A dispute between 
Bello and his uncle, Abdullahi, resulted in a nominal division of 
the caliphate into eastern and western divisions, although the 
supreme authority of Bello as caliph was upheld. The division was 
institutionalized through the creation of a twin capital at Gwandu, 
which was responsible for the western emirates as far as modern 
Burkina Faso — formerly Upper Volta — and initially as far west as 
Massina in modern Mali. As events turned out, the eastern emirates 
were more numerous and larger than the western ones, which re- 
inforced the primacy of the caliph at Sokoto. 

By the middle of the nineteenth century, there were thirty 
emirates and the capital district of Sokoto, which itself was a large 
and populous territory although not technically an emirate. All the 
important Hausa emirates, including Kano, the wealthiest and most 
populous, were directly under Sokoto. Adamawa, which was es- 
tablished by Fulani forced to evacuate Borno, was geographically 
the biggest, stretching far to the south and east of its capital at Yola 
into modern Cameroon. Ilorin, which became part of the caliphate 
in the 1830s, was initially the headquarters of the Oyo cavalry that 
had provided the backbone of the king's power. An attempted coup 
d'etat by the general of the cavalry in 1817 backfired when the caval- 
ry itself revolted and pledged its allegiance to the Sokoto Caliphate. 
The cavalry was largely composed of Muslim slaves from farther 
north, and they saw in the jihad a justification for rebellion. In 
the 1820s, Oyo had been torn asunder, and the defeated king and 
the warlords of the Oyo Mesi retreated south to form new cities, 
including Ibadan, where they carried on their resistance to the 
caliphate and fought among themselves as well. 

Usman dan Fodio's jihad created the largest empire in Africa 
since the fall of Songhai in 1591. By the middle of the nineteenth 
century, when the Sokoto Caliphate was at its greatest extent, it 
stretched 1,500 kilometers from Dori in modern Burkina Faso to 
southern Adamawa in Cameroon and included Nupe lands, Ilo- 
rin in northern Yorubaland, and much of the Benue River valley. 
In addition, Usman dan Fodio's jihad provided the inspiration for 



21 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

a series of related holy wars in other parts of the savanna and Sa- 
hel far beyond Nigeria's borders that led to the foundation of Is- 
lamic states in Senegal, Mali, Ivory Coast, Chad, Central African 
Republic, and Sudan. An analogy has been drawn between Us- 
man dan Fodio's jihad and the French Revolution in terms of its 
widespread impact. Just as the French Revolution affected the 
course of European history in the nineteenth century, the Sokoto 
jihad affected the course of history throughout the savanna from 
Senegal to the Red Sea. 

The Yoruba Wars 

Oyo, the great exporter of slaves in the eighteenth century, col- 
lapsed in a civil war after 1817, and by the middle of the 1830s 
the whole of Yorubaland was swept up in these civil wars. New 
centers of power — Ibadan, Abeokuta, Owo, and Warri — contested 
control of the trade routes and sought access to fresh supplies of 
slaves, which were important to repopulate the turbulent country- 
side. At this time, the British withdrew from the slave trade and 
began to blockade the coast (see Abolition of the Slave Trade, this 
ch.). The blockade required some adjustments in the slave trade 
along the lagoons that stretched outward from Lagos, whereas the 
domestic market for slaves to be used as farm laborers and as porters 
to carry commodities to market easily absorbed the many captives 
that were a product of these wars. 

War and slave raiding were complementary exercises among the 
Yoruba, who needed capital to buy the firearms with which they 
fought in a vicious cycle of war and enslavement. Military leaders 
were well aware of the connection between guns and enslavement. 

Some of the emerging Yoruba states started as war camps dur- 
ing the period of chaos in which Oyo broke up and the Muslim 
revolutionaries who were allied to the caliphate conquered north- 
ern Yorubaland. Ibadan, which became the largest city in black 
Africa during the nineteenth century, owed its growth to the role 
it played in the Oyo civil wars. Ibadan 's omuogun (war boys) raided 
far afield for slaves and held off the advance of the Fulani. They 
also took advantage of Benin's isolation to seize the roads leading 
to the flourishing slave port at Lagos. The threat that Ibadan would 
dominate Yorubaland alarmed its rivals and inspired a military 
alliance led by the Egba city of Abeokuta. Dahomey, to the west, 
further contributed to the insecurity by raiding deep into Yoruba- 
land, the direction of raids depending upon its current alliances. 

Abolition of the Slave Trade 

In 1807 the Houses of Parliament in London enacted legislation 



22 



Historical Setting 



prohibiting British subjects from participating in the slave trade. 
Indirectly, this legislation was one of the reasons for the collapse 
of Oyo. Britain withdrew from the slave trade while it was the major 
transporter of slaves to the Americas. Furthermore, the French had 
been knocked out of the trade during the French Revolution be- 
ginning in 1 789 and by the Napoleonic wars of the first fifteen years 
of the nineteenth century. Between them, the French and the British 
had purchased a majority of the slaves sold from the ports of Oyo. 
The commercial uncertainty that followed the disappearance of the 
major purchasers of slaves unsettled the economy of Oyo. Ironi- 
cally, the political troubles in Oyo came to a head after 1817, when 
the transatlantic market for slaves once again boomed. Rather than 
supplying slaves from other areas, however, Oyo itself became the 
source of slaves. 

British legislation forbade ships under British registry to engage 
in the slave trade, but the restriction was applied generally to all 
flags and was intended to shut down all traffic in slaves coming 
out of West African ports. Other countries more or less hesitantly 
followed the British lead. The United States, for example, also pro- 
hibited the slave trade in 1807 (Denmark actually was the first coun- 
try to declare the trade illegal in 1792). Attitudes changed slowly, 
however, and not all countries cooperated in controlling the ac- 
tivity of their merchant ships. American ships, for instance, were 
notorious for evading the prohibition and going unpunished under 
United States law. It should be noted, moreover, that the aboli- 
tion movement concentrated on the transadantic trade for more 
than five decades before eventually turning to a full-fledged attack 
on slave trading within Africa itself. 

The Royal Navy maintained a prevention squadron to block- 
ade the coast, and a permanent station was established at the Span- 
ish colony of Fernando Po, off the Nigerian coast, and given 
responsibility for patrolling the West African coast. For several de- 
cades, as many as one-sixth of all British warships were assigned 
to this mission, and a squadron was maintained at Fernando Po 
from 1827 until 1844. Slaves rescued at sea were usually taken to 
Sierra Leone, where they were released. British naval crews were 
permitted to divide prize money from the sale of captured slave 
ships. Apprehended slave runners were tried by naval courts and 
were liable to capital punishment if found guilty. 

Still, a lively slave trade to the Americas continued into the 1860s. 
The demands of Cuba and Brazil were met by a flood of captives 
taken in wars among the Yoruba and shipped from Lagos, and 
the Aro continued to supply the delta ports with slave exports 
through the 1830s. Despite the British blockade, almost 1 million 



23 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

slaves were exported from Nigeria in the nineteenth century. The 
risk involved in running the British blockade obviously made profits 
all the greater on delivery. 

The campaign to eradicate the slave trade and substitute for it 
trade in other commodities increasingly resulted in British inter- 
vention in the internal affairs of the Nigerian region during the 
nineteenth century and ultimately led to the decision to assume 
jurisdiction over the coastal area. Suppression of the slave trade 
and issues related to slavery remained at the forefront of British 
dealings with local states and societies for the rest of the nineteenth 
century and even into the twentieth century. 

Lagos, where the British concentrated activities after 1851, had 
been founded as a colony of Benin in about 1700. A long dynastic 
struggle, which became entwined with the struggle against the slave 
trade, resulted in the overthrow of the reigning oba and the renun- 
ciation of a treaty with Britain to curtail the slave trade. Britain 
was determined to halt the traffic in slaves fed by the Yoruba wars 
and responded to this frustration by annexing the port of Lagos 
in 1861. Thereafter, Britain gradually extended its control along 
the coast. British intervention became more insistent in the 1870s 
and 1880s as a result of pressure from missionaries and liberated 
slaves returning from Sierra Leone. There was also the necessity 
of protecting commerce disrupted by the fighting. The method of 
dealing with these problems was to dictate treaties that inevitably 
led to further annexations. 

Commodity Trade 

The development of "legitimate" trade was the final phase of 
private and official British efforts to find a positive alternative to 
the traffic in slaves. Earlier aspects of such constructive interest 
had included the founding of the colony at Sierra Leone in 1787 
as a refuge for liberated slaves, the missionary movement designed 
to bring Christianity to the region, and programs of exploration 
sponsored by learned societies and scientific groups, such as the 
London-based African Association. 

The principal commodities of legitimate trade were palm oil and 
palm kernels, which were used in Europe to make soap and as lubri- 
cants for machinery before petroleum products were developed for 
that purpose. Although this trade grew to significant proportions — 
palm oil exports alone were worth £21 million a year by 1840 — it 
was concentrated near the coast, where palm trees grew in abun- 
dance. Gradually, however, the trade forced major economic and 
social changes in the interior, although it failed to undermine slavery 



24 



Historical Setting 



and the slave trade. Quite the contrary, the incidence of slavery 
in local societies actually increased. 

Initially most palm oil (and later kernels) came from Igboland, 
where palm trees formed a canopy over the densely inhabited areas 
of the Ngwa, Nri, Awka, and other Igbo peoples. Palm oil was 
used locally for cooking, the kernels were a source for food, trees 
were tapped for palm wine, and the fronds were used for building 
material. It was a relatively simple adjustment for many Igbo fam- 
ilies to transport the oil to rivers and streams that led to the Niger 
Delta for sale to European merchants. The rapid expansion in ex- 
ports, especially after 1830, occurred precisely at the time slave 
exports collapsed. Instead, slaves were redirected into the domes- 
tic economy, especially to grow the staple food crop, yams, in north- 
ern Igboland for marketing throughout the palm-tree belt. As 
before, Aro merchants dominated trade, including the sale of slaves 
within Igboland as well as palm products to the coast. They main- 
tained their central role in the confederation that governed the 
region. 

The Niger Delta and Calabar, which once had been known for 
the export of slaves, now became famous for the export of palm 
oil, so much so that the delta streams were given the name the "oil 
rivers." The basic economic units in each town were "houses," 
family-operated entities that were also the focus of loyalty for those 
employed in them. A "house" included the extended family of the 
trader, both his retainers and slaves. As its head, the master trader 
taxed other traders who were members of his "house" and was 
obligated to maintain a war vessel, which was a large dugout ca- 
noe that could hold several tons of cargo and dozens of crew, for 
the defense of the harbor. Whenever a trader could afford to keep 
a war canoe, he was expected to form his own "house." Economic 
competition among these "houses" was so fierce that trade often 
erupted into armed battle between the large canoes. 

Because of the hazards of climate and disease for Europeans and 
the absence of any authority responsive to their interests on the 
mainland, European merchants ordinarily moored their ships out- 
side harbors or in the delta and used the ships as trading stations 
and warehouses. In time, however, they built depots onshore and 
eventually moved up the Niger River to stations established in the 
interior, like that at Onitsha, where they could bargain with local 
suppliers and purchase products likely to turn a profit. Some Eu- 
ropean traders switched to legitimate business only when the com- 
merce in slaves became too hazardous. Disreputable as many of 
the traders had been, they often suffered from the precariousness 
of their position and were at the mercy of what they considered 



25 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

to be unpredictable coastal rulers. Accordingly, as the volume of 
trade increased, the British government responded to repeated re- 
quests of merchants to appoint a consul to cover the region. Con- 
sequently in 1849, John Beecroft was accredited as consul for the 
bights of Benin and Biafra, a jurisdiction stretching from Dahomey 
to Cameroon. Beecroft was the British representative to Fernando 
Po, where the British navy's prevention squadron was stationed. 

Exploration of the Niger Basin had a commercial as well as scien- 
tific motivation, but curiosity about the course and destination of 
the river also played a part. The delta masked the mouth of the 
great river, and for centuries Nigerians chose not to tell Europe- 
ans the secrets of the interior, initially probably because no one 
thought to ask but by the nineteenth century because of the com- 
mercial implications. In 1794 the African Association commissioned 
Mungo Park, an intrepid Scottish physician and naturalist, to search 
for the headwaters of the Niger and follow the river downstream. 
Park reached the upper Niger the next year by traveling inland 
from the Gambia River. Although he reported on the eastward flow 
of the Niger, he was forced to turn back when his equipment was 
lost to Muslim slave traders. In 1805 he set out on a second expe- 
dition, sponsored by the British government, to follow the Niger 
to the sea. His mission failed, but Park and his party covered more 
than 1,500 kilometers, passing through the western portions of the 
Sokoto Caliphate, before being drowned in rapids near Bussa. 

On a subsequent expedition to the Sokoto Caliphate, Hugh Clap- 
perton learned where the Niger River flowed to the sea, but Clap- 
perton also died before he could substantiate his information. It 
was his servant, Richard Lander, and Lander's brother, John, who 
actually demonstrated that the Niger flowed into the delta. The 
Lander brothers were seized by slave traders in the interior and 
sold down the river to a waiting European ship. 

Initial attempts to open trade with the interior by way of the 
Niger could not overcome climate and disease, which took the lives 
of a third of a British riverine expedition in 1842. Use of quinine 
to combat malaria on similar expeditions in the 1850s enabled a 
Liverpool merchant, Macgregor Laird, to open the river. Laird's 
efforts were stimulated by the detailed reports of a pioneer Ger- 
man explorer, Heinrich Barth, who traveled through much of Borno 
and the Sokoto Caliphate and recorded information about the 
region's geography, economy, and inhabitants. 

Royal Niger Company 

The legitimate trade in commodities attracted a number of rough- 
hewn British merchants to the Niger River, as well as some men 



26 



Historical Setting 



who formerly had been engaged in the slave trade but who had 
changed their line of wares. The large companies that subsequently 
opened depots in the delta cities and in Lagos were as ruthlessly 
competitive as the delta towns themselves and frequently used force 
to compel potential suppliers to agree to contracts and to meet their 
demands. The most important of these trading companies, whose 
activities had far-reaching consequences for Nigeria, was the United 
Africa Company, founded by George Goldie in 1879. In 1886 Gol- 
die's consortium was chartered by the British government as the 
Royal Niger Company and granted broad concessionary powers in 
"all the territory of the basin of the Niger." Needless to say, these 
concessions emanated from Britain, not from any authority in 
Nigeria. 

The terms of the charter specified that trade should be free in 
the region — a principle systematically violated as the company 
strengthened its monopoly to forestall French and German trade 
interests. The company also was supposed to respect local customs 
"except so far as may be necessary in the interests of humanity." 
The qualifying clause was aimed at slavery and other activities 
categorized as "barbarous practices" by British authorities, and 
it foreshadowed the qualifications applied to noninterference as a 
guide to official policy when Britain assumed formal colonial respon- 
sibility in Nigeria. 

Meanwhile, the Royal Niger Company established its headquar- 
ters far inland at Lokoja, from where it pretended to assume respon- 
sibility for the administration of areas along the Niger and Benue 
rivers where it maintained depots. The company interfered in the 
territory along the Niger and the Benue, sometimes becoming em- 
broiled in serious conflicts when its British-led native constabulary 
intercepted slave raids or attempted to protect trade routes. The 
company negotiated treaties with Sokoto, Gwandu, and Nupe that 
were interpreted as guaranteeing exclusive access to trade in return 
for the payment of annual tribute. Officials of the Sokoto Caliphate 
considered these treaties quite differently; from their perspective, 
the British were granted only extraterritorial rights that did not 
prevent similar arrangements with the Germans and the French 
and certainly did not surrender sovereignty. 

Under Goldie 's direction, the Royal Niger Company was in- 
strumental in depriving France and Germany of access to the 
region. Consequently, he may well deserve the epithet "father of 
Nigeria," which imperialists accorded him. He definitely laid the 
basis for British claims. 



27 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

Influence of the Christian Missions 

Christianity was introduced at Benin in the fifteenth century by 
Portuguese Roman Catholic priests who accompanied traders and 
officials to the West African coast. Several churches were built to 
serve the Portuguese community and a small number of African 
converts. When direct Portuguese contacts in the region were with- 
drawn, however, the influence of the Catholic missionaries waned 
and by the eighteenth century had disappeared. 

Although churchmen in Britain had been influential in the drive 
to abolish the slave trade, significant missionary activity was 
renewed only in the 1840s and was confined for some time to the 
area between Lagos and Ibadan. The first missions there were 
opened by the Church of England's Church Missionary Society 
(CMS). They were followed by other Protestant denominations 
from Britain, Canada, and the United States and in the 1860s by 
Roman Catholic religious orders. Protestant missionaries tended 
to divide the country into spheres of activity to avoid competition 
with each other, and Catholic missions similarly avoided duplica- 
tion of effort among the several religious orders working there. 
Catholic missionaries were particularly active among the Igbo, the 
CMS among the Yoruba. 

The CMS initially promoted Africans to responsible positions 
in the mission field, an outstanding example being the appoint- 
ment of Samuel Adjai Crowther as the first Anglican bishop of the 
Niger. Crowther, a liberated Yoruba slave, had been educated in 
Sierra Leone and in Britain, where he was ordained before returning 
to his homeland with the first group of missionaries sent there by 
the CMS. This was part of a conscious ''native church" policy 
pursued by the Anglicans and others to create indigenous ecclesiasti- 
cal institutions that eventually would be independent of European 
tutelage. The effort failed, however, in part because church authori- 
ties came to think that religious discipline had grown too lax dur- 
ing Crowther' s episcopate but especially because of the rise of 
prejudice. Crowther was succeeded as bishop by a British cleric. 
Nevertheless, the acceptance of Christianity by large numbers of 
Nigerians depended finally on the various denominations com- 
ing to terms with local conditions and involved the participation 
of an increasingly high proportion of African clergy in the missions. 

In large measure, European missionaries were convinced of the 
value of colonial rule, thereby reinforcing colonial policy. In reac- 
tion some African Christian communities formed their own in- 
dependent churches. 



28 



Historical Setting 



Colonial Nigeria 

Prodded by the instability created by the Yoruba wars and by 
the activities of other European powers, Britain moved cautiously 
but inexorably toward colonial domination of the lower Niger Ba- 
sin. In the decades that followed Britain's abolition of the slave 
trade, British diplomacy wove a fabric of treaties with kings and 
chieftains whose cooperation was sought in suppressing the traffic. 
British interests also dictated occasional armed intervention by the 
Royal Navy and by the Royal Niger Company Constabulary to 
staunch the flow of slaves to the coast, to protect legitimate com- 
merce, and to maintain peace. Moreover, the missionaries cried 
out for protection and assistance in stamping out slavery and other 
"barbarous practices" associated with indigenous religions. Finally, 
the posting of consular officials by the Foreign Office to service 
the increasing amount of trade in the ports of the bights of Benin 
and Biafra helped project British influence inland. 

For many years, official hesitation about adding tropical depen- 
dencies to the British Empire outweighed these factors. The prevail- 
ing sentiment, even after Lagos became a colony in 1861, was 
expressed in a parliamentary report in 1865 urging withdrawal from 
West Africa. Colonies were regarded as expensive liabilities, es- 
pecially where trading concessions could be exercised without resort- 
ing to annexation. Attitudes changed, however, as rival European 
powers, especially France and Germany, scurried to develop over- 
seas markets and annexed territory (see fig. 5). 

Inevitably, imperial ambitions clashed when the intentions of 
the various European countries became obvious. In 1885 at the 
Berlin Conference, the European powers attempted to resolve their 
conflicts of interest by allotting areas of exploitation. The conferees 
also enunciated the principle, known as the dual mandate, that the 
best interests of Europe and Africa would be served by maintain- 
ing free access to the continent for trade and by providing Africa 
with the benefits of Europe's civilizing mission. Britain's claims 
to a sphere of influence in the Niger Basin were acknowledged for- 
mally, but it was stipulated here as elsewhere that only effective 
occupation would secure full international recognition. In the end, 
pressure in the region from France and Germany hastened the es- 
tablishment of effective British occupation. 

Extension of British Control 

British expansion accelerated in the last decades of the nineteenth 
century. The early history of Lagos Colony was one of repeated 
attempts to end the Yoruba wars. In the face of threats to the divided 



29 



Nigeria: A Country Study 




Present international boundary 

Colonial boundary, 1914 

- - - Protectorate boundary, pre-1 914 

Approximate limits of effective 
administration by Royal Niger 
Company, 1885 
Populated place 
Gradual expansion of British 
protectorate in Southern 
Nigeria, 1887-1906 

3 50 1 00 1 50 Kilometers 



Figure 5. British Presence in the Niger Region, 1861-1914 



Yoruba states from Dahomey and the Sokoto Caliphate, as repre- 
sented by the emirate of Ilorin, the British governor — assisted by the 
CMS — succeeded in imposing peace settlements on the interior. 

Colonial Lagos was a busy, cosmopolitan port, reflecting Vic- 
torian and distinctively Brazilian architecture and the varied back- 
grounds of a black elite, composed of English- speakers from Sierra 
Leone and of emancipated slaves repatriated from Brazil and Cuba. 
Its residents were employed in official capacities and were active 
in business. Africans also were represented on the Lagos Legisla- 
tive Council, a largely appointed assembly. 

After the Berlin Conference, Britain announced formation of the 
Oil Rivers Protectorate, which included the Niger Delta and exten- 
ded eastward to Calabar, where the British consulate general was re- 
located from Fernando Po. The essential purpose of the protectorate 



30 



Historical Setting 



was to control trade coming down the Niger. Vice consuls were 
assigned to ports that already had concluded treaties of coopera- 
tion with the Foreign Office. Local rulers continued to administer 
their territories, but consular authorities assumed jurisdiction for 
the equity courts established earlier by the foreign mercantile com- 
munities. A constabulary force was raised and used to pacify the 
coastal area. In 1894 the territory was redesignated the Niger Coast 
Protectorate and was expanded to include the region from Cala- 
bar to Lagos Colony and Protectorate, including the hinterland, 
and northward up the Niger River as far as Lokoja, the headquar- 
ters of the Royal Niger Company. As a protectorate, it did not 
have the status of a colony but remained under the jurisdiction of 
the Foreign Office. 

Continued expansion of the protectorate was accomplished largely 
by diplomatic means, although military force was employed to bring 
Ijebu, Oyo, and Benin into compliance with dictated treaty obli- 
gations. The conquest of Benin in 1897 completed the British oc- 
cupation of southwestern Nigeria. The incident that sparked the 
expedition was the massacre of a British consul and his party, who 
were on their way to investigate reports of ritual human sacrifice 
in the city of Benin. In reprisal a marine detachment promptly 
stormed the city and destroyed the oba's palace. The reigning oba 
was sent into exile, and Benin was administered indirectly under 
the protectorate through a council of chiefs. 

Although treaties were signed with rulers as far north as Sokoto 
by 1885, actual British control was confined to the coastal area and 
the immediate vicinity of Lokoja until 1900. The Royal Niger Com- 
pany had access to the territory from Lokoja extending along the 
Niger and Benue rivers above their confluence, but there was no 
effective control, even after punitive expeditions against Bida and 
Ilorin in 1897. The clear intent was to occupy the Sokoto Caliphate, 
but for that purpose the Royal Niger Company was not deemed 
to be a sufficient instrument of imperialism. Consequently, on De- 
cember 31, 1899, Britain terminated the charter of the company, 
providing compensation and retention of valuable mineral rights. 

Lugard and Indirect Rule 

Frederick Lugard, who assumed the position of high commis- 
sioner of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria in 1900, often has 
been regarded as the model British colonial administrator. Trained 
as an army officer, he had served in India, Egypt, and East Afri- 
ca, where he expelled Arab slave traders from Nyasaland and es- 
tablished the British presence in Uganda. Joining the Royal Niger 
Company in 1894, Lugard was sent to Borgu to counter inroads 



31 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

made by the French, and in 1897 he was made responsible for rais- 
ing the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF) from local 
levies to serve under British officers. 

During his six-year tenure as high commissioner, Lugard was 
occupied with transforming the commercial sphere of influence in- 
herited from the Royal Niger Company into a viable territorial 
unit under effective British political control. His objective was to 
conquer the entire region and to obtain recognition of the British 
protectorate by its indigenous rulers, especially the Fulani emirs 
of the Sokoto Caliphate. Lugard' s campaign systematically sub- 
dued local resistance, using armed force when diplomatic measures 
failed. Borno capitulated without a fight, but in 1903 Lugard' s 
RWAFF mounted assaults on Kano and Sokoto. From Lugard' s 
point of view, clear-cut military victories were necessary because 
their surrenders weakened resistance elsewhere. 

Lugard 's success in northern Nigeria has been attributed to his 
policy of indirect rule, which called for governing the protectorate 
through the rulers who had been defeated. If the emirs accepted 
British authority, abandoned the slave trade, and cooperated with 
British officials in modernizing their administrations, the colonial 
power was willing to confirm them in office. The emirs retained 
their caliphate titles but were responsible to British district officers, 
who had final authority. The British high commissioner could de- 
pose emirs and other officials if necessary. Lugard reduced sharply 
the number of titled fief holders in the emirates, weakening the 
rulers' patronage. Under indirect rule, caliphate officials were trans- 
formed into salaried district heads and became, in effect, agents 
of the British authorities, responsible for peacekeeping and tax col- 
lection. The old chain of command merely was capped with a new 
overlord, the British high commissioner. 

The protectorate required only a limited number of colonial 
officers scattered throughout the territory as overseers. Depend- 
ing on local conditions, they exercised discretion in advising the 
emirs and local officials, but all orders from the high commissioner 
were transmitted through the emir. Although the high commis- 
sioner possessed unlimited executive and legislative powers in the 
protectorate, most of the activities of government were undertaken by 
the emirs and their local administrations, subject to British approval. 
A dual system of law functioned — the sharia (Islamic law) court con- 
tinued to deal with matters affecting the personal status of Muslims, 
including land disputes, divorce, debt, and slave emancipation. As 
a consequence of indirect rule, Hausa- Fulani domination was 
confirmed — and in some instances imposed — on diverse ethnic 
groups, some of them non-Muslim, in the so-called middle belt. 



32 



Historical Setting 



The accomplishments of Lugard and his successors in economic 
development were limited by the revenues available to the colonial 
government. One of Lugard' s initial acts was to separate the general 
treasury of each emirate from the emir's privy purse. From taxes 
collected by local officials, first one-quarter and later one-half was 
taken to support services of the colonial regime, which were meager 
because of the protectorate's lack of public resources. In the south, 
missionaries made up for the lack of government expenditure on 
services; in the north, Lugard and his successors limited the ac- 
tivities of missionaries in order to maintain Muslim domination. 
Consequentiy, educational and medical services in the north lagged 
behind those in the south. Progress was made in economic develop- 
ment, however, as railroad lines were constructed to transport tin 
from Jos Plateau and northern- grown peanuts and cotton to ports 
on the coast. 

Efforts to apply indirect rule to the south, which was formally 
a protectorate from 1906, in emulation of Lugard' s successful policy 
in the north set off a search for legitimate indigenous authorities 
through whom the policy could be implemented. The task proved 
relatively easy in Yorubaland, where the governments and bound- 
aries of traditional kingdoms were retained or, in some instances, 
revived. In the southeast, where Aro hegemony had been crushed, 
the search for acceptable local administrators met with frustration. 
As a result, the tasks of government initially were left in the hands 
of colonial officials, who antagonized many Igbo. The Igbo there- 
fore stressed traditional egalitarian principles as a justification for 
their early opposition to colonial rule; in Yorubaland and in the 
north, the devolution of administrative duties to the indigenous 
ruling elites contained much of the early opposition. Resistance 
to colonial rule was mitigated to the extent that local authorities 
and courts were able to manage affairs. 

The British prohibited the enslavement of free persons and sup- 
pressed slave trading. All children in the north who were born to 
persons in bondage on or after April 1, 1900, were declared free. 
The relations between existing slaves and their owners, however, 
were allowed to continue indefinitely, on the assumption that whole- 
sale liberation would cause more harm than good by disrupting 
the agricultural economy. As a consequence, at least several 
hundred thousand slaves deserted their masters in the early years 
of colonial rule. In 1906 a radical, allegedly Mahdist, Muslim up- 
rising that received the support of many fugitive slaves was bru- 
tally crushed. In the south, slaves legally could be forced to return 
to their owners until 1914. In the north, vagrancy laws and the 
enforcement of proprietary rights to land were used to try to check 



33 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

the flight of slaves. Slaves in the northern emirates could secure 
their freedom upon application to an Islamic court, but compara- 
tively few used this option. Throughout the colonial period in the 
Muslim north, many slaves and their descendants continued to work 
for their masters or former masters and often received periodic pay- 
ments leading to emancipation. 

Unification of Nigeria 

After having been assigned for six years as governor of Hong 
Kong, Lugard returned to Nigeria in 1912 to set in motion the 
merger of the northern and southern protectorates. The task of unifi- 
cation was achieved two years later on the eve of World War I. 
The principle of indirect rule administered by traditional rulers was 
applied throughout Nigeria, and colonial officers were instructed 
to interfere as little as possible with the existing order. In 1916 
Lugard formed the Nigerian Council, a consultative body that 
brought together six traditional leaders — including the sultan of 
Sokoto, the emir of Kano, and the king of Oyo — to represent all 
parts of the colony. The council was promoted as a device for al- 
lowing the expression of opinions that could instruct the governor. 
In practice Lugard used the annual sessions to inform the tradi- 
tional leaders of British policy, leaving them with no functions at 
the council's meetings except to listen and to assent. 

Unification meant only the loose affiliation of three distinct 
regional administrations into which Nigeria was subdivided — 
northern, western, and eastern regions (see fig. 6). Each was un- 
der a lieutenant governor and provided independent government 
services. The governor was, in effect, the coordinator for virtually 
autonomous entities that had overlapping economic interests but 
little in common politically or socially. In the Northern Region, 
the colonial government took careful account of Islam and avoid- 
ed any appearance of a challenge to traditional values that might 
incite resistance to British rule. This system, in which the struc- 
ture of authority focused on the emir to whom obedience was a 
mark of religious devotion, did not welcome change. As the emirs 
settled more and more into their role as reliable agents of indirect 
rule, colonial authorities were content to maintain the status quo, 
particularly in religious matters. Christian missionaries were barred, 
and the limited government efforts in education were harmonized 
with Islamic institutions. 

In the south, by contrast, traditional leaders were employed as 
vehicles of indirect rule in Yorubaland, but Christianity and 
Western education undermined their sacerdotal functions. In some 
instances, however, a double allegiance — to the idea of sacred 



34 



Historical Setting 



monarchy for its symbolic value and to modern concepts of law 
and administration — was maintained. Out of reverence for tradi- 
tional kingship, for instance, the oni of Ife, whose office was close- 
ly identified with Yoruba religion, was accepted as the sponsor of 
a Yoruba political movement. In the Eastern Region, appointed 
officials, who were given "warrants" and hence called warrant 
chiefs, were vehemently resisted because they had no claims on 
tradition. 

In practice, however, British administrative procedures under 
indirect rule entailed constant interaction between colonial authori- 
ties and local rulers — the system was modified to fit the needs of 
each region. In the north, for instance, legislation took the form 
of a decree cosigned by the governor and the emir, whereas in the 
south, the governor sought the approval of the Legislative Coun- 
cil. Hausa was recognized as an official language in the north, and 
knowledge of it was expected of colonial officers serving there, 
whereas only English had official status in the south. Regional ad- 
ministrations also varied widely in the quality of local personnel 
and in the scope of the operations they were willing to undertake. 
British staffs in each region continued to operate according to proce- 
dures developed before unification. Economic links among the 
regions increased, but indirect rule tended to discourage political 
interchange. There was virtually no pressure for fuller unity until 
the end of World War II. 

Public works, such as harbor dredging and road and railroad 
construction, opened Nigeria to economic development. British soap 
and cosmetics manufacturers tried to obtain land concessions for 
growing oil palms, but these were refused. Instead, the companies 
had to be content with a monopoly of the export trade in these 
products. Other commercial crops such as cocoa and rubber also 
were encouraged, and tin was mined on the Jos Plateau. The only 
significant interruption in economic development arose from natural 
disaster — the great drought of 1913-14. Recovery came quickly, 
however, and improvements in port facilities and the transporta- 
tion infrastructure during World War I furthered economic de- 
velopment. Nigerian recruits participated in the war effort as 
laborers and soldiers. The Nigeria Regiment of the RWAFF, in- 
tegrating troops from the north and south, saw action against Ger- 
man colonial forces in Cameroon and in German East Africa. 
During the war, the colonial government earmarked a large por- 
tion of the Nigerian budget as a contribution to imperial defense. 
To raise additional revenues, Lugard took steps to institute a uni- 
form tax structure patterned on the traditional system that he had 
adopted in the north during his tenure there. Taxes became a source 



35 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



.j 



WESTERN 

REGION 
Lagos 



NORTHERN 
REGION 



EASTERN , 
; REGION ) 

i 





^NORTHERN 

CAMEROONS 

(British mandate, 
1920-61) 



Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 



Present-day 

international boundary 

Regional boundary 

® National capital 



1 1 i i i I Territory added 
1 1 1 1 1 1 after 1914 



50 100 150 Kilometers 



50 100 150 ► 



Figure 6. Unification of Nigeria, 1914 



of discontent in the south, however, and contributed to disturbances 
protesting British policy. In 1920 portions of former German Camer- 
oon were mandated to Britain by the League of Nations and were 
administered as part of Nigeria. 

Until he stepped down as governor general in 1918, Lugard was 
primarily concerned with consolidating British sovereignty and with 
assuring local administration through traditional leaders. He was con- 
temptuous of the educated and Westernized African elite, and he 
even recommended transferring the capital from Lagos, the cos- 
mopolitan city where the influence of these people was most 
pronounced, to Kaduna in the north. Although the capital was not 
moved, Lugard 's bias in favor of the Muslim north was clear at 
the time. Nevertheless, Lugard was able to bequeath to his succes- 
sor a prosperous colony when his term as governor general expired. 



36 



Historical Setting 



Further Development of Colonial Policy 

Lugard's immediate successor, Hugh Clifford (1919-25), was 
an aristocratic professional administrator with liberal instincts who 
had won recognition for his enlightened governorship of the Gold 
Coast. The approaches of the two governors to colonial develop- 
ment were diametrically opposed. In contrast to Lugard, Clifford 
argued that it was the primary responsibility of colonial govern- 
ment to introduce as quickly as practical the benefits of Western 
experience. He was aware that the Muslim north would present 
problems, but he evinced great hopes for progress along the lines 
that he laid down in the south, where he anticipated "general eman- 
cipation" leading to a more representative form of government. 
Clifford emphasized economic development, encouraging enter- 
prises by immigrant southerners in the north while restricting Eu- 
ropean participation to capital-intensive activity. 

Uneasy with the amount of latitude allowed traditional leaders 
under indirect rule, Clifford opposed further extension of the ju- 
dicial authority held by the northern emirs, stating bluntly that 
he did ' 'not consider that their past traditions and their present 
backward cultural conditions afford to any such experiment a 
reasonable chance of success." He did not apply this rationale in 
the south, however, where he saw the possibility of building an 
elite educated in schools modeled on a European method. These 
schools would teach "the basic principles that would and should 
regulate character and conduct." In line with this attitude, he re- 
jected Lugard's proposal for moving the capital from Lagos, the 
stronghold of the elite in whom he placed so much confidence for 
the future. 

Clifford also believed that indirect rule encouraged centripetal 
tendencies, and he argued that the division into two separate colo- 
nies was advisable unless a stronger central government could bind 
Nigeria into more than just an administrative convenience for the 
three regions. Whereas Lugard had applied lessons learned in the 
north to the administration of the south, Clifford was prepared to 
extend to the north practices that had been successful in the south. 
The Colonial Office, where Lugard was still held in high regard, 
accepted that changes might be due in the south, but it forbade 
fundamental alteration of procedures in the north. A.J. Harding, 
director of Nigerian affairs at the Colonial Office, defined the offi- 
cial position of the British government in its continued support of 
indirect rule when he commented that "direct government by im- 
partial and honest men of alien race . . . never yet satisfied a 



37 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

nation long and . . . under such a form of government, as wealth 
and education increase, so do political discontent and sedition." 

Clifford's recommendations, as modified by the Colonial Office, 
were embodied in the 1922 constitution (known as the Clifford Con- 
stitution). Whereas administration in the north was left untouched, 
a new legislative council was established in common for the two 
southern regions, replacing the Lagos Legislative Council and the 
moribund Nigerian Council. For the first time, direct elections took 
place outside Lagos, although only four of the council's forty-six 
members were elected. Moreover, the introduction of the legisla- 
tive principle encouraged the emergence of political parties and 
ultimately the growth of nationalism in Nigeria. By 1931 strong 
sentiments had emerged in the north in reaction to Clifford's 
reforms. 

Emergence of Nigerian Nationalism 

British colonialism created Nigeria, joining diverse peoples and 
regions in an artificial political entity. It was not unusual that the 
nationalism that became a political factor in Nigeria during the 
interwar period derived both from an older political particularism 
and broad pan- Africanism rather than from any sense of a common 
Nigerian nationality. Its goal initially was not self-determination, 
but rather increased participation in the governmental process on 
a regional level. Inconsistencies in British policy reinforced cleavages 
based on regional animosities by attempting simultaneously to 
preserve the indigenous cultures of each area and to introduce 
modern technology and Western political and social concepts. In 
the north, appeals to Islamic legitimacy upheld the rule of the emirs, 
so that nationalist sentiments there were decidedly anti-Western. 
Modern nationalists in the south, whose thinking was shaped by 
European ideas, opposed indirect rule, which had entrenched what 
was considered to be an anachronistic ruling class in power and 
shut out the Westernized elite. 

The ideological inspiration for southern nationalists came from 
a variety of sources, including prominent United States-based ac- 
tivists such as Marcus Garvey and W.E.B. Du Bois. Nigerian stu- 
dents abroad joined those from other colonies in pan- African groups, 
such as the West African Students Union, founded in London in 
1925. Early nationalists tended to ignore Nigeria as the focus of patri- 
otism; rather, the common denominator was based on a newly as- 
sertive ethnic consciousness, particularly Yoruba and Igbo. Despite 
their acceptance of European and North American influences, the 
nationalists were critical of colonialism for its failure to appreciate 
the antiquity of indigenous cultures. They wanted self-government, 



38 



Historical Setting 



charging that only colonial rule prevented the unshackling of 
progressive forces in Africa. 

Political opposition to colonial rule often assumed religious 
dimensions. Independent Christian churches had emerged at the 
end of the nineteenth century because many European mission- 
aries were racist and blocked the advancement of a Nigerian clergy. 
European interpretations of Christian orthodoxy also refused to 
allow the incorporation of local customs and practices, even though 
the various mission denominations themselves interpreted Chris- 
tianity very differently. It was acceptable for the established mis- 
sions to differ, but most Europeans were surprised and shocked 
that Nigerians, would develop new denominations independent of 
European control. Christianity long had experienced "protestant" 
schisms; the emergence of independent Christian churches in Nigeria 
was another phase of this history. The pulpits of the independent 
congregations provided one of the few available avenues for the 
free expression of attitudes critical of colonial rule. 

In the 1920s, there were several types of associations that were 
ostensibly nonpolitical. One group consisted of professional and 
business associations, such as the Nigerian Union of Teachers, 
which provided trained leadership for political groups; the Nigeri- 
an Law Association, which brought together lawyers, many of 
whom had been educated in Britain; and the Nigerian Produce 
Traders' Association, led by Obafemi Awolowo. 

Ethnic and kinship organizations that often took the form of a 
tribal union also emerged in the 1920s. These organizations were 
primarily urban phenomena that arose after large numbers of rural 
migrants moved to the cities. Alienated by the anonymity of the 
urban environment and drawn together by ties to their ethnic 
homelands — as well as by the need for mutual aid — the new city 
dwellers formed local clubs that later expanded into federations 
covering whole regions. By the mid- 1940s, the major ethnic groups 
had formed such associations as the Igbo Federal Union and the 
Egbe Omo Oduduwa (Society of the Descendants of Oduduwa), 
a Yoruba cultural movement, in which Awolowo played a leading 
role. 

A third type of organization that was more pointedly political 
was the youth or student group, which became the vehicle of in- 
tellectuals and professionals. They were the most politically con- 
scious segment of the population and stood in the vanguard of the 
nationalist movement. Newspapers, some of which were published 
before World War I, provided coverage of nationalist views. 

The opportunity afforded by the 1922 constitution to elect a hand- 
ful of representatives to the Legislative Council gave politically 



39 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



conscious Nigerians something concrete to work on. The principal 
figure in the political activity that ensued was Herbert Macauley, 
often referred to as the father of Nigerian nationalism. He aroused 
political awareness through his newspaper, the Lagos Daily News, 
while leading the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), 
which dominated elections in Lagos from its founding in 1922 un- 
til the ascendancy of the National Youth Movement (NYM) in 
1938. His political platform called for economic and educational 
development, Africanization of the civil service, and self- 
government for Lagos. Significantly, however, Macauley' s NNDP 
remained almost entirely a Lagos party, popular only in the area 
with experience in elective politics. 

The NYM first used nationalist rhetoric to agitate for improve- 
ments in education. The movement brought to public notice a long 
list of future leaders, including H.O. Davies and Nnamdi Azikiwe. 
Although Azikiwe later came to be recognized as the leading spokes- 
man for national unity, his orientation on return from university 
training in the United States was pan-African rather than nation- 
alist, emphasizing the common African struggle against Europe- 
an colonialism. He betrayed much less consciousness of purely 
Nigerian goals than Davies, a student of Harold Laski at the Lon- 
don School of Economics, whose political orientation was consid- 
ered left-wing. 

By 1938 the NYM was agitating for dominion status within the 
British Commonwealth of Nations, so that Nigeria would have the 
same status as Canada and Australia. In elections that year, the 
NYM ended the domination of the NNDP in the Legislative Coun- 
cil and moved to establish a genuinely national network of affil- 
iates. This promising start was stopped short three years later by 
internal divisions in which ethnic loyalties emerged triumphant. 
The departure of Azikiwe and other Igbo members of the NYM 
left the organization in Yoruba hands; during World War II, it 
was reorganized into a predominantly Yoruba political party, the 
Action Group, by Awolowo. Yoruba-Igbo rivalry had become a 
major factor in Nigerian politics (see Ethnic Relations, ch. 2). 

During World War II, three battalions of the Nigeria Regiment 
fought in the Ethiopian campaign. Nigerian units also contribut- 
ed to two divisions serving with British forces in Palestine, Morocco, 
Sicily, and Burma, where they won many honors. Wartime ex- 
periences provided a new frame of reference for many soldiers, who 
interacted across ethnic boundaries in ways that were unusual in 
Nigeria. The war also made the British reappraise Nigeria's polit- 
ical future. The war years,, moreover, witnessed a polarization 



40 



Historical Setting 



between the older, more parochial leaders inclined toward gradu- 
alism and the younger intellectuals, who thought in more immediate 
terms. 

The rapid growth of organized labor in the 1940s also brought 
new political forces into play. During the war, union membership 
increased sixfold to 30,000. The proliferation of labor organiza- 
tions, however, fragmented the movement, and potential leaders 
lacked the experience and skill to draw workers together. 

In the postwar period, party lines were sharply drawn on the 
basis of ethnicity and regionalism. After the demise of the NYM, 
the nationalist movement splintered into the Hausa- and Fulani- 
backed Northern People's Congress (NPC), the Yoruba- supported 
Action Group, and the Igbo-dominated National Council of Nigeria 
and the Cameroons (NCNC, later the National Council of Nigerian 
Citizens). These parties negotiated with the British government 
over constitutional changes, but cooperation among them was the 
result of expediency rather than an emerging sense of national iden- 
tity. Because of the essentially regional political alignments of the 
parties, the British government decided to impose a political solu- 
tion for Nigeria based on a federally structured constitution. 

The first political party in Nigeria to have nationwide appeal 
was the NCNC, founded in 1944 when Azikiwe encouraged ac- 
tivists in the National Youth Movement to call a conference in Lagos 
of all major Nigerian organizations to "weld the heterogeneous 
masses of Nigeria into one solid bloc." The aged Macauley was 
elected president of the new group, and Azikiwe became its secre- 
tary general. The party platform renewed the National Youth 
Movement's appeal for Nigerian self-government within the Com- 
monwealth under a democratic constitution. 

At its inception, party membership was based on affiliated or- 
ganizations that included labor unions, social groups, political clubs, 
professional associations, and more than 100 ethnic organizations. 
These bodies afforded unusual opportunities for political educa- 
tion in existing constituencies, but the NYM, which was fading 
out, was absent from the list of NCNC affiliates. Leadership of 
the NCNC rested firmly with Azikiwe, in large part because of 
his commanding personality but also because of the string of 
newspapers he operated and through which he argued the nation- 
alist cause. In the late 1940s, the NCNC captured a majority of 
the votes in the predominantly Yoruba Western Region, but in- 
creasingly it came to rely on Igbo support, supplemented by alli- 
ances with minority parties in the Northern Region. The NCNC 
backed the creation of new regions, where minorities would be 



41 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

ensured a larger voice, as a step toward the formation of a strong 
unitary national government. 

The Action Group arose in 1951 as a response to Igbo control 
of the NCNC and as a vehicle for Yoruba regionalism that resist- 
ed the concept of unitary government. The party was structured 
democratically and benefited from political spadework done by the 
NCNC in the Western Region in the late 1940s. As a movement 
designed essentially to exploit the federal arrangement to attain 
regional power, however, the Action Group became the NCNC's 
competitor for votes in the south at the national level and at the 
local level in the Western Region. 

The Action Group was largely the creation of Awolowo, gener- 
al secretary of Egbe Omo Oduduwa and leader of the Nigerian 
Produce Traders' Association. The Action Group was thus the heir 
of a generation of flourishing cultural consciousness among the 
Yoruba and also had valuable connections with commercial interests 
that were representative of the comparative economic advancement 
of the Western Region. Awolowo had little difficulty in appealing 
to broad segments of the Yoruba population, but he strove to pre- 
vent the Action Group from being stigmatized as a ' 'tribal" group. 
Despite his somewhat successful efforts to enlist non-Yoruba sup- 
port, the regionalist sentiment that had stimulated the party ini- 
tially could hardly be concealed. 

Another obstacle to the development of the Action Group was 
the animosity between segments of the Yoruba community — for 
example, many people in Ibadan opposed Awolowo on personal 
grounds because of his identification with the Ijebu Yoruba. Despite 
these difficulties, the Action Group rapidly built an effective or- 
ganization. Its program reflected greater planning and was more 
ideologically oriented than that of the NCNC. Although he did not 
have Azikiwe's compelling personality, Awolowo was a formida- 
ble debater as well as a vigorous and tenacious political campaigner. 
He used for the first time in Nigeria modern, sometimes flam- 
boyant, electioneering techniques. Among his leading lieutenants 
were Samuel Akintola of Ibadan and the oni of Ife. 

The Action Group was a consistent supporter of minority- group 
demands for autonomous states within a federal structure, and it 
even supported the severance of a midwest state from the Western 
Region. This move assumed that comparable alterations would be 
made elsewhere, an attitude that won the party minority voting 
support in the other regions. It also backed Yoruba irredentism 
in the Fulani-ruled emirate of Ilorin in the Northern Region and 
separatist movements among non-Igbo in the Eastern Region. 



42 



Historical Setting 



The Northern People's Congress (NPC) was organized in the 
late 1940s by a small group of Western-educated northern Mus- 
lims who obtained the assent of the emirs to form a political party 
capable of counterbalancing the activities of the southern-based 
parties. It represented a substantial element of reformism in the 
Muslim north. The most powerful figure in the party was Ahmadu 
Bello, the sardauna (war leader) of Sokoto, a controversial figure 
who aspired to become the sultan of Sokoto, still the most impor- 
tant political and religious position in the north. Often described 
by opponents as a * ' feudal" conservative, Bello had a consuming 
interest in the protection of northern social and political institu- 
tions from southern influence. He also insisted on maintaining the 
territorial integrity of the Northern Region, including those areas 
with non-Muslim populations. He was prepared to introduce educa- 
tional and economic changes to strengthen the north. Although his 
own ambitions were limited to the Northern Region, Bello backed 
the NPC's successful efforts to mobilize the north's large voting 
strength so as to win control of the national government. 

The NPC platform emphasized the integrity of the north, its tra- 
ditions, religion, and social order. Support for broad Nigerian con- 
cerns occupied a clear second place. A lack of interest in extending 
the NPC beyond the Northern Region corresponded to this strict- 
ly regional orientation. Its activist membership was drawn from 
local government and emirate' officials who had access to means 
of communication and to repressive traditional authority that could 
keep the opposition in line. 

The small contingent of northerners who had been educated 
abroad — a group that included Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and 
Aminu Kano — was allied with British-backed efforts to introduce 
gradual change to the emirates. The support given by the emirs 
to limited modernization was motivated largely by fear of the un- 
settling presence of southerners in the north and by the equally 
unsettling example of improving conditions in the south. Those 
northern leaders who were committed to modernization were firmly 
connected to the traditional power structure. Most internal problems 
within the north — peasant disaffection or rivalry among Muslim 
factions — were concealed, and open opposition to the domination 
of the Muslim aristocracy was not tolerated. Critics, including 
representatives of the middle belt who plainly resented Muslim 
domination, were relegated to small, peripheral parties or to in- 
consequential separatist movements. 

In 1950 Aminu Kano, who had been instrumental in founding 
the NPC, broke away to form one such party, the Northern Ele- 
ments Progressive Union (NEPU), in protest against the NPC's 



43 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

limited objectives and what he regarded as a vain hope that tradi- 
tional rulers would accept modernization. NEPU formed a 
parliamentary alliance with the NCNC. 

The NPC continued to represent the interests of the traditional 
order in the preindependence deliberations. After the defection of 
Kano, the only significant disagreement within the NPC related 
to the awareness of moderates, such as Balewa, that only by over- 
coming political and economic backwardness could the NPC pro- 
tect the foundations of traditional northern authority against the 
influence of the more advanced south. 

In all three regions, minority parties represented the special in- 
terests of ethnic groups, especially as they were affected by the 
majority. The size of their legislative delegations, when successful 
in electing anyone to the regional assemblies, was never large 
enough to be effective, but they served as a means of public ex- 
pression for minority concerns. They received attention from major 
parties before elections, at which time either a dominant party from 
another region or the opposition party in their region sought their 
alliance. 

The political parties jockeyed for positions of power in anticipa- 
tion of the independence of Nigeria. Three constitutions were enact- 
ed from 1946 to 1954 that were subjects of considerable political 
controversy in themselves but inevitably moved the country toward 
greater internal autonomy, with an increasing role for the politi- 
cal parties. The trend was toward the establishment of a parliamen- 
tary system of government, with regional assemblies and a federal 
House of Representatives. 

In 1 946 a new constitution was approved by the British Parlia- 
ment and promulgated in Nigeria. Although it reserved effective 
power in the hands of the governor and his appointed executive 
council, the so-called Richards Constitution (after Governor Ar- 
thur Richards, who was responsible for its formulation) provided 
for an expanded Legislative Council empowered to deliberate on 
matters affecting the whole country. Separate legislative bodies, 
the houses of assembly, were established in each of the three regions 
to consider local questions and to advise the lieutenant governors. 
The introduction of the federal principle, with deliberative authority 
devolved on the regions, signaled recognition of the country's diver- 
sity. Although realistic in its assessment of the situation in Niger- 
ia, the Richards Constitution undoubtedly intensified regionalism 
as an alternative to political unification. 

The pace of constitutional change accelerated after the promul- 
gation of the Richards Constitution, which was suspended in 1950. 
The call for greater autonomy resulted in an interparliamentary 



44 



Historical Setting 



conference at Ibadan in 1950, when the terms of a new constitu- 
tion were drafted. The so-called Macpherson Constitution, after 
the incumbent governor, went into effect the following year. 

The most important innovations in the new charter reinforced 
the dual course of constitutional evolution, allowing for both region- 
al autonomy and federal union. By extending the elective princi- 
ple and by providing for a central government with a Council of 
Ministers, the Macpherson Constitution gave renewed impetus to 
party activity and to political participation at the national level. 
But by providing for comparable regional governments exercising 
broad legislative powers, which could not be overridden by the new- 
ly established 185-seat federal House of Representatives, the Mac- 
pherson Constitution also gave a significant boost to regionalism. 
Subsequent revisions contained in a new constitution, the Lyttle- 
ton Constitution, enacted in 1954, firmly established the federal 
principle and paved the way for independence. 

In 1957 the Western and the Eastern regions became formally 
self-governing under the parliamentary system. Similar status was 
acquired by the Northern Region two years later. There were 
numerous differences of detail among the regional systems, but all 
adhered to parliamentary forms and were equally autonomous in 
relation to the federal government at Lagos. The federal govern- 
ment retained specified powers, including responsibility for bank- 
ing, currency, external affairs, defense, shipping and navigation, 
and communications, but real political power was centered in the 
regions. Significantly, the regional governments controlled public 
expenditures derived from revenues raised within each region. 

Ethnic cleavages intensified in the 1950s. Political activists in 
the southern areas spoke of self-government in terms of educational 
opportunities and economic development. Because of the spread 
of mission schools and wealth derived from export crops, the 
southern parties were committed to policies that would benefit the 
south of the country. In the north, the emirs intended to maintain 
firm control on economic and political change. Any activity in the 
north that might include participation by the federal government 
(and consequently by southern civil servants) was regarded as a 
challenge to the primacy of the emirates. Broadening political par- 
ticipation and expanding educational opportunities and other so- 
cial services also were viewed as threats to the status quo. Already 
there was an extensive immigrant population of southerners, es- 
pecially Igbo, in the north; they dominated clerical positions and 
were active in many trades. 

The cleavage between the Yoruba and the Igbo was accentuat- 
ed by their competition for control of the political machinery. The 



45 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

receding British presence enabled local officials and politicians to 
gain access to patronage over government jobs, funds for local de- 
velopment, market permits, trade licenses, government contracts, 
and even scholarships for higher education. In an economy with 
many qualified applicants for every post, great resentment was 
generated by any favoritism authorities showed to members of their 
own ethnic group. 

In the immediate post- World War II period, Nigeria benefited 
from a favorable trade balance. The principal exports were agricul- 
tural commodities — peanuts and cotton from the Northern Region, 
palm products from the Eastern Region, and cocoa from the 
Western Region. Marketing boards, again regionally based, were 
established to handle these exports and to react to price fluctua- 
tions on the world market. During the 1950s, the marketing boards 
accumulated considerable surpluses. Initially, imports lagged be- 
hind exports, although by the mid-1950s imports began to catch 
up with exports, and the surpluses decreased. Expansion in the 
nonagricultural sectors required large imports of machinery, trans- 
port equipment and, eventually, intermediate materials for industry. 
In time there also were increased administrative costs to be met. 
Although per capita income in the country as a whole remained 
low by international standards, rising incomes among salaried per- 
sonnel and burgeoning urbanization expanded consumer demand 
for imported goods. 

In the meantime, public sector spending increased even more 
dramatically than export earnings. It was supported not only by 
the income from huge agricultural surpluses but also by a new range 
of direct and indirect taxes imposed during the 1950s. The trans- 
fer of responsibility for budgetary management from the central 
to the regional governments in 1954 accelerated the pace of public 
spending on services and on development projects. Total revenues 
of central and regional governments nearly doubled in relation to 
the gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary) during the decade. 

The most dramatic event, having a long-term effect on Nige- 
ria's economic development, was the discovery and exploitation 
of petroleum deposits. The search for oil, begun in 1908 and aban- 
doned a few years later, was revived in 1937 by Shell and British 
Petroleum. Exploration was intensified in 1946, but the first com- 
mercial discovery did not occur until 1956, at Olobiri in the Niger 
Delta. In 1958 exportation of Nigerian oil was initiated at facili- 
ties constructed at Port Harcourt. Oil income was still marginal, 
but the prospects for continued economic expansion appeared bright 
and further accentuated political rivalries on the eve of in- 
dependence. 



46 



Historical Setting 



The election of the House of Representatives after the adoption 
of the 1954 constitution gave the NPC a total of seventy- nine seats, 
all from the Northern Region. Among the other major parties, the 
NCNC took fifty-six seats, winning a majority in both the Eastern 
and the Western regions, while the Action Group captured only 
twenty- seven seats. The NPC was called on to form a government, 
but the NCNC received six of the ten ministerial posts. Three of 
these posts were assigned to representatives from each region, and 
one was reserved for a delegate from the Northern Cameroons. 

As a further step toward independence, the governor's Execu- 
tive Council was merged with the Council of Ministers in 1957 
to form the all-Nigerian Federal Executive Council. NPC federal 
parliamentary leader Balewa was appointed prime minister. Balewa 
formed a coalition government that included the Action Group as 
well as the NCNC to prepare the country for the final British with- 
drawal. His government guided the country for the next three years, 
operating with almost complete autonomy in internal affairs. 

The preparation of a new federal constitution for an indepen- 
dent Nigeria was carried out at conferences held at Lancaster House 
in London in 1957 and 1958 and presided over by the British colonial 
secretary. Nigerian delegates were selected to represent each region 
and to reflect various shades of opinion. The delegation was led by 
Balewa of the NPC and included party leaders Awolowo of the Ac- 
tion Group, Azikiwe of the NCNC, and Bello of the NPC; they 
were also the premiers of the Western, Eastern, and Northern 
regions, respectively. Independence was achieved on October 1, 
1960. 

Elections were held for a new and greatly enlarged House of 
Representatives in December 1959; 174 of the 312 seats were allo- 
cated to the Northern Region on the basis-o{its larger population. 
The NPC, entering candidates only in the Northern Region, con- 
fined campaigning largely to local issues but opposed the addition 
of new regions. The NCNC backed creation of a midwest state and 
proposed federal control of education and health services. The Ac- 
tion Group, which staged a lively campaign, favored stronger govern- 
ment and the establishment of three new states, while advocating 
creation of a West Africa Federation that would unite Nigeria with 
Ghana and Sierra Leone. The NPC captured 142 seats in the new 
legislature. Balewa was called on to head a NPC-NCNC coalition 
government, and Awolowo became official leader of the opposition. 

Independent Nigeria 

By an act of the British Parliament, Nigeria became an indepen- 
dent country within the Commonwealth on October 1 , 1960. Azildwe 



47 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

was installed as governor general of the federation and Balewa con- 
tinued to serve as head of a democratically elected parliamentary, 
but now completely sovereign, government. The governor general 
represented the British monarch as head of state and was appointed 
by the crown on the advice of the Nigerian prime minister in con- 
sultation with the regional premiers. The governor general, in turn, 
was responsible for appointing the prime minister and for choos- 
ing a candidate from among contending leaders when there was 
no parliamentary majority. Otherwise, the governor general's office 
was essentially ceremonial. 

The government was responsible to a parliament composed of 
the popularly elected 312-member House of Representatives and 
the 44-member Senate, chosen by the regional legislatures. 

In general, the regional constitutions followed the federal model, 
both structurally and functionally. The most striking departure was 
in the Northern Region, where special provisions brought the 
regional constitution into consonance with Islamic law and custom. 
The similarity between the federal and regional constitutions was 
deceptive, however, and the conduct of public affairs reflected wide 
differences among the regions. 

In February 1961, a plebiscite was conducted to determine the 
disposition of the Southern Cameroons and Northern Cameroons, 
which were administered by Britain as United Nations Trust Ter- 
ritories. By an overwhelming majority, voters in the Southern 
Cameroons opted to join formerly French-administered Cameroon 
over integration with Nigeria as a separate federated region. In 
the Northern Cameroons, however, the largely Muslim electorate 
chose to merge with Nigeria's Northern Region. 

Politics in the Crisis Years 

During the first three years after independence, the federal 
government was an NPC-NCNC coalition, despite the conflicting 
natures of the two partners. The former was regionalist, Muslim, 
and aristocratic; the latter was nationalist, Christian, and populist. 
Moreover, the NCNC supported opponents of the NPC in regional 
elections in the Northern Region. Although a more natural ideo- 
logical alignment of the Action Group and the NCNC was called 
for by some Action Group leaders, it held no attraction for the 
NCNC as long as the NPC was assured of a parliamentary majority. 

Domination of the Northern Region by the NPC and NCNC 
control of the Eastern Region were assured. Action Group control 
of the Western Region, however, was weakened and then collapsed 
because of divisions within the party that reflected cleavages within 



48 




Yoruba society. This loss of stability in one region gradually under- 
mined the political structure of the whole country. 

The leadership of the Action Group, which formed the official 
opposition in the federal parliament, split in 1962 as a result of 
a rift between Awolowo and Akintola, prime minister of the Western 
Region. Awolowo favored the adoption of democratic socialism as 
party policy, following the lead of Kwame Nkrumah's regime in 
Ghana. The radical ideology that Awolowo expressed was at vari- 
ance with his earlier positions, however, and was seen as a bid to 
make the Action Group an interregional party that drew support 
across the country from educated younger voters, whose expecta- 
tions were frustrated by unemployment and the rising cost of living. 
Akintola, in reaction, attempted to retain the support of conserva- 
tive party elements who were disturbed by Awolowo 's rhetoric. He 
called for better relations with the NPC and an all-party federal 
coalition that would remove the Action Group from opposition and 
give its leaders greater access to power. 

Awolowo' s radical majority staged the expulsion of Akintola from 
the party. The governor of the Western Region demanded Akin- 
tola's resignation as prime minister (although he had not lost a vote 
of confidence in the regional legislature) and named a successor 
recommended by the Action Group to head the government. Akin- 
tola immediately organized a new party, the United People's Party, 

49 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

which pursued a policy of collaboration with the NPC-NCNC 
government in the federal parliament. 

Akintola's resignation in May 1962 sparked bloody rioting in 
the Western Region and brought effective government to an end 
as rival legislators, following the example in the streets, introduced 
violence to the floor of the regional legislature. The federal govern- 
ment declared a state of emergency, dissolved the legislature, and 
named a federal administrator for the Western Region. One of his 
first acts was to place many Action Group leaders under house 
arrest. 

Investigations by the federal administrator led to accusations of 
criminal misuse of public funds against Awolowo and other Ac- 
tion Group leaders. A special commission found that Awolowo had 
funneled several million pounds from public development corpo- 
rations to the Action Group through a private investment corpo- 
ration when he was prime minister of the Western Region in the 
1950s. The regional government seized the corporation's assets and 
pressed legal claims against the Action Group. 

In the course of the financial investigation, police uncovered evi- 
dence linking Awolowo with a conspiracy to overthrow the govern- 
ment. With a number of other Action Group leaders, he was 
arrested and put on trial for treason. Authorities charged that 200 
activists had received military training in Ghana and had smug- 
gled arms into Nigeria in preparation for a coup d'etat. Awolowo 
was found guilty, along with seventeen others, and was sentenced 
to ten years in prison. Anthony Enahoro, Awolowo 's chief lieu- 
tenant who had been abroad at the time of the coup, was extradit- 
ed from Britain and also was convicted of treason and imprisoned. 

In the meantime, the state of emergency was lifted and Balewa, 
determining that Akintola had been improperly dismissed, obtained 
his reinstatement as prime minister of the Western Region at the 
head of a coalition between the NCNC and the United People's 
Party. The Action Group successfully contested the legality of this 
action in the courts, but a retroactive amendment to the Western 
Region's constitution that validated Akintola's reappointment was 
quickly enacted. As Balewa told parliament, the legalities of the 
case "had been overtaken by events." 

Later in 1963, Nigeria became a republic within the Common- 
wealth. The change in status called for no practical alteration of 
the constitutional system. The president, elected to a five-year term 
by a joint session of the parliament, replaced the crown as the sym- 
bol of national sovereignty and the British monarchy as head of 
state. Azikiwe, who had been governor general, became the repub- 
lic's first president. 



50 



Historical Setting 



New State Movements 

After independence the attitudes of the major parties toward the 
formation of new states that could accommodate minority aspira- 
tions varied widely. The NCNC espoused self-determination for 
ethnic minorities but only in accordance with its advocacy of a uni- 
tary state. The Action Group also supported such movements, in- 
cluding the restoration of the northern Yoruba area (Ilorin) to the 
Western Region, but as part of a multistate, federal Nigeria. The 
NPC steadfastly opposed separatism in the Northern Region and 
attempted with some success to win over disaffected minorities in 
the middle belt. 

Proposals were introduced for the creation of three states as a 
means of restructuring the regions along ethnic lines. The most 
extensive revision sought the separation of the middle belt from 
the Northern Region, a move the United Middle Belt Congress 
promoted. Serious riots in Tivland in 1960 and 1964 were related 
to this agitation. Another plan was put forward by the Edo and 
western Igbo to create the Midwestern Region by separating the 
whole tract adjacent to the Niger River from the Yoruba-dominated 
Western Region. At the same time, Ijaw and Efik-Ibibio ethnic 
groups proposed that the coast between the Niger Delta and Cala- 
bar become a new region in order to end Igbo dominance in that 
area. At this time, however, only the Midwestern Region achieved 
formal approval, despite opposition of the Action Group. The cre- 
ation of the region was confirmed by plebiscite in 1963. 

The creation of the Midwestern Region reopened the question 
of the internal restructuring of Nigeria. One motive for a more 
drastic restructuring was the desire to break up the Northern 
Region. That region, having more than half the country's popu- 
lation, controlled a majority of the seats in the House of Represen- 
tatives. There was also the fear that the Igbo-dominated NCNC 
would gain control of the Midwestern legislature and thereby be- 
come even more powerful. A new political coalition, the Midwest 
Democratic Front (MDF), was formed by leaders of the Action 
Group and the United People's Party to contest the Midwestern 
Region election with the NCNC. During the campaign, the con- 
servative United People's Party accepted support from the NPC, 
a fact that NCNC candidates stressed in their call to keep north- 
ern influence out of the region. Many Action Group workers with- 
drew support from the MDF in protest, and some allied themselves 
with the NCNC. In the 1964 elections, the NCNC won by a 
landslide. 



51 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



The Census Controversy 

Because seats in the House of Representatives were apportioned 
on the basis of population, the constitutionally mandated decen- 
nial census had important political implications (see Population, 
ch. 2; The First Republic, ch. 4). The Northern Region's politi- 
cal strength, marshaled by the NPC, had arisen in large measure 
from the results of the 1952-53 census, which had identified 54 per- 
cent of the country's population in that area. A national campaign 
early in 1962 addressed the significance of the forthcoming census. 
Politicians stressed the connection between the census and parlia- 
mentary representation on the one hand, and the amount of finan- 
cial support for regional development on the other. The 1962 census 
was taken by head count, but there was evidence that many enumer- 
ators obtained their figures from heads of families, and many per- 
sons managed to be counted more than once. 

Southern hopes for a favorable reapportionment of legislative 
seats were buoyed by preliminary results, which gave the south 
a clear majority. A supplementary count was immediately taken 
in the Northern Region that turned up an additional 9 million per- 
sons reportedly missed in the first count. Charges of falsification 
were voiced on all sides and led to an agreement among federal 
and regional governments to nullify the count and to conduct a 
new census. 

The second nationwide census reported a population of 60.5 mil- 
lion, which census officials considered impossibly high. A scaled- 
down figure of 55.6 million, including 29.8 million in the North- 
ern Region, finally was submitted and adopted by the federal 
government, leaving legislative apportionment virtually unchanged. 

Demographers generally rejected the results of the 1963 census 
as inflated, arguing that the actual figure was as much as 10 mil- 
lion lower. Controversy over the census remained a lively political 
issue. NCNC leaders publicly charged the Northern Region's 
government with fraud, a claim that was denied by Balewa and 
by Bello, the regional prime minister. 

Popular Disillusionment and Political Realignment 

The conspiracy trials that led to the conviction of two of the coun- 
try 's most dynamic politicians, Awolowo and Enahoro, severely 
weakened public confidence in the political and judicial systems. 
Abuses were widespread, including intimidation of opponents by 
threats of criminal investigation, manipulation of the constitution 
and the courts, diversion of public funds to party and private use, 
rigging of elections, and corruption of public officials whose political 



52 



Historical Setting 



patrons expected them to put party interests ahead of their legal 
responsibilities. Popular disillusion also intensified because politi- 
cians failed to produce benefits commensurate with expectations 
of constituents. 

The volatile political scene leading up to elections in 1964 was 
ominous. The Action Group virtually disappeared from the federal 
parliament as a result of the Awolowo affair, thereby fundamen- 
tally altering political alignments at the national level. By early 1964, 
therefore, the federal parliament no longer had a recognized op- 
position. Akintola's party, which was renamed the Nigerian Na- 
tional Democratic Party in an effort to attract more support, now 
dominated the Western Region. The federal government nomi- 
nally consisted of a consensus of the ruling parties of all four regions, 
but it was a fragile alliance at best and had emerged as a result 
of heavy-handed tactics. The NCNC had strengthened its position 
by gaining firm control of the Midwestern Region, so that it domi- 
nated two of the four regions. Akintola managed to undermine the 
NCNC in the Western Region, even though nationally he was 
pledged to an alliance with the NCNC. For its part, the NCNC 
denounced Akintola's party as a "tool of the NPC" and allied it- 
self with remnants of the Action Group. 

Political realignment was deceptive, however, because the basic 
divisions within the country remained unaltered. The NPC was 
reasonably secure in the Northern Region, despite the presence 
of minor parties, but it could not govern Nigeria alone, and alli- 
ances with any of the southern parties were ideologically incom- 
patible and very tenuous. The NPC continued its dominance 
because of the inability of the other parties to find common ground 
among themselves and with northern progressives. Awolowo 's 
pointed remarks in 1963 that democracy could be secured only if 
the Action Group and the NCNC could reach an accommodation 
that would remove the deadweight of the NPC from power fueled 
NPC concerns. The detention of Awolowo prevented that alliance 
from maturing, but it did not result in greater political stability. 
Indeed the alliance between the NPC and NCNC, which had domi- 
nated federal politics and destroyed the Action Group, now fell 
apart. 

The 1964-65 Elections 

The federal parliamentary election campaign in December 
1964 — the first since independence — was contested by two political 
alliances incorporating all the major parties. The Nigerian Nation- 
al Alliance (NNA) was composed of the NPC, Akintola's Western- 
based Nigerian National Democratic Party, and opposition parties 



53 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

representing ethnic minorities in the Midwestern and Eastern 
regions. It was opposed by the United Progressive Grand Alliance 
(UPGA), which joined the NCNC and the remnants of the Action 
Group with two minority-based northern allies, the Northern Ele- 
ments Progressive Union and the United Middle Belt Congress. 

Not surprisingly, the NNA adopted a platform that reflected the 
views of the northern political elite and, hence, was an attempt 
by the NPC to gain firmer control of federal politics through an 
alliance with the Western Region. Its appeal to voters outside the 
north was based essentially on the advantages to be gained from 
associating with the party in power. The NNA preyed on Yoruba 
fears of Igbo domination of the federal government. The UPGA 
was employed in an attempt by the NCNC to use the two regional 
governments that it controlled as a springboard to domination of 
the federal government. Strategically it offered a reformist program, 
combining a planned economy that endorsed increased public 
spending while also encouraging private enterprise. The UPGA 
proposed to divide the country into states that reflected ethnicity. 
Its proposals were intended to undermine the existing regional basis 
of political power by creating a sufficient number of states in each 
region so that none of the major ethnic groups — Hausa, Yoruba, 
or Igbo — could dominate a region. The UPGA presented itself as 
an alternative to northern and, more specifically, to Hausa- Fulani 
domination of the federal government. Convinced that it would 
win if the election were held in an atmosphere free from interfer- 
ence by ruling parties in the Northern Region and the Western 
Region, the UPGA spent most of its efforts denouncing what it 
regarded as NNA intentions to rig the election in those regions. 

The election was postponed for several weeks because of dis- 
crepancies between the number of names on voting rolls and on 
census returns. Even then the UPGA was not satisfied and called 
on its supporters to boycott the election. The boycott was effective 
in the Eastern Region, where polling places did not open in fifty- 
one constituencies that had more than one candidate running for 
office. In other constituencies in the region, UPGA candidates ran 
unopposed. Nationwide, only 4 million voters cast ballots, out of 
15 million who were eligible. The NNA elected 198 candidates, 
of whom 162 represented the NPC, from the 261 constituencies 
returning results. After an embarrassing delay, President Azikiwe 
agreed to ask Balewa to form a government with the NNA majority. 
The boycott had failed to stop the election, and in March 1965 
supplementary elections were held in those areas in the Eastern 
Region and in Lagos where the boycott had been honored. UPGA 
candidates were elected in all these constituencies, bringing the 



54 



Third session of the Enugu Provincial Assembly in the early 1960s 
Courtesy Embassy of Nigeria, Washington 

NCNC -dominated coalition a total of 108 seats in the House of 
Representatives. The UPGA became the official opposition. 

After this decisive defeat, the UPGA prepared for the Novem- 
ber 1965 legislative election in the Western Region in an attempt 
to gain control of the three southern regions and the Federal Ter- 
ritory of Lagos, the region surrounding the capital. If successful, 
the NPC -dominated NNA still would have controlled the House 
of Representatives, but it would have given the predominantly 
southern UPGA a majority in the Senate, whose members were 
chosen by the regional legislatures. 

Once more NCNC strategy failed. Amid widespread charges of 
voting irregularities, Akintola's NNDP, supported by its NPC ally, 
scored an impressive victory in November. There were extensive 
protests, including considerable grumbling among senior army offi- 
cials, at the apparent perversion of the democratic process. In the 
six months after the election, an estimated 2,000 people died in 
violence that erupted in the Western Region. In the face of the 
disorders, the beleaguered Balewa delegated extraordinary pow- 
ers to the regional governments to deal with the situation. By this 
time, Azikiwe and the prime minister were scarcely on speaking 
terms, and there were suggestions that Nigeria's armed forces 
should restore order. 



55 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

In January 1966, army officers attempted to seize power. In a 
well-coordinated action, the conspirators, most of whom were Igbo, 
assassinated Balewa in Lagos, Akintola in Ibadan, and Bello in 
Kaduna, as well as senior officers of northern origin. In a public 
proclamation, the coup leaders pledged to establish a strong and 
efficient government committed to a progressive program and even- 
tually to new elections. They vowed to stamp out corruption and 
to suppress violence. Despite the bloody and calculated character 
of the coup, these sentiments appealed directly to younger, edu- 
cated Nigerians in all parts of the country. 

The army's commander in chief, Major General Johnson Aguiyi 
Ironsi, quickly intervened to restore discipline within the army. 
In the absence of Azikiwe, who was undergoing treatment in a Lon- 
don hospital, Balewa' s shaken cabinet resigned, leaving the reins 
of authority to the armed forces. Ironsi, also an Igbo, suspended 
the constitution, dissolved all legislative bodies, banned political 
parties, and as an interim measure formed a Federal Military 
Government (FMG) to prepare the country for a return to civilian 
rule at an unspecified date. He appointed military governors in 
each region and assigned officers to ministerial positions, instructing 
them to implement sweeping institutional reforms. 

Ironsi and his advisers favored a unitary form of government, 
which they thought would eliminate the intransigent regionalism 
that had been the stumbling block to political and economic 
progress. A decree issued in March abolished the federation and 
unified the federal and regional civil services. Civilian experts, large- 
ly Igbo, set to work on a new constitution that would provide for 
a centralized unitary government such as the NCNC had favored 
since the 1950s. 

Although the decree contained a number of concessions to region- 
al interests, including protection of northerners from southern com- 
petition in the civil service, Ironsi' s action showed dangerous 
disregard for the nuances of regional politics and badly misjudged 
the intensity of ethnic sensitivities in the aftermath of the bloody 
coup. The failure of the military government to prosecute Igbo 
officers responsible for murdering northern leaders stirred animos- 
ities further. Igbo civil servants and merchants residing in the north 
made the situation even worse through their triumphant support 
for the coup. Furthermore, Ironsi was vulnerable to accusations 
of favoritism toward the Igbo. The coup was perceived not so much 
as an effort to impose a unitary government as a plot by the Igbo 
to dominate Nigeria. Likewise, many Muslims saw the military 
decrees as Christian-inspired attempts to undermine emirate 
government. 



56 



Historical Setting 



Troops of northern origin, who made up the bulk of the infan- 
try, became increasingly restive. Fighting broke out between them 
and Igbo soldiers in garrisons in the south. In June mobs in the 
northern cities, abetted by local officials, carried out a pogrom 
against resident Igbo, massacring several hundred people and de- 
stroying Igbo-owned property. Some northern leaders spoke seri- 
ously of secession. Many northerners feared that Ironsi intended 
to deprive them of power and to consolidate further an Igbo- 
dominated centralized state. 

In July northern officers and army units staged a countercoup, 
during which Ironsi and a number of other Igbo officers were killed. 
The Muslim officers named thirty-one-year-old Lieutenant Colonel 
(later Major General) Yakubu "Jack" Gowon, a Christian from 
a small ethnic group (the Anga) in the middle belt, as a compromise 
candidate to head the FMG. A young and relatively obscure officer 
serving as army chief of staff, Gowon had not been involved in 
the coup, but he enjoyed wide support among northern troops who 
subsequently insisted that he be given a position in the ruling body. 
His first act was to repeal the Ironsi decree and to restore federal- 
ism, a step followed by the release of Awolowo and Enahoro from 
prison. 

Civil War 

Throughout the remainder of 1966 and into 1967, the FMG 
sought to convene a constituent assembly for revision of the con- 
stitution that might enable an early return to civilian rule. Nonethe- 
less, the tempo of violence increased. In September attacks on Igbo 
in the north were renewed with unprecedented ferocity, stirred up 
by Muslim traditionalists with the connivance, Eastern Region lead- 
ers believed, of northern political leaders. The army was sharply 
divided along regional lines. Reports circulated that troops from 
the Northern Region had participated in the mayhem. The esti- 
mated number of deaths ranged as high as 30,000, although the 
figure was probably closer to 8,000 to 10,000. More than 1 mil- 
lion Igbo returned to the Eastern Region. In retaliation, some north- 
erners were massacred in Port Harcourt and other eastern cities, 
and a counterexodus of non-Igbo was under way. 

The Eastern Region's military governor, Lieutenant Colonel 
Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, was under pressure from Igbo 
officers to assert greater independence from the FMG. Indeed, the 
eastern military government refused to recognize Gowon' s legitima- 
cy on the ground that he was not the most senior officer in the chain 
of command. Some of Ojukwu 's colleagues questioned whether the 
country could be reunited amicably after the outrages committed 



57 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

against the Igbo in the Northern Region. Ironically, many respon- 
sible easterners who had advocated a unitary state now called for 
looser ties with the other regions. 

The military commanders and governors, including Ojukwu, 
met in Lagos to consider solutions to the regional strife. But they 
failed to reach a settlement, despite concessions offered by the north- 
erners, because it proved impossible to guarantee the security of 
Igbo outside the Eastern Region. The military conferees reached 
a consensus only in the contempt they expressed for civilian politi- 
cians. Fearing for his safety, Ojukwu refused invitations to attend 
subsequent meetings in Lagos. 

In January 1967, the military leaders and senior police officials 
met at Aburi, Ghana, at the invitation of the Ghanaian military 
government. By now the Eastern Region was threatening seces- 
sion. In a last-minute effort to hold Nigeria together, the military 
reached an accord that provided for a loose confederation of regions. 
The federal civil service vigorously opposed the Aburi Agreement, 
however. Awolowo, regrouping his supporters, demanded the 
removal of all northern troops garrisoned in the Western Region 
and warned that if the Eastern Region left the federation, the 
Western Region would follow. The FMG agreed to the troop with- 
drawal. 

In May Gowon issued a decree implementing the Aburi Agree- 
ment. Even the Northern Region leaders, who had been the first 
to threaten secession, now favored the formation of a multistate 
federation. Meanwhile, the military governor of the Midwestern 
Region announced that his region must be considered neutral in 
the event of civil war. 

The Ojukwu government rejected the plan for reconciliation and 
made known its intention to retain all revenues collected in the 
Eastern Region in reparation for the cost of resettling Igbo refugees. 
The eastern leaders had reached the point of rupture in their rela- 
tions with Lagos and the rest of Nigeria. Despite offers made by 
the FMG that met many of Ojukwu 's demands, the Eastern Region 
Consultative Assembly voted May 26 to secede from Nigeria. In 
Lagos, Gowon proclaimed a state of emergency and unveiled plans 
for abolition of the regions and for redivision of the country into 
twelve states. This provision broke up the Northern Region, under- 
mining the possibility of continued northern domination and offer- 
ing a major concession to the Eastern Region. It was also a strategic 
move, which won over eastern minorities and deprived the rebel- 
lious Igbo heartland of its control over the oil fields and access 
to the sea. Gowon also appointed prominent civilians, including 



58 



Historical Setting 



Awolowo, as commissioners in the federal and new state govern- 
ments, thus broadening his political support. 

On May 30, Ojukwu answered the federal decree with the procla- 
mation of the independent Republic of Biafra, named after the Bight 
of Biafra. He cited as the principal cause for this action the Nigerian 
government's inability to protect the lives of easterners and sug- 
gested its culpability in genocide, depicting secession as a mea- 
sure taken reluctantly after all efforts to safeguard the Igbo people 
in other regions had failed. 

Initially, the FMG launched ' 'police measures" to restore the 
authority of Lagos in the Eastern Region. Army units attempted 
to advance into secessionist territory in July, but rebel troops easi- 
ly stopped them. The Biafrans retaliated with a surprise thrust into 
the Midwestern Region, where they seized strategic points. 
However, effective control of the delta region remained under fed- 
eral control despite several rebel attempts to take the non-Igbo area. 
The federal government began to mobilize large numbers of recruits 
to supplement its 10,000-member army. 

By the end of 1967, federal forces had regained the Midwestern 
Region and secured the delta region, which was reorganized as the 
Rivers State and the Southeastern State, cutting off Biafra from 
direct access to the sea. But a proposed invasion of the rebel-held 
territory, now confined to the Igbo heardand, stalled along the 
stiffened Biafran defense perimeter. 

A stalemate developed as federal attacks on key towns broke down 
in the face of stubborn Biafran resistance. Ill-armed and trained 
under fire, rebel troops nonetheless had the benefit of superior 
leadership and superb morale. Although vastly outnumbered and 
outgunned, the Biafrans probed weak points in the federal lines, 
making lightning tactical gains, cutting off and encircling advanc- 
ing columns, and launching commando raids behind federal lines. 
Biafran strikes across the Niger managed to pin down large con- 
centrations of federal troops on the west bank. 

In September 1968, Owerri was captured by federal troops ad- 
vancing from the south, and early in 1969 the federal army, ex- 
panded to nearly 250,000 men, opened three fronts in what Gowon 
touted as the "final offensive." Although federal forces flanked the 
rebels by crossing the Niger at Onitsha, they failed to break through. 
The Biafrans subsequently retook Owerri in fierce fighting and 
threatened to push on to Port Harcourt until thwarted by a renewed 
federal offensive in the south. That offensive tightened the noose 
around the rebel enclave without choking it into submission. 

Biafran propaganda, which stressed the threat of genocide to the 
Igbo people, was extremely effective abroad in winning sympathy 



59 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



for the secessionist movement. Food and medical supplies were 
scarce in Biafra. Humanitarian aid, as well as arms and munitions, 
reached the embattled region from international relief organiza- 
tions and from private and religious groups in the United States 
and Western Europe by way of nighttime airlifts over the war zone. 
The bulk of Biafra' s military supplies was purchased on the inter- 
national arms market, with unofficial assistance provided by France 
through former West African colonies. In one of the most dramat- 
ic episodes of the civil war, Carl Gustav von Rosen, a Swedish count 
who at one time commanded the Ethiopian air force, and several 
other Swedish pilots flew five jet trainers modified for combat in 
successful strikes against Nigerian military installations. 

Biafra' s independence was recognized by Tanzania, Zambia, 
Gabon, and the Ivory Coast, but it was compromised in the eyes of 
most African states by the approval of South Africa, Southern Rho- 
desia, and Portugal. Britain extended diplomatic support and limited 
military assistance to the federal government. The Soviet Union 
became an important source of military equipment for Nigeria. 
Modern Soviet-built warplanes, flown by Egyptian and British 
pilots, interdicted supply flights and inflicted heavy casualties during 
raids on Biafran urban centers. In line with its policy of nonin- 
volvement, the United States prohibited the sale of military goods 
to either side while continuing to recognize the FMG. 

In October 1969, Ojukwu appealed for United Nations (UN) 
mediation for a cease-fire as a prelude to peace negotiations. But 
the federal government insisted on Biafra' s surrender, and Gowon 
observed that " rebel leaders had made it clear that this is a fight 
to the finish and that no concession will ever satisfy them." In De- 
cember federal forces opened a four-pronged offensive, involving 
120,000 troops, that sliced Biafra in half. When Owerri fell on Janu- 
ary 6, 1970, Biafran resistance collapsed. Ojukwu fled to the Ivory 
Coast, leaving his chief of staff, Philip Effiong, behind as "officer 
administering the government." Effiong called for an immediate, 
unconditional cease-fire January 12 and submitted to the authori- 
ty of the federal government at ceremonies in Lagos. 

Estimates in the former Eastern Region of the number of dead 
from hostilities, disease, and starvation during the thirty-month 
civil war are estimated at between 1 million and 3 million. The 
end of the fighting found more than 3 million Igbo refugees crowded 
into a 2, 500- square-kilometer enclave. Prospects for the survival 
of many of them and for the future of the region were dim. There 
were severe shortages of food, medicine, clothing, and housing. The 
economy of the region was shattered. Cities were in ruins; schools, 
hospitals, utilities, and transportation facilities were destroyed or 



60 



Historical Setting 



inoperative. Overseas groups instituted a major relief effort, but 
the FMG insisted on directing all assistance and recovery opera- 
tions and barred some agencies that had supplied aid to Biafra. 

Because charges of genocide had fueled international sympathy 
for Biafra, the FMG allowed a team of international experts to ob- 
serve the surrender and to look for evidence. Subsequently, the 
observers testified that they found no evidence of genocide or sys- 
tematic destruction of property, although there was considerable 
evidence of famine and death as a result of the war. Furthermore, 
under Gowon's close supervision, the federal government ensured 
that Igbo civilians would not be treated as defeated enemies. A pro- 
gram was launched to reintegrate the Biafran rebels into a unified 
Nigeria. A number of public officials who had "actively counselled, 
aided, or abetted" secession were dismissed, but a clear distinc- 
tion was made between them and those who had simply carried 
out their duties. Igbo personnel soon were being reenlisted in the 
federal armed forces. There were no trials and few people were 
imprisoned. Ojukwu, in exile, was made the scapegoat, but efforts 
to have him extradited failed. 

An Igbo official, Ukapi "Tony" Asika, was named administra- 
tor of the new East Central State, comprising the Igbo heartland. 
Asika had remained loyal to the federal government during the civil 
war, but as a further act of conciliation, his all-Igbo cabinet in- 
cluded members who had served under the secessionist regime. Asi- 
ka was unpopular with many Igbo, who considered him a traitor, 
and his administration was characterized as inept and corrupt. In 
three years under his direction, however, the state government 
achieved the rehabilitation of 70 percent of the industry incapaci- 
tated during the war. The federal government granted funds to 
cover the state's operating expenses for an interim period, and much 
of the war damage was repaired. Social services and public utili- 
ties were slowly reinstituted, although not to the prewar levels. 

The Federal Military Government in the Postwar Era 

In the postwar period, all significant political power remained 
concentrated in the FMG. None of the three major ethnic groups 
had a powerful voice in its executive element, which was dispropor- 
tionately composed of representatives of middle belt minorities and 
to a lesser extent of Muslim Yoruba and of Ijaw and Ibibio from 
the Eastern Region. The Northern Region had been divided into 
six states in 1967, which left the area without its former power base 
in the federation. The decision was accepted by northerners in part 
because of the military government's relative strength in comparison 
with earlier civilian governments. Acceptance also was motivated 



61 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

by the fact that northerners were less fearful of the Igbo or a southern 
coalition. Only the Yoruba power base in the west retained its 
prewar characteristics. The 1967 administrative structure also made 
national unity attractive to the westerners because, with the crea- 
tion of a Yoruba state (Kwara) in the north, their position seemed 
stronger relative to the northerners. Remaining points of conflict 
included the number of civil service posts to be allotted to each 
ethnic group and the assignment of civil servants from former 
regional services to states other than their own. 

The Gowon Regime 

Gowon' s influence depended upon his position as chairman of 
the Supreme Military Council, which had come into existence in 
March 1967. The council included top-ranking staff officers, service 
and police heads, state military governors, and the civilian adminis- 
trator of the East Central State. Gowon also chaired the Federal 
Executive Council, the cabinet of ministers composed of military 
officers and civilian technocrats. The regime ruled by decree, 
although the concurrence of state military governors was sought 
before decrees were issued. 

In October 1970, Gowon announced his intention to stay in pow- 
er until 1976, which was set as the target year for completion of 
the military's political program and the return to an elected civilian 
government. Gowon outlined a nine-point program that would ena- 
ble the military to relinquish control. Included in the package were 
reorganization of the armed forces; implementation of a national 
economic development plan, including reconstruction of war- 
damaged areas; eradication of corruption; establishment of more 
states; adoption of a new constitution; introduction of a formula 
for allocating revenue; completion of a national census; organiza- 
tion of national political parties; and elections at federal and state 
levels. Criticism of the six-year plan was widespread because the 
agenda was so broad. Many Nigerians feared that the military 
planned to retain power indefinitely. The reaction of civilian poli- 
ticians was particularly negative. Muslim traditionalists also ex- 
pressed concerns that military rule, with its modernizing tendencies, 
would erode the authority of the emirates. 

Foreign Policy 

Gowon reaffirmed the priorities in foreign policy established at 
independence. These included active participation in the UN, 
advocacy of pan-African solidarity through the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU), regional cooperation, support for anti- 
colonial and liberation movements — particularly those in southern 



62 



Railroad construction project in 1963 to open market for 
agricultural produce in northeastern Nigeria 
Courtesy World Bank 

Africa — and nonalignment in the East-West conflict. The role of 
Nigeria in world affairs, outside its African concerns, was insig- 
nificant, however. 

Nigeria was admitted to the UN within a week of independence 
in 1960. It was represented on the committees of specialized agen- 
cies and took its turn as a nonpermanent member of the Security 
Council. One of Nigeria's earliest and most significant contribu- 
tions to the UN was to furnish troops for the peacekeeping opera- 
tion in Zaire in the early 1960s. By 1964 Nigerian army units, under 
Ironsi's command, formed the backbone of the UN force. The 
FMG was committed to eliminating white-minority rule in Afri- 
ca, and it channeled financial and military aid to liberation move- 
ments through the OAU. 

Although there was considerable African criticism of Nigeria dur- 
ing the civil war, the military government resisted this pressure 
as interference in the country's internal affairs. An OAU state- 
ment in 1967 backing the federal position on national unity assuaged 
Nigerian feelings to some extent, but Lagos protested subsequent 
OAU efforts to bring about a cease-fire. When the war ended, 
Nigeria's participation in OAU activities returned to normal. 



63 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



There were minor problems relating to border demarcations with 
neighboring countries, but these were resolved to the satisfaction 
of the parties involved. Relations also were mended with African 
states that had recognized Biafra. Particularly close ties were de- 
veloped with the military regime in Ghana, which gave full sup- 
port to the federal government during the civil war. In 1975 Nigeria 
joined other West African countries in creating the Economic Com- 
munity of West African States (ECOWAS), whose mandate was 
the reduction of trade barriers among countries in the region. Spon- 
sored by Gowon, the agreement was indicative of the government's 
concern with improving intraregional economic ties. 

Nigeria played an active role in the Commonwealth, which linked 
Nigeria to developing countries outside Africa and complemented 
regional ties through ECOWAS and the OAU. Financial and tech- 
nical assistance was channeled to Nigeria through the Common- 
wealth. The aid came from Britain, Canada, and Australia, with 
which Nigeria had advantageous trade relations. Nigeria's interac- 
tion with Britain continued to be cooperative, although the renewal 
of arms sales to South Africa, permitted by the Conservative Brit- 
ish government in the early 1970s, caused some strain in Nigeria. 
Relations cooled even more because of Nigeria's apprehension over 
Britain's application for entry into the European Economic Com- 
munity (EEC). Nigeria feared that it would suffer economically 
as a result of British membership in the EEC . 

The FMG was committed to the principle of nonalignment, a 
policy initially established in the early years of independence. Ac- 
ceptance of Western aid — including US$225 million from the Unit- 
ed States in the early years of independence — tended to undermine 
this position. Nigeria had begun to move toward a more autono- 
mous position in 1962, when the Anglo- Nigerian Defense Pact was 
abrogated. With this step, Nigeria affirmed its independence of 
British foreign policy to which it had adhered since achieving na- 
tionhood. The abrogation of the pact was a clear message of 
nonalignment. During the war, the federal government accepted 
assistance from both East and West. Aircraft and heavy equipment 
were purchased from the Soviet Union, for example, because Brit- 
ain and the United States refused to supply heavy armaments. 
Nigeria's relations with the United States were good, largely be- 
cause the United States provided financial aid and recognized the 
FMG during the civil war. United States ties with South Africa 
and Portugal caused some friction on the official level, and there 
was considerable criticism in the Nigerian press. The Nigerian ver- 
sion of nonalignment had a slightly pro- Western tilt. 



64 



Historical Setting 



Economic Development 

After the civil war, the FMG moved to resurrect the six-year 
development plan inaugurated in 1962. The First National Develop- 
ment Plan charted Nigeria's transition from an essentially agricul- 
tural economy to a mixed economy based on agricultural expansion 
and limited industrial growth. Government was heavily involved 
in the economy because locally generated private investment was 
unable to generate sufficient capital for development. New develop- 
ment plans were instituted in 1970 and 1975, but the goals set in 
all three plans proved unrealistic (see Planning, ch. 3). 

By the late 1960s, oil had replaced cocoa, peanuts, and palm 
products as the country's biggest foreign exchange earner. In 1971 
Nigeria — by then the world's seventh-largest petroleum producer — 
became a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Export- 
ing Countries (OPEC). The dramatic rise in world oil prices in 
1974 caused a sudden flood of wealth that can be described as "dy- 
namic chaos." Much of the revenue was intended for investment 
to diversify the economy, but it also spurred inflation and, com- 
ing in the midst of widespread unemployment, underscored ineq- 
uities in distribution. In 1975 production fell sharply as a result 
of the sudden decrease in world demand, and prices moved down- 
ward until late in the year when OPEC intervened to raise prices. 
Nigeria fully supported OPEC policies. 

In 1972 the government issued an indigenization decree, the first 
of a number of Nigerian Enterprises Promotion decrees that barred 
aliens from investing in specified enterprises and reserved partici- 
pation in certain trades to Nigerians. At the time, about 70 per- 
cent of commercial firms operating in Nigeria were foreign-owned. 
In 1975 the federal government bought 60 percent of the equity 
in the marketing operations of the major oil companies in Nigeria, 
but full nationalization was rejected as a means of furthering its 
program of indigenization. 

Unemployment constituted an increasingly serious problem. 
Large numbers of farm workers who had gone to urban areas in 
search of higher wages remained in the cities even if they failed 
to find jobs, while school graduates and dropouts flooded the labor 
market at a rate of 600,000 a year in the mid-1970s. Unemploy- 
ment reached its highest levels in the crowded Igbo areas in the 
east, where the economy still was recovering from the effects of 
the war. Skilled workers were reluctant to leave the east in search 
of work, although eventually the shortage of skilled workers in other 
parts of the country began to have its effect in overcoming Igbo 
fears. The dangers involved in discharging large numbers of soldiers 



65 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



who had no job prospects made demobilization of the costly mili- 
tary establishment undesirable. Substantial increases in public-sector 
employment promised to absorb some of the soldiers, but they 
lacked training. These economic problems assumed an imposing 
political dimension. To some extent, they reflected a pattern in 
the world economic situation, but the popular imagination blamed 
corruption and mismanagement and held the Gowon regime 
responsible. 

The regime also had to deal with a severe drought that struck 
the northern states between 1972 and 1974. The drought was the 
most serious since that of 1913-14. The drought and resulting fam- 
ine affected the Sahel countries to the west, north, and east far more 
than Nigeria, but considerable numbers of refugees poured into 
Nigeria from Niger. Famine conditions also prevailed in some parts 
of the north of Nigeria. In the long run, however, Nigerian agricul- 
ture benefited from the rise in prices that resulted from crop failures 
in other parts of the Sahel. In the short run, the drought influenced 
policy decisions about the necessity of promoting irrigation schemes 
and reforestation. 

Crime, Corruption, and Political Turbulence 

In 1972 Gowon partially lifted the ban on political activity that 
had been in force since 1966 in order to permit a discussion of a 
new constitution that would prepare the way for civilian rule. The 
debate that followed was ideologically charged. Awolowo's call for 
a transition to "democratic socialism" made the military particu- 
larly nervous. The press, trade unions, and universities demand- 
ed a quick return to the democratic process. The call for new states 
was loud, but there was no agreement over how many there should 
be. Gowon abruptly ended public discussion, explaining that "peace 
is more important than politics." 

The decennial census was scheduled for 1973. Under the ban- 
ner "Prepare to be Counted," the military government conduct- 
ed a public campaign that emphasized the technical rather than 
political dimensions of the exercise. The procedure was to be su- 
pervised by a committee whose members were selected carefully 
for geographical and ethnic balance, and computers were to be used 
for processing the returns. Despite measures taken to ensure a more 
accurate count than had been possible before, the results once again 
confounded demographers: the census found that Nigeria's popu- 
lation had increased by nearly 44 percent in 10 years, a rate of 
growth unprecedented in any developing country. According to 
the returns submitted, the north contained 64 percent of the total 
population, compared with 53.7 percent in 1963, a figure even then 



66 



Historical Setting 



believed to be exaggerated. The 1973 census, on which represen- 
tation in a new, elected parliament would be based, revived fears 
that one ethnic group would permanently dominate the others. It 
also meant that a considerable share of oil revenues would flow 
to the northern states under the existing system of allocation. The 
government failed in its efforts to sell the census as a technical ex- 
ercise because the political implications were widely understood 
and hotly debated, despite the ban on political discussion. 

The Gowon regime came under fire because of widespread and 
obvious corruption at every level of national life. Graft, bribery, 
and nepotism were an integral part of a complex system of patronage 
and * ■ gift" giving through which influence and authority were as- 
serted. Although the military had pledged to rid the government 
of corruption, the public became increasingly aware of abuses, 
primarily because of daily exposes in the press. In 1973 the feder- 
al government established a special anticorruption police force — 
the "X-Squad" — whose subsequent investigations revealed ingeni- 
ous forms of extortion and fraud — not only in government and pub- 
lic corporations but also in private business and in the professions. 

A major scandal that had international implications and reached 
the highest levels of government and the business community took 
place in the mid-1970s; it involved the purchase abroad of con- 
struction materials by state agents at prices well above market 
values. Rake-offs were pocketed by public officials and private con- 
tractors. Other scandals in hospitals and orphanages shocked the 
populace, and corruption in importing medical drugs whose effec- 
tive dates long since had expired revealed that even the health of 
Nigerians was at risk. 

Inefficiencies compounded the impact of corruption. In 
mid- 1975, 400 cargo ships — 250 of them carrying 1.5 million tons 
of cement — clogged the harbor of Lagos, which had been para- 
lyzed for fifteen months with vessels waiting to be unloaded. To 
compound the error, spoiled and inferior- grade cement was con- 
cealed by mixing it with acceptable material for use in public build- 
ing projects. Later, buildings collapsed or had to be dismantled 
because of the inferior product. New roads washed away because 
of bad construction and inadequate controls. In these scandals, as 
in others, the culprits were a combination of Nigerian business- 
men, government officials, and foreign companies. Few people and 
few projects seemed exempt from the scourge. 

Crime posed a threat to internal security and had a seriously 
negative impact on efforts to bring about economic development. 
Armed gangs, often composed of former soldiers, roamed the coun- 
tryside engaging in robbery, extortion, and kidnapping. The gangs 



67 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



sometimes operated with the connivance of the police or included 
moonlighting soldiers. Pirates raided cargo ships awaiting entry 
to ports or unloaded them at the piers ahead of the stevedores. Drug 
trafficking and smuggling were prevalent. Punishment was meted 
out to large batches of convicted and suspected criminals, who were 
dispatched by firing squads in public executions meant to impress 
spectators with the seriousness of the offenses and with the govern- 
ment's concern to curb crime. These measures had no noticeable 
effect on the crime rate, however, but seemed rather to provoke 
a callous public attitude toward violence. 

In January 1975, Gowon revamped the membership of the Fed- 
eral Executive Council, increasing the number of military ministers. 
He depended more and more on a small group of advisers and be- 
came increasingly inaccessible to his military colleagues. Without 
broad consultation, he backed off from the 1976 date set for a return 
to civilian rule, explaining that to adhere rigidly to it would 
"amount to a betrayal of a trust" and "certainly throw the nation 
back into confusion." Public employees staged protest strikes in 
May and June that brought essential services to a standstill. The 
government responded by granting retroactive wage increases that 
averaged 30 percent; the action fed inflation and led to industrial 
strikes as union members demanded parallel raises. 

The political atmosphere deteriorated to the point that Gowon 
was deposed in a bloodless coup d'etat July 29, 1975 — the ninth an- 
niversary of the revolt that had brought him to power. At the time, 
Gowon was at an OAU summit meeting in Kampala, Uganda. 
The perpetrators of the coup included many of the officers who 
had participated in the July 1966 coup. Even the officers responsi- 
ble for Gowon 's security were involved. Gowon pledged his full 
loyalty to the new regime and left for exile in Britain, where he 
received a pension from the Nigerian government. 

The Regime of Murtala Muhammad, 1975-76 

The armed forces chose thirty-eight-year-old Brigadier (later 
General) Murtala Ramat Muhammad, a Muslim northerner, to 
succeed Gowon. A Hausa, trained at the British military academy 
at Sandhurst, Murtala Muhammad had command of federal field 
forces in the final phase of the civil war, including being responsi- 
ble for the abortive efforts to cross the Niger River. He was not 
directly involved in the coup d'etat that brought him to power, 
but he had played a prominent role in rallying northern officers 
behind the July 1966 coup that felled Ironsi. In a short time, Mur- 
tala Muhammad's policies won him broad popular support, and 
his decisiveness elevated him to the status of a national hero. 



68 



Historical Setting 



One of his first acts was to scrap the 1973 census, which was 
weighted in favor of the north, and to revert to the 1963 count for 
official purposes. Murtala Muhammad removed top federal and 
state officials to break links with the Gowon regime and to restore 
public confidence in the federal government. More than 10,000 
public officials and employees were dismissed without benefits, on 
account of age, health, incompetence, or malpractice. The purge 
affected the civil service, judiciary, police and armed forces, diplo- 
matic service, public corporations, and universities. Some officials 
were brought to trial on charges of corruption, and one former mili- 
tary state governor was executed for gross misconduct in office. 
Murtala Muhammad also began the demobilization of 100,000 
troops from the swollen ranks of the armed forces. 

Twelve of the twenty-five ministerial posts on the new Federal 
Executive Council went to civilians, but the cabinet was secondary 
to the executive Supreme Military Council. Murtala Muhammad 
imposed the authority of the federal government in areas formerly 
reserved for the states, restricting the latitude exercised by state 
governments and their governors in determining and executing poli- 
cy. Newly appointed military governors of the states were not given 
seats on the Supreme Military Coucil, but instead were expected 
to administer federal policies handed down by Murtala Muham- 
mad through the military coucil. The federal government took over 
the operation of the country's two largest newspapers, made broad- 
casting a federal monopoly, and brought remaining state-run 
universities under federal control. 

Murtala Muhammad initiated a comprehensive review of the 
Third National Development Plan. Singling out inflation as the 
greatest danger to the economy, he was determined to reduce the 
money supply that had been swollen by government expenditures 
on public works. Murtala Muhammad also announced that his 
government would encourage the rapid expansion of the private 
sector into areas dominated by public corporations. He reappraised 
foreign policy, stressing a "Nigeria first" orientation in line with 
OPEC price guidelines that was to the disadvantage of other Afri- 
can countries. Nigeria became "neutral" rather than "nonaligned" 
in international affairs. The shift in orientation became apparent 
with respect to Angola. Nigeria had worked with the OAU to bring 
about a negotiated reconciliation of the warring factions in the former 
Portuguese colony, but late in 1975 Murtala Muhammad announced 
Nigeria's support for the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de 
Angola — MP LA), citing South Africa's armed intervention on the 
side of the rival National Union for the Total Independence of 



69 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

Angola (Unicao National para a Independencia Total de Angola — 
UNITA). The realignment strained relations with the United 
States, which argued for the withdrawal of Cuban troops and Soviet 
advisers from Angola. In October the Nigerian air force took deliv- 
ery of Soviet-built aircraft that had been ordered under Gowon. 

Preparation for the Return to Civilian Rule 

Murtala Muhammad set in motion the stalled machinery of devo- 
lution to civilian rule with a commitment to hand over power to 
a democratically elected government by October 1979. The tran- 
sition, as outlined by Murtala Muhammad, would take place in 
successive stages. In August 1975, he appointed a five-member 
panel to study Gowon 's plan for a nineteen- state federation that 
would "help to erase memories of past political ties and emotional 
attachments." The plan, reaffirmed by the panel, assaulted eth- 
nic power by recommending that the predominantly Yoruba 
Western State be divided into three states, the Igbo East Central 
State into two, and the six states of the north into nine states, only 
three of which would be predominantly Hausa-Fulani. Murtala 
Muhammad claimed that he wanted to avoid the "proliferation 
of states" that would highlight the problems of minorities and 
warned petitioners that no further demands for new states would 
be tolerated. In the end, seven more states were created. In 1976 
Nigeria came to have nineteen states. 

In October 1975, Murtala Muhammad named a blue-ribbon 
committee, drawn from business, the professions, universities, and 
the civil service, as well as from prominent civilian political lead- 
ers, to draft a constitution that would be put before a constituent 
assembly for approval. Awolowo, the spokesman for the Nigerian 
left, was excluded from the committee. Murtala Muhammad cau- 
tioned the drafting committee against opening old wounds. He fa- 
vored consensus politics that avoided the institutionalized opposition 
of the former constitution. Rather than a British parliamentary sys- 
tem, he wanted executive and legislative functions clearly defined, 
preferring a strong executive on the United States model. In his 
instructions to the committee, Murtala Muhammad said he 
preferred the elimination of all political parties, and failing that, 
he suggested that parties be limited in number to those with a 
genuinely national constituency. 

Murtala Muhammad was assassinated during an unsuccessful 
coup d'etat in February 1976, and the country went into deep 
mourning. In less than a year, this man had captured the hearts 
of many Nigerians. The political shake-up and the decisive leader- 
ship in the midst of rapid economic growth seemed to promise a 



70 



Historical Setting 



bright future. In fact, there was considerable opposition to Mur- 
tala Muhammad that would have become more pronounced in the 
succeeding months, but this opposition was stifled under the out- 
pouring of national loss. 

The attempted coup reflected dissatisfaction within the military 
that was unconnected with the larger currents of opposition in the 
country. Two groups of conspirators were involved in the coup. 
The first, composed of middle-grade officers, was led by Lieutenant 
Colonel Bukar Dimka, who was related to Go won by marriage. 
Dimka's opposition to Murtala Muhammad was both profession- 
al and political. Dimka's group protested demobilization and al- 
leged that the FMG was "going communist. " A group of colonels 
answering to Major General I.D. Bisalla, the minister of defense, 
waited in the wings for Dimka's group to overthrow the govern- 
ment, and then planned to seize power. Dimka, Bisalla, and thirty- 
eight other conspirators were convicted after a secret trial before 
a military tribunal and were executed publicly by a firing squad. 
Evidence published by the FMG implied that both groups of con- 
spirators had been in communication with Go won, who was ac- 
cused of complicity in the plot against Murtala Muhammad. The 
British government refused to accede to Nigerian demands for Go- 
won' s extradition, however, and protests against the decision forced 
Britain to recall its high commissioner from Lagos. 

The Obasanjo Regime, 1976-79 

Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo, a Yoruba, succeeded 
Murtala Muhammad. As chief of staff of Supreme Headquarters, 
Obasanjo was Murtala Muhammad's deputy and had the support 
of the military. He had commanded the federal division that took 
Owerri, effectively bringing an end to the civil war. Keeping the 
chain of command established by Murtala Muhammad in place, 
Obasanjo pledged to continue the program for the restoration of 
civilian government in 1979 and to carry forward the reform pro- 
gram to improve the quality of public service. 

The draft constitution was published in October 1976, anticipat- 
ing the seating of a constituent assembly in 1977. Debates during 
sessions of the drafting committee were frequently ideological in 
nature, but divisive proposals, such as the attempt to define Nigeria 
as a "socialist" state, were decisively rejected. Committee mem- 
bers discarded Murtala Muhammad's recommendations for a non- 
party system, but they insisted that parties applying for registration 
had to have national objectives and executive boards whose mem- 
bers represented at least two-thirds of the states. The model for 
the constitution, which was adopted in 1979, was based on the 



71 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

Constitution of the United States, with provision for a president, 
Senate, and House of Representatives. The country was now ready 
for local elections, to be followed by national elections, that would 
return Nigeria to civilian rule. 

The military regimes of Murtala Muhammad and Obasanjo 
benefited from a tremendous influx of oil revenue that increased 
350 percent between 1973 and 1974, when oil prices skyrocketed, 
to 1979, when the military stepped down. Increased revenues per- 
mitted massive spending that, unfortunately, was poorly planned 
and concentrated in urban areas. The oil boom was marred by a 
minor recession in 1978-79, but revenues rebounded until 
mid- 1981. The increase in revenues made possible a rapid rise in 
income, especially for the urban middle class. There was a cor- 
responding inflation, particularly in the price of food, that promoted 
both industrialization and the expansion of agricultural produc- 
tion. As a result of the shift to food crops, the traditional export 
earners — peanuts, cotton, cocoa, and palm products — declined in 
significance and then ceased to be important at all. Nigeria's ex- 
ports became dominated by oil. 

Industrialization, which had grown slowly after World War II 
through the civil war, boomed in the 1970s, despite many infra- 
structure constraints. Growth was particularly pronounced in the 
production and assembly of consumer goods, including vehicle as- 
sembly and the manufacture of soap and detergents, soft drinks, 
pharmaceuticals, beer, paint, and building materials. Furthermore, 
there was extensive investment in infrastructure from 1975 to 1980, 
and the number of parastatals — jointly government- and private- 
ly owned companies — proliferated. The Nigerian Enterprises Pro- 
motion decrees of 1972 and 1977 further encouraged the growth 
of an indigenous middle class. 

Plans were undertaken for the movement of the federal capital 
from Lagos to a more central location in the interior at Abuja. Such 
a step was seen as a means of encouraging the spread of industrial 
development inland and of relieving the congestion that threatened 
to choke Lagos. Abuja also was chosen because it was not identi- 
fied with any particular ethnic group. 

Heavy investment was planned in steel production. With Soviet 
assistance, a steel mill was developed at Ajaokuta in Kwara State, 
not far from Abuja. The most significant negative sign was the 
decline of industry associated with agriculture, but large-scale ir- 
rigation projects were launched in the states of Borno, Kano, Soko- 
to, and Bauchi under World Bank (see Glossary) auspices. 

Education also expanded rapidly. At the start of the civil war, 
there were only five universities, but by 1975 the number had 



72 



General Olusegun Obasanjo, 
president 1976-79, 
at Obasanjo Farms, 
Ogun State, 1989 
Courtesy Orlando E. Pacheco 




increased to thirteen, with seven more established over the next 
several years. In 1975 there were 53,000 university students. There 
were similar advances in primary and secondary school education, 
particularly in those northern states that had lagged behind. 

The Second Republic, 1979-83 

The first elections under the 1979 constitution were held on sched- 
ule in July and August 1979, and the FMG handed over power 
to a new civilian government under President Shehu Shagari on 
October 1, 1979. Nigeria's Second Republic was born amid great 
expectations. Oil prices were high, and revenues were on the in- 
crease. It appeared that unlimited development was possible. Un- 
fortunately, the euphoria was short-lived, and the Second Republic 
did not survive its infancy. 

Five major parties competed for power in the first elections in 
1979. As might be expected, there was some continuity between 
the old parties of the First Republic and the new parties of the Se- 
cond Republic. The National Party of Nigeria (NPN), for exam- 
ple, inherited the mantle of the Northern People's Congress, 
although the NPN differed from the NPC in that it obtained sig- 
nificant support in the non-Igbo states of southeastern Nigeria. The 
United Party of Nigeria (UPN) was the successor to the Action 
Group, with Awolowo as its head. Its support was almost entirely 
in the Yoruba states. The Nigerian People's Party (NPP), the 



73 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

successor to the NCNC, was predominantly Igbo and had Azikiwe 
as its leader. An attempt to forge an alliance with non-Hausa-Fulani 
northern elements collapsed in the end, and a breakaway party with 
strong support in parts of the north emerged from the failed alli- 
ance. This northern party was known as the Great Nigerian Peo- 
ple's Party under the leadership of Waziri Ibrahim of Borno. 
Finally, the People's Redemption Party was the successor to the 
Northern Elements Progressive Union and had Aminu Kano as 
its head. 

Just as the NPC dominated the First Republic, its successor, 
the NPN, dominated the Second Republic. Shagari won the 
presidency, defeating Azikiwe in a close and controversial vote. 
The NPN also took 36 of 95 Senate seats, 165 of 443 House of 
Representatives seats and won control of seven states (Sokoto, 
Niger, Bauchi, Benue, Cross River, Kwara, and Rivers). The NPN 
lost the governorship of Kaduna State but secured control of the 
Kaduna legislature. The NPN failed to take Kano and lacked a 
majority in either the Senate or House of Representatives. It was 
forced to form a shaky coalition with the NPP, the successor of 
the NCNC, the old coalition partner of the NPC. The NPP took 
three states (Anambra, Imo, and Plateau), sixteen Senate seats and 
seventy-eight House of Representatives seats, so that in combina- 
tion with the NPN the coalition had a majority in both the House 
of Representatives and the Senate. Nonetheless, the interests of 
the two parties were often in conflict; hence the NPN was forced 
to operate alone in most situations. Even though the presidential 
form of constitution was intended to create a stronger central 
government, the weakness of the coalition undermined effective 
central authority. 

The UPN came in with the second largest number of seats and 
effectively formed the official opposition, just as the Action Group 
had done in the First Republic. The UPN took five states (Lagos, 
Oyo, Ogun, Ondo, and Bendel), 28 Senate seats, and 111 House 
seats. Awolowo continued as spokesman for the left of center. The 
Great Nigerian People's Party managed to win two states (Borno 
and Gongola), eight Senate seats, and forty-three House of 
Representatives seats. The People's Redemption Party, which was 
the most radical of the parties, won Kano and the governorship 
of Kaduna, seven Senate seats, and forty-nine House of Represen- 
tatives seats. 

A number of weaknesses beset the Second Republic. First, the 
coalition that dominated federal politics was not strong, and in ef- 
fect the NPN governed as a minority because no coalition formed 
to challenge its supremacy. Second, there was lack of cooperation 



74 



Historical Setting 



between the NPN-dominated federal government and the twelve 
states controlled by opposition parties. Third, and perhaps most 
important, the oil boom ended in mid- 1981, precisely when ex- 
pectations of continuous growth and prosperity were at a height. 

There were many signs of tension in the country. The Bakalori 
Project, an irrigation scheme in Sokoto, for example, became the 
focus of serious unrest in the late 1970s when thousands of farmers 
protested the loss of their land, and police retaliated by burning 
villages and killing or wounding hundreds of people. Widespread 
dissatisfaction became apparent with the Maitatsine, or Yan Tat- 
sine (followers of the Maitatsine), a quasi-Muslim fringe group that 
sparked religious riots in Kano in 1980 and Kaduna and Maiduguri 
in 1982 after police tried to control their activities (see Islam, ch. 
2). The disturbance in Kano alone resulted in the deaths of 4,177 
people between December 18 and 29, 1980. In 1981 teachers staged 
a strike because they had not been paid. As the political situation 
deteriorated, the federal government looked for scapegoats and 
found them in the large number of foreign workers who had come 
to Nigeria in response to the jobs created by the oil boom. In the 
crackdown on illegal immigration, an estimated 2 million foreigners 
were expelled in January and February 1983, of whom 1 million 
were from Ghana and 150,000 to 200,000 from Niger. 

The recession that set in with the fall in oil prices after the mid- 
dle of 1981 put severe strains on the Second Republic. For politi- 
cal reasons, government spending continued to accelerate, and the 
frictions among the political parties and between the federal govern- 
ment and the states only reinforced financial irresponsibility. Nige- 
ria's foreign debt increased from N3.3 billion (for value of the 
naira— see Glossary) in 1978 to N14.7 billion in 1982. By 1983 
the nineteen state governments had run up a combined debt of 
N13.3 billion. Heavy investment in economic development con- 
tinued unabated. A steel mill at Ajaokuta in Kwara State was 
finished, for example, and a second plant opened at Aladje, near 
Warri, in 1982. Steel rolling mills also were built at Jos, Oshog- 
bo, and Katsina — sites chosen for political reasons. By 1987 N5 
billion had been spent on the steel industry alone, most of this com- 
mitted under the Second Republic, even though the economics of 
steel development were questionable. 

Corruption once again was rampant under the Second Repub- 
lic. It had been a serious problem since the civil war, when war- 
time contracts often were awarded under dubious circumstances. 
Corruption became more serious after the war, most notably in 
connection with the cement scandal of the early 1970s, the Second 
World Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture (FESTAC) 



75 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

in Lagos, and the development of Abuja as the new federal capital. 
Corruption under the Second Republic was even greater. Major 
scandals involved the Federal Housing Scheme, the National Youth 
Service Corps, the Nigerian External Telecommunications, the Fed- 
eral Mortgage Bank, the Federal Capital Territory Administra- 
tion, the Central Bank of Nigeria, and the Nigerian National Supply 
Company. In addition, the halfhearted attempts to license imports 
and to control inflation encouraged smuggling, which became a 
major crime that went virtually unchecked. Umaru Dikko came 
to the attention of the international community because of an abor- 
tive plot to kidnap him in London and return him to Nigeria to 
stand trial for corruption. British authorities found him in a ship- 
ping crate on a runway moments before he was to be sent to Nigeria. 
Dikko was involved in many scandals, including the issuance of 
licenses to import rice — rice imports had risen from 50,000 tons 
in 1976 to 651,000 tons in 1982. 

As elections approached in August 1983, an economic decline 
that reflected low oil prices, widespread corruption, and continued 
government spending at record levels was proof to many that the 
Second Republic was in sad shape. The lack of confidence was evi- 
dent in the massive flight of capital — estimated at US$14 billion 
between 1979 and 1983. The second elections under the Second 
Republic were to be its last. When the results were tallied in 1983, 
it was clear that there had been fraud (see The Second Republic, 
ch. 4). The NPN increased its control of states from seven to twelve, 
including Kano and Kaduna. Shagari was reelected president, and 
the NPN gained 61 of 95 Senate seats and 307 of 450 House of 
Representatives seats. Not even the supporters of the NPN expected 
such results. Considering the state of the economy and the public 
outcry over the rigged election, the Shagari government stayed in 
power for a surprisingly long time. 

Return to Military Rule 

On December 31, 1983, the military seized power once again, 
primarily because there was virtually no confidence in the civilian 
regime. The fraudulent election was used as an excuse for the 
takeover, although the military was in fact closely associated with 
the ousted government. More serious still, the economy was in 
chaos. The true cost of the failure to use earlier revenues and for- 
eign reserves to good effect now became apparent. 

The leader of the coup d'etat was Major General Muhammadu 
Buhari of Katsina, whose background and political loyalties tied 
him closely to the Muslim north and the deposed government. Bu- 
hari had been director of supply and services in the early 1970s, 



76 



Historical Setting 



military governor of Northeast State at the time it was divided into 
three states, and federal commissioner for petroleum and mines 
(1976-78) during the height of the oil boom. At the time of the 
coup, he was commander of the Third Armored Division in Jos. 

Buhari tried to restore public accountability and to reestablish 
a dynamic economy without altering the basic power structure of the 
country. The military had become impatient with the civilian gov- 
ernment. Corruption in particular was out of control, and the 
fraudulent election had been too obvious. Because the civilians in 
the NPN could not control the situation, the military would try its 
hand. Nonetheless, Buhari 's political and economic aims were almost 
identical to those of the NPN (see The Buhari Regime, ch. 4). 

The military regime conducted tribunals to curb corruption, and 
many scandals were revealed. Once again the civil service was 
cleansed, although on a smaller scale than in the purge of 1975. 
This time, however, the military tried to achieve two aims. First, 
it attempted to secure public support by reducing the level of cor- 
ruption; second, it demonstrated its commitment to austerity by 
trimming the federal budget. As a further attempt to mobilize the 
country, Buhari launched a War Against Indiscipline in the spring 
of 1984. This national campaign, which lasted fifteen months, 
preached the work ethic, emphasized patriotism, decried corrup- 
tion, and promoted environmental sanitation. 

The campaign was a military program for reform and mobili- 
zation that achieved few of its aims. Unemployment was on the 
rise as the recession worsened, so that speeches about working hard 
seemed out of place. The appeal to Nigerian nationalism had the 
negative effect of restricting the flexibility of the government in 
international negotiations over the debt. The campaign was en- 
forced haphazardly; some people were executed or given long jail 
terms while others were allowed off if they were well-connected. 
Environmental sanitation meant that the state capitals had to be 
cleaned up, and the principal target was the petty bourgeoisie who 
eked a living out of selling services or retailing commodities on a 
small scale. Their "illegal structures" — market stalls and work- 
shops along the streets — were destroyed, and as a consequence there 
was widespread resentment among the small traders, repairmen, 
and others in the self-employed service sector. 

The regime attempted to stifle criticism. Journalists were 
harassed, and many critics were arrested. Symbolically, the arrest 
of the popular musician, Fela Ransome-Kuti, personified the crack- 
down. Ransome-Kuti's lyrics sharply mocked the government's 
inability to deal with national problems. The National Security Or- 
ganisation (NSO) became the principal instrument of repression. 



77 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

The NSO, created in 1976, had played only a marginal role in 
Nigerian politics until the Buhari regime. Buhari appointed Rafin- 
dadi, a civilian, as head of the NSO, and under Rafindadi, Nigeria 
experienced the harassment and insecurity of a secret police force 
for the first time. Fortunately, the NSO proved to be inefficient, 
and subsequent reaction to its operations led to its reorganization. 

Buhari 's biggest problem was Nigeria's foreign debt. Negotia- 
tions with the International Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary) 
dragged on, and in the end efforts to reschedule the debt failed 
(see The Debt Overhang, ch. 3). Although Buhari was committed 
to austerity, the IMF insisted on even more drastic measures to 
cut spending, devalue the currency, and otherwise restructure the 
economy than most Nigerians were willing to accept. Buhari had 
to accede to the strong and vocal opposition to the IMF terms. 
Nigerian nationalism won out over economic necessity, at least in 
the short run. Furthermore, by the end of 1985 there was consider- 
able frustration within the army. The army had been reduced in 
size steadily since the end of the civil war, from a total of about 
275,000 in 1969 to about 80,000 by the end of the 1980s (see Demo- 
graphic Factors and the Defense Budget, ch. 5). The.economic cri- 
sis, the campaign against corruption, and civilian criticism of the 
military undermined Buhari' s position, and in August 1985 a group 
of officers under Major General Ibrahim Babangida removed Bu- 
hari from power. 

The officers who staged the coup were mostly from the north, 
but unlike Buhari (of Hausa origin), they were mosdy from minority 
ethnic groups. Babangida, for example, was of Gwari origin from 
Niger State. He was a member of the Supreme Military Council 
under the Murtala Muhammad, Obasanjo, and Buhari regimes 
and had been involved in the 1975 and 1984 coups. Lieutenant 
General Domkat Bali became chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
The Armed Forces Ruling Council (which succeeded the Supreme 
Military Council) was dominated by minority groups from the 
north. Some radicals and technocrats were appointed to ministerial 
positions. 

The new regime was committed to a return to civilian rule and 
supported the 1979 constitution. Babangida assumed the title of 
president, which he justified in terms of the constitution. Further- 
more, he tried to assuage the unrest in the country by correcting 
the excesses of the Buhari regime. The NSO was abolished in 1986, 
and its duties were reassigned to less threatening bodies. The 
freewheeling press was allowed fuller rein again, although there 
was still occasional harassment. Trials of former politicians were 
ended, and many former officials who had been convicted were 



78 



r 



B 



-8 




Qutf of Quima 



Mtantic 
Ocean 4 



Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 




Figure 7. Administrative Divisions, 1987- August 1991 



80 



- 1 
I i 



BORNO 




\ 



...s 

UCH 

lauchi 



®Maiduguri ( 

/ 



12- 
S 



/ 



r 



/ \ 



/ 



GONGOLA 



i ! 



CAMEROON 




r 



International boundary 

State or territory boundary 

® National capital 

® State capital 

• Territory capital 

50 100 150 Kilometers 

I H h 1 

50 100 150 Miles 



GABON 



Historical Setting 



released from jail. In 1987 the regime decreed that all politicians 
who had held office since 1960 and who had been convicted of crimi- 
nal offenses were banned from politics. 

The Babangida regime had a rocky start. A countercoup in De- 
cember 1985 failed but made it clear that not everyone in the mili- 
tary sided with the Armed Forces Ruling Council. The most serious 
opposition centered in the labor movement and on the university 
campuses. In May 1986, students at Ahmadu Bello University and 
Kaduna Polytechnic staged demonstrations that led to military oc- 
cupation of those campuses and to the deaths of a number of stu- 
dents. The student movement had considerable support at other 
universities. On June 4, 1986, the Nigerian Labour Congress in 
alliance with students and university teachers organized a nation- 
al day of sympathy, which led to the arrest of many union leaders. 
There was also considerable controversy over Nigeria's entry into 
the Organization of the Islamic Conference, an international body 
of Muslim states, in 1986. Buhari's regime had made the applica- 
tion, which Babangida allowed to stand. The strong reaction among 
many Christians, led by the Christian Association of Nigeria 
(formed in 1976), proved to be an embarrassment to the regime. 

Babangida addressed the worsening recession through the struc- 
tural adjustment program of 1986. By 1986, 44 percent of export 
earnings was being used to service the foreign debt. Austerity was 
not enough; rescheduling the foreign debt was essential, but pub- 
lic opinion was against an IMF loan. The government already was 
committed to many of the conditions for the IMF loan, including 
even more austere measures. However, it resisted pressures to 
reduce the petroleum subsidy, to allow trade liberalization, and 
to devalue the naira. Although negotiations with the IMF were sus- 
pended, the federal budget of 1986 still imposed many of the IMF 
conditions. On October 1, 1986, the government declared a Na- 
tional Economic Emergency, which lasted for fifteen months. Un- 
der the emergency, the government de-emphasized large-scale 
agricultural projects and introduced salary and wage reductions 
for armed forces and for public- and private-sector employees. Im- 
port restrictions were intensified, including a 30-percent surcharge 
on imports. Officially, the government now encouraged foreign 
investment and promoted privatization. Finally, the petroleum sub- 
sidy was cut back. Despite these drastic moves, efforts to resched- 
ule the foreign debt without an IMF loan failed, and a drop in world 
oil prices further compounded Nigeria's situation. 

Eventually the World Bank stepped into the breach and provided 
US$4.2 billion over three years to support the structural adjust- 
ment program. The eligible debt finally was rescheduled in early 



81 



NIGER 



CHAD 



12 y ^ > 

v y 

- BURKINA ( 

V 
{ ~ 

BENIN i 



NIGER 



KATSINA_ 



KADUNA \ \ 

'\ @J<aduna 



- s>7~ 



®Maidugun 



\ 

i V 



BAUCHI 

®Bauchi 



PLATEAU ' 

^ 7FEDERAL CAPITAL — "1 

j territory , . _ > gongola 

iondo; ^. 

B E N U E _/ 

, ( 



ANAMBRA 1 \ > 

. — ~ J A CROSS • 
A RIVER I 




CAMEROON 



— International boundary 

— State or territory boundary 
S> National capital 

•> State capital 

» Territory capital 



Figure 7. Administrative Divisions, 1987-August 1991 



80 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

1988. There was heavy devaluation of the naira in 1986, followed 
by even more drastic reductions in 1989 and early 1990. As a result 
of the recession, there was a drop in real income, especially for 
urban dwellers, and unemployment rose steadily from a low in 1980 
to almost 12 percent in 1986. The situation in the second half of 
the 1980s was even worse, with per capita income falling below 
US$300 in 1988. 

The Babangida regime appointed a new body, the Political 
Bureau, in January 1986 to make recommendations on the return 
to civilian rule. Its report, submitted in March 1987, was decid- 
edly at odds with the government's structural adjustment program. 
The Political Bureau, composed of academics and civil servants, 
wanted to maintain a strong state presence in the economy, whereas 
the military regime was steadily moving away from that position. 
The bureau also favored creation of a two-party political system 
that would be broadly social democratic in ideology, as a means 
of escaping from the ethnic-based political parties of the past. The 
Political Bureau also recommended creation of at least two new 
states, Katsina and Akwa Ibom; this was accomplished in 1987. 
Although the Babangida regime did not like many of the Political 
Bureau's recommendations, a Constitution Review Committee was 
formed in September 1987. 

This process of review and discussion convinced the military re- 
gime that the transition to civilian rule should be gradual. The per- 
ceived mistakes of 1979 and the creation of the Second Republic 
would not be repeated, it was hoped. The military would stay in 
power through 1989 to oversee the transition. The first stage was 
local elections, held in December 1987. No political parties were 
allowed, and in many districts, especially in Lagos, the results were 
overturned and new elections held. In 1990 the military continued 
in power but still promised a return to civilian rule. 

* * * 

The best introductions to Nigeria are Obaro Ikime's Groundwork 
of Nigerian History and the relevant chapters in J.F. Ade Ajayi and 
Michael Crowder's History of West Africa. For the impact of slav- 
ery and the slave trade on Nigeria, see Paul E. Lovejoy's Transfor- 
mations in Slavery. Regional studies include Elizabeth Isichei's A His- 
tory of the Igbo People; A. Afigbo's Ropes of Sand: Studies in Igbo Histo- 
ry and Culture; Robert S. Smith's Kingdoms of the Yoruba; Yusufu 
Bala Usman's Studies in the History of the Sokoto Caliphate; and Michael 
Watts 's Silent Violence: Food, Famine and Peasantry in Northern Nige- 
ria. John Flint's Sir George Goldie and the Making of Nigeria provides 



82 



Historical Setting 



a readable and excellent introduction to British imperialism along 
the Niger River. For recent history, see Toy in Falola and J.O. 
Ihonvbere's The Rise and Fall of Nigeria 's Second Republic, 1979-1984 
and Thomas Forrest's Politics, Policy, and Capitalist Development in 
Nigeria, 1970-1990. (For further information and complete citations, 
see Bibliography.) 



83 



Statue of Oya, traditional goddess of rivers and the wife of Shango, 
Yoruba god of thunder 



NIGERIA, THE MOST POPULOUS country in Africa and the 
tenth largest country by population in the world, is located at the 
eastern terminus of the bulge of West Africa. As with many of the 
other nations of Africa, Nigeria's national boundaries result from 
its colonial history and cut across a number of cultural and physi- 
cal boundaries. Nigeria has a total area of 923,768 square kilome- 
ters, it is about 60 percent the size of the state of Alaska, and has 
the greatest area of the nations along the coast of West Africa 
(although in Africa as a whole, it is only the fourteenth largest coun- 
try by area). The maximum north-south distance within the country 
is about 1,040 kilometers, whereas the maximum east-west distance 
is about 1,120 kilometers. Although it represents only about 3 per- 
cent of the surface area of Africa, Nigeria contains about 20 per- 
cent of sub-Saharan African population. In this and other respects, 
it is arguably the single most important country on the continent. 

Physical Setting 

Relief and Main Physical Features 

Much of Nigeria's surface consists of ancient crystalline rocks 
of the African Shield. Having been subject to weathering and ero- 
sion for long periods, the landscape of this area is characterized 
by extensive level plains interrupted by occasional granite moun- 
tains. These features are a major landscape type in Nigeria and 
in West Africa as a whole. Smaller areas of younger granites are 
also found, for example, on the Jos Plateau (see fig. 8). 

Sedimentary strata dating from various periods overlay the older 
rocks in many areas. The sedimentary areas typically consist of 
flat-topped ridges and dissected plateaus and a characteristic land- 
scape of extensive plains with no major rocky outcrops. This land- 
scape is generally found in the basins of the Niger and Benue rivers 
as well as the depressions of the Chad and Sokoto basins in the far 
northeast and northwest of the country, respectively. The most dra- 
matic of the sedimentary landscapes are in southeastern Nigeria, 
where thick sedimentary beds from the Abakaliki Uplift to the Anam- 
bra Basin have been tilted and eroded. This process has resulted 
in a rugged scarp land topography with east-facing cliffs in the Udi 
Hills, north of Enugu, and in the area around Nanka and Agulu. 

Although relatively little of the Nigerian landscape has been 
shaped by volcanic episodes, there are two main areas of volcanic 



87 



Nigeria: A Country Study 




Figure 8. Topography and Drainage 
88 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

rock. They are found on the Biu Plateau in the northeast, extend- 
ing into some localized volcanic areas along the eastern border with 
Cameroon, and on the Jos Plateau in the northern center of the 
country. 

The elevational pattern of most of Nigeria consists of a gradual 
rise from the coastal plains to the northern savanna regions, gener- 
ally reaching an elevation of 600 to 700 meters. Higher altitudes, 
reaching more than 1,200 meters in elevation, are found only in 
isolated areas of the Jos Plateau and in parts of the eastern high- 
lands along the Cameroon border. The coastal plain extends in- 
land for about ten kilometers and rises to an elevation of forty to 
fifty meters above sea level at its northern boundary. The eastern 
and western sections of the coastal plain are separated by the Niger 
Delta, which extends over an area of about 10,000 square kilo- 
meters. Much of this area is swampland, separated by numerous 
islands. The coastal plain region penetrates inland about seventy- 
five kilometers in the west but extends farther in the east. This 
region is gently undulating, with elevation increasing northward 
and a mean elevation of about 150 meters above sea level. Much 
of the population of southern Nigeria is located in these eastern 
and western coastal plains and, as well, in some of the contiguous 
areas of the coast and the lower Niger Basin. 

Separating the two segments of the coastal plain and extending 
to the northeast and northwest are the broad river basins of the 
Niger and Benue rivers. The upper reaches of these rivers form 
narrow valleys and contain falls and rapids. Most of the lower por- 
tions, however, are free from rapids and have extensive floodplains 
and braided stream channels. To the north of the Niger and Benue 
basins are the broad, stepped plateau and granite mountains that 
characterize much of northern Nigeria. Such mountains are also 
found in the southwest, in the region between the western coastal 
plains and the upper Niger Basin. The western wedge between 
Abeokuta and Ibadan and the Niger Basin reaches elevations of 
600 meters or more, whereas the extensive northern savanna region, 
stretching from Kontagora to Gombe and east to the border, in- 
cludes extensive areas with elevations of more than 1,200 meters 
at its center. The mountainous zone along the middle part of the 
eastern border, the Cameroon Highlands, includes the country's 
highest point (2,042 meters). In the far northeast and northwest, 
elevation falls again to below 300 meters in the Chad Basin in the 
far northeast and the Sokoto Basin in the northwest. 

Climate 

As in most of West Africa, Nigeria's climate is characterized by 



90 



The Society and Its Environment 



strong latitudinal zones, becoming progressively drier as one moves 
north from the coast. Rainfall is the key climatic variable, and there 
is a marked alternation of wet and dry seasons in most areas. Two 
air masses control rainfall — moist northward-moving maritime air 
coming from the Atlantic Ocean and dry continental air coming 
south from the African landmass. Topographic relief plays a sig- 
nificant role in local climate only around the Jos Plateau and along 
the eastern border highlands. In the coastal and southeastern por- 
tions of Nigeria, the rainy season usually begins in February or 
March as moist Atlantic air, known as the southwest monsoon, 
invades the country. The beginning of the rains is usually marked 
by the incidence of high winds and heavy but scattered squalls. 
The scattered quality of this rainfall is especially noticeable in the 
north in dry years, when rain may be abundant in some small areas 
while other contiguous places are completely dry. By April or ear- 
ly May in most years, the rainy season is under way throughout 
most of the area south of the Niger and Benue river valleys. Far- 
ther north, the rains do not usually commence before June or July. 
Through most of northern Nigeria, the peak of the rainy season 
occurs in August, when air from the Atlantic covers the entire coun- 
try. In southern regions, this period marks the August dip in precipi- 
tation. Although rarely completely dry, this dip in rainfall, which 
is especially marked in the southwest, can be useful agriculturally 
because it allows a brief dry period for grain harvesting. 

From September through November, the northeast trade winds 
generally bring a season of clear skies, moderate temperatures, and 
lower humidity for most of the country. From December through 
February, however, the northeast trade winds blow strongly and 
often bring with them a load of fine dust from the Sahara. These 
dust-laden winds, known locally as the harmattan, often appear 
as a dense fog and cover everything with a layer of fine particles. 
The harmattan is more common in the north but affects the entire 
country except for a narrow strip along the southwest coast. An 
occasional strong harmattan, however, can sweep as far south as 
Lagos, providing relief from high humidities in the capital and push- 
ing clouds of dust out to sea. 

Given this climatological cycle and the size of the country, there 
is a considerable range in total annual rainfall across Nigeria, both 
from south to north and, in some regions, from east to west. The 
greatest total precipitation is generally in the southeast, along the 
coast around Bonny (south of Port Harcourt) and east of Calabar, 
where mean annual rainfall is more than 4,000 millimeters. Most 
of the rest of the southeast receives between 2,000 and 3,000 mil- 
limeters of rain per year, and the southwest (lying farther north) 



91 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

receives lower total rainfall, generally between 1,250 and 2,500 mil- 
limeters per year. Mean annual precipitation at Lagos is about 1 ,900 
millimeters; at Ibadan, only about 140 kilometers north of Lagos, 
mean annual rainfall drops to around 1,250 millimeters. Moving 
north from Ibadan, mean annual rainfall in the west is in the range 
of 1,200 to 1,300 miUimeters. 

North of Kaduna, through the northern Guinea savanna and 
then the Sudan (see Glossary) savanna zones, the total rainfall and 
the length of the rainy season decline steadily. The Guinea savanna 
starts in the middle belt, or southern part of northern Nigeria. It 
is distinguished from the Sudan savanna because it has a number 
of trees whereas the Sudan has few trees. Rainy seasons decline 
correspondingly in length as one moves north, with Kano having 
an average rainy period of 120 to 130 days, and Katsina and Sokoto 
having rainy seasons 10 to 20 days shorter. Average annual rain- 
fall in the north is in the range of 500 to 750 millimeters. 

The regularity of drought periods has been among the most nota- 
ble aspects of Nigerian climate in recent years, particularly in the 
drier regions in the north. Experts regard the twentieth century 
as having been among the driest periods of the last several centu- 
ries; the well publicized droughts of the 1970s and 1980s were only 
the latest of several significant such episodes to affect West Africa 
in this century. At least two of these droughts have severely affect- 
ed large areas of northern Nigeria and the Sahel region farther 
north. These drought periods are indications of the great variabil- 
ity of climate across tropical Africa, the most serious effects of which 
are usually felt at the drier margins of agricultural zones or in the 
regions occupied primarily by pastoral groups. 

Temperatures throughout Nigeria are generally high; diurnal 
variations are more pronounced than seasonal ones. Highest tem- 
peratures occur during the dry season; rains moderate afternoon 
highs during the wet season. Average highs and lows for Lagos 
are 31°C and 23°C in January and 28°C and 23°C in June. 
Although average temperatures vary little from coastal to inland 
areas, inland areas, especially in the northeast, have greater ex- 
tremes. There, temperatures reach as high as 44 °C before the on- 
set of the rains or drop as low as 6°C during an intrusion of cool 
air from the north from December to February. 

Population 

The size of its population is one of Nigeria's most significant 
and distinctive features. With probably more than 100 million peo- 
ple in 1990 — the precise figure is uncertain because there has been 
no accepted census since 1963, although a census was scheduled 



92 



The Society and Its Environment 



for the fall of 1991 — Nigeria's population is about twice the size 
of that of the next largest country in Africa, Egypt, which had an 
estimated population of 52 million in mid- 1989. Nigeria represents 
about 20 percent of the total population of sub-Saharan Africa. The 
population is unevenly distributed, however; a large percentage 
of the total number live within several hundred kilometers of the 
coast, but population is also dense along the northern river basin 
areas such as Kano and Sokoto. Population densities, especially 
in the southwest near Lagos and the rich agricultural regions around 
Enugu and Owerri, exceed 400 inhabitants per kilometer (see ta- 
ble 2, Appendix). None of the neighboring states of West or Cen- 
tral Africa approaches the total level of Nigerian population or the 
densities found in the areas of greatest concentration in Nigeria. 
Several of Nigeria's twenty-one states have more people than a num- 
ber of other countries in West Africa, and some of the Igbo areas 
of the southeast have the highest rural densities in sub-Saharan 
Africa. In contrast, other areas of Nigeria are sparsely populated 
and have apparendy remained so for a considerable time. This pat- 
tern of population distribution has major implications for the coun- 
try's development and has had great impact on the nation's 
postindependence history. 

Migration from rural to urban areas has accelerated in recent 
decades. Estimates of urban dwellers reveal this shift. In 1952, 11 
percent of the total population was classified as urban; in 1985, 
28 percent. One-sixth of the urban population, or approximately 
6 million people, lived in Lagos, and in 1985 eight other cities had 
populations of more than 500,000. 

Census History 

Although numerous estimates of the Nigerian population were 
made during the colonial period, the first attempt at a nationwide 
census was during 1952-53. This attempt yielded a total popula- 
tion figure of 31 .6 million within the current boundaries of the coun- 
try. This census has usually been considered an undercount for 
a number of reasons: apprehension that the census was related to 
tax collection; political tension at the time in eastern Nigeria; logisti- 
cal difficulties in reaching many remote areas; and inadequate train- 
ing of enumerators in some areas. The extent of undercounting 
has been estimated at 10 percent or less, although accuracy prob- 
ably varied among the regions. Despite its difficulties, the 1952-53 
census has generally been seen as less problematic than any of its 
successors. 

Subsequent attempts to conduct a reliable postindependence cen- 
sus have been mired in controversy, and only one was officially 



93 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

accepted. The first attempt, in mid- 1962, was canceled after much 
controversy and allegations of overcounting in many areas. A sec- 
ond attempt in 1963, which was officially accepted, also was en- 
cumbered with charges of inaccuracy and manipulation for regional 
and local political purposes. Indeed, the official 1963 figure of 55.6 
million as total national population is inconsistent with the census 
of a decade earlier because it implies a virtually impossible annual 
growth rate of 5.8 percent. In addition to likely inflation of the ag- 
gregate figure, significant intraregional anomalies emerge from a 
close comparison of the 1953 and 1963 figures. In portions of the 
southeast, for example, the two sets of data imply that some non- 
urban local government areas (LGAs) had increased at a rate of 
almost 13 percent per year, whereas other neighboring areas ex- 
perienced a minute growth rate of 0.5 percent per year. Despite the 
controversy, the results of the 1963 census were eventually accepted. 

After the civil war of 1967-70, an attempt was made to hold a 
census in 1973, but the results were canceled in the face of repeated 
controversy. No subsequent nationwide census had been held as 
of 1990, although there have been various attempts to derive popu- 
lation estimates at a state or local level. Most official national popu- 
lation estimates are based on projections from the 1963 census. 

The great improvements in transport and accessibility of most 
areas, in technological capability, and in the level of education 
throughout the country, as well as the generalized acceptance of 
national coherence and legitimacy, favored the success of the fall 
1991 census. It was to be conducted in about 250,000 enumera- 
tion areas by the National Population Commission, with offices 
in each of the country's LGAs. To reduce possible controversy, 
religious and ethnic identification would be excluded from the census 
forms, and verification of state results would be handled by super- 
visors from outside the state. Some analysts believe that the effort 
to carry out a reliable census with perceived legitimacy might be- 
come an unexpectedly positive exercise, reinforcing a sense of shared 
nationhood and providing a model for the attempt to overcome 
regional and ethnic differences. 

Population Estimates and the Demographic Transition 

The absence of virtually any reliable current demographic data 
has not prevented national and international bodies from generat- 
ing estimates and projections of population and population growth 
in Nigeria. The World Bank (see Glossary) estimate of Nigeria's 
1990 population was 119 million, with an estimated annual growth 
rate of 3.3 percent. Although other sources differed on the exact 
figure, virtually all sources agreed that the annual rate of population 



94 



Cattle grazing in the hilly terrain of northern Nigeria 
Courtesy Embassy of Nigeria, Washington 

growth in the country had increased from the 1950s through most 
of the 1980s. The government estimated a 2 percent rate of popu- 
lation growth for most of the country between 1953 and 1962. For 
the period between 1965 and 1973, the World Bank estimated 
Nigeria's growth rate at 2.5 percent, increasing to 2.7 percent be- 
tween 1973 and 1983. Projections about the population growth rate 
were uncertain, however, in view of questions concerning the ac- 
curacy of Nigerian census statistics. 

This increase was typical of most of sub-Saharan Africa, where 
growth rates increased steadily throughout the post- World War II 
period. The key to decelerating the rate of population growth would 
be a sharp decline in the fertility rate, which is defined as the aver- 
age number of children a woman will bear in her lifetime. Consid- 
ered the second stage of the demographic transition process, this 
decline was well under way in 1990 in most other developing regions 
of the world, except for the Islamic nations of the Middle East. 
Few African countries, however, had experienced any substantial 
fertility decline, and the overall fertility rate for sub-Saharan Afri- 
ca was estimated as 6.5 in 1983. 

Any decline in the population growth rate in Nigeria or the rest 
of sub-Saharan Africa was expected to depend on the balance be- 
tween the demand for smaller families and the supply of birth control 



95 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

technology. Urbanization (especially when full households, rather 
than just males, are involved) was likely to be the most powerful 
factor leading to a decline in fertility because it induced the most 
radical shifts in the relative costs and benefits of having large num- 
bers of children. Other important factors were likely to include the 
availability of health care and of birth control information and 
equipment in both rural and urban areas, the rate of expansion 
of education, and the general pace of economic development. If 
the pattern of change in Africa were to follow that in other parts 
of the world, urbanization, economic development, education, im- 
proved health care, increased availability of birth control, and 
declining infant mortality would eventually lead to a marked decline 
in fertility rates. 

Between 1970 and 1987, life expectancy in Nigeria was estimated 
to have increased from forty to fifty-one years. Much of this rise 
resulted from a sharp decline in mortality among infants younger 
than one year and children ages one to four. Infant mortality was 
estimated to have declined 25 percent from 152 per 1 ,000 live births 
in 1965 to 1 13 in 1983, and child mortality declined almost 50 per- 
cent from 33 to 17 per 1,000 in the same period. These levels were 
likely to continue to fall, thereby exerting continuing upward pres- 
sure on the population growth rate. As of 1990, maternity deaths 
exceeded 75,000 per year, excluding deaths resulting from illegal 
abortions, and both were estimated to have risen during the 1980s. 

Despite the probable decline in fertility in the 1990s, given the 
country's age structure, Nigeria's 1990 population was expected 
at least to double before the middle of the next century. Somewhat 
less than half of Nigeria's 1990 population was younger than fifteen. 
As a result, even if population growth were to drop immediately 
to a replacement rate and remain there, the 1990 population would 
double before stabilizing. Nigeria, thus, could expect to deal with 
a population of more than 200 million probably within the next 
twenty-five years. 

These projections suggested that population growth would be 
an issue of central concern for Nigeria for some time to come. Mere- 
ly to remain at current per capita levels, agricultural production, 
industrial and other economic output, and provision of health and 
other social services would all need to double within twenty-five 
years. This situation was a challenge of historic proportions for 
Nigeria, and one faced by many other nations of Africa. 

Ethnicity 

Ethnicity is one of the keys to understanding Nigeria's pluralis- 
tic society. It distinguishes groupings of peoples who for historical 



96 



The Society and Its Environment 



reasons have come to be seen as distinctive — by themselves and 
others — on the basis of locational origins and a series of other cul- 
tural markers. Experience in the postindependence period fostered 
a widespread belief that modern ethnicity affects members' life 
chances. In Nigerian colloquial usage, these collectivities were com- 
monly called "tribes." In the emergent Nigerian national culture, 
this topic was discussed widely as "tribalism," a morally repre- 
hensible term whose connotations were similar to American terms 
such as "discrimination," "racism," or "prejudice." Nigerian 
national policies have usually fostered tolerance and appreciation 
for cultural differences, while trying at the same time to suppress 
unfair treatment based on ethnic prejudice. This long-term cam- 
paign involved widespread support in educated circles to replace 
the term "tribe" or "tribal" with the more universally applicable 
concept of ethnicity. Nevertheless, the older beliefs died slowly, 
and ethnic identities were still a vital part of national life in 1990. 

The ethnic variety was dazzling and confusing. Estimates of the 
number of distinct ethnic groupings varied from 250 to as many 
as 400. The most widely used marker was that of language. In most 
cases, people who spoke a distinct language that had a separate 
term for the language and/or its speakers saw themselves, or were 
viewed by others, as ethnically different. Language groupings were 
numbered in the 1970s at nearly 400, depending upon disagree- 
ments over whether or not closely related languages were mutually 
intelligible. Language groupings sometimes shifted their distinc- 
tiveness rather than displaying clear boundaries. Manga and Kanuri 
speakers in northeastern Nigeria spoke easily to one another. But 
in the major Kanuri city of Maiduguri, 160 kilometers south of 
Manga-speaking areas, Manga was considered a separate language. 
Kanuri and Manga who lived near each other saw themselves as 
members of the same ethnic group; others farther away did not. 

Markers other than language were also used to define ethnicity. 
Speakers of Bura (a Chadic language closely related to Marghi) 
saw themselves traditionally as two ethnic groups, Bura and Pabir, 
a view not necessarily shared by others. Bura mostly adhered to 
Christianity or to a local indigenous religion, and a few were Mus- 
lims. They lived originally in small, autonomous villages of 100 
to 500 persons that expanded and split as the population grew. The 
Pabir had the same local economy as the Bura, but they were Mus- 
lim, they lived in larger (originally walled) villages of 400 to 3,000 
with more northerly architectural styles, they resisted splitting up 
into subgroups, and they recognized a central ruler (emir) in a cap- 
ital town (Biu). There was a strong movement in the 1980s among 
many Bura speakers to unite the two groups based on their common 



97 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



language, location, and interests in the wider society. Given long- 
standing conflicts that separated them as late as 1990, however, 
their common ethnicity was open to question. 

The official language of the country is English, which is taught 
in primary schools and used for instruction in secondary schools 
and universities. All officials with education to secondary school 
level or beyond spoke English and used it across language barriers 
formed by Nigeria's ethnic diversity. Many in the university-trained 
elite used English as one of the languages in their homes and/or 
sent their children to preschools that provided a head start in 
English-language instruction. In addition to English, pidgin has 
been used as a lingua franca in the south (and in adjoining Came- 
roon) for more than a century among the nonschool population. 
In 1990 it was used in popular songs, radio and television dramas, 
novels, and even newspaper cartoons. In the north, southerners 
spoke pidgin to one another, but Hausa was the lingua franca of 
the region and was spreading rapidly as communications and travel 
provided a need for increased intelligibility. Counting English, the 
use of which was expanding as rapidly as Hausa, many Nigerians 
were at least trilingual. This language facility usually included a 
local vernacular, a wider African lingua franca, and English. Given 
the long history of trade and markets that stimulated contacts across 
local ethnic units, multilingualism was a very old and established 
adaptation. Such multilingualism enabled communication among 
different ethnic groups in the country. 

Regional Groupings 

The broadest groupings of linked ethnic units are regional. Brit- 
ain ruled most of the area of present-day Nigeria as two protec- 
torates from 1900 to 1914, the southern and northern protectorates 
each having separate regional administrations. These portions were 
joined finally under a single Nigerian colonial government in 1914. 
But they retained their regionally based authorities, divided after 
1914 into three regional units. The announcement of their imminent 
demise by the first postcoup military government in 1966 helped 
to set off violent reactions in the north against southerners who 
had settled in their midst, contributing to the outbreak of civil war. 

Within each of the major northern and southern regions, there 
were significant subregions that combined ethnicity, geography, 
and history. What is generally referred to historically as the south 
included a western Yoruba- speaking area, an eastern Igbo area 
(the "g" is softly pronounced), a midsection of related but differ- 
ent groups, and a set of Niger Delta peoples on the eastern and 
central coastal areas. The north was widely associated with the 



98 



The Society and Its Environment 



Hausa-speaking groups that occupied most of the region, but the 
Kanuri predominated in the northeast, with a belt of peoples be- 
tween the two. There were also important pastoral nomadic groups 
(mosdy Fulani) that lived throughout the same region. In the middle 
belt (see Glossary) were congeries of peoples in an area running 
east- west in the hills, along the southern rim of the north, divid- 
ing it from the larger region of Nigeria's south. On its northern 
side, the middle belt shaded culturally into the Muslim north. In 
contrast, on the southern side, its peoples were more similar to those 
of the south. 

The Northern Area 

The best known of the northern peoples, often spoken of as coter- 
minous with the north, are the Hausa. The term refers also to a 
language spoken indigenously by savanna peoples spread across 
the far north from Nigeria's western boundary eastward to Borno 
State and into much of the territory of southern Niger. The core 
area lies in the region in the north and northwest where about 30 
percent of all Hausa could be found. It also includes a common 
set of cultural practices and, with some notable exceptions, Islam- 
ic emirates that originally comprised a series of centralized govern- 
ments and their surrounding subject towns and villages. 

These precolonial emirates were still major features of local 
government in 1990. Each had a central citadel town that housed 
its ruling group of nobles and royalty and served as the adminis- 
trative, judicial, and military center of these states. Traditionally, 
the major towns were also trading centers; some such as Kano, 
Zaria, or Katsina were urban conglomerations with populations 
of 25,000 to 100,000 in the nineteenth century. They had central 
markets, special wards for foreign traders, complex organizations 
of craft specialists, and religious leaders and organizations. They 
administered a hinterland of subject settlements through a hierar- 
chy of officials, and they interacted with other states and ethnic 
groups in the region by links of warfare, raiding, trade, tribute, 
and alliances. 

The rural areas remained in 1990 fundamentally small to 
medium-sized settlements of farmers ranging from 2,000 to 12,000 
persons. Both within and spread outward from the settlements, 
one-third to one-half the population lived in hamlet-sized farm set- 
tlements of patrilocal extended families, or gandu, an economic kin- 
based unit under the authority and direction of the household head. 
Farm production was used for both cash and subsistence, and as 
many as two-thirds of the adults also engaged in off-farm occu- 
pations. 



99 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

Throughout the north, but especially in the Hausa areas, over 
the past several centuries Fulani cattle-raising nomads have migrat- 
ed westward, sometimes settling into semisedentary villages. Their 
relations with local agriculturalists generally involved the symbi- 
otic trading of cattle for agricultural products and access to 
pasturage. Conflicts arose, however, especially in times of drought 
or when population built up and interethnic relations created pres- 
sures on resources. These pressures peaked at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century and were contributing factors in a Fulani-led 
intra-Muslim holy war and the founding of the Sokoto Caliphate 
(see Usman dan Fodio and the Sokoto Caliphate, ch. 1). Fulani 
leaders took power over the Hausa states, intermarried with the 
ruling families and settled into the ruling households of Hausaland 
and many adjacent societies. By the twentieth century, the ruling 
elements of Hausaland were often referred to as Hausa- Fulani. 
Thoroughly assimilated into urban Hausa culture and language 
but intensely proud of their Fulani heritage, many of the leading 
"Hausa" families in 1990 claimed such mixed origins. In terms 
of local traditions, this inheritance was expressed as a link to the 
conquering founders of Sokoto and a zealous commitment to Is- 
lamic law and custom. 

Centralized government in the urban citadels along the southern 
rim of the desert has encouraged long-distance trade over the cen- 
turies, both across the Sahara and into coastal West Africa after 
colonial rule moved forcefully to cut the trans-Saharan trade, forcing 
the north to use Nigerian ports. Ultimately, this action resulted 
in enclaves of Hausa traders in all major cities of West Africa, linked 
socially and economically to their home areas. 

In summary, Hausa is both an ethnic group and a language; 
in contemporary usage the term refers primarily to the language. 
Linked culturally to Islam, Hausa are characterized by centralized 
emirate governments, Fulani rulers since the early nineteenth cen- 
tury, extended households and agricultural villages, trade and mar- 
kets, and strong assimilative capacities. For these reasons, Hausa 
cultural borders have been constantly expanding. Given modern 
communications, transportation, and the accelerating need for a 
lingua franca, Hausa was rapidly becoming either the first or sec- 
ond language of the entire northern area of the country. 

The other major ethnic grouping of the north is that of the Kanuri 
of Borno. They entered Nigeria from the central Sahara as Mus- 
lim conquerors in the fifteenth century, set up a capital, and sub- 
dued and assimilated the local Chadic speakers. By the sixteenth 
century, they had developed a great empire that at times included 
many of the Hausa states and large areas of the central Sahara (see 



100 



The Society and Its Environment 



The Savanna States, 1500-1800, ch. 1). Attacked in the nineteenth 
century by the Fulani, they resisted successfully, although the con- 
flict resulted in a new capital closer to Lake Chad, a new ruling 
dynasty, and a balance of power between the Hausa-Fulani of the 
more westerly areas and the Kanuri speakers of the central sub- 
Saharan rim. 

Even though Kanuri language, culture, and history are distinc- 
tive, other elements are similar to those of the Hausa. Similar ele- 
ments include the general ecology of the area, Islamic law and 
politics, the extended households, and rural-urban distinctions. 
There was, however, a distinctive Kanuri tradition of a U-shaped 
town plan open to the west. The town's political leader or founder 
was housed at the head of the plaza, in an area formed by the arms 
of the U. The people remained intensely proud of their ancient 
traditions of Islamic statehood. Among many ancient traits were 
their long chronicles of kings, wars, and hegemony in the region 
and their specific Kanuri cultural identity, which was reflected in 
the hairstyles of the women, the complex cuisine, and the identifi- 
cation with ruling dynasties whose names and exploits were still 
fresh. 

Things have been changing, however. Maiduguri, the central 
city of Kanuri influence in the twentieth century, was chosen as 
the capital of an enlarged Northeast State during the civil war. Be- 
cause this state encompassed large sections of Hausa-Fulani areas, 
many of these ethnic groups came to the capital. This sudden in- 
corporation, together with mass communications, interstate com- 
merce, and intensification of travel and regional contacts brought 
increased contacts with Hausa culture. By the 1970s, and increas- 
ingly during the 1980s and into the 1990s, Kanuri speakers found 
it best to get along in Hausa, certainly outside their home region 
and even inside Borno State. By 1990 women were adopting Hausa 
dress and hairstyles, and all schoolchildren learned to speak Hausa. 
Almost all Bornoans in the larger towns could speak Hausa, and 
many Hausa administrators and businesspeople were settling in 
Borno. Just as Hausa had incorporated its Fulani conquerors 175 
years earlier, in 1990 it was spreading into Borno, assimilating as 
it went. Its probable eventual triumph as the universal northern 
language was reinforced by its utility, although the ethnically proud 
Kanuri would retain much of their language and culture for many 
years. 

Along the border, dividing northern from southern Nigeria lies 
an east- west belt of peoples and languages, generally known as the 
middle belt. The area runs from the Cameroon Highlands on the 
east to the Niger River valley on the west and contains 50 to 100 



101 



Nigeria: A Country Study 




Figure 9. Distribution of Principal Ethnic Groups, 1990 

separate language and ethnic groups (see fig. 9). These groups 
varied from the Nupe and Tiv, comprising more than half a mil- 
lion each, to a few hundred speakers of a distinct language in small 
highland valleys in the Jos Plateau. On the east, languages were 
of the Chadic group, out of which Hausa differentiated, and the 
Niger-Congo family, indicating links to eastern and central Afri- 
can languages. In the west, the language groupings indicated histor- 
ical relations to Mende- speaking peoples farther west. Cultural and 
historical evidence supports the conclusion that these western groups 
were marginal remnants of an earlier substratum of cultures that 
occupied the entire north before the emergence of large central- 
ized Islamic emirates. 

In time three distinct kinds of organized groups emerged. The larg- 
est and most centralized groups, such as the Nupe, under colonial 



102 



The Society and Its Environment 



administration became smaller versions of the emirates. A few of 
these peoples, such as the Tiv, were of the classic "segmentary" 
variety, in which strongly organized patrilineages link large por- 
tions of the ethnic group into named nonlocal segments based on 
real and putative concepts of descent. Local organization, land 
tenure, inheritance, religious beliefs, law, and allegiances are all 
related to this sense of segmentary lineage relationship. During the 
1960s, some Tiv segments allied with the southern political par- 
ties, and others linked with the northern parties. Like the larger 
groups, they demanded, and by 1960 had been granted, a central 
"chief and local administration of their own. 

The most common groupings in the middle belt were small local- 
ized villages and their outlying hamlets and households; they were 
autonomous in precolonial times but were absorbed into wider ad- 
ministrative units under British rule. Most often they were patri- 
lineal, with in-marrying wives, sons, unmarried daughters, and 
possibly parents or parents' siblings living together. Crops sepa- 
rated this residence grouping from similar ones spread out over 
a small area. They cultivated local fields and prayed to local spirits 
and the ghosts of departed lineage elders. Descendants of found- 
ers were often village heads or priests of the village shrine, whereas 
leading members of the other lineages formed an eldership that 
governed the place and a few outlying areas, consisting of those 
who were moving toward open lands as the population increased. 

The missionaries and party politics influenced, but did not ob- 
literate, these older units. Missionaries arrived in the 1910s and 
1920s and were allowed into non-Muslim areas. They set up schools 
using United States or British staff to teach English and helped 
to create a sense of separateness and educational disparity between 
the Christianized groups and Muslim ones. From the 1920s to cur- 
rent times, both religions competed for adherents. Political par- 
ties representing both southern and northern interests have always 
found supporters in this border area, making its participation in 
national life more unpredictable. Attempts in the 1960s and 1970s 
to create a separate region, or develop a political party represent- 
ing middle belt peoples, were quickly cauterized by northern 
Muslim-based political parties whose dominance at the national 
level could have been weakened by losing administrative control 
over the middle belt. 

At the same time, possibly the greatest influence on the area was 
that of Hausaization. The emergent dominance of the Hausa lan- 
guage, dress patterns, residential arrangements, and other cultur- 
al features was clear as one traveled from the far north into the 
middle belt area. Local councils that only a few years previously 



103 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



had dressed differently and had spoken in local vernaculars looked 
and acted in 1990 as if they were parts of more northerly areas. 
Although Hausaization was weaker in the more remote areas and 
in Jos, the largest middle belt city, it was progressing rapidly every- 
where else and constituted a unifying factor throughout the region. 

The Southern Area 

In general, the southern groups of peoples are fragmented. In 
1990 the two most important groupings were the Igbo and the Yoru- 
ba — both linguistic communities rather than single ethnic units. 
History, language, and membership in the modern nation-state, how- 
ever, had led to their identity as ethnic groups. In addition, although 
not as clearly differentiated, two subunits had strong traditions of 
ethnic separateness. These were the peoples of the Niger River del- 
ta area and those on the border between the Igbo and Yoruba. 

Yorubaland takes in most of southwestern Nigeria and the peo- 
ples directly west of the Nigerian border in the independent coun- 
try of Benin. In Nigeria alone, Yorubaland included 20 million 
to 30 million people in 1990 (about double the 1963 census figures). 
Each of its subunits was originally a small to medium-sized state 
whose major town provided the name of the subgrouping. Over 
time seven subareas — Oyo, Kabba, Ekiti, Egba, Ife, Ondo, and 
Ijebu — became separate hegemonies that differentiated culturally 
and competed for dominance in Yorubaland. Early nineteenth- 
century travelers noted that northern Oyo people had difficulty un- 
derstanding the southern Ijebu, and these dialect differences re- 
mained in 1990. The language is that of the Kwa group of the 
Niger-Congo family, related to the Idoma and I gala of the southern 
grouping of middle belt chieftaincies south of the Benue River. The 
population has expanded in a generally westerly and southwester- 
ly direction over the past several centuries. In the twentieth centu- 
ry, this migration brought Yoruba into countries to the west and 
northwest as far as northern Ghana. 

The Yoruba kingdoms were essentially unstable, even when 
defended by Portuguese guns and later by cavalry (in Ilorin and 
Kabba), because the central government had insufficient power 
constitutionally or militarily to stabilize the subordinate chiefs in 
the outlying centers. This separatist tendency has governed Yoru- 
ba contemporary history and has weakened traditional rulers and 
strengthened the hands of local chiefs and elected councils. Ilorin, 
like Nupe to the north, was an exception, an extension of Fulani 
imperial expansion; in 1990 it was ethnically Yoruba, yet more 
closely allied through its traditional rulers to the Islamic societies 
to the north. It thus formed a bridge between north and south. 



104 



The Society and Its Environment 



The region has had the longest and most penetrating contacts 
with the outside world of any area in Nigeria. Returned Yoruba 
slaves, the early nineteenth-century establishment of the Anglican 
Church, and Yoruba churchmen, such as Bishop Samuel Adjai 
Crowther (active in the 1820s), made the region's religious life, 
its formal education, and its elites among the most Westernized 
in the country (see Christianity, this ch.). The first university, 
founded in 1948, was at Ibadan in the heart of Yorubaland, as were 
the first elite secondary schools; the first research institutes for 
agriculture, economics, African studies, and foreign affairs; the first 
publishing houses; and the first radio and television stations. Wole 
Soyinka, Africa's first Nobel prizewinner in literature, claims Yoru- 
ba ethnicity. The entry port of Lagos, predominantly Yoruba, is 
the largest and economically dominant city in the country (and its 
first capital). 

In relation to other Nigerian peoples, the Yoruba have a strong 
sense of ethnic identity and of region, history, and leadership. In 
relation to each other, the seven subgroups have inherited prejudices 
and behavior that could exacerbate animosities should other fac- 
tors such as access to education or prominent positions create con- 
flict among the subdivisions. At the same time, the longer contacts 
of the Yoruba with Westernizing influences have created some dedi- 
cated nationalists who see their Yoruba identity as a contributing 
factor in their loyalty to the wider concept of a Nigerian nation-state. 

The other major group of the south are the Igbo. The Igbo are 
found primarily in the southeast and speak a Kwa language of the 
Niger-Congo family. This language ties them, historically, to 
regions east and south of their contemporary locations. In 1990 
it was hard to find any major town in Nigeria without an Igbo 
minority, often in an ethnic enclave. As communities they have 
traditionally been segmented into more than 200 named group- 
ings, each originally a locally autonomous polity. These groupings 
vary from a single village to as many as two or three dozen nucleated 
settlements that over time have expanded outward from an origi- 
nal core town. Most of these central villages ranged from 1,000 
to 3,000 persons in the nineteenth century. In 1990 they were as 
much as five to ten times larger, making severe land shortages and 
overused farmland a widespread problem. Precolonial trade up the 
Niger River from the coast stimulated the early development of 
a few larger towns, such as Onitsha, that in 1990 contained a popu- 
lation of several hundred thousand. Igbo culture, however, unlike 
the emirates and the Yoruba city-states, does not count urban liv- 
ing among the traditional ways of life. 



105 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

For the Igbo as an ethnic group, personal advancement and par- 
ticipation in local affairs are matters of individual initiative and 
skill. Villages are run by a council of the most respected elders of 
the locality. Colonial administration created local headmen, or 
"warrant chiefs," who were never fully accepted and were finally 
replaced by locally elected councils. 

This development does not mean that Igbo culture is exclusive- 
ly dedicated to egalitarianism. Rank and wealth differences have 
been part of the society from early times and have been highly 
prized. Success, eldership, wealth, a good modern education, po- 
litical power, and influence have all been recognized as ways by 
which people, especially adult males, could distinguish themselves. 
As with all Nigerian societies, Igbo life is complex, and the organi- 
zation of local and regional society is stratified into more and less 
affluent and successful groups, families, individuals, and even neigh- 
borhoods. Graduates of secondary schools form "old boy associa- 
tions, ' ' some of which have as members wealthy men linked to one 
another as local boosters and mutual supporters. Comparatively 
speaking, Igbo are most unlike other Nigerians in their strong posi- 
tive evaluation of open competition for success. Children are en- 
couraged to succeed; if they do so skillfully, rewards of high status 
await them. It is no accident that the first American-style land- 
grant university, linked for guidance during its founding to Michi- 
gan State University, was at Nsukka in Igboland, whereas the first 
universities in Yorubaland and in the north looked to Britain and 
its elitist traditions of higher education for their models of univer- 
sity life. 

Psychological tests of "achievement motivation" that measure 
American-style individual competitiveness against standards of ex- 
cellence given to comparable Nigerian groups resulted in Igbo peo- 
ple placing highest, followed by Yoruba, and then Hausa. This 
stress on individual achievement has made Igbo people seem 
"pushy" to fellow Nigerians, whose own ethnic traditions foster 
individual contributions to collective achievements within close- 
knit kin and patron- client groups that are more hierarchically 
arranged. In these latter groups, achievements are obtained through 
loyalty, disciplined membership in a large organization, and so- 
cial skills that employ such memberships for personal advancement. 

The impressive openness of Igbo culture is what first strikes the 
outsider, but closer inspection produces several caveats. Besides 
differences of wealth and rank achieved in one's lifetime or inherit- 
ed, there is a much older tendency for people who trace their de- 
scent from the original settler-founders of a village to have higher 
status as "owners of the land." Generally, they provide the men 



106 



The Society and Its Environment 



who act as priests of the local shrines, and often they provide more 
local leaders than descendants of later arrivals. At the other end 
of the scale are known descendants of people, especially women, 
who were originally slaves. They are akin to Indian "untouch- 
ables," low in status and avoided as marriage partners. 

As with all Nigerian ethnic groups, there are internal divisions. 
Generally, these have to do with town area of origin. More north- 
erly areas have had a feeling of separateness, as do larger towns 
along the Niger River. Beyond Igboland, people from the region 
are treated as a single unit, live in separate enclaves, and even face 
restrictions against ownership of local property in some northern 
towns. Once they had suffered and fought together in the civil war 
of Biafran secession in the 1960s, these people developed a much 
stronger sense of Igbo identity that has since been expressed polit- 
ically. Nevertheless, localized distinctions remain and in 1990 were 
significant internally. 

The peoples of the Atlantic Coast and the Niger River delta are 
linguistically and culturally related to the Igbo. But the ecological 
demands of coastal life and the separate history of contact with 
coastal trade and its effects have produced ethnic differences that 
are strong enough to have made these people resist the Biafra seces- 
sion movement when it was promulgated by Igbo leadership. Ijaw, 
Ibibio, Anang, and Efik live partly from agriculture and partly from 
fishing and shrimping in the coastal waters. Religion, social or- 
ganization, village life, local leadership, and gender relations have 
been deeply affected by this ecology-based differentiation. Although 
there has been a natural and historical pull of migration to Lagos, 
especially by young Ijaw men who went to the city to find work 
and send home remittances, the area boasts its own coastal town 
of Port Harcourt in Efik country that is, in a sense, the headquarters 
of this subgrouping. 

To a lesser extent, the peoples of the western bank of the Niger 
River — and the western delta — especially the Bini speakers and 
Urhobo — are culturally close to those around them but have a suffi- 
cient sense of linguistic and historical separateness to see themselves 
as unique. These differences have been partly buttressed by the 
past glory of the kingdom of Benin, of which a much diminished 
remnant survived in 1990. Benin had been used to provide the south 
first with an extra region, then with extra states when the regional 
level of government was abandoned in 1967. 

Ethnic Relations 

Relations between ethnic groups remained a major problem for 
such a large and pluralistic society in 1990. In precolonial times, 



107 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

interethnic relations were often mistrustful, or discriminatory, and 
sometimes violent. At the same time, there were relationships, such 
as trade, that required peaceful communications. The most 
widespread communication was in the north between pastoral and 
agricultural peoples, who traded cattle for farm products and 
pasturage rights for manuring. Farmers might also buy a few cat- 
tle and have them cared for by pastoralists. Emirate rulers who 
normally raided and pillaged among non-Muslim village groups 
often established peaceful "trust" relations with residents of one 
or two villages; those residents then acted as hosts and guides for 
the raiders in exchange for immunity for themselves. More subtle 
and peaceful exchanges involved smaller ethnic groups in the middle 
belt, each of which specialized in one or more commodities. In towns 
and along trade routes, occupations such as smithing, producing 
cotton, selling cattle, weaving, house building, and beer making 
were often confined to, or correlated with, ethnically defined units. 
Thus, ecological and economic specializations promoted peaceful 
interethnic relations. Conversely, promulgating conflict, mistrust, 
and stereotypes in ethnic relations were droughts; competition for 
control over trade routes or allies; resistance to, or the creation 
and maintenance of, exploitative relations; and other factors. 

The civil war taught Nigerians that ethnic conflicts were among 
the most destructive forces in the life of the nation. By 1990 ethnic 
conflict was suppressed and carefully controlled so that any out- 
break or seriously publicized discrimination on ethnic grounds was 
considered a matter of national security. In the few outbreaks that 
had occurred since the war, the federal government acted swiftly 
to gain control and stop the conflict. Nevertheless, the way in which 
ethnic relations might threaten the security of individuals and groups 
was one of the most serious issues in national life, especially for 
the millions of Nigerians who had to live and work in interethnic 
contexts. 

Even in the more cosmopolitan cities, in 1990 more than 90 per- 
cent of marriages were within rather than between ethnic units, 
or at least within identical regions and language groups. Mar- 
riages between subgroups of Igbo, Yoruba, Hausa, Fulani, or Kanuri 
occurred without stigma and had done so for many decades. But 
in the south, Yoruba-Igbo unions were uncommon, and north-south 
marriages were even rarer, especially between Hausa-Fulani or 
Kanuri and any person from southern Nigeria. Northern Muslim 
intermarriage was not uncommon, nor was intermarriage among 
peoples of the middle belt. But unions between middle belters and 
Muslims from emirates farther north remained rare. Migrants who 
could not find a spouse from their own ethnic group within the 



108 




Village elder from Gusau in highlands of eastern Nigeria 
Courtesy World Bank (Josef Hadad) 



109 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

local enclave obtained a mate from the home community. Social 
pressure for ethnic endogamy was intense and persisted even among 
elites in business, universities, the military, religion, and politics. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, it appeared that mar- 
riages within the Christian and Muslim communities were increas- 
ingly transethnic. 

The conjunction of location, language, religion, and common 
and differentiating customs has created a strong sense of shared 
fate among coethnics and has formed a constant basis for organiz- 
ing ethnically related groupings into political constituencies. Thus, 
when political parties emerged, they represented the northern Mus- 
lim peoples, the Yoruba, and the Igbo; middle belters and others 
in between were courted from several directions (see The Second 
Republic, ch. 4). Given the shortage of government jobs and the 
expanding numbers of qualified applicants coming out of the edu- 
cation system, ethnic rivalry for government posts exacerbated eth- 
nic competition. It was also a driving force in the establishment 
of more states, with more state capitals and more locally controlled 
jobs. Such jobs were likely to be less competitive ethnically because 
the boundaries of local governments tended to correlate with eth- 
nic units. Under such conditions, would-be leaders stimulated the 
fears of their ethnic constituents. Ethnic organizations and university 
students wrote letters to newspapers pressuring for greater represen- 
tation, more development resources, and separate states or districts 
for their particular group. Countering this practice, after the civil 
war the new constitution of 1979 provided that no political party 
could be legalized unless it obtained support in all parts of the coun- 
try. This attempt to crosscut ethnicity with rules of political party 
competition has gone far toward alleviating the problem. 

People first looked for relatives when migrating into one of the 
country's many large cities, as an increasing number of Nigerians 
were doing. If they found none, they looked for coethnics from their 
own rural area who shared a network of friends, neighbors, and 
relations. They spoke the same language, went to the same church 
or mosque and helped one another to find a job and housing and 
to join ethnic associations. In the textile mills of Kaduna in the 
north, studies of "class formation" among workers indicated that 
ethnic groupings were far stronger and used more frequently by 
workers than were trade unions, unless working conditions became 
extremely bad. It was only then that union membership, interac- 
tion, strength, and unity rose. Otherwise, ethnicity was the primary 
dimension for worker relations and mutual aid. Studies elsewhere 
in the country produced similar results. The trade union move- 
ment in Nigeria was well established and strong, especially at times 



110 



The Society and Its Environment 



of severe economic downturn, such as the late 1980s and early 
1990s, when the structural adjustment program (SAP) severely 
decreased real wages (see Labor Unions; Structural Adjustment, 
ch. 3). Rivalry within unions, however, and worker associations 
for mutual aid, as well as normal social life at work and afterward, 
were strongly influenced by formal and informal ethnic affiliations. 

Ethnic stereotypes remained strong. Each of the main groups 
had disparaging stories and sayings about the others that were dis- 
cussed openly when a foreigner was alone with members of a sin- 
gle ethnic group. Such prejudices died slowly, especially when ethnic 
groups lived in enclaves, knew little of each other's customs, and 
often attended different schools. It was official policy, however, to 
protect the rights of minorities, and in several instances the will 
to do so was ably demonstrated. Thus, Igbo property abandoned 
in the north at the time of the civil war was maintained by local 
governments and later returned. Although there were problems, 
this property restitution, the attempt to ensure that Igbo were ac- 
cepted at all major universities, and the placement of Igbo in civil 
service posts has helped to create a sense of nationhood and trust 
in the rule of law and in the good intentions of the federal 
government. 

Contemporary Society 

Nigerian history has provided an extraordinary set of pressures 
and events as a context for modern nation building: the imposi- 
tion of colonial rule, independence, interethnic and interregional 
competition or even violence, military coups, a civil war, an oil 
boom that had government and individuals spending recklessly and 
often with corrupt intentions, droughts, and a debt crisis that led 
to a drastic recession and lowered standards of living. Under such 
circumstances, people tended to cleave to what they knew. That 
is to say, they adhered to regional loyalties, ethnicity, kin, and to 
patron-client relations that protected them in an unstable and inse- 
cure environment. Meanwhile, other factors and processes stimu- 
lated by education, jobs, politics, and urban and industrial 
development created crosscutting ties that linked people in new, 
more broadly national ways. 

By 1990 both sets of distinctions operated at once and gave no 
sign of weakening. For example, from time to time labor unions 
were able to call widespread, even general, strikes. At other times, 
unorganized workers or farmers rioted over long-held or sudden 
grievances. Nevertheless, attempts to create national movements 
or political parties out of such momentary flare-ups failed. Instead, 
once the outburst was over, older linkages reasserted themselves. 



Ill 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

In effect, the structure of society in 1990 was the result of these 
two processes — historical, locational, and ethnic on the one hand 
and socioeconomic on the other. In Nigeria the latter context 
referred primarily to occupation, rural-urban residence, and for- 
mal education. Together these factors accounted for similarities 
and differences that were common across ethnic and regional 
groupings. 

Social Structure 

About 70 percent of all Nigerians were still living in farming 
villages in 1990, although the rural dwellers formed a shrinking 
proportion of the labor force. It was among these people that ways 
of life remained deeply consistent with the past. People lived in 
small, modest households whose members farmed, sold some cash 
crops, and performed various kinds of nonfarm work for cash 
income. With the steady decline of export crop prices since the 1960s 
and the price rise in locally grown foods after the early 1970s, farm- 
ers shifted from export crops to local foods for their own subsis- 
tence and for sale to city consumers through middlemen. Most 
farmers used traditional hand tools in smallholdings outside the 
rural village. Houses in 1990 might have tin roofs instead of grass, 
and the village water supply might be a standpipe, or a hand pump. 
New practices included the widespread acceptance of fertilizers; 
a few new crops, especially corn; the use of rented tractors; the 
increased dependence on paid labor; and the development of larg- 
er commercial farms. Absentee city-based farmers also had start- 
ed to buy up agricultural land. 

Paved roads, better marketing procedures, and increased exten- 
sion services in 1990 were producing a change in the rural areas 
that was missing during the first decades of independence. Sur- 
veys indicated that improved transportation (paved or dirt roads 
and cheap, private minibus services) was felt to be the most im- 
portant change, bringing almost all rural areas into touch with near- 
by cities and larger market towns. Still, for most of the 70 to 80 
percent of the people who remained involved in agriculture, life 
was hard, and income levels averaged among the lowest in the 
country. 

Western- style education was a necessary, albeit not always suffi- 
cient, means to gain better income and rank. Under colonial rule, 
literacy and educational qualifications were required for access to 
more powerful, better paying jobs. Education in 1990 was one of 
the most widely accepted criteria for job recruitment. Older edu- 
cation systems, especially in the Islamic north, had always produced 
clerics and judges and some training for the populace. Long years 



112 



The Society and Its Environment 



of Quranic learning continued to give one high status in religious 
occupations, but to qualify for secular jobs in the upper salary scale 
required at least secondary and, increasingly, postsecondary school- 
ing. Most rural families tried to get at least one child through six 
years of elementary school and into secondary school, if possible. 
In the cities, if a family had any stable income, all of the children 
attended school, tried for secondary level and even went on to 
university or other postsecondary education if the youngsters could 
successfully compete for places. For the wealthy, there were pri- 
vate preschools in all major cities that provided a head start in aca- 
demic work and private boarding schools that generally followed 
the British model (see Education, this ch.). 

By the 1980s, the education system was turning out an increas- 
ing surplus of graduates. Dozens of university graduates lined up 
for a single opening and many more for less specialized positions. 
Under such conditions, nepotism, ethnic favoritism, and bribery 
flourished in employment decisions. 

Education requirements for work were known and widely dis- 
cussed. Job descriptions for government posts, commercial com- 
panies, and even factory work required set levels of schooling for 
applicants. Large factories and international corporations had train- 
ing programs for future managers. In the 1980s, however, the vast 
majority of workers still learned their skills from the family or on 
the job. Outside the home, systems of apprenticeship produced 
cheap labor for the teacher and gave the trainee skills, along with 
a potential future network of customers or employers. Thus, truck 
drivers took on trainees, who worked as apprentice-assistants and 
general laborers for several years before they took a license test 
and hired out as drivers themselves. During that time, they learned 
about roads, maps, truck parks, markets, and vehicle servicing; 
they became acquainted with customers and vehicle owners, who 
in turn learned about their trustworthiness and efficiency. 

In contemporary Nigeria as elsewhere, occupation differentiat- 
ed people, incomes, and life- styles. In rural areas, smallholder farm- 
ers were the rule, but farmers often had a nonfarm occupation in 
order to produce income during the nongrowing season. The size 
of the farm depended on family size, farming skills, inherited wealth, 
and access to nonfarm income to provide money for laborers. Some 
nonfarm work, such as trade, was prestigious; some, such as butch- 
ering, was less so. The most prestigious work in rural areas was 
in public administration, either as local traditional headmen and 
chiefs or as rural representatives of government departments — 
such as teachers, district officers, veterinarians, extension workers, 
public works foremen, postal officials, and the like. Such offices 



113 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

required formal educational qualifications. The offices offered steady 
salaries and the possibility of government housing, or housing and 
vehicle allowances. Unlike farming, such work also meant protec- 
tion against the vagaries of climate and economic conditions. This 
situation lasted well into the late 1980s, at which point inflation, 
recession, and government cutbacks destroyed these advantages. 

In 1990 a growing number of medium-sized towns (with more 
than 10,000 people) were spreading out across the country. They 
contained branch banks; branches of larger urban-based trading 
companies; smaller stores; and trade, building, and transport en- 
terprises whose owner-managers formed a rural middle class of 
semiurbanized households. Often such individuals owned and oper- 
ated nearby commercial farms as part of their diversified business 
interests. Their incomes were higher than those of usual farm fam- 
ilies; their education level was quite low, ranging up to comple- 
tion of primary school; and they were often active as local political 
party representatives with links to more important men and or- 
ganizations in nearby cities. 

In a number of special situations, the government had invested 
in a rural area, creating peri-urban conditions surrounding a large 
town. Government involvement might result in a state university 
or a large irrigation project, for example, or, on a smaller scale, 
the building of a secondary school that had been sited with appropri- 
ate housing, electrification, and transportation links to a nearby 
urban center. In some instances, such as the Tiga Dam in Kano 
State or the massive irrigation project on Lake Chad, entire com- 
munities had sprung up to provide housing for the technical staff; 
new schools and markets also were built to meet the increased con- 
sumer needs of the farmers whose incomes rose as the project went 
into production. 

Because of high inflation and sluggish salary increases through- 
out the 1980s and into 1990, rural officials were obliged to moon- 
light, usually by farming, to maintain real wage levels. Extension 
workers had been observed spending their days in a nearby city 
on a second job and carrying out visits to farmers in the evenings 
and on weekends. The wives of officials set up poultry sheds be- 
hind their houses and raised chickens and eggs for local and near- 
by city markets. By contrast, traditional chiefs, who had less formal 
education and often received much lower salaries than government 
representatives, were able to sell services, especially access to land 
purchases; to adjudicate disputes; and to keep a small portion of 
taxes. This shadowy income allowed them to maintain or even in- 
crease consumption levels more easily and set the pattern for the 
sale of public services that was quickly picked up by other officials 



114 



Migration of Fulani people in northern Nigeria 
Courtesy Embassy of Nigeria, Washington 

living in rural areas. In the late 1980s, these well-established "cor- 
rupt" practices were viewed widely as essential for rural officials 
because real incomes had fallen so drastically. 

In the cities, occupations were highly differentiated. Unskilled 
traditional work was more common in the northern cities but not 
yet extinct in southern areas. Unskilled workers in the traditional 
sector included water carriers, servants, women and young girls 
selling cooked foods on the streets, and hawkers of all kinds linked 
to patrons who supplied them and took part of the proceeds. The 
move to cities involved vast numbers of unemployed, who sought 
any type of work. In the modern sector, the unskilled were taken 
on by manufacturing plants, wholesale or retail establishments, 
hotels, and government departments. Such people lived in crowded 
rented rooms, often several families in a room with a curtain down 
the middle. They cooked in a common courtyard and used a la- 
trine that might serve a number of families; the compound might 
or might not have a source of water. They barely managed even 
when their wives and children also sought work daily. 

Lower-level skilled workers in the traditional sector were em- 
ployed in house building and a variety of crafts from pottery to 
iron and brass smithing, leather work, tanning, and butchery. They 
generally had better incomes, lived in several rooms or even a small 



115 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



house or compound, practiced their craft in the household itself, 
and sent children to school. Their counterparts in the modern sec- 
tor were clerks, store attendants, mechanics, carpenters, and fac- 
tory workers who had some schooling and had managed to get into 
the lower levels of the wage system. The two groups often lived 
in the same neighborhoods, although the education of those in the 
modern sector set them somewhat apart. Their incomes, however, 
provided them with similar amenities: a standpipe for household 
water; electricity; a latrine or even a flush toilet; a bicycle or mo- 
tor scooter, or a motorcycle for the slightly better off; a radio; and, 
for a few, a small black and white television set and a bank ac- 
count. Such households often had an extra kin member or two from 
the country who had come to seek their fortunes. 

The middle-level income groups in traditional jobs consisted of 
higher-level skilled workers and entrepreneurs. They included dye 
pit owners with a small work force, middlemen who with financ- 
ing from larger traders bought food and export crops in rural areas 
for sale and storage in the cities, and wholesalers and retailers of 
traditional goods and services, as well as transporters of such items 
as kola nuts, craft goods, specialty crops, and cattle for sale in 
southern markets. This group was larger in the north than the south 
because of the larger traditional economic sector in the region. 
Skilled workers in the modern sector ranged from machine opera- 
tors and skilled craftsmen to accountants; teachers; lower-level 
managers of service stations; small to medium-sized storekeepers, 
who owned or rented and operated a canteen; owners of a truck 
or two, or of a small minibus used as transport for people and goods; 
and workers in the middle ranks of the vast public services that, 
until the shrinkage of the 1980s, accounted for more than half of 
the salaried jobs in Nigeria. 

This group lived in small to medium-sized houses with Western- 
style furniture, a refrigerator, and electronic receivers; the better- 
off had color television sets. Housing was sometimes owned by 
the worker but more often rented. Younger members had motor- 
cycles; more mature ones, cars; and entrepreneurs, a pickup truck. 
Modern- sector middle-level people generally had some secondary 
education, which allowed them to spend time filling out applica- 
tions and to dream of someday attending a university or other post- 
secondary institution to qualify for higher paid jobs. 

At the middle-income level, a number of factors began to separate 
traditional and modern households. Traditional work did not de- 
mand literacy in English, but most jobs at the modern middle lev- 
el did. The amount of Western-style education and acculturation 
to more international tastes affected the life-styles of modern- sector 



116 



The Society and Its Environment 



workers, although ethnicity, kin, and possible patrons in the more 
traditional sector meant that connections were not severed. At the 
same time, both groups had connections upward and downward 
in both the city and rural areas. For members of the traditional 
middle group, this meant the possibility of someday becoming 
wealthier and diversifying their economic activities; for members 
of the modern group, it most often meant more education, better 
jobs, and, ideally, entry into the elite level of society in either the 
public or the private sector. By the late 1980s, a number of middle- 
income workers and small businessmen in both north and south 
were putting greater effort into farming in natal or nearby villages, 
as food prices escalated in the cities and as government policies 
favored the private acquisition of land and provided farm credits 
to would-be commercial farmers. 

Above the middle rank were the elites. Traditional chiefs in the 
south had been losing power to business and government leaders 
for decades. In 1990 they still received respect and officiated at 
ceremonial occasions, but unless they had taken positions in busi- 
ness or government, their status declined. This situation was less 
true in the north, where emirs and other titled officials continued 
to have considerable power and authority. Even there, however, 
the modern sector produced city and township governments that 
were eroding the power of local officials. State governments were 
becoming more important as centralized federal functions carried 
out by parastatals were being sold off to the private business sec- 
tor during the 1980s. In the rural areas of the north, however, tradi- 
tional district and village chiefs remained influential. In the modern 
sector, public service jobs and incoming top management in cor- 
porations required university degrees. Wealthy business leaders 
might lack formal education, although more and more business 
leaders, especially in the south, were university graduates. Entry- 
level salaries for elite jobs were fifteen to twenty times those of the 
bottom salary scale (compared with two to three times in more de- 
veloped economies). Added to the basic salary was hidden income 
in the form of car loans and allowances. Housing often was subsi- 
dized to such an extent that only 7 percent of salary was charged 
for rents and maintenance was free. Housing for holders of elite 
jobs was generally of the standard of the middle class in a devel- 
oped country, but ranged up to huge mansions in exclusive hous- 
ing estates for the very rich. 

In the late 1980s, inflation and wage controls had drastically erod- 
ed the incomes of the salaried elites, and, in most cases, they had 
to moonlight in the private sector through farming, trade, consul- 
tancy, or business. It was not unusual to find a professor's campus 



117 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



garage used as a warehouse for his trucks and the equipment used 
in his construction business; behind his house might be pens where 
his wife conducted a poultry business. Others sought to emigrate, 
especially highly skilled people, such as doctors, lawyers, and profes- 
sors, who realized that they could do much better abroad. The sud- 
den decline in the income of the elites resulted from Nigeria's 
belt- tightening policies. Business people, especially those in trade, 
were less affected by inflation, but the recessionary effects of the 
SAP had cut into their incomes, as well, by lowering demand or 
by controlling imports and exports more tightly. By the late 1980s, 
many of the elite and even the middle classes were being obliged 
to adjust to a lower standard of living. 

Women's Roles 

As with other aspects of society, in the early 1990s women's roles 
were primarily governed by regional and ethnic differences. In the 
north, Islamic practices were still common. This process meant, 
generally, less formal education; early teenage marriages, especially 
in rural areas; and confinement to the household, which was often 
polygynous, except for visits to kin, ceremonies, and the workplace, 
if employment were available and permitted by a girl's family or 
husband. For the most part, Hausa women did not work in the 
fields, whereas Kanuri women did; both helped with harvesting 
and were responsible for all household food processing. Urban wom- 
en sold cooked foods, usually by sending young girls out onto the 
streets or operating small stands. Research indicated that this prac- 
tice was one of the main reasons city women gave for opposing 
schooling for their daughters. Even in elite houses with educated 
wives, women's presence at social gatherings was either nonexis- 
tent or very restricted. In the modern sector, a few women were 
appearing at all levels in offices, banks, social services, nursing, 
radio, television, and the professions (teaching, engineering, en- 
vironmental design, law, pharmacy, medicine, and even agricul- 
ture and veterinary medicine). This trend resulted from women's 
attendance at women's secondary schools and teachers' colleges, 
and in the 1980s from women holding approximately one-fifth of 
university places — double the proportion of the 1970s. Research 
in the 1980s indicated that, for the Muslim north, education be- 
yond primary school was restricted to the daughters of the busi- 
ness and professional elites, and in almost all cases, courses and 
professions were chosen by the family, not the women themselves. 

In the south, women traditionally had held economically impor- 
tant positions in interregional trade and the markets, had worked 
on farms as major labor sources, and had had influential positions 



118 



A family preparing gari, cassava porridge 
Courtesy UNICEF (Maggie Black) 



in traditional systems of local organization. The south, like the 
north, however, had been polygynous; in 1990 it still was for many 
households, including those professing Christianity. Women in the 
south, especially among the Yoruba peoples, had received Western- 
style education since the nineteenth century, and hence they occu- 
pied positions in the professions and to some extent in politics. In 
addition, women headed households, something not seriously con- 
sidered in Nigeria's development plans. Such households were more 
numerous in the south, but they were on the rise everywhere. 

Generally, Nigerian development planning referred to "adult 
males," "households," or "families." Women were included in 
such units but not as a separate category. Up until the 1980s, the 
term "farmer" was assumed to be exclusively male, even though 
in some areas of the south women did most of the farm work. In 
Nigerian terms, a woman was almost always defined as someone's 
daughter, wife, mother, or widow. Single women were suspect, 
although they constituted a large category, especially in the cities, 
because of the high divorce rate. Traditionally, and to some ex- 
tent this remained true in popular culture, single adult women were 
seen as available sexual partners should they try for some indepen- 
dence and as easy victims for economic exploitation. In Kaduna 
State, for example, investigations into illegal land expropriations 



119 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

noted that women's farms were confiscated almost unthinkingly 
by local chiefs wishing to sell to urban-based speculators and would- 
be commercial farmers. 

A national feminist movement was inaugurated in 1982, and a 
national conference held at Ahmadu Bello University. The papers 
presented there indicated a growing awareness by Nigeria's 
university-educated women that the place of women in society re- 
quired a concerted effort and a place on the national agenda; the 
public perception, however, remained far behind. For example, 
a feminist meeting in Ibadan came out against polygyny and then 
was soundly criticized by market women, who said they support- 
ed the practice because it allowed them to pursue their trading ac- 
tivities and have the household looked after at the same time. 
Research in the north, however, indicated that many women op- 
posed the practice and tried to keep bearing children to stave off 
a second wife's entry into the household. Although women's sta- 
tus would undoubtedly rise, for the foreseeable future Nigerian 
women lacked the opportunities of men. 

Religion 

Several religions coexisted in Nigeria, helping to accentuate 
regional and ethnic distinctions. All religions represented in Nigeria 
were practiced in every major city in 1990. But Islam dominated 
in the north, Protestantism and local syncretic Christianity were 
most in evidence in Yoruba areas, and Catholicism predominated 
in the Igbo and closely related areas. The 1963 census indicated 
that 47 percent of Nigerians were Muslim, 35 percent Christian, 
and 18 percent members of local indigenous congregations. If ac- 
curate, these figures indicated a sharp increase in the number of 
Christians (up 13 percent); a slight decline among those profess- 
ing indigenous beliefs, compared with 20 percent in 1953; and only 
a modest (4 percent) rise of Muslims. This surge was partly a result 
of the recognized value of education provided by the missions, es- 
pecially in the previously non-Christian middle belt. It also result- 
ed from 1963 census irregularities that artificially increased the 
proportion of southern Christians to northern Muslims. Since then 
two more forces have been operating. There has been the growth 
of the Aladura Church, an Africanized Christian sect that was es- 
pecially strong in the Yoruba areas, and of evangelical churches, 
in general, spilling over into adjacent and southern areas of the 
middle belt. At the same time, Islam has been spreading south- 
ward into the northern reaches of the middle belt, especially among 
the upwardly mobile, who saw it as a necessary attribute for full 
acceptance in northern business and political circles. In general, 



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The Society and Its Environment 



however, the country should be seen as having a predominantly 
Muslim north and a non-Muslim, primarily Christian south, with 
each as a minority faith in the other's region; the middle belt was 
more heterogeneous. 

Indigenous Beliefs 

Alongside most Nigerian religious beliefs were systems of belief 
that had ancient roots in the area. These beliefs tied family ghosts 
to the primordial spirits of a particular site. In effect the rights of 
a group defined by common genealogical descent were linked to 
a particular place and the settlements within it. The primary func- 
tion of such beliefs was to provide supernatural sanctions and 
legitimacy to the relationship between, and the regulations govern- 
ing, claims on resources, especially agricultural land and house sites. 
Access rights to resources, political offices, economic activities, or 
social relations were defined and legitimized by these same reli- 
gious beliefs. 

The theology expressing and protecting these relationships cen- 
tered, first, on the souls of the recently dead, ghosts who continued 
their interest in the living as they had when they were alive. That 
is to say, authoritative elders demanded conformity to rules govern- 
ing access to, and inheritance of, rights to resources. Indigenous 
theology also comprised all of the duties of the living to one another 
and to their customs, including their obligations to the dead an- 
cestors whose spirits demanded adherence to the moral rules govern- 
ing all human actions. The second pantheon were the supernatural 
residents of the land. These spirits of place (trees, rock outcrop- 
pings, a river, snakes, or other animals and objects) were discov- 
ered and placated by the original founders, who had migrated to 
the new site from a previous one. Spirits of the land might vary 
with each place or be so closely identified with a group's welfare 
that they were carried to a new place as part of the continuity of 
a group to its former home. In the new place, these spiritual 
migrants joined the local spirit population. Such deities developed 
from an original covenant created by the founders of a settlement 
between themselves and the local spirits. This covenant legitimized 
their arrival. In return for regular rites and prayers to these spirits, 
the founders could claim perpetual access to local resources. In doing 
so, they became the lineage in charge of the hereditary local priest- 
hood and village headship and were recognized as ' 'owners of the 
place" by later human arrivals. Both sets of spirits, those of fami- 
ly and those of place, demanded loyalty to communal virtues and 
to the authority of the elders in defending ancient beliefs and 
practices. 



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Nigeria: A Country Study 



In addition to ensuring access to, and the continual fertility of, 
both land and people, the spiritual entities protected their adher- 
ents from misfortune, adjudicated disputes through trials by or- 
deal or through messages divined by special seers, and punished 
personal or communal immorality through personal and group 
failures, sickness, drought, fires, and other catastrophes. Special 
practitioners were in control of supernatural forces to heal illness- 
es, counter malevolent intentions by others and the ghostly enti- 
ties, and diagnose witchcraft — the effects of malefactors whose 
personal spirits might cause harm, sometimes without the actual 
knowledge of the evildoer. Protection against misfortune was 
strengthened by charms, amulets, and medicinal products sold by 
the practitioners. In everyday life, misfortune, sickness, political 
rivalries, inheritance disputes, and even marital choices or the clear- 
ing of a new field could be incorporated and explained within this 
religious framework. Given these beliefs, causal relations were stipu- 
lated and explained through the actions of supernatural entities, 
whose relations to the living involved interventions that enforced 
morality and traditional values. 

As with many peoples around the world, especially in Africa, 
the adult men were organized into secret societies that imitated the 
activity of the spirits in maintaining the moral order. In the 1980s 
in Igboland and in similar societies in neighboring areas, social 
control and conformity to moral order was still enforced by secret 
societies. In the 1970s, this pattern was observed spreading into 
small, originally autonomous communities of the southern middle 
belt at the northern rim of Igboland. Generally, adult men received 
some training and were then initiated into membership. In 1990 
memberships were more selective, and in some places such organi- 
zations had died out. Specifically, these societies enforced commu- 
nity morality through rituals and masked dances. During these 
performances, secret society members imitated the spirits. They 
preached and expressed displeasure with and gave warnings about 
individual and communal morality, attributing accusations and 
threats to spirits of place and family who were displeased with their 
human charges. 

Sorcery and even witchcraft beliefs persisted and were discussed 
as forms of medicine, or as coming from "bad people" whose spirits 
or souls were diagnosed as the cause of misfortune. There also were 
special ways in which the outcomes of stressful future activity, long 
trips, lingering illnesses, family and other problems could be exam- 
ined. Soothsayers provided both therapy and divinatory fore- 
knowledge in stressful situations. 



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The Society and Its Environment 



In the city-states of Yorubaland and its neighbors, a more com- 
plex religion evolved that expressed the subjugation of village life 
within larger polities. These city-states produced a theology that 
linked local beliefs to a central citadel government and its sover- 
eignty over a hinterland of villages through the monarch. The king 
(oba) and his ancestors were responsible for the welfare of the en- 
tire state, in return for confirmation of the legitimacy of the oba's 
rule over his subjects (see Early States Before 1500, ch. 1). In Oyo, 
for example, there were a number of national cults, each with its 
own priests who performed rituals under the authority of the king 
(alafin) in the public interest. Shango, god of thunder, symbolized 
the power of the king and of central government; Ogboni represent- 
ed the fertility of the land and the monarch's role in ensuring the 
well-being of the kingdom. 

In 1990 these indigenous beliefs were more or less openly prac- 
ticed and adhered to among many Christians and Muslims in var- 
ious parts of the country. Thus, in a number of the northern Muslim 
emirates, the emir led prayers for the welfare of the state at the 
graves of royal ancestors. In many Muslim and Christian house- 
holds and villages, a number of the older religious practices and 
beliefs also survived. On the other hand, research indicated that 
many, especially younger people, believed the older traditions to 
be apostasy so that it was common, particularly in rural areas, to 
see mixtures of local beliefs with either Christianity or Islam. And 
in some instances, although the overall trend was away from in- 
digenous religions and toward monotheism, older people suffered 
such mental and physical anguish over denouncing inherited be- 
liefs that they abandoned the newer one. 

Islam 

Islam is a traditional religion in West Africa. It came to north- 
ern Nigeria as early as the eleventh century and was well estab- 
lished in the state capitals of the region by the sixteenth century, 
spreading into the countryside and toward the middle belt uplands. 
There, Islam's advance was stopped by the resistance of local peo- 
ples to incorporation into the emirate states. The Fulani-led jihad 
in the nineteenth century pushed Islam into Nupe and across the 
Niger River into northern Yoruba-speaking areas. The colonial 
conquest established a rule that active Christian proselytizing could 
not occur in the northern Muslim region, although in 1990 the two 
religions continued to compete for converts in the middle belt, where 
ethnic groups and even families had adherents of each persuasion. 

The origins of Islam date to Muhammad (the Prophet), a 
prosperous merchant of the town of Mecca in Arabia. He began 



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Nigeria: A Country Study 



in A.D. 610 to preach the first of a series of revelations granted 
him by God (Allah) through the agency of the archangel Gabriel. 
The divine messages, received during solitary visits into the desert, 
continued during the remainder of his life. 

Muhammad denounced the polytheistic paganism of his fellow 
Meccans; his vigorous and continuing censure ultimately earned 
him their bitter enmity. In 622 he and a group of followers accept- 
ed an invitation to setde in Yathrib, which became known as Me- 
dina (the city) through its association with him. The hijra (known 
in the West as the hegira), or journey to Medina, marked the be- 
ginning of the Islamic calendar in the year 622. In Medina Mu- 
hammad continued his preaching, ultimately defeated his detractors 
in battle, and had consolidated the temporal as well as spiritual 
leadership of most Arabs before his death in 632. 

After Muhammad's death, his followers compiled his words that 
were regarded as coming directly from God in a document known 
as the Quran, the holy scripture of Islam. Other sayings and teach- 
ings of the Prophet, as well as the precedents of his personal be- 
havior as recalled by those who had known him, became the hadith 
("sayings"). From these sources, the faithful have constructed the 
Prophet's customary practice, or sunna, which they endeavor to 
emulate. Together, these documents form a comprehensive guide 
to the spiritual, ethical, and social life of the faithful in most Mus- 
lim countries. 

The shahada (profession of faith, or testimony) states succinctly 
the central belief, "There is no God but Allah, and Muhammad 
is his Prophet." The faithful repeat this simple profession on ritu- 
al occasions, and its recital designates the speaker as a Muslim. 
The term islam means submission to God, and the one who sub- 
mits is a Muslim. 

The God preached by Muhammad was previously known to his 
countrymen, for Allah is the general Arabic term for the supreme 
being rather than the name of a particular deity. Rather than in- 
troducing a new deity, Muhammad denied the existence of the pan- 
theon of gods and spirits worshipped before his prophethood and 
declared the omnipotence of God, the unique creator. Muham- 
mad is the "Seal of the Prophets," the last of the prophetic line. 
His revelations are said to complete for all time the series of reve- 
lations that had been given earlier to Jews and Christians. God 
is believed to have remained one and the same throughout time, 
but humans are seen as having misunderstood or strayed from 
God's true teachings until set aright by Muhammad. Prophets and 
sages of the biblical tradition, such as Abraham, Moses, and Jesus, 
are recognized as inspired vehicles of God's will. Islam, however, 



124 



The Society and Its Environment 



reveres as sacred only the message. It accepts the concepts of guar- 
dian angels, the Day of Judgment, resurrection, and the eternal 
life of the soul. 

The duties of the Muslim form the "five pillars" of the faith. 
These are shahada, salat (daily prayer), zakat (almsgiving), sawm (fast- 
ing), and hajj (pilgrimage). The believer prays facing Mecca at 
five specified times during the day. Whenever possible, men ob- 
serve their prayers in congregation at a mosque under direction 
of an imam, or prayer leader, and on Fridays are obliged to do 
so. Women are permitted to attend public worship at the mosque, 
where they are segregated from men, but their attendance tends 
to be discouraged, and more frequently they pray in the seclusion 
of their homes. 

In the early days of Islam, a tax for charitable purposes was im- 
posed on personal property in proportion to the owner's wealth. 
The collection of this tax and its distribution to the needy were 
originally functions of the state. But with the breakdown of Muslim 
religiopolitical authority, alms became an individual responsibility. 

The ninth month of the Muslim calendar is Ramadan, a period 
of obligatory fasting in commemoration of Muhammad's receipt 
of God's revelation. Throughout the month, all but the sick and 
the weak, pregnant or lactating women, soldiers on duty, travel- 
ers on necessary journeys, and young children are enjoined from 
eating, drinking, smoking, or sexual intercourse during daylight 
hours. Those adults excused are obliged to endure an equivalent 
fast at their earliest opportunity. A festive meal breaks the daily 
fast and inaugurates a night of feasting and celebration. Well-to- 
do believers usually do little or no work during this period, and 
some businesses close for all or part of the day. Because the months 
of the lunar year revolve through the solar year, Ramadan falls 
at various seasons in different years. A considerable test of discipline 
at any time of the year, a fast that falls in summertime imposes 
severe hardship on those who must do physical work. 

Finally, at least once during their lifetime all Muslims should 
make the hajj, or pilgrimage, to the holy city of Mecca to partici- 
pate in the special rites that occur during the twelfth month of the 
lunar calendar. For most well-to-do Nigerian traders and business 
people, the trip was so common that the honorific hajji (fern., 
hajjia ), signifying a pilgrim, was routinely used to refer to suc- 
cessful traders. 

Two features of Islam are essential to understanding its place 
in Nigerian society. They are the degree to which Islam perme- 
ates other institutions in the society and its contribution to Nigeri- 
an pluralism. As an institution in emirate society, Islam includes 



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Nigeria: A Country Study 

daily and annual ritual obligations; the pilgrimage to Mecca; the 
sharia, or religious law; and an establishment view of politics, fam- 
ily life, communal order, and appropriate modes of personal con- 
duct in most situations. Thus, even in 1990, Islam pervaded daily 
life. Public meetings began and ended with Muslim prayer, and 
everyone knew at least the minimum Arabic prayers and the five 
pillars of the religion required for full participation. Public adju- 
dication (by local leaders with the help of religious experts, or Alkali 
courts) provided widespread knowledge of the basic tenets of shar- 
ia law — the Sunni school of law according to Malik ibn Anas, the 
jurist from Medina, was that primarily followed. Sunni (from sun- 
na), or orthodox Islam, is the dominant sect in Nigeria and most 
of the Muslim world. The other sect is Shia Islam, which holds 
that the caliphs or successors to the Prophet should have been his 
relatives rather than elected individuals. 

Every settlement had at least one place set aside for communal 
prayers. In the larger settlements, mosques were well attended, 
especially on Fridays when the local administrative and chiefly elites 
led the way, and the populace prayed with its leaders in a demon- 
stration of communal and religious solidarity. Gaining increased 
knowledge of the religion, one or more pilgrimages to Mecca for 
oneself or one's wife, and a reputation as a devout and honorable 
Muslim all provided prestige. Those able to suffuse their every- 
day lives with the beliefs and practices of Islam were deeply 
respected. 

Air transport had made the hajj more widely available, and the 
red cap wound with a white cloth, signifying its wearer's pilgrimage, 
was much more common in 1990 than twenty years previously. 
Upper-income groups went several times and sent or took their 
wives as well. The ancient custom of spending years walking across 
Africa to reach Mecca was still practiced, however, and groups of 
such pilgrims could be seen receiving charity at Friday prayers out- 
side major mosques in the north. 

Nigerian Islam was not highly organized. Reflecting the 
aristocratic nature of the traditional ruling groups, there were fam- 
ilies of clerics whose male heirs trained locally and abroad in the- 
ology and jurisprudence and filled major positions in the mosques 
and the judiciary. These ulama, or learned scholars, had for cen- 
turies been the religious and legal advisers of emirs, the titled no- 
bility, and the wealthy trading families in the major cities. Ordinary 
people could consult the myriads of would-be and practicing clerics 
in various stages of training, who studied with local experts, func- 
tioned at rites of passage, or simply used their religious education 
to gain increased "blessedness" for their efforts. Sufi brotherhoods 



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The Society and Its Environment 



(from suf, or wool; the wearing of a woolen robe indicated devo- 
tion to a mystic life), a form of religious order based on more per- 
sonal or mystical relations to the supernatural, were widespread, 
especially in the major cities. There the two predominant ones, 
Qadiriyah and Tijaniyah, had separate mosques and, in a num- 
ber of instances, a parochial school system receiving grants from 
the state. The brotherhoods played a major role in the spread of 
Islam in the northern area and the middle belt. 

Islam both united and divided. It provided a rallying force in 
the north and into the middle belt, where it was spreading. The 
wide scope of Islamic beliefs and practices created a leveling force 
that caused Muslims in the north to feel that they were part of a 
common set of cultural traditions affecting family life, dress, food, 
manners, and personal qualities linking them to one another and 
a wider Islamic world. At the constitutional conference of 1978, 
Muslim delegates walked out as a unit over the issue of a separate 
Islamic supreme court, a demand they lost but which in 1990 re- 
mained a Muslim goal. To adapt fully to northern life, non-Muslims 
had to remain in an enclave, living quasi-segregated lives in their 
churches, their social clubs, and even their work. In contrast, be- 
coming a convert to Islam was the doorway to full participation 
in the society. Middle belt people, especially those with ambitions 
in politics and business, generally adopted Islam. The main ex- 
ception to this rule was Plateau State, where the capital, Jos, was 
as much a Christian as a Muslim community, and a greater ac- 
commodation between the two sets of beliefs and their adherents 
had occurred. 

Divisions within the Muslim community existed, however. The 
nineteenth-century jihad that founded the Sokoto Caliphate was 
a regenerative and proselytizing movement within the communi- 
ty of the faithful. In major centers in 1990, the Sufi brotherhoods 
supported their own candidates for both religious and traditional 
emirate offices. These differences were generally not disruptive. 
Islamic activist preachers and student leaders who spread ideas 
about a return to extreme orthodoxy also existed. In addition, a 
fringe Islamic cult, known as the Maitatsine, started in the late 
1970s and operated throughout the 1980s, springing up in Kano 
around a mystical leader (since deceased) from Cameroon who 
claimed to have had divine revelations superseding those of the 
Prophet. The cult had its own mosques and preached a doctrine 
antagonistic to established Islamic and societal leadership. Its main 
appeal was to marginal and poverty-stricken urban migrants, whose 
rejection by the more established urban groups fostered this re- 
ligious opposition. These disaffected adherents ultimately lashed 



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Nigeria: A Country Study 

out at the more traditional mosques and congregations, resulting 
in violent outbreaks in several cities of the north (see Domestic Secu- 
rity, ch. 5). 

Christianity 

The majority of Christians were found in the south. A few iso- 
lated mission stations and mission bookstores, along with churches 
serving southern enclaves in the northern cities and larger towns, 
dotted the Muslim north. The Yoruba area traditionally has been 
Protestant and Anglican, whereas Igboland has always been the 
area of greatest activity by the Roman Catholic Church. Other 
denominations abounded as well. Presbyterians arrived in the early 
twentieth century in the Ibibio Niger Delta area and had missions 
in the middle belt as well. This latter area was an open one. Small 
missionary movements were allowed to start up, generally in the 
1920s, after the middle belt was considered pacified. Each denomi- 
nation set up rural networks by providing schooling and health fa- 
cilities. Most such facilities remained in 1990, although in many 
cases schools had been taken over by the local state government 
in order to standardize curricula and indigenize the teaching staff. 
Pentecostals arrived mostly as indigenous workers in the post- 
independence period and in 1990 Pentecostalism was spreading 
rapidly throughout the middle belt, having some success in Roman 
Catholic and Protestant towns of the south as well. There were also 
breakaway, or Africanized, churches that blended traditional Chris- 
tian symbols with indigenous symbols. Among these was the 
Aladura movement that was spreading rapidly throughout Yoru- 
baland and into the non-Muslim middle belt areas. 

Apart from Benin and Warri, which had come in contact with 
Christianity through the Portuguese as early as the fifteenth cen- 
tury, most missionaries arrived by sea in the nineteenth century. 
As with other areas in Africa, Roman Catholics and Anglicans each 
tended to establish areas of hegemony in southern Nigeria. After 
World War I, smaller sects such as the Brethren, Seventh Day Ad- 
ventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, and others worked in interstitial 
areas, trying not to compete. Although less well-known, African- 
American churches entered the missionary field in the nineteenth 
century and created contacts with Nigeria that lasted well into the 
colonial period. 

African churches were founded by small groups breaking off from 
the European denominations, especially in Yorubaland, where such 
independence movements started as early as the late nineteenth 
century. They were for the most part ritually and doctrinally iden- 
tical to the parent church, although more African music, and later 



128 



The Society and Its Environment 



dance, entered and mixed with the imported church services. A 
number also used biblical references to support polygyny. With 
political independence came African priests in both Roman Catholic 
and Protestant denominations, although ritual and forms of wor- 
ship were strictly those of the home country of the original mis- 
sionaries. By the 1980s, however, African music and even dancing 
were being introduced quietly into church services, albeit altered 
to fit into rituals of European origin. Southern Christians living 
in the north, especially in larger cities, had congregations and 
churches founded as early as the 1920s. Even medium-sized towns 
(20,000 persons or more) with an established southern enclave had 
local churches, especially in the middle belt, where both major 
religions had a strong foothold. The exodus of Igbo from the north 
in the late 1960s left Roman Catholic churches poorly attended, 
but by the 1980s adherents were back in even greater numbers, 
and a number of new churches had been built. 

The Aladura, like several other breakaway churches, stress heal- 
ing and fulfillment of life goals for oneself and one's family. Afri- 
can beliefs that sorcery and witchcraft are malevolent forces against 
which protection is required are accepted; rituals are warm and 
emotional, stressing personal involvement and acceptance of spirit 
possession. Theology is biblical, but some sects add costumed 
processions and some accept polygyny. 

Major congregations of the larger Anglican and Roman Catholic 
missions represented elite families of their respective areas, although 
each of these churches had members from all levels and many quite 
humble church buildings. Nevertheless, a wedding in the Angli- 
can cathedral in Lagos was usually a gathering of the elite of the 
entire country, and of Lagos and Yorubaland in particular. Such 
families had connections to their churches going back to the 
nineteenth century and were generally not attracted to the break- 
away churches. All major urban centers, all universities, and the 
new capital of Abuja had areas set aside for the major religions 
to build mosques and churches and for burial grounds. 

Interethnic conflict generally has had a religious element. Riots 
against Igbo in 1953 and in the 1960s in the north were said to 
be fired by religious conflict. The riots against Igbo in the north 
in 1966 were said to have been inspired by radio reports of mis- 
treatment of Muslims in the south. In the 1980s, serious outbreaks 
between Christians and Muslims occurred in Kafanchan in southern 
Kaduna State in a border area between the two religions. 

Urbanization 

Throughout Africa societies that had been predominantly rural 



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Nigeria: A Country Study 

for most of their history were experiencing a rapid and profound 
reorientation of their social and economic lives toward cities and 
urbanism. As ever greater numbers of people moved to a small 
number of rapidly expanding cities (or, as was often the case, a 
single main city), the fabric of life in both urban and rural areas 
changed in massive, often unforeseen ways. Having the largest and 
one of the most rapidly growing cities in sub-Saharan Africa, Nige- 
ria has experienced the phenomenon of urbanization as thorough- 
ly as any African nation, but its experience has also been unique — in 
scale, in pervasiveness, and in historical antecedents. 

Modern urbanization in most African countries has been domi- 
nated by the growth of a single primary city, the political and com- 
mercial center of the nation; its emergence was, more often than 
not, linked to the shaping of the country during the colonial era. 
In countries with a coastline, this was often a coastal port, and in 
Nigeria, Lagos fitted well into this pattern. Unlike most other na- 
tions, however, Nigeria has not just one or two but several other 
cities of major size and importance, a number of which are larger 
than most other national capitals in Africa. In two areas, the Yoruba 
region in the southwest and the Hausa-Fulani and Kanuri areas 
of the north, there are numbers of cities with historical roots stretch- 
ing back considerably before the advent of British colonizers, giv- 
ing them distinctive physical and cultural identities. Moreover, in 
areas such as the Igbo region in the southeast, which had few ur- 
ban centers before the colonial period and was not highly urbanized 
even at independence, there has been a massive growth of newer 
cities since the 1970s, so that these areas in 1990 were also highly 
urban. 

Cities are not only independent centers of concentrated human 
population and activity; they also exert a potent influence on the 
rural landscape. What is distinctive about the growth of cities in 
Nigeria is the long history of urban growth and the presence of 
urban areas in many parts of the country. 

Historical Development of Urban Centers 

Nigerian urbanism, as in other parts of the world, is a function 
primarily of trade and politics. In the north, the great urban centers 
of Kano, Katsina, Zaria, Sokoto, the early Borno capitals (Gazar- 
gamo and Kuka), and other cities served as entrepots to the Saha- 
ran and trans-Saharan trade, and as central citadels and political 
capitals for the expanding states of the northern savanna. They 
attracted large numbers of traders and migrants from their own 
hinterlands and generally also included "stranger quarters" for 
migrants of other regions and nations. In the south, the rise of the 



130 



The Society and Its Environment 



Yoruba expansionist city-states and of Benin and others was stimu- 
lated by trade to the coast and by competition among these grow- 
ing urban centers for the control of their hinterlands and of the 
trade from the interior to the Atlantic (including the slave trade). 
The activities of European traders also attracted people to such 
coastal cities as Lagos, Badagri, Brass, and Bonny, and later Cala- 
bar and Port Harcourt. Overlying the original features of the earlier 
cities were those generated by colonial and postcolonial rule, which 
created new urban centers while also drastically altering the older 
ones. All these cities and peri-urban areas generally tended to have 
high population densities in the early 1990s. 

The northern savanna cities grew within city walls, at the center 
of which were the main market, government buildings, and the 
central mosque. Around them clustered the houses of the rich and 
powerful. Smaller markets and denser housing were found away 
from this core, along with little markets at the gates and some 
cleared land within the gates that was needed especially for siege 
agriculture. Groups of specialized craft manufacturers (cloth dyers, 
weavers, potters, and the like) were organized into special quar- 
ters, the enterprises often being family-based and inherited. Roads 
from the gates ran into the central market and the administrative 
headquarters. Cemeteries were outside the city gates. 

The concentration of wealth, prestige, political power, and reli- 
gious learning in the cities attracted large numbers of migrants, 
both from the neighboring countryside and from distant regions. 
This influx occasioned the building of additional sections of the 
city to accommodate these strangers. In many of the northern ci- 
ties, these areas were separated between sections for the distant, 
often non-Muslim migrants not subject to the religious and other 
prohibitions of the emir, and for those who came from the local 
region and were subjects of the emir. The former area was desig- 
nated the "Sabon Gari," or new town (which in southern cities, 
such as Ibadan, has often been shortened to "Sabo"), whereas the 
latter was often known as the * 'Tudun Wada, ' ' an area often quite 
wealthy and elaborately laid out. To the precolonial sections of the 
town was often added a government area for expatriate adminis- 
trators. As a result, many of the northern cities have grown from 
a single centralized core to being polynucleated cities, with areas 
whose distinctive character reflects their origins and the roles and 
position of their inhabitants. 

Surrounding many of the large, older northern cities, including 
Kano, Sokoto, and Katsina, there developed regions of relatively 
dense rural settlement where increasingly intensive agriculture was 
practiced to supply food and other products to the urban population. 



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Nigeria: A Country Study 

These areas have come to be known as close settled zones, and they 
remain of major importance to the agricultural economies of the 
north. By 1990 the inner close settled zone around Kano, the larg- 
est of its kind, extended to a radius of about thirty kilometers, es- 
sentially the limit of a day trip to the city on foot or by donkey. 
Within this inner zone, there has long been a tradition of inten- 
sive interaction between the rural and urban populations, involv- 
ing not just food but also wood for fuel, manure, and a range of 
trade goods. There has also been much land investment and specu- 
lation in this zone. The full range of Kano' s outer close settled zone 
in 1 990 was considered to extend sixty-five to ninety-five kilome- 
ters from the city, and the rural-urban interactions had extended 
in distance and increased in intensity because of the great improve- 
ments in roads and in the availability of motorized transport. With- 
in this zone, the great majority of usable land was under annual 
rainy season or continuous irrigated cultivation, making it one of 
the most intensively cultivated regions in sub-Saharan Africa. 

In the south, there were some similarities of origin and design 
in the forest and southern savanna cities of Yorubaland, but cul- 
ture, landscape, and history generated a very different character 
for most of these cities. As in the north, the earlier Yoruba towns 
often centered around the palace of a ruler, or afin, which was sur- 
rounded by a large open space and a market. This arrangement 
was still evident in older cities such as Ife. However, many of the 
most important contemporary Yoruba cities, including the largest, 
Ibadan, were founded during the period of the Yoruba wars in the 
first half of the nineteenth century. Reflecting their origins as war 
camps, they usually contained multiple centers of power without 
a single central palace. Instead, the main market often assumed 
the central position in the original town, and there were several 
separate areas of important compounds established by the major 
original factions. Abeokuta, for example, had three leading fami- 
lies from the Egba clan, all of whom were headed by chiefs, who 
had broken away from and become important rivals of Ibadan. 
Besides these divisions were the separate areas built for stranger 
migrants, such as Sabo in Ibadan, where many of the Hausa 
migrants resided; the sections added during the colonial era, often 
as government reserve areas (GRAs); and the numerous areas of 
postcolonial expansion, generally having little or no planning. 

The high population densities typically found in Yoruba cities — 
and even in rural villages in Yorubaland — were among the strik- 
ing features of the region. This culturally based pattern was prob- 
ably reinforced during the period of intense intercity warfare, but 
it persisted in most areas through the colonial and independence 



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The Society and Its Environment 



periods. The distinctive Yoruba pattern of densification involved 
filling in compounds with additional rooms, then adding a second, 
third, or sometimes even a fourth story. Eventually, hundreds of 
people might live in a space that had been occupied by only one 
extended family two or three generations earlier. Fueling this process 
of densification were the close connections between rural and ur- 
ban dwellers, and the tendency for any Yoruba who could afford 
it to maintain both urban and rural residences. 

The colonial government, in addition to adding sections to ex- 
isting cities, also created important new urban centers in areas where 
there previously had been none. Among the most important were 
Kaduna, the colonial capital of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, 
and Jos in the central highlands, which was the center of the tin 
mining industry on the plateau and a recreational town for expatri- 
ates and the Nigerian elite. These new cities lacked walls but had 
centrally located administrative buildings and major road and rail 
transport routes, along which the main markets developed. These 
routes became one of the main forces for the cities' growth. The 
result was usually a basically linear city, rather than the circular 
pattern largely based on defensive needs, which characterized the 
earlier indigenous urban centers. 

The other ubiquitous colonial addition was the segregated GRA, 
consisting of European- style housing, a hospital or nursing station, 
and educational, recreational, and religious facilities for the Brit- 
ish colonials and the more prominent European trading commu- 
nity. The whole formed an expatriate enclave, which was 
deliberately separated from the indigenous Nigerian areas, osten- 
sibly to control sanitation and limit the spread of diseases such as 
malaria. After independence, these areas generally became upper 
income suburbs, which sometimes spread outward into surround- 
ing farmlands as well as inward to fill in the space that formerly 
separated the GRA from the rest of the city. New institutions, such 
as university campuses, government office complexes, hospitals, 
and hotels, were often located outside or on the fringes of the city 
in the 1980s. The space that originally separated them from the 
denser areas was then filled in as further growth occurred. 

Urbanization since Independence 

Spurred by the oil boom prosperity of the 1970s and the mas- 
sive improvements in roads and the availability of vehicles, Nigeria 
since independence has become an increasingly urbanized and 
urban-oriented society. During the 1970s Nigeria had possibly the 
fastest urbanization growth rate in the world. Because of the great in- 
flux of people into urban areas, the growth rate of urban population 



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Nigeria: A Country Study 

in Nigeria in 1986 was estimated to be close to 6 percent per year, 
more than twice that of the rural population. Between 1970 and 
1980, the proportion of Nigerians living in urban areas was esti- 
mated to have grown from 16 to more than 20 percent, and by 
2010, urban population was expected to be more than 40 percent 
of the nation's total. Although Nigeria did not have the highest 
proportion of urban population in sub-Saharan Africa (in several 
of the countries of francophone Central Africa, for example, close 
to 50 percent of the population was in the major city or cities), 
it had more large cities and the highest total urban population of 
any sub-Saharan African country. 

In 1990 there were twenty-one state capitals in Nigeria, each 
estimated to have more than 100,000 inhabitants; fifteen of these, 
plus a number of other cities, probably had populations exceeding 
200,000. Virtually all of these were growing at a rate that doubled 
their size every fifteen years. These statistics did not include the 
new national capital, Abuja, which was planned to have more than 
1 million inhabitants by early in the twenty-first century, although 
that milestone might be delayed as construction there stretched out. 
In 1990 the government was still in the process of moving from 
Lagos, the historical capital, to Abuja in the middle belt, and most 
sections of the government were still operating from Lagos. Since 
1976 there had been dual capitals in both Lagos and Abuja. If one 
added the hundreds of smaller towns with more than 20,000 in- 
habitants, which resembled the larger centers more than the many 
smaller villages throughout the country, the extent of Nigerian ur- 
banization was probably more widespread than anywhere else in 
sub-Saharan Africa. 

Many of the major cities had growing manufacturing sectors, 
including, for example, textile mills, steel plants, car assembly 
plants, large construction companies, trading corporations, and 
financial institutions. They also included government service 
centers, large office and apartment complexes, along with a great 
variety of small business enterprises, many in the "informal sec- 
tor," and vast slum areas. All postsecondary education installa- 
tions were in urban centers, and the vast majority of salaried jobs 
remained urban rather than rural. 

Although cities varied, there was a Third World urban approach 
that distinguished life in the city from that in the countryside. It 
emerged from the density and variety of housing — enormous 
poverty and overcrowding for most and exorbitantly wealthy sub- 
urbs and guarded enclaves for the upper classes. It also emerged 
from the rhythm of life set by masses of people going to work 
each day; the teeming central market areas; the large trading 



134 




135 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

and department stores; the traffic, especially at rush hours; the filth 
that resulted from inadequate housing and public services; the des- 
titution indicated by myriads of beggars and unemployed; the fear 
of rising crime; and the excitement of night life that was nonexis- 
tent in most rural areas. All these factors, plus the increased op- 
portunity to connect with the rich and powerful through chains of 
patron-client relations, made the city attractive, lively, and dan- 
gerous. Urban people might farm, indeed many were trying to do 
so as food prices soared in the 1980s, but urban life differed vastly 
from the slow and seasonally defined rhythm of life in rural areas. 
Generally, even with all its drawbacks, it was seen as more desira- 
ble, especially by young people with more than a primary education. 

The most notorious example of urban growth in Nigeria has un- 
doubtedly been Lagos, its most important commercial center. The 
city has shot up in size since the 1960s; its annual growth rate was 
estimated at almost 14 percent during the 1970s, when the mas- 
sive extent of new construction was exceeded only by the influx 
of migrants attracted by the booming prosperity. Acknowledged 
to be the largest city in sub-Saharan Africa (although an accurate 
count of its population must await census results), Lagos has be- 
come legendary for its congestion and other urban problems. Built 
for the most part on poorly drained marshlands, the city commonly 
had flooding during the rainy season, and there was frequent sew- 
age backup, especially in the poorer lowland sections. As in other 
Nigerian cities, garbage and waste disposal was a constant problem. 
Housing construction had boomed but rarely seemed to keep pace 
with demand. The city's main fame, however, came from the scale 
of its traffic jams. Spanning several islands as well as a large and 
expanding mainland area, the city never seemed to have enough 
bridges or arteries. The profusion of vehicles that came with the 
prosperity of the 1970s seemed often to be arranged in a massive 
standstill, which became the site for urban peddling of an amaz- 
ing variety of goods, as well as for entertainment, exasperation, 
innovation, and occasionally crime. By 1990 Lagos had made some 
progress in managing its traffic problems both through road and 
bridge construction and traffic control regulations. This progress 
was aided by the economic downturn of the late 1980s, which slowed 
urban migration and even led some people to return to rural areas. 

Aside from Lagos, the most rapid recent rates of urbanization 
in the 1980s were around Port Harcourt in the Niger Delta region, 
which was at the heart of the oil boom, and generally throughout 
the Igbo and other areas of the southeast. These regions histori- 
cally had few urban centers, but numerous large cities, including 
Onitsha, Owerri, Enugu, Aba, and Calabar, grew very rapidly 



136 



The Society and Its Environment 



as commercial and administrative centers. The Yoruba southwest 
was by 1990 still the most highly urbanized part of the country, 
whereas the middle belt was the least urbanized. The problems of 
Lagos, as well as the desire for a more centrally located capital that 
would be more of a force for national unity, led to the designation 
in 1976 of a site for a new national capital at Abuja. 

Rural-Urban Linkages 

Cities in Nigeria, as elsewhere, have historically exerted potent 
influences on the countryside. The northern city-states played a 
major role in the distribution of human population and economic 
activity throughout the savanna region. As citadels and centers of 
power and conquest, they caused depopulation in some regions, 
notably those subject to conquest and raiding, and population con- 
centration in other areas. The low populations of the middle belt 
savanna probably resulted from the raiding and the conquests of 
the Hausa and Fulani city-states. The subsequent regrowth of bush 
land is thought to have led to a resurgence of tsetse flies and other 
disease vectors, which inhibited attempts to repopulate the region. 
The complementary effect was to increase population in zones of 
relative security, either areas under the protection of the dominant 
political states or areas of refuge, such as hill masses, which were 
difficult for armed horsemen to conquer. 

The areas under the control or influence of major city-states 
would have been economically oriented toward those centers, both 
through the coercive exaction of taxes or tribute and through the 
production of food and manufactured products for the court and 
urban population. Many of these economic factors were replicat- 
ed in the modern experience of urbanization, although one major 
change, dating from the imposition of British colonialism in the 
north, was the removal of the insecurity caused by warring polities. 

Although there are similarities to this northern savanna pattern 
in the historical impact of Yoruba urbanization, the very different 
nature of the Yoruba cities led to a distinctive pattern of rural 
interaction. Yoruba cities traditionally had attached to them sat- 
ellite villages or hamlets, the inhabitants of which considered them- 
selves as belonging to that city, although most of their lives were 
spent outside the cities and their livelihoods derived from farming 
or other rural activities. The resulting close connection between 
urban dwellers and the surrounding farmers, indeed the fact that 
they were often identical in that urban dwellers also had farms in 
which they lived for much of the year, was noted by early European 
travelers to Yorubaland. Even in 1990, many Yoruba urban dwellers 
owned farms within a reasonable distance from the city and worked 



137 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

them regularly. Moreover, many villagers owned houses, rooms, 
or partly completed structures in nearby towns or cities and divid- 
ed their time, investments, and activities between urban and rural 
settings. Thus, the traditional pattern of urban-rural interconnec- 
tions continued to be a deeply rooted facet of Yoruba culture. 

Among the most important interactions between rural and ur- 
ban areas through the 1980s in Nigeria and most other parts of 
Africa were the demographic impacts of urban migration on rural 
areas. Because the great majority of migrants were men of work- 
ing age, the rural areas from which they came were left with a 
demo graphically unbalanced population of women, younger chil- 
dren, and older people. This phenomenon was not new to Nigeria 
and had been evident in parts of the country since long before in- 
dependence. The 1953 census showed that the crowded rural regions 
of Igboland, among other areas, had already experienced a sub- 
stantial migration of men, leaving a large preponderance of wom- 
en in the prime working ages. In what is today Imo State, for 
example, the sex ratio (that is, the ratio of men to women, multi- 
plied by 100) for the zero to fourteen age-group in 1953 was 100.2, 
but for ages fifteen to forty-nine, it fell to 79.1, indicating a large 
surplus of females. Many of the male Igbo migrants left to work 
in the cities of the north and southwest. Although the civil war sub- 
sequently caused many Igbos to return to the southeast, the over- 
all scale and geographic extent of rural-urban migration in the 
country had increased steadily after the war. Migration was strongly 
stimulated by the oil boom of the 1970s, with all of the opportuni- 
ties that era brought for making one's fortune in cities such as La- 
gos, Port Harcourt, and Warri, as well as others that were indirecdy 
affected by the oil economy. Since then, migration has waxed and 
waned with the state of the economy. In the late 1980s, many young 
people were compelled by the sharp downturn of the economy and 
the shortage of urban employment to return to their home villages. 
As a longer-term phenomenon, however, migration from the rural 
areas, especially by young men, was expected to be an accelerat- 
ing and largely irreversible social process. 

This process affected the rural economy in the areas of migra- 
tion by creating marked changes in the gender division of labor. 
In most of Africa, agricultural labor was traditionally specified by 
gender: men had certain tasks and women had others, although 
the specific divisions varied by culture and ethnic group. As 
working-age men left the rural areas, the resulting labor gap was 
met by others, usually wives or children, or by hired labor — or the 
tasks were modified or not performed. The departure of men helped 
to generate a lively market for rural wage labor. In many areas 



138 



The Society and Its Environment 



in 1990, male and female laborers were commonly hired to per- 
form agricultural tasks such as land preparation, weeding, and har- 
vesting, which in the past had been done by either household labor 
or traditional work parties. In turn, the growth in demand for hired 
labor fostered an increase of seasonal and longer term intrarural 
migration. The improvement of roads was also extremely impor- 
tant in stimulating the scale of seasonal labor migration. It became 
feasible, for example, for Hausa and other northern workers to come 
south to work as hired laborers in the cocoa belt and elsewhere at 
the onset of the rains and later to return to their home villages in 
time to plant their own crops. 

In more remote areas, however, finding hired workers was often 
difficult. The absence of men led to neglect of such tasks as land 
clearing and heavy soil conservation work, which they generally 
performed. Thus, in forest areas from which there was much male 
migration, thickly overgrown land that had been left fallow for ex- 
tended periods would not be cleared for cultivation; instead, the 
same parcels were used repeatedly, leading to rapid declines in soil 
fertility and yields. As a result, land degradation also occurred in 
these low density areas. 

Some of the most profound impacts of urban areas on the rural 
economy derived from the vast increase in food demand generat- 
ed by the growth of cities. Both the amounts and types of foods 
consumed by urban populations helped to transform agricultural 
systems and practices. Cassava, corn, and fresh vegetable produc- 
tion especially benefited from the expansion of urban demand. Cas- 
sava tubers can be processed by fermenting, grating, and drying 
to produce a powdered product known as gari, which can be stored 
and is very suitable for cooking in urban settings. Especially 
throughout the southern parts of the country, gari demand grew 
rapidly with the expansion of urban populations, causing a large 
increase in cassava planting and processing, largely done by women 
as a cottage industry. Demand for and production of corn also in- 
creased significantly. In the early portion of the harvest season, 
fresh corn sold as roadside "fast food" became a highly profitable 
endeavor, especially in cities. Throughout the northern areas of 
the country, corn production for dried grain — most of which was 
grown for sale to urban areas — also expanded rapidly through the 
1980s, supplementing or replacing some of the traditional sorghum 
and millet production. The expansion of commercial chicken and 
egg production, also largely for the urban market, further raised 
demand for corn as feed. 

The expansion and improvement of the transport network in the 
1970s and 1980s played a key role in tying urban markets to rural 



139 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

producing regions. This linkage was most critical for fresh vegeta- 
ble production, which previously had been very limited in ge- 
ographical extent but became feasible and profitable in many areas 
once efficient transport connections to urban areas were established. 
The continued growth of urbanization and expansion of transport 
capacity were likely to be the major driving forces of agricultural 
production and modernization through the 1990s. 

Education 

There were three fundamentally distinct education systems in 
Nigeria in 1990: the indigenous system, Quranic schools, and for- 
mal European- style education institutions. In the rural areas where 
the majority lived, children learned the skills of farming and other 
work, as well as the duties of adulthood, from participation in the 
community. This process was often supplemented by age-based 
schools in which groups of young boys were instructed in commu- 
nity responsibilities by mature men. Apprentice systems were 
widespread throughout all occupations; the trainee provided ser- 
vice to the teacher over a period of years and eventually struck out 
on his own. Truck driving, building trades, and all indigenous crafts 
and services from leather work to medicine were passed down in 
families and acquired through apprenticeship training as well. In 
1990 this indigenous system included more than 50 percent of the 
school-age population and operated almost entirely in the private 
sector; there was virtually no regulation by the government unless 
training included the need for a license. By the 1970s, education 
experts were asking how the system could be integrated into the 
more formal schooling of the young, but the question remained 
unresolved by 1990. 

Islamic education was part of religious duty. Children learned 
up to one or two chapters of the Quran by rote from a local mal- 
lam, or religious teacher, before they were five or six years old. 
Religious learning included the Arabic alphabet and the ability to 
read and copy texts in the language, along with those texts required 
for daily prayers. Any Islamic community provided such instruc- 
tion in a mallarrCs house, under a tree on a thoroughfare, or in a 
local mosque. This primary level was the most widespread. A 
smaller number of those young Muslims who wished, or who came 
from wealthier or more educated homes, went on to examine the 
meanings of the Arabic texts. Later, grammar, syntax, arithme- 
tic, algebra, logic, rhetoric, jurisprudence, and theology were ad- 
ded; these subjects required specialist teachers at the advanced level. 
After this level, students traditionally went on to one of the famous 
Islamic centers of learning. 



140 



The Society and Its Environment 



For the vast majority, Muslim education was delivered infor- 
mally under the tutelage of mallams or ulama, scholars who special- 
ized in religious learning and teaching. Throughout the colonial 
period, a series of formal Muslim schools were set up and run on 
European lines. These schools were established in almost all major 
Nigerian cities but were notable in Kano, where Islamic brother- 
hoods developed an impressive number of schools. They catered 
to the children of the devout and the well-to-do who wished to have 
their children educated in the new and necessary European learn- 
ing, but within a firmly religious context. Such schools were in- 
fluential as a form of local private school that retained the 
predominance of religious values within a modernized school sys- 
tem. Because the government took over all private and parochial 
schools in the mid-1970s and only allowed such schools to exist again 
independendy in 1990, data are lacking concerning numbers of 
students enrolled. 

Western- style education came to Nigeria with the missionaries 
in the mid-nineteenth century. Although the first mission school 
was founded in 1843 by Methodists, it was the Anglican Church 
Missionary Society that pushed forward in the early 1850s to found 
a chain of missions and schools, followed quickly in the late 1850s 
by the Roman Catholics. In 1887 in what is now southern Nigeria, 
an education department was founded that began setting curricu- 
la requirements and administering grants to the mission societies. 
By 1914, when north and south were united into one colony, there 
were fifty-nine government and ninety-one mission primary schools 
in the south; all eleven secondary schools, except for King's Col- 
lege in Lagos, were run by the missions. The missions got a foothold 
in the middle belt; a mission school for the sons of chiefs was opened 
in Zaria in 1907 but lasted only two years. In 1909 Hans Vischer, 
an ex- Anglican missionary, was asked to organize the education 
system of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. Schools were set 
up and grants given to missions in the middle belt. In 1914 there 
were 1,100 primary school pupils in the north, compared with 
35,700 in the south; the north had no secondary schools, compared 
with eleven in the south. By the 1920s, the pressure for school places 
in the south led to increased numbers of independent schools 
financed by local efforts and to the sending of favorite sons over- 
seas for more advanced training. 

The education system focused strongly on examinations. In 1916 
Frederick Lugard, first governor of the unified colony, set up a 
school inspectorate. Discipline, buildings, and adequacy of teach- 
ing staff were to be inspected, but the most points given to a school's 
performance went to the numbers and rankings of its examination 



141 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

results. This stress on examinations was still used in 1990 to judge 
educational results and to obtain qualifications for jobs in govern- 
ment and the private sector. 

Progress in education was slow but steady throughout the colonial 
era until the end of World War II. By 1950 the country had devel- 
oped a three-tiered system of primary, secondary, and higher educa- 
tion based on the British model of wide participation at the bottom, 
sorting into academic and vocational training at the secondary level, 
and higher education for a small elite destined for leadership. On 
the eve of independence in the late 1950s, Nigeria had gone through 
a decade of exceptional educational growth leading to a movement 
for universal primary education in the Western Region. In the 
north, primary school enrollments went from 66,000 in 1947 to 
206,000 in 1957, in the west (mostly Yoruba areas) from 240,000 
to 983,000 in the same period, and in the east from 320,000 to 
1,209,000. Secondary level enrollments went from 10,000 for the 
country as a whole in 1947 to 36,000 in 1957; 90 percent of these, 
however, were in the south. 

Given the central importance of formal education, it soon be- 
came "the largest social programme of all governments of the 
federation," absorbing as much as 40 percent of the budgets of 
some state governments. Thus, by 1984-85 more than 13 million 
pupils attended almost 35,000 public primary schools. At the secon- 
dary level, approximately 3.7 million students were attending 6,500 
schools (these numbers probably included enrollment in private 
schools), and about 125,000 postsecondary level students were at- 
tending 35 colleges and universities. The pressure on the system 
remained intense in 1990, so much so that one education researcher 
predicted 800,000 higher level students by the end of the 1990s, 
with a correlated growth in numbers and size of all education in- 
stitutions to match this estimate. 

Universal primary education became official policy for the 
federation in the 1970s. The goal has not been reached despite 
pressure throughout the 1980s to do so. In percentage terms, accom- 
plishments have been impressive. Given an approximate popula- 
tion of 49.3 million in 1957 with 23 percent in the primary school 
age- group (ages five to fourteen), the country had 21 percent of 
its school-age population attending in the period just prior to in- 
dependence, after what was probably a tripling of the age- group 
in the preceding decade. By 1985 with an estimated population 
of 23 million between ages five and fourteen, approximately 47 
percent of the age-group attended school (see table 3, Appendix). 
Although growth slowed and actually decreased in some rural areas 



142 



The Society and Its Environment 



in the late 1980s, it was projected that by the early part of the next 
century universal primary education would be achieved. 

Secondary and postsecondary level growth was much more dra- 
matic. The secondary level age- group (ages fifteen to twenty-four) 
represented approximately 16 percent of the entire population in 
1985. Secondary level education was available for approximately 
0.5 percent of the age-group in 1957, and for 22 percent of the 
age-group in 1985 (see table 4, Appendix). In the early 1960s, there 
were approximately 4,000 students at six institutions (Ibadan, Ife, 
Lagos, Ahmadu Bello University, the University of Nigeria at 
Nsukka, and the Institute of Technology at Benin), rising to 19,000 
by 1971 and to 30,000 by 1975 (see table 5, Appendix). In 1990 
there were thirty-five polytechnic institutes, military colleges, and 
state and federal universities, plus colleges of education and of 
agriculture; they had an estimated enrollment of 150,000 to 
200,000, representing less than 1 percent of the twenty-one to 
twenty-nine-year-old age- group. 

Such growth was impossible without incurring a host of problems, 
several of which were so severe as to endanger the entire system 
of education. As long as the country was growing apace in terms 
of jobs for the educated minority through investment in expanded 
government agencies and services and the private sector, the grow- 
ing numbers of graduates could be absorbed. But the criterion of 
examination results as the primary sorting device for access to 
schools and universities led to widespread corruption and cheat- 
ing among faculty and students at all levels, but especially second- 
ary and postsecondary. Most Nigerian universities had followed 
the British higher education system of "final examinations" as the 
basis for granting degrees, but by 1990 many were shifting to the 
United States system of course credits. Economic hardship among 
teaching staffs produced increased engagement in nonacademic 
moonlighting activities. Added to these difficulties were such fac- 
tors as the lack of books and materials, no incentive for research 
and writing, the use of outdated notes and materials, and the defi- 
ciency of replacement laboratory equipment. One researcher not- 
ed that in the 1980s Nigeria had among the lowest number of 
indigenous engineers per capita of any Third World country. Un- 
fortunately, nothing was done to rectify the situation. The teach- 
ing of English, which was the language of instruction beyond 
primary school, had reached such poor levels that university faculty 
complained they could not understand the written work of their 
students. By 1990 the crisis in education was such that it was predict- 
ed that by the end of the decade, there would be insufficient per- 
sonnel to run essential services of the country. It was hoped that 



143 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

the publication of critical works and international attention to this 
crisis might reverse the situation before Nigeria lost an entire gener- 
ation or more of its skilled labor force. 

Health 

Whereas traditional medicine continued to play an important 
role in Nigeria in 1990, the country had made great strides in the 
provision of modern health care to its population in the years since 
World War II, particularly in the period after independence, es- 
pecially the 1960s and 1970s. Among the most notable accomplish- 
ments were the expansion of medical education, the improvement 
of public health care, the control of many contagious diseases and 
disease vectors, and the provision of primary health care in many 
urban and rural areas. In the late 1980s, a large increase in vacci- 
nation against major childhood diseases and a significant expan- 
sion of primary health care became the cornerstones of the 
government's health policies. 

Nonetheless, many problems remained in 1990. Sharp dispari- 
ties persisted in the availability of medical facilities among the 
regions, rural and urban areas, and socioeconomic classes. The 
severe economic stresses of the late 1980s had serious impacts 
throughout the country on the availability of medical supplies, 
drugs, equipment, and personnel. In the rapidly growing cities, 
inadequate sanitation and water supply increased the threat of in- 
fectious disease, and health care facilities were generally not able 
to keep pace with the rate of urban population growth. There were 
several serious outbreaks of infectious diseases during the 1980s, 
including cerebrospinal meningitis and yellow fever, for which, es- 
pecially in rural areas, treatment or preventive immunization was 
often difficult to obtain. Chronic diseases, such as malaria and 
guinea worm, continued to resist efforts to reduce their incidence 
in many areas. The presence of acquired immune deficiency syn- 
drome (AIDS) in Nigeria was confirmed by 1987 and appeared 
to be growing. 

History of Modern Medical Services 

Western medicine was not formally introduced into Nigeria until 
the 1860s, when the Sacred Heart Hospital was established by Ro- 
man Catholic missionaries in Abeokuta. Throughout the ensuing 
colonial period, the religious missions played a major role in the 
supply of modern health care facilities in Nigeria. The Roman 
Catholic missions predominated, accounting for about 40 percent 
of the total number of mission-based hospital beds by 1960. By that 
time, mission hospitals somewhat exceeded government hospitals 



144 







University education has a high priority. Main library, University of Lagos 

Arts block, University of Ibadan 
Courtesy Orlando E. Pacheco 



145 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



in number; there were 118 mission hospitals, compared with 101 
government hospitals. 

Mission-based facilities were concentrated in certain areas, de- 
pending on the religious and other activities of the missions. Ro- 
man Catholic hospitals in particular were concentrated in the 
southeastern and midwestern areas. By 1954 almost all the hospi- 
tals in the midwestern part of the country were operated by Ro- 
man Catholic missions. The next largest sponsors of mission 
hospitals were, respectively, the Sudan United Mission, which con- 
centrated on middle belt areas, and the Sudan Interior Mission, 
which worked in the Islamic north. Together they operated twenty- 
five hospitals or other facilities in the northern half of the country. 
Many of the mission hospitals remained important components of 
the health care network in the north in 1990. 

The missions also played an important role in medical training 
and education, providing training for nurses and paramedical per- 
sonnel and sponsoring basic education as well as advanced medi- 
cal training, often in Europe, for many of the first generation of 
Western-educated Nigerian doctors. In addition, the general edu- 
cation provided by the missions for many Nigerians helped to lay 
the groundwork for a wider distribution and acceptance of modern 
medical care. 

The British colonial government began providing formal med- 
ical services with the construction of several clinics and hospitals 
in Lagos, Calabar, and other coastal trading centers in the 1870s. 
Unlike the missionary facilities, these were, at least initially, sole- 
ly for the use of Europeans. Services were later extended to Afri- 
can employees of European concerns. Government hospitals and 
clinics expanded to other areas of the country as European activi- 
ty increased there. The hospital in Jos, for example, was founded 
in 1912 after the initiation there of tin mining. 

World War I had a strong detrimental effect on medical ser- 
vices in Nigeria because of the large number of medical person- 
nel, both European and African, who were pulled out to serve in 
Europe. After the war, medical facilities were expanded substan- 
tially, and a number of government- sponsored schools for the train- 
ing of Nigerian medical assistants were established. Nigerian 
physicians, even if trained in Europe, were, however, generally 
prohibited from practicing in government hospitals unless they were 
serving African patients. This practice led to protests and to fre- 
quent involvement by doctors and other medical personnel in the 
nationalist movements of the period. 

After World War II, partly in response to nationalist agitation, 
the colonial government tried to extend modern health and education 



146 



The Society and Its Environment 



facilities to much of the Nigerian population. A ten-year health 
development plan was announced in 1946. The University of 
Ibadan was founded in 1948; it included the country's first full 
faculty of medicine and university hospital, still known as Univer- 
sity College Hospital. A number of nursing schools were estab- 
lished, as were two schools of pharmacy; by 1960 there were 
sixty-five government nursing or midwifery training schools. The 
1946 health plan established the Ministry of Health to coordinate 
health services throughout the country, including those provided 
by the government, by private companies, and by the missions. 
The plan also budgeted funds for hospitals and clinics, most of which 
were concentrated in the main cities; little funding was allocated 
for rural health centers. There was also a strong imbalance between 
the appropriation of facilities to southern areas, compared with those 
in the north. 

By 1979 there were 562 general hospitals, supplemented by 16 
maternity and/or pediatric hospitals, 11 armed forces hospitals, 6 
teaching hospitals, and 3 prison hospitals. Altogether they accounted 
for about 44,600 hospital beds. In addition, general health centers 
were estimated to total slightly less than 600; general clinics 2,740; 
maternity homes 930; and maternal health centers 1,240. 

Ownership of health establishments was divided among feder- 
al, state, and local governments, and there were privately owned 
facilities. Whereas the great majority of health establishments were 
government owned, the number of private institutions grew through 
the 1980s. By 1985 there were 84 health establishments owned by 
the federal government (accounting for 13 percent of hospital beds); 
3,023 owned by state governments (47 percent of hospital beds); 
6,331 owned by local governments (11 percent of hospital beds); 
and 1,436 privately owned establishments (providing 14 percent 
of hospital beds) (see table 6, Appendix). 

The problems of geographic maldistribution of medical facili- 
ties among the regions and of the inadequacy of rural facilities per- 
sisted. By 1980 the ratios were an estimated 3,800 people per 
hospital bed in the north (Borno, Kaduna, Kano, Niger, and Sokoto 
states); 2,200 per bed in the middle belt (Bauchi, Benue, Gongo- 
la, Kwara, and Plateau states); 1,300 per bed in the southeast 
(Anambra, Cross River, Imo, and Rivers states); and 800 per bed 
in the southwest (Bendel, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, and Oyo states). 
There were also significant disparities within each of the regions. 
For example, in 1980 there were an estimated 2,600 people per 
physician in Lagos State, compared with 38,000 per physician in 
the much more rural Ondo State. 



147 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

In a comparison of the distribution of hospitals between urban 
and rural areas in 1980, Dennis Ityavyar found that whereas ap- 
proximately 80 percent of the population of those states lived in 
rural regions, only 42 percent of hospitals were located in those 
areas. The maldistribution of physicians was even more marked 
because few trained doctors who had a choice wanted to live in 
rural areas. Many of the doctors who did work in rural areas were 
there as part of their required service in the National Youth Ser- 
vice Corps, established in 1973. Few, however, remained in remote 
areas beyond their required term. 

Hospitals were divided into general wards, which provided both 
outpatient and inpatient care for a small fee, and amenity wards, 
which charged higher fees but provided better conditions. The 
general wards were usually very crowded, and there were long waits 
for registration as well as for treatment. Patients frequently did 
not see a doctor, but only a nurse or other practitioner. Many types 
of drugs were not available at the hospital pharmacy; those that 
were available were usually dispensed without containers, which 
meant that the patients had to provide their own containers. The 
inpatient wards were extremely crowded; beds were in corridors 
and even consisted of mattresses on floors. Food was free for very 
poor patients who had no one to provide for them. Most, however, 
had relatives or friends present, who prepared or brought food and 
often stayed in the hospital with the patient. By contrast, in the 
amenity wards available to wealthier or elite patients, food and bet- 
ter care were provided, and drug availability was greater. The 
highest level of the Nigerian elite frequently traveled abroad for 
medical care, particularly when a serious medical problem existed. 

In the early 1980s, because of shortages of fuel and spare parts, 
much expensive medical equipment could not be operated. Cur- 
rency devaluation and structural adjustment beginning in 1986 ex- 
acerbated these conditions. Imported goods of all types doubled 
or tripled in price, and government and public health care facili- 
ties were severely affected by rising costs, government budget cuts, 
and materials shortages of the late 1980s. Partly as a result of these 
problems, privately owned health care facilities became increas- 
ingly important in the late 1980s. The demand for modern medi- 
cal care far outstripped its availability. Medical personnel, drugs, 
and equipment were increasingly diverted to the private sector as 
government hospitals deteriorated. 

Government health policies increasingly had become an issue 
of policy debate and public contention in the late 1980s. The issue 
emerged during the Constituent Assembly held in 1989 to draft 
a proposed constitution. The original draft reported by the assembly 



148 



The Society and Its Environment 



included a clause specifying that free and adequate health care was 
to be available as a matter of right to all Nigerians within certain 
categories. The categories included all children younger than eigh- 
teen; all people sixty-five and older; and all those physically dis- 
abled or handicapped. This provision was, however, deleted by 
the president and the governing council when they reviewed the 
draft constitution. 

Primary Health Care Policies 

In August 1987, the federal government launched its Primary 
Health Care plan (PHC), which President Ibrahim Babangida an- 
nounced as the cornerstone of health policy. Intended to affect the 
entire national population, its main stated objectives included ac- 
celerated health care personnel development; improved collection 
and monitoring of health data; ensured availability of essential drugs 
in all areas of the country; implementation of an Expanded 
Programme on Immunization (EPI); improved nutrition through- 
out the country; promotion of health awareness; development of 
a national family health program; and widespread promotion of 
oral rehydration therapy for treatment of diarrheal disease in in- 
fants and children. Implementation of these programs was intended 
to take place mainly through collaboration between the Ministry 
of Health and participating local government councils, which 
received direct grants from the federal government. 

Of these objectives, the EPI was the most concrete and proba- 
bly made the greatest progress initially. The immunization program 
focused on four major childhood diseases: pertussis, diphtheria, 
measles, and polio, as well as tetanus and tuberculosis. Its aim was 
to increase dramatically the proportion of immunized children youn- 
ger than two from about 20 percent to 50 percent initially, and 
to 90 percent by the end of 1990. Launched in March 1988, the 
program by August 1989 was said to have been established in more 
than 300 of 449 LGAs. Although the program was said to have 
made much progress, its goal of 90 percent coverage was probably 
excessively ambitious, especially in view of the economic strains 
of structural adjustment that permeated the Nigerian economy 
throughout the late 1980s. 

The government's population control program also came par- 
tially under the PHC. By the late 1980s, the official policy was 
strongly to encourage women to have no more than four children, 
which would represent a substantial reduction from the estimated 
fertility rate of almost seven children per woman in 1987. No offi- 
cial sanctions were attached to the government's population policy, 



149 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

but birth control information and contraceptive supplies were avail- 
able in many health facilities. 

The federal government also sought to improve the availability 
of pharmaceutical drugs. Foreign exchange had to be released for 
essential drug imports; hence the government attempted to en- 
courage local drug manufacture. Because raw materials for local 
drug manufacture had to be imported, however, costs were reduced 
only partially. In order for Nigeria both to limit its foreign exchange 
expenditures and to simultaneously implement massive expansion 
in primary health care, foreign assistance would probably be need- 
ed. Despite advances against many infectious diseases, Nigeria's 
population continued through the 1980s to be subject to several 
major diseases, some of which occurred in acute outbreaks caus- 
ing hundreds or thousands of deaths, while others recurred chron- 
ically, causing large-scale infection and debilitation. Among the 
former were cerebrospinal meningitis, yellow fever, Lassa fever and, 
most recently, AIDS; the latter included malaria, guinea worm, 
schistosomiasis (bilharzia), and onchocerciasis (river blindness). 
Malnutrition and its attendant diseases also continued to be a 
problem among infants and children in many areas, despite the 
nation's economic and agricultural advances. 

Among the worst of the acute diseases was cerebrospinal menin- 
gitis, a potentially fatal inflammation of the membranes of the brain 
and spinal cord, which can recur in periodic epidemic outbreaks. 
Northern Nigeria is one of the most heavily populated regions in 
what is considered the meningitis belt of Africa, an area stretch- 
ing from Senegal to Sudan that has a long dry season and low hu- 
midity between December and April. The disease plagued the 
northern and middle belt areas in 1986 and 1989, generally ap- 
pearing during the cool, dry harmattan season when people spend 
more time indoors, promoting contagious spread. Paralysis, and 
often death, can occur within forty-eight hours of the first symptoms. 

In response to the outbreaks, the federal and state governments 
in 1989 attempted mass immunization in the affected regions. 
Authorities pointed, however, to the difficulty of storing vaccines 
in the harsh conditions of northern areas, many of which also had 
poor roads and inadequate medical facilities. 

Beginning in November 1986 and for several months thereafter, 
a large outbreak of yellow fever occurred in scattered areas. The 
most heavily affected were the states of Oyo, Imo, Anambra, and 
Cross River in the south, Benue and Niger in the middle belt, and 
Kaduna and Sokoto in the north. There were at least several hundred 
deaths. Fourteen million doses of vaccine were distributed with in- 
ternational assistance, and the outbreak was brought under control. 



150 



The Society and Its Environment 



Lassa fever, a highly contagious and virulent viral disease, ap- 
peared periodically in the 1980s in various areas. The disease was 
first identified in 1969 in the northeast Nigerian town of Lassa. 
It is believed that rats and other rodents are reservoirs of the vi- 
rus, and that transmission to humans can occur through droppings 
or food contamination in and around homes. Mortality rates can 
be high, and there is no known treatment. 

The presence of AIDS in Nigeria was officially confirmed in 1987, 
considerably later than its appearance and wide dispersion in much 
of East and Central Africa. In March 1987, the minister of health 
announced that tests of a pool of blood samples collected from high 
risk groups had turned up two confirmed cases of AIDS, both hu- 
man immunodeficiency virus (HIV) type-1 strains. Subsequent- 
ly, HIV type-2, a somewhat less virulent strain found mainly in 
West Africa, was also confirmed. In 1990 the infection rate for either 
virus in Nigeria was thought to be below 1 percent of the population. 

Less dramatic than the acute infectious diseases were a host of 
chronic diseases that were serious and widespread but only occa- 
sionally resulted in death. Of these the most common was malar- 
ia, including cerebral malaria, which can be fatal. The guinea worm 
parasite, which is spread through ingestion of contaminated water, 
is endemic in many rural areas, causing recurring illness and oc- 
casionally permanendy crippling its victims. The World Health 
Organization (WHO) in 1987 estimated that there were 3 million 
cases of guinea worm in Nigeria — about 2 percent of the world 
total of 140 million cases — making Nigeria the nation with the 
highest number of guinea worm cases. In affected areas, guinea 
worm and related complications were estimated to be the major 
cause of work and school absenteeism. Virtually all affected states 
had campaigns under way to eradicate the disease through educa- 
tion and provision of pure drinking water supplies to rural villages. 
The government has set an ambitious target of full eradication by 
1995, with extensive assistance from the Japanese government, 
Global 2000, and numerous other international donors. 

The parasitic diseases onchocerciasis and schistosomiasis, both 
associated with bodies of water, were found in parts of Nigeria. 
Onchocerciasis is caused by filarial worms transmitted by small 
black flies that typically live and breed near rapidly flowing water. 
The worms can damage the eyes and optic nerve and can cause 
blindness by young adulthood or later. In some villages near the 
Volta River tributaries where the disease is endemic, up to 20 per- 
cent of adults older than thirty are blind because of the disease. 
Most control efforts have focused on a dual strategy of treating the 



151 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

sufferers and trying to eliminate the flies, usually with insecticide 
sprays. The flies and the disease are most common in the lowland 
savanna areas of the middle belt. 

Schistosomiasis is caused by blood flukes, which use freshwater 
snails as an intermediate host and invade humans when the larvae 
penetrate the skin of people entering a pond, lake, or stream in 
which the snails live. Most often, schistosomiasis results in chronic 
debilitation rather than acute illness. 

Welfare 

Welfare concerns in Nigeria were primarily related to its general 
lack of development and the effects on the society of the economic 
stringency of the 1980s. Given the steady population growth and 
the decline in urban services and incomes since 1980, it was difficult 
not to conclude that for the mass of the people at the lower income 
level, malnutrition, poor health, and overcrowded housing were 
perpetual problems. 

Nigeria had no social security system in 1990. Less than 1 per- 
cent of the population older than sixty years received pensions. Be- 
cause of the younger age of urban migrants, there were fewer older 
people per family unit in urban areas. Official statistics were ques- 
tionable, however, because at least one survey indicated a num- 
ber of elderly living alone in northern cities or homeless persons 
living on the streets and begging. There was some evidence that 
the traditional practice of caring for parents was beginning to 
erode under harsh conditions of scarcity in urban areas. In rural 
Nigeria, it was still the rule that older people were cared for by 
their children, grandchildren, spouses, siblings, or even ex- spouses. 
The ubiquity of this tradition left open, however, the possibility 
of real hardship for urban elderly whose families had moved away 
or abandoned them. 

Traditionally, family problems with spouses or children were han- 
dled by extended kinship groups and local authorities. For the most 
part, this practice continued in the rural areas. In urban settings, 
social services were either absent or rare for family conflict, for 
abandoned or runaway children, for foster children, or for chil- 
dren under the care of religious instructors. 

As with many other developing nations, Nigeria had many so- 
cial welfare problems that needed attention. The existence of 
a relatively free press combined with a history of self-criticism — 
in journalism, the arts, the social sciences, and by religious and 
political leaders — were promising indications of the awareness and 



152 



The Society and Its Environment 

public debate required for change and adaptive response to its so- 
cial problems. 

* * * 

The literature on Nigeria is voluminous and includes several clas- 
sic works on Nigeria's major ethnic groups. Among these are the 
chapters by M.G. Smith (Hausa), Paul and Laura Bohannan (Tiv), 
and Phoebe Ottenberg (Igbo) in James L. Gibbs, Jr., (ed.), Peo- 
ples of Africa. Urban Hausa life and its religious and political na- 
ture are explored in John N. Paden's Religion and Political Culture 
in Kano. Possibly the fullest account of a northern emirate society 
is S.F. Nadel's A Black Byzantium on the Nupe. Kanuri culture is the 
subject of Ronald Cohen's The Kanuri ofBornu, and Derrick J. Sten- 
ning's Savannah Nomads is the best work available on the Fulani. 
Simon Ottenberg' s Leadership and Authority in an African Society and 
Victor C. Uchendu's brief but readable The Igbo of Southeast Nige- 
ria are recommended on the Igbo. The classic work on the Yoruba 
is N.A. Fadipe, The Sociology of the Yoruba. This work, together with 
Robert S. Smith's Kingdoms of the Yoruba, is the best general work 
on Yoruba political society. 

Understanding Islam in Nigeria still requires looking at John 
Spencer Trimingham's classic, Islam in West Africa, and Islamiza- 
tion is well-treated in African Religion Meets Islam by Dean S. Gil- 
liland. Possibly the most important discussion on the synthesis of 
Christianity and Yoruba religion is that by John D.Y. Peel in 
Aladura: A Religious Movement among the Yoruba. 

Perhaps the best recent analysis of drought and climatic varia- 
tion in northern Nigeria is Michael Mortimore's Adapting to Drought. 
For a general overview of population growth in Africa, including 
Nigeria, the World Bank study, Population Growth and Policies in Sub- 
Saharan Africa, is extremely useful, as are other standard World Bank 
and United Nations sources on current population trends. 

Finally, much useful information on health and education can 
be found in the annual Social Statistics in Nigeria, published by the 
Nigerian Office of Statistics. (For further information and com- 
plete citations, see Bibliography.) 



153 



Chapter 3. The Economy 



bronze head said to represent Olorun, god of sea and wealth 



A MAJOR FEATURE of Nigeria's economy in the 1980s, as in 
the 1970s, was its dependence on petroleum, which accounted for 
87 percent of export receipts and 77 percent of the federal govern- 
ment's current revenue in 1988. Falling oil output and prices con- 
tributed to another noteworthy aspect of the economy in the 
1980s — a decline in per capita real gross national product (GNP — 
see Glossary) that persisted until oil prices began to rise in 1990. 
Indeed, GNP per capita per year decreased 4.8 percent from 1980 
to 1987, a decrease that led in 1989 to Nigeria's classification by 
the World Bank (see Glossary) as a low-income country (based on 
1987 data) for the first time since the annual World Development Report 
was instituted in 1978. In 1989 the World Bank also declared Nige- 
ria poor enough to be eligible (along with countries such as Ban- 
gladesh, Ethiopia, Chad, and Mali) for concessional aid from an 
affiliate, the International Development Association (IDA). 

Another relevant feature of the Nigerian economy was a series 
of abrupt changes in the government's share of expenditures. As 
a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary), 
national government expenditures rose from 9 percent in 1962 to 
44 percent in 1979, but fell to 17 percent in 1988. In the aftermath 
of the 1967-70 civil war, Nigeria's government became more cen- 
tralized. The oil boom of the 1970s provided the tax revenue to 
strengthen the central government further. Expansion of the gov- 
ernment's share of the economy did little to enhance its political 
and administrative capacity, but did increase incomes and the 
number of jobs that the governing elites could distribute to their 
clients. 

The economic collapse in the late 1970s and early 1980s con- 
tributed to substantial discontent and conflict among ethnic com- 
munities and nationalities, adding to the political pressure to expel 
more than 2 million illegal workers (mostly from Ghana, Niger, 
Cameroon, and Chad) in early 1983 and May 1985. 

The lower spending of the 1980s was partly the result of the struc- 
tural adjustment program (SAP) in effect from 1986 to 1990. SAP 
was mooted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glos- 
sary) and carried out under the auspices of the World Bank, which 
emphasized privatization, market prices, and reduced government 
expenditures. This program was based on the principle that, as 
GDP per capita falls, people demand relatively fewer social goods 
(produced in the government sector) and relatively more private 



157 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

goods, which tend to be essential items such as food, clothing, and 
shelter. 

The Colonial Economic Legacy 
Early British Imperialism 

The European struggle to establish forts and trading posts on 
the West African coast from about the mid- 1600s to the mid- 1700s 
was part of the wider competition for trade and empire in the At- 
lantic. The British, like other newcomers to the slave trade, found 
they could compete with the Dutch in West Africa only by form- 
ing national trading companies. The first such effective English 
enterprise was the Company of the Royal Adventurers, chartered 
in 1660 and succeeded in 1672 by the Royal African Company. 
Only a monopoly company could afford to build and maintain the 
forts considered essential to hold stocks of slaves and trade goods. 
In the early eighteenth century, Britain and France destroyed the 
Dutch hold on West African trade; and by the end of the French 
Revolution and the subsequent Napoleonic Wars (1799-1815), Brit- 
ain had become the dominant commercial power in West Africa 
(see European Slave Trade in West Africa, ch. 1). 

The slave trade was one of the major causes of the devastating 
internecine strife in southern Nigeria during the three centuries prior 
to the mid- 1800s, when abolition actually occurred. In the nine- 
teenth century, Britain was interested primarily in opening markets 
for its manufactured goods in West Africa and expanding com- 
merce in palm oil. Securing the oil and ivory trade required that 
Britain usurp the power of coastal chiefs in what became Nigeria. 

Formal "protection" and — eventually — colonization of Nigeria 
resulted not only from the desire to safeguard Britain's expanding 
trade interests in the Nigerian hinterland, but also from an interest 
in forestalling formal claims by other colonial powers, such as France 
and Germany. By 1850 British trading interests were concentrat- 
ing in Lagos and the Niger River delta. British administration in 
Nigeria formally began in 1861, when Lagos became a crown colo- 
ny, a step taken in response to factors such as the now-illegal ac- 
tivities of slave traders, the disruption of trade by the Yoruba civil 
wars, and fears that the French would take over Lagos (see The 
Nineteenth Century: Revolution and Radical Adjustment, ch. 1). 
Through a series of steps designed to facilitate trade, by 1906 
present-day Nigeria was under British control. 

The Colonial Period 

Colonies such as Nigeria became part of British imperial expansion 



158 



The Economy 



that focused on exploiting raw materials, minerals, and foodstuffs 
important to Western industrial development. Britain tried to en- 
courage tropical export crops in Nigeria and to stimulate demand 
there for British manufactured goods. The colonies built a railroad 
network between the 1890s and World War II and constructed roads 
at an accelerating rate after the 1930s. These developments, along 
with the introduction of the pound sterling as the universal medi- 
um of exchange, encouraged export trade in tin, cotton, cocoa, 
peanuts, and palm oil. Britain maintained its economic hegemony 
over the colonies through military power, strategic alliances, and 
the collaboration of indigenous rulers. 

Development of National Economic Interests to World War II 

British rule exacerbated differences of class, region, and com- 
munity in Nigeria. The emergent nationalist movement in the 1930s 
was spearheaded by a new elite of businesspeople and profession- 
als and promoted mainly by persons who expected to gain econom- 
ically and politically from independence (see Emergence of Nigerian 
Nationalism, ch. 1). The movement first became multiethnic — 
although limited to the south — between 1930 and 1944, when the 
real incomes of many participants in Nigeria's money economy 
fell as a result of a deterioration in the net barter terms of trade 
(the ratio between average export and import prices). During the 
same period, the Great Depression and, later, World War II, 
reduced Britain's investment, imports, and government spending 
in Nigeria. 

Once the wartime colonial government assumed complete con- 
trol of the local economy, it would issue trade licenses only to es- 
tablished firms, a practice that formalized the competitive advantage 
of foreign companies. Also, wartime marketing boards pegged the 
prices of agricultural commodities below the world market rate, 
workers faced wage ceilings, traders encountered price controls, 
and Nigerian consumers experienced shortages of import goods. 

Labor activity grew during the war in reaction to the heavy- 
handed policies of the colonial government (see Labor Unions, this 
ch.). Among the expressions of labor unrest was a strike by 43,000 
workers in mid- 1945 that lasted more than forty days. Aspiring 
Nigerian entrepreneurs, deprived of new economic opportunities, 
and union leaders, politicized by the strike's eventual success, chan- 
neled their sense of grievance into nationalist agitation. Educated 
persons, whose economic opportunities were limited largely to pri- 
vate business and professional activity, began to demand more par- 
ticipation in the colonial government. 



159 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

National Economic Interests in the Postwar Period 

Starting in 1949, when Nigeria's recently emergent labor, com- 
mercial, and professional elites were first consulted by the British 
as part of a constitutional review, the peoples of Nigeria engaged 
in ongoing debate over the processes of decolonization, indepen- 
dence, and modernization. The two coups d'etat of 1966 and the 
civil war of 1967-70 reflected economic as well as political elements. 

Between 1951 and 1960, the major political parties played lead- 
ing roles in unifying and locally mobilizing the economic elite (see 
Politics in the Crisis Years, ch. 1). Elites from majority parties in 
the regional assemblies who cooperated with the ruling federal coa- 
lition dispensed a wide range of rewards and sanctions, thus re- 
taining their own positions and power and keeping the masses 
subordinated. Positions in government services and public corpo- 
rations, licenses for market stalls, permits for agricultural export 
production, rights to establish enterprises, roads, electrical ser- 
vice, running water, and scholarships were allocated by the govern- 
ing group to its supporters. Each major party was backed by a bank, 
which assisted in the transfer of substantial public funds to the party. 

At all levels — local and regional after 1951 and federal after 
1954 — political leaders could use a range of controls, extending over 
local councils, district administration, police, and courts, to sub- 
due any dissident minority, especially in the far north, where clien- 
tage was the social adhesive of the emirate system. Political superiors 
offered protection, patronage, and economic security in exchange 
for loyalty and the obedience of inferiors. 

The elites attracted clients and socially inferior groups not only 
in the far north, where Islam legitimized the traditional hierarchy, 
but even in Igboland, an area of southeastern Nigeria where pow- 
er had been widely dispersed before the twentieth century. The 
elites of the three regions preferred to close ranks to share the fruits 
of office and to prevent challenges to their positions, but by the 
time independence was achieved in 1960, policies designed to en- 
hance the security of one regional elite threatened the security of 
others. 

The Role of Government 

Some of Nigeria's political leaders have advocated African so- 
cialism, an ideology that does not necessarily coincide with the 
Western socialist concept of the ownership of most capital and land 
by the state. Instead, the African variety usually has included the 
following: a substantial level of state ownership in modern indus- 
try, transportation, and commerce; a penchant for public control 



160 



The Economy 



of resource allocation in key sectors; a priority on production for 
domestic consumption; and an emphasis on the rapid Africaniza- 
tion of high-level jobs. Despite the socialist rhetoric of some politi- 
cians, in practice Nigeria worked toward a mixed economy, with 
the directiy productive sector dominated by private enterprise, the 
state investing in infrastructure as a foundation for private activi- 
ty, and government providing programs and policies to stimulate 
private (especially indigenous) enterprise. 

None of the major Nigerian political parties controlling nation- 
al or regional governments from 1951 to 1966 (or 1979 to 1983) 
was a socialist party or a party strongly committed to egalitarian- 
ism. Even the Action Group, led during the First Republic by the 
ostensibly anticapitalist Chief Obafemi Awolowo, had as its foun- 
dation the rising new class of professionals, businesspeople, and 
traders. 

After Nigeria's 1967-70 civil war, petroleum output and prices 
increased rapidly. The government's control of the extraction, refin- 
ing, and distribution of oil meant that the state became the dominant 
source of capital. By the mid-1970s, petroleum accounted for about 
three-fourths of total federal revenue. To the most vigorous, re- 
sourceful, and well-connected venture capitalists (often politicians, 
bureaucrats, army officers, and their clients), productive eco- 
nomic activity lost appeal. Manipulating government spending 
became the means to fortune. Because of the rapid growth of the 
state bureaucracy and the establishment of numerous federally 
funded parastatals, the size of the government sector relative to 
the rest of the national economy hit a peak in the late 1970s. 

In an effort that culminated in the 1970s, the Nigerian govern- 
ment gradually expanded its controls over the private sector, levy- 
ing differential taxes and subsidies, increasing industrial prices 
relative to farm prices, favoring investment in key sectors, providing 
tariff and tax incentives to vital sectors, protecting favored indus- 
trial establishments from foreign competition, awarding import 
licenses to selected firms and industries, and providing foreign ex- 
change to priority enterprises at below-market exchange rates. 
While the ostensible reasons for this policy of favoritism were to 
transfer resources to modern industry, expand high-priority busi- 
nesses and sectors, encourage profitable enterprises, and discourage 
unprofitable ones, in practice the government often favored ur- 
ban areas by promoting production that used socially expensive 
inputs of capital, foreign exchange, and high technology. Market 
intervention helped political and bureaucratic leaders protect their 
positions, expand their power, and implement their policies. Project- 
or enterprise-based policies (unlike reliance on the market) allowed 



161 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

benefits to be apportioned selectively, for maximum political ad- 
vantage. Government made it in the private interest of numerous 
individuals to cooperate in programs that were harmful to the in- 
terests of producers as a whole. However, market-clearing prices 
(for farm commodities or foreign exchange), whose benefits were 
distributed indiscriminately, inspired little or no political support 
among farmers and businesspeople. 

Beginning in 1979, the policy prescription of the World Bank 
(and IMF) was for African countries to refrain from interfering 
in foreign exchange and interest rates, wages, and farm prices; to 
privatize state-owned enterprises (especially agro-processing, farm 
input distribution, insurance, and retail and wholesale trade); to 
relax restrictions on foreign capital; and to encourage indigenous 
business ventures. By the early 1980s, Nigeria faced substantial 
international payments deficits in the midst of declining export 
prices and rising import prices, rising external debt payments, and 
negative economic growth. In 1986 the government consequently 
undertook its own SAP. It was patterned along World Bank guide- 
lines, with World Bank conditions that included devaluation of the 
naira (N, for value of the naira — see Glossary), reductions in real 
government spending, abolition of official agricultural marketing 
boards, the sale of public enterprises, liberalized trade, and reduced 
quotas and licenses (see Planning, this ch.). 

Planning 

Before 1945 the colonial government had undertaken no seri- 
ous comprehensive planning. Nigeria's earliest national plans, the 
1946-55 Ten-Year Plan of Development and Welfare (with plan 
revisions, 1951-55) and the 1955-60 plan (later extended to 1962), 
were framed by colonial administrators. As the authors of the First 
National Development Plan, 1962-68 (henceforth, first plan) wrote, 
these "were not 'plans,' in the truest sense of the word . . . [but] 
a series of projects which had not been coordinated or related to 
any overall economic target." After 1960, however, development 
planning had a broad scope, encompassing government policies 
to achieve national economic objectives, such as accelerated growth 
and higher levels of average material welfare. This planning af- 
fected the policies of such agencies as the central bank, state-owned 
enterprises, the Ministry of Education, marketing boards, state- 
level departments, and extension services. 

Nigerian plans included economic forecasts, policies toward the 
private sector, and a list of proposed public expenditures. Plans 
did not constitute commitments by public departments to spend 
funds. Although Nigerian political leaders made decisions about 



162 



The Economy 



general objectives and priorities for the first plan, foreign economists 
were the main authors of the actual document. Its authors favored 
decentralized decision making by private units, disregard of major 
discrepancies between financial and social profitability, and high 
economic payoffs from direcdy productive investments (as opposed 
to indirect returns from social overheads). They discouraged in- 
creased taxes on the wealthy (out of a fear of dampening private 
incentive) and advocated a conservative monetary and fiscal policy 
emphasizing a relatively small plan, openness to foreign trade and 
investment, and reliance on overseas assistance. Foreign aid was 
set at one-half of public sector investment. 

Nobel economist W. Arthur Lewis has suggested that the main 
weaknesses of the 1962-68 plan were incomplete feasibility studies 
and inadequate evaluation of projects, meager public participation, 
and excessive political intervention in economic decisions. More- 
over, insufficient attention was paid to the small indigenous sec- 
tor, and the machinery for implementing developments in the public 
sector was unsatisfactory. Lewis noted that the most important 
aspects of Nigeria's 1962-68 plan were "how the government pro- 
poses to raise the money and to recruit the personnel to carry out 
its objectives." 

Postwar reconstruction, restoring productive capacity, overcoming 
critical botdenecks, and achieving self-reliance were major goals of 
the Second National Development Plan (1970-74). The replacement 
cost of physical assets damaged and destroyed in the civil war with 
the secessionist Igbo area in the southeast, then known as Biafra, 
was estimated to exceed N600 million (then about US$900 million). 

The United Nations (UN) Center for Development Planning, 
Projections, and Policies observed that Nigeria's real growth in GDP 
between 1970 and 1974 was 12.3 percent per year. The annual 
target had been only 6.2 percent. Nigerian growth could be ex- 
plained by factors largely outside the planners' purview — rapid oil 
industry growth and sharply increasing oil prices. 

Announced in March 1975, the Third National Development 
Plan (1975-80) envisioned a twelvefold increase in the annual rate 
of public capital expenditures over the previous plan period. This 
document included the statement, "There will be no savings and 
foreign exchange constraints during the third plan period and be- 
yond." The document outlined ambitious plans to expand agricul- 
ture, industry, transport, housing, water supplies, health facilities, 
education, rural electrification, community development, and state 
programs. The third plan also designated substantial funds for pres- 
tige projects, such as the Second World Black and African Fes- 
tival of Arts and Culture (FESTAC) in Lagos. 



163 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

Amid the euphoria of the 1974 oil price boom, the Ministry of 
Economic Development approved and added numerous projects 
for other ministries not supported by a proper appraisal of techni- 
cal feasibility, costs and benefits, or the technical and administra- 
tive arrangements required to establish and operate the projects. 
According to Sayre P. Schatz, who advised the Ministry of Trans- 
port while it prepared feasibility studies for the plan in 1974, "Eco- 
nomic reasoning gave way before economic enthusiasm," and the 
necessary coordination and implementation were ignored. 

Inflationary minimum wage and administrative salary increases 
after October 1974, in combination with the slowing of the econo- 
my, made budget shortfalls inevitable. In June 1975, several state 
and local governments did not receive their monthly subsidies from 
the federal government. Just before the July 29, 1975 coup in which 
head of state General Yakubu Go won was toppled, government 
workers in several areas threatened to impair vital services unless 
their June wages were paid. 

In March 1976, in response to an economy overheated by de- 
mands for new programs and higher wages, General Olusegun 
Obasanjo, then head of state, pointed out that petroleum revenue 
was not a cure-all. Many projects had to be postponed, scaled down, 
or canceled when oil-revenue-based projections made in 1974-75 
later proved too optimistic. Projects tended to be retained for po- 
litical reasons, not because they were considered socially or eco- 
nomically useful by the Central Planning Office of the Supreme 
Military Council. 

The civilian government that took office on October 1, 1979, 
postponed the beginning of the fourth plan (1981-85) for nine 
months. Whereas the plan's guidelines indicated that local govern- 
ments were to be involved in planning and execution, such involve- 
ment was not feasible because local governments lacked the staff 
and expertise to accept this responsibility. The plan was also threat- 
ened by falling oil revenues and an increased need for imported 
food that had resulted from delays in agricultural modernization. 
Projected to rise 12.1 percent annually, exports actually fell 5.9 
percent yearly during the plan, as a recession among the nations 
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
reduced demand for Third World imports. As exports declined, 
the capacity to import construction materials and related capital 
goods also fell, reducing growth in the construction, transport, com- 
munications, utilities, and housing sectors. 

Nigeria was heavily dependent on agriculture, with the sector 
accounting for more than 40 percent of pre- 1973 GDP. But in the 
decade up to 1983, agricultural output in Nigeria declined 1.9 



164 



Mechanized farm in northern Nigeria 
Young farmers making vegetable beds at Esa-Oke agricultural settlement 

Courtesy Embassy of Nigeria, Washington 



165 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



percent and exports fell 7.9 percent yearly. Agricultural imports 
as a share of total imports rose from 3 percent in the late 1960s 
to 7 percent in the early 1980s. Nigeria's unfavorable agricultural 
development resulted from the loss of competitiveness among farm 
exports as the real value of the Nigerian naira appreciated sub- 
stantially from 1970 to 1972 and from 1982 to 1983. 

Thanks in large part to the overthrow at the end of 1983 of Nige- 
ria's second civilian administration, the Second Republic headed 
by President Shehu Shagari, and of the military government of 
General Muhammadu Buhari in 1985, the Fifth National Develop- 
ment Plan was postponed until 1988-92. Continuing the emphases 
of the SAP, the fifth plan's objectives were to devalue the naira, 
remove import licenses, reduce tariffs, open the economy to for- 
eign trade, promote nonoil exports through incentives, and achieve 
national self-sufficiency in food production. The drafters of the fifth 
plan sought to improve labor productivity through incentives, 
privatization of many public enterprises, and various government 
measures to create employment opportunities. 

In late 1989, the administration of General Ibrahim Babangida 
abandoned the concept of a fixed five-year plan. Instead, a three- 
year "rolling plan" was introduced for 1990-92 in the context of 
more comprehensive fifteen- to twenty-year plans. A rolling plan, 
considered more suitable for an economy facing uncertainty and 
rapid change, is revised at the end of each year, at which point 
estimates, targets, and projects are added for an additional year. 
Thus, planners would revise the 1990-92 three-year rolling plan 
at the end of 1990, issuing a new plan for 1991-93. In effect, a 
plan is renewed at the end of each year, but the number of years 
remains the same as the plan rolls forward. In Nigeria, the objec- 
tives of the rolling plan were to reduce inflation and exchange rate 
instability, maintain infrastructure, achieve agricultural self- 
sufficiency, and reduce the burden of structural adjustment on the 
most vulnerable social groups. 

Government Finance 

A major cause of political conflict in Nigeria since independence 
has been the changing formula for allocating revenue by region 
or state. Before 1959 all revenues from mineral and agricultural 
products were retained by the producing region. But after 1959, 
the region retained only a fraction of the revenue from mineral 
production. This policy was a major source of dissatisfaction in 
the Eastern Region, which seceded in May 1967 as the would-be 
state of Biafra. By contrast, the revenue from agricultural exports 
was retained by regional marketing boards after 1959, but the 



166 



The Economy 



agricultural exports of eastern Nigeria were smaller than those of 
the other major regions. 

The rapid growth of petroleum revenue in the 1970s removed 
most of the severe constraints placed on federal and regional or 
state budgets in the 1960s. Total federal revenue grew from N306.4 
million in 1966 to N7.791 billion in 1977, a twenty-fivefold increase 
in current income in eleven years. Petroleum revenue as a per- 
centage of the total went from 26.3 percent in 1970 to more than 
70 percent by 1974-77. 

During the civil war, most of the twelve new states created in 
1967 faced a revenue crisis. But a 1970 decree brought the states 
closer to fiscal parity by decreasing the producing state's share of 
export, import, and excise duties, and of mining rents and royal- 
ties, and by increasing the share allocated to all states and the fed- 
eral government. Also, in 1973 the commodity export marketing 
boards, which had been a source of political power for the states, 
were brought under federal control. Other changes later in the 1970s 
further reduced claims to revenue based on place of origin. In the 
1970s, the federal government was freed to distribute more to the 
states, thus strengthening federal power as well as the states' fiscal 
positions. Statutory appropriations from the federal government 
to the states, only about N128 million in FY 1966, increased to 
Nl,040 million in 1975 with the oil boom, but dropped to N502.2 
million in 1976, as oil revenues declined. 

The burgeoning revenues of the oil boom had encouraged 
profligacy among the federal ministries. Government deficits were 
a major factor in accelerated inflation in the late 1970s and the early 
1980s. In 1978 the federal government, compelled to cut spending 
for the third plan, returned much of the financial responsibility 
for housing and primary education to state and local governments. 
Federal government finances, especially, drifted into acute dis- 
equilibrium between 1981 and 1983, at the end of President 
Shagari's civilian administration. The 1983 federal government 
deficit rose to N5.3 billion (9.5 percent of GDP) at the same time 
that external debt was increasing rapidly. The state governments' 
deficit compounded the problem, with the states collectively bud- 
geting for a deficit of N6.8 billion in 1983. 

Falling export prices caused the military governments between 
1983 and 1988 to continue cutting real spending, especially for cap- 
ital, imports, civil service and armed forces salaries and consumer 
subsidies. Many parastatals also had their subsidies cut, and others 
were sold off entirely. The result of these actions was a substantial 
reduction in the federal deficit. The announcement of the spend- 
ing reductions that would be part of the fifth plan coincided with 



167 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

the military coup of August 1985. Unlike earlier plans, the fifth 
plan (put back to 1988-92 partly because of the coup) allocated 
the largest amounts of capital to agriculture and stressed the im- 
portance of private investment. 

In 1988 the federal budget was still highly dependent on oil 
revenues (taxes on petroleum profits, mining rents and royalties, 
and Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation earnings). Altogether, 
oil receipts accounted for 77 percent of total federal current revenue 
in 1988 (see table 7, Appendix). The federal government retained 
62 percent of the revenue it collected in 1988, and the rest of the 
funds were distributed to the state and local governments by a for- 
mula based on population, need, and, to a very limited extent, deri- 
vation. 

International aid designated for domestic Nigerian development 
constituted a minor source of government revenue. In 1988 such 
official assistance amounted to US$408 million, or US$1.09 per 
capita, which placed Nigeria lowest among low-income and lower- 
middle-income aid recipients. This aid represented 0.4 percent of 
Nigeria's GNP, far less than the average of 2.4 percent received 
by all low-income countries, a group that included such states as 
China, India, and Zambia. 

Economic Development 

The reliability of Nigeria's national income statistics was limit- 
ed by meager industry-wide information (especially for domesti- 
cally consumed commodities), the questionable validity of data, 
and quantification based on subjective judgments by state officials. 
Despite deficiencies in aggregate economic statistics, a few gener- 
al tendencies concerning growth, income distribution, prices, wages, 
and the employment rate could be discerned. The Office of Statis- 
tics indicated that GDP grew 6.0 percent annually (adjusted for 
inflation) between FY (fiscal year — see Glossary) 1959 and FY 1967. 
GDP shrank at an inflation-adjusted annual rate of 1 . 1 percent be- 
tween FY 1967 (which ended two months before the secession of 
the Eastern Region) and FY 1970 (which ended three months af- 
ter the war). However, because capital destruction such as occurs 
during wartime is not reflected in annual measures of GDP, the 
decline in net domestic production was probably severely under- 
stated. 

Income Distribution 

Annual population growth estimates vary considerably, but it 
is generally held that growth was roughly 2 percent in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, 2.5 to 3.0 percent from the mid-1960s to the late 



168 



The Economy 



1970s, and 3.0 to 3.5 percent in the 1980s (see Population, ch. 2). 
Accordingly, annual GDP growth per person can be estimated at 
4.0 percent in the late 1950s and early 1960s, 3.0 to 3.5 percent 
in the mid 1960s, -3.5 to -4.0 percent during the civil war, 
roughly 7 percent in the early to late 1970s, - 6.0 percent from 
the late 1970s to the early 1980s, and - 2.5 percent for the balance 
of the 1980s. 

Nigeria's decline in real GNP per capita to US$290 by 1988 
relegated the nation to low-income status below India, Pakistan, 
and Ghana. Other indicators of development — life expectancy, for 
which Nigeria ranked 155th out of the world's 177 countries, and 
infant mortality, for which Nigeria ranked 148th among 173 
countries — were consistent with Nigeria's low ranking in income 
per capita. 

The authors of the first plan had argued that a "very good case 
can be made that premature preoccupation with equity problems 
will backfire and prevent any development from taking place." 
Thus, Nigeria's first plan stressed production and profitability, not 
distribution. Yet people who already own property, hold influen- 
tial positions, and have good educations are best situated to profit 
once growth begins. Thus, a society with initial income inequality 
that begins to expand economically is likely to remain unequal, 
or even become more so. 

Although wealth appeared to be highly concentrated in Nigeria, 
the government had no comprehensive income-distribution esti- 
mates. From 1960 to 1978, the number of rural poor remained 
constant, but the rural poverty rate declined. During the same peri- 
od, the urban poor roughly doubled in number, although the rate 
of urban poverty also probably declined. Federal civil service studies 
indicating a substantial increase in income concentration from 1969 
to 1976 may have reflected a trend toward overall income inequality, 
exacerbated perhaps by the large raises given to high-ranking ad- 
ministrators by the Udoji Commission on wages and salaries in 
1975. But this inequality probably eased from 1976 to the end of 
the decade, thanks to increased salaries for low-income workers, 
the abolition of subsidized automobile allowances for the wealthy, 
and a decline in economic activity, especially in the oil sector. 

During the 1960s and 1970s, Nigeria's degree of income con- 
centration was average for sub-Saharan Africa, which, after Latin 
America, had the highest income inequality of any region in the 
world. Income concentration in Nigeria was probably higher than 
in Niger or Ivory Coast, about the same as in Tanzania, and lower 
than in Kenya and Cameroon. 



169 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

Because the rural masses were politically weak, official income 
distribution policies focused on interurban redistribution. More 
than 80 percent of Nigeria's second plan (1970-74) investment was 
in urban areas. The third plan (1975-80) emphasized more even 
distribution, but did not mention urban-rural imbalances (see Fed- 
eralism and Intragovernmental Relations). 

The ratio of industrial to agricultural labor productivity, 2.5:1 
in 1966, increased to 2.7:1 in 1970 and 7.2:1 in 1975. (Urban- 
rural per capita income ratios showed greater differentials for suc- 
ceeding years, largely because incomes from capital, property, and 
entrepreneurial activity were far larger for city dwellers than for 
rural residents.) The sharp rise in industrial productivity between 
1970 and 1975 was caused largely by phenomenal increases in oil 
output, prices, and tax revenues rather than by technical changes 
or improved skills. Without oil, 1975's labor productivity ratio 
would have been 3.0:1, as the terms of trade shifted away from 
agriculture. Moreover, emigration drained the rural areas of the 
most able young people, attracted by the Udoji Commission's dou- 
bling of government minimum wages. The loss of the superior edu- 
cation and skills of these rural-to-urban migrants resulted in a 
decline in inflation-adjusted agricultural productivity between 1970 
and 1975. Average rural income was so low by 1975 that the richest 
rural quartile was poor by urban standards. 

Rising debt and falling average income in the 1980s had a par- 
ticularly severe effect on the poor. Consumption per capita fell 7 
percent annually during that decade, material standards of living 
were lower in the mid-1980s than in the 1950s, and calorie and 
protein intake per capita were no greater in 1985 than in 1952. 
In effect, the economic crisis of the 1980s canceled out the progress 
of the previous two decades. 

Wages and Prices 

Urban real wages fell rapidly between 1982 and 1989 as a result 
of a minimum wage freeze in the formal sector. Rural real wages 
also fell, but more slowly because few employers had previously 
paid as much as the minimum wage on the farm. Beginning in 
1986, the liberalizing effect of the SAP on agricultural prices and 
the exchange rate also redistributed income from urban to rural 
areas, especially in the agricultural export sector. In the 1980s, the 
urban self-employed, a group that included many in the low-income 
informal sector (e.g., cottage industries, crafts, petty trade, and 
repair work), had lower incomes than urban wage earners. Even 
the rural self-employed (smallholder farmers, sharecroppers, and 
tenants, as well as a few commercial farmers) had lower incomes 



170 



The Economy 



than rural wage earners, who ranged from unskilled, landless work- 
ers to plantation workers. 

During the 1980s, the urban-rural gap narrowed — a result of 
rising urban poverty rather than of growing rural affluence. A 
World Bank- International Finance Corporation study estimated 
that 64 percent of urban households and 61 percent of rural house- 
holds lived in poverty in FY 1984. Because 70 percent of Nigeria's 
population was rural, most of the poor were to be found in rural 
areas. By the late 1980s, with structural adjustment and agricul- 
tural price decontrol, the average income of all rural households 
exceeded the average for urban households. Ironically, rural house- 
hold income levels in the late 1980s only improved relative to lev- 
els for city households, as real income in both urban and rural areas 
had fallen throughout the 1980s. As a result, for the first time since 
independence, more Nigerians migrated to the country than to ur- 
ban areas. 

Rapid inflation, 20 percent yearly between 1973 and 1980 and 
more than 20 percent per year between 1980 and 1984 (as mea- 
sured by the consumer price index), dropped to 5.5 percent in 1985, 
5.4 percent in 1986 (years of good harvests), and 10.2 percent in 
1987, before rising to 38.3 percent in 1988 and 47.5 percent in 
1989. Under a World Bank SAP, 1986 and 1987 were years of tight- 
money financial policy. But a poor harvest in 1987 put pressure 
on 1988 food prices, and authorities lifted the wage freeze and eased 
fiscal policies in 1988 in the face of rising political opposition to 
austerity. Inflation abated somewhat in late 1989, as food supplies 
grew and the Central Bank of Nigeria tightened monetary policy. 

Real wages fell significantly in the 1980s following a statutory 
wage freeze (1982-88), salary cuts in the public sector in 1985, and 
a constant nominal minimum wage that started in 1981 . From 1986 
to 1989, real wages fell almost 60 percent. 

Labor 

The size of Nigeria's labor force was difficult to calculate be- 
cause of the absence of accurate census data. The labor force in- 
creased from 18.3 million in 1963 to 29.4 million in 1983. Census 
data apparently understated the number of self-employed peasants 
and farmers, but estimated that the proportion of Nigerians em- 
ployed in agriculture, livestock, forestry, and fishing fell from 56.8 
percent in 1963 to 33.5 percent in 1983. The percentage of the labor 
force employed in mining rose from 0. 1 percent in 1963 to 0.4 per- 
cent in 1983. Exactly comparable data were lacking on manufac- 
turing, but from 1965 to 1980 industry's share of the labor force 



171 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



rose from 10 percent to 12 percent whereas the services sector grew 
from 18 percent to 20 percent of the labor force (see table 8, 
Appendix). 

Unemployment 

The national unemployment rate, estimated by the Office of 
Statistics as 4.3 percent of the labor force in 1985, increased to 5.3 
percent in 1986 and 7.0 percent in 1987, before falling to 5.1 per- 
cent in 1988 as a result of measures taken under the SAP. Most 
of the unemployed were city dwellers, as indicated by urban job- 
less rates of 8.7 percent in 1985, 9.1 percent in 1986, 9.8 percent 
in 1987, and 7.3 percent in 1988. Underemployed farm labor, often 
referred to as disguised unemployed, continued to be supported 
by the family or village, and therefore rural unemployment figures 
were less accurate than those for urban unemployment. Among 
the openly unemployed rural population, almost two-thirds were 
secondary-school graduates. 

Consistently, the largest proportion of the unemployed were 
secondary- school graduates. There was also a 40-percent unem- 
ployment rate among urban youth aged twenty to twenty-four and 
a 31 -percent rate among those aged fifteen to nineteen. Two-thirds 
of the urban unemployed were fifteen to twenty-four years old. 
Moreover, the educated unemployed tended to be young males with 
few dependents. There were relatively few secondary-school gradu- 
ates, and the lowered job expectations of primary- school gradu- 
ates in the urban formal sector kept the urban unemployment rate 
for these groups to 3 to 6 percent in the 1980s. 

Labor Unions 

Labor unions have been a part of Nigerian industry since 1912, 
when government employees formed a civil service union. In 1914 
this organization became the Nigerian Union of Civil Servants af- 
ter the merger of the protectorates of Northern Nigeria and 
Southern Nigeria. In 1931 two other major unions were founded — 
the Nigerian Railway Workers Union and the Nigerian Union of 
Teachers (which included private-school teachers). Legalization of 
unions in 1938 was followed by rapid labor organization during 
World War II as a result of passage by the British government of 
the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940, which en- 
couraged the establishment of unions in the colonies. The defense 
regulation of October 1942 made strikes and lockouts illegal for 
the duration of the war and denied African workers the cost-of- 
living allowances that European civil servants received. In addi- 
tion, the colonial government increased wages only modestly, 



172 



The Economy 



although the cost of living rose 74 percent from September 1939 
to October 1943. In June and July of 1945, 43,000 workers, most 
of whom were performing services indispensable to the country's 
economic and administrative life, went on a strike that lasted more 
than forty days. In large part as a result of the strike's success, 
the labor movement grew steadily, and by 1950 there were 144 
unions with more than 144,000 members. 

Although the labor movement was federated in 1941, the peri- 
od from the end of World War II to 1964 was characterized by 
numerous splits, regroupings, and further fragmentation. Faction- 
alism was rampant, engendered by the reluctance of the Colonial 
Office to strengthen union rights, dependence on foreign financial 
support, the thwarting of labor's political objectives by nationalist 
leaders, and intramural ideological differences. The most visible 
manifestation of labor problems was the dispute over whether to 
affiliate with the East European socialist-oriented World Federa- 
tion of Trade Unions, based in Prague, or the more capitalist- 
oriented International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, head- 
quartered in Brussels. 

In 1963 union members numbered 300,000, or 1.6 percent of 
the labor force. Despite this low level of organization, labor dis- 
content worsened as the gap widened between the wages of white- 
collar and those of blue-collar workers. In FY 1964, supervisors 
were paid thirty-three times as much as daily-wage workers and 
semiskilled workers in public service. After independence, many 
workers had begun to feel that the political leadership was making 
no effort to reduce the inequalities of the colonial wage and benefit 
structure. Corruption and conspicuous consumption were perceived 
to be widespread among politicians. An April 1963 pay raise for 
ministers and members of parliament further fueled labor resent- 
ment because rank-and-file civil servants had been doing without 
raises since 1960. The five superordinate central labor organiza- 
tions consequently formed the Joint Action Committee (JAC) to 
pressure the government to raise wages. Numerous delays in the 
publication of a government commission report on wages and 
salaries provided partial impetus for a JAC -mobilized general strike 
of 800,000 supporters, most of them nonunionists, which lasted 
twelve days in June 1964. Although the strike demonstrated the 
government's fragility, the JAC could not translate its victory into 
permanent political strength; labor unity disintegrated in the face 
of overtures by political parties to segments of organized labor as 
the federal elections of December 1964 neared. 

Political parties and communal associations were banned dur- 
ing the military rule of the late 1960s, so labor unions posed a 



173 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

potential organized threat to the government. The military govern- 
ment's decree in 1969 forbidding strikes was repeatedly defied dur- 
ing the next four years, most notably in 1973, when the regime 
gave in to demands by striking postal and telecommunications work- 
ers, about one-fifth of the federal civil service. Labor activities and 
internal strife among four central labor organizations continued 
up to 1975, when the military government attempted, unsuccess- 
fully at first, to merge the four bodies into one unit, the Nigerian 
Labour Congress (NLC). The government dissolved the four central 
unions, prohibited union affiliations with international labor or- 
ganizations, and in 1977 banned eleven labor leaders from further 
union activity. Under terms of a 1978 labor decree amendment, 
the more than 1,000 previously existing unions were reorganized 
into 70 registered industrial unions under the NLC, now the sole 
central labor organization. 

In the early 1980s, the civilian government found itself losing 
control of organized labor. Numerous wildcat strikes occurred in 
1980-81, and in May 1981, the NLC mobilized 700,000 of 1 mil- 
lion unionized Nigerian workers for a two-day strike, despite the 
opposition of a government- supported faction. 

Working days lost through strikes declined from 9.6 million in 
1982 to 200,000 in 1985 in the midst of a decline in national in- 
come that had begun in 1983. Industrial unrest resulted, however, 
in demands by larger number of workers for payments of salary 
arrears and fringe benefits as real wages fell by almost 60 percent. 
The causes of the decline in real wages were the World Bank-advised 
SAP and the unfavorable terms of trade that resulted from the col- 
lapse of the world oil market between 1986 and 1989. 

Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 

As economic development occurs, the relative size of the agricul- 
tural sector usually decreases. Accordingly, Nigerian GDP originat- 
ing in the agricultural sector shrank from 65.7 percent in FY 1959 
to 30.9 percent by 1976. The overall economic decline reversed 
this trend, and by 1988, 39.1 percent of GDP was derived from 
agricultural activity (see table 9, Appendix). 

The contribution of the agricultural sector increased 3.8 percent 
yearly between 1983 and 1988, and the percentage of export value 
in agriculture grew from 3 percent in 1983 to 9 percent in 1988, 
although much of this growth resulted from the fall in oil export 
receipts (see table 10, Appendix). Food production also increased 
rapidly during the 1980s, especially after exchange-rate reform 
restricted food imports in 1986. 



174 



Cocoa House in Ibadan, 
the cocoa marketing center 
Courtesy Embassy of Nigeria, 
Washington 



■ 




175 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

Land Use, Soils, and Land Tenure 

In 1990 estimates indicated that 82 million hectares out of Nige- 
ria's total land area of about 91 million hectares were arable. 
However, only about 34 million hectares (or 42 percent of the cul- 
tivable area) were being cultivated at the time. Much of this land 
was farmed under bush fallow, a technique whereby an area much 
larger than that under cultivation is left idle for varying periods 
to allow natural regeneration of soil fertility. Another 18 million 
hectares were classified as permanent pasture, but much of this 
land had the potential to support crops. About 20 million hectares 
were covered by forests and woodlands. Most of this land also had 
agricultural potential. The country's remaining 19 million hectares 
were covered by buildings or roads, or were considered wasteland. 

Nigeria's soil is rated from low to medium in productivity. 
However, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO) concluded that most of the country's soil would 
have medium to good productivity if this resource were managed 
properly. 

Traditional land tenure throughout Nigeria was based on cus- 
tomary laws under which land was considered community property. 
An individual had usufructuary rights to the land he farmed in his 
lineage or community area. He could possess the land as long as 
he used it to his family's or society's benefit, and could pass the 
land on to heirs and pledge its use to satisfy a debt, but could not 
sell or mortgage it. The right of disposal belonged only to the com- 
munity, which, acting through traditional authorities, exercised this 
right in accordance with customary law. 

The Fulani conquest of much of northern Nigeria in the early 
1800s brought a change in land tenure in areas under Fulani con- 
trol. The conquerors bestowed fiefs on certain individuals, who 
sometimes appointed overseers with the power to allocate unused 
land without regard for local community interests. One result was 
a growing number of grants to strangers during the nineteenth cen- 
tury because overseers sought to increase the revenue from their 
landlords' holdings. This practice gradually reduced the extent of 
bush land and encouraged the migration of farmers to urban areas 
that began toward the end of the nineteenth century. 

In the early 1900s, the British established hegemony over the 
Fulani and declared all land in the former Fulani fiefs to be public 
property. Subsequendy, in contrast to southern Nigeria, where the 
community owned land, in the north the government required oc- 
cupancy permits. However, at the same time the northern authori- 
ties were charged with supervision and protection of the indigenous 



176 



The Economy 



population's traditional rights, and a general reversion to customary 
land-tenure practices occurred. In predominantly Muslim areas, 
traditional land inheritance laws were allowed to remain in force. 
As a result of the government's support of local customary laws, 
encroachment by outsiders appears largely to have been halted. 
In 1962 the government of the Northern Region placed formal 
restrictions on landholding by individuals who were not members 
of a northern community. 

In the south, colonial authorities introduced the concept of in- 
dividual ownership of property and authorized the legal convey- 
ance of land that could be registered with the government. Various 
laws and ordinances gave government the power to expropriate 
statutory landholdings in return for compensation. Expansion of 
the money economy and the resulting emphasis on commercial 
crops encouraged farmers to seek private ownership of land. 
Nonetheless, customary tenure remained the principal form of land- 
holding throughout Nigeria as late as the early 1970s. During the 
1970s, however, individuals and business enterprises drove up land 
prices, especially in newly urbanized areas, by investing heavily 
in real estate. In the south, customary owners turned from land 
sales to more profitable high-rent leasing arrangements. In the 
north, where land was held only by permit, farmers on the out- 
skirts of cities became victims of developmental rezoning. Their 
permits were revoked, and, only minimally compensated, they 
moved to other areas. The land was then subdivided and sold at 
high prices. 

In response to a potential crisis in land distribution, the Federal 
Military Government promulgated the Land Use Decree of March 
1978, establishing a uniform tenure system for all of Nigeria. Sub- 
sequently incorporated in the constitution of 1979, the decree ef- 
fectively nationalized all land by requiring certificates of occupancy 
from the government for land held under customary and statutory 
rights and the payment of rent to the government. However, the 
decree stipulated that anyone in a rural or urban area who nor- 
mally occupied land and developed it would continue to enjoy the 
right of occupancy and could sell or transfer his interest in the 
development of the land. 

The main purpose of the 1978 decree was to open land to devel- 
opment by individuals, corporations, institutions, and governments. 
The decree gave state and local governments authority to take over 
and assign any undeveloped land. Occupancy or possession of un- 
developed land by individuals was restricted. To prevent fragmen- 
tation, the statutory right of occupancy could be passed on only 
to one person or heir. 



177 



Nigeria: A Country Study 
Crops 

Nigeria's climate permits the cultivation of a variety of crops 
in a pattern that emerged in earlier centuries in response to local 
conditions. As in other West Africa states, rainfall is heaviest in 
the south, where the forests and savannas benefit from abundant 
precipitation and relatively short dry seasons. The staples are root 
crops, including cassava, yams, taro (cocoyams), and sweet pota- 
toes. Tree crops — cacao, oil palm, and rubber — constitute the area's 
main commercial produce (see table 11, Appendix). Cacao, from 
which cocoa is made, grows mostly in the southwest. Oil palms 
(whose kernels can be made into palm wine) predominate in the 
southeast and are numerous in the south-central area. Rubber 
stands are common in south-central and southeastern Nigeria. 

Smallholder farmers, who use simple production techniques and 
bush-fallow cultivation and cultivate areas of one-half to two hect- 
ares each, contribute two-thirds of farm production. In most areas, 
some noncash crops are grown, such as sorghum, yams, cassava, 
cowpeas, millet, corn, cocoyams, sweet potatoes, and rice. 

The northern third of Nigeria, which experiences a dry season 
of five to seven months, during which less than twenty-five mil- 
limeters of rain falls, lies mosdy in the Sudan (see Glossary) savanna 
and the arid Sahel (see Glossary) zone. There, the staples are millet, 
cowpeas, and a drought-resistant variety of sorghum known as 
guinea corn. Corn is also cultivated, as well as rice in suitable 
lowland areas. The north's principal commercial crops are cotton 
and peanuts. 

Between the arid north and the moist south lies a Guinea savanna 
region sometimes referred to as the middle belt (see Glossary). This 
area produces staples such as yams, sorghum, millet, cassava, cow- 
peas, and corn, with rice an important crop in some places. The 
middle belt's southern edge represents the lower limits of the north- 
ern grain-dominated economy. The most significant commercial 
crop of the middle belt is sesame (or benniseed). 

Most Nigerians eat grains, but the production and consump- 
tion of sorghum (guinea corn) and millet are heavily concentrated 
in the savanna north. In 1980 the two grains accounted for 80 per- 
cent of Nigeria's total grain production. Corn production in the 
savanna middle belt benefits from heavier rainfall, which frequently 
permits two crops a year. The demand for rice, much of it import- 
ed, increased dramatically during the affluent 1970s, but had to 
be cut back during the foreign exchange shortages of the 1980s. 

Cocoa and peanuts were Nigeria's two major exports until 
petroleum surpassed both in 1965. Cocoa, cotton, peanuts, oil palm 



178 



The Economy 



products, and rubber were the principal export crops in the 1960s 
and early 1970s, but with export reorientation, only cocoa remained 
of any importance after 1975. Although Nigeria was the world's 
largest exporter of peanuts in the early 1970s, peanuts fell from 
the export list by the end of the 1970s as a result of the severe 
Sahel drought of 1972-74 and a viral disease in 1975. With as- 
sistance from the World Bank, the government restored cocoa 
production in the late 1970s and 1980s through replanting programs 
and producer price supports. The resulting increase in cocoa out- 
put (to 200,000 tons in 1988) kept Nigeria in third place among 
world cocoa producers, after Ivory Coast and Ghana. 

Although the devaluation of the naira and the abolition of agri- 
cultural marketing boards in FY 1986 were intended to increase 
cash-crop output, the results were disappointing. The failure to 
signiflcandy increase output was caused partly by the lack of incen- 
tives for producers to invest in maintenance. 

In the late 1980s, Nigeria reduced the structural bias against 
agricultural activity by decontrolling farm prices, maintaining sub- 
sidies on fertilizer and farm exports, and maintaining import bans 
on some food items. Despite the granting of increased incentives 
to the domestic farming industry, agricultural output rose slowly 
because of inadequate transportation and power networks, a lack 
of appropriate technology, and the ineffective application of rural 
credit. Although the domestic production of food did not decline, 
on a per capita basis food became less available during this period. 

Irrigation 

Traditional cultivators throughout Nigeria used elemental irri- 
gation systems long before the colonial period. These systems 
included seasonally inundated depressions in upland areas of the 
south and parts of the middle belt that received heavy rainfall, shal- 
low swamps, and seasonally flooded riverine land. In the north, 
shadoof irrigation was also used along rivers, and some use was 
made of wells. Smallholders were using traditional methods to ir- 
rigate about 120,000 hectares in the 1950s and about 800,000 
hectares in the late 1970s. 

In 1949 the Northern Region established the first government 
irrigation agency. By the end of the 1960s, government projects — all 
relatively small — brought 9,000 hectares under irrigation. The se- 
vere Sahel drought of 1972-74 resulted in the expenditure of large 
sums for irrigation development by the federal government and 
by some state governments during the third plan, 1975-80. In 1975 
the federal government established the Ministry of Water Resources 
and in 1976 created eleven river basin development authorities with 



179 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



responsibility for irrigation and the comprehensive development 
of water resources. Major irrigation projects after the mid-1970s 
included the South Chad Irrigation Project in Borno State, the 
Bakolori Project in Sokoto State, and the Kano River Project. 

Livestock 

Reliable statistics on livestock holdings did not exist, but care- 
ful estimates suggested a total of 10 to 11 million cattle in the early 
1970s and, after the severe drought, 8.5 million in the late 1970s. 
Although an epidemic of rinderpest killed more than a million cattle 
in 1983, production recovered by the end of the 1980s. The UN 
FAO estimated that in 1987 there were 12.2 million cattle, 13.2 
million sheep, 26.0 million goats, 1.3 million pigs, 700,000 don- 
keys, 250,000 horses, 18,000 camels (found mostly in the Sahel 
savanna around Lake Chad), and 175 million poultry nationally. 
This livestock was owned mostly by villages rather than by com- 
mercial operators. The livestock subsector accounted for about 2 
percent of GDP in the 1980s. 

Until the 1990s, cattle-raising was limited largely to the north- 
ern fifth of the country that was free of the tsetse fly. A program 
of tsetse-fly research and eradication was somewhat successful dur- 
ing the 1970s and 1980s, but 90 percent of the national cattle herd 
was still found in the northern states in 1990. About 96 percent 
of these animals were zebu-type cattle, most of which were tended 
by Fulani pastoralists. Traditionally, the Fulani moved their herds 
during the dry season to pasture in the moister Guinea savanna, 
returning northward when the rains began and danger from the 
tsetse fly increased. During the 1970s and 1980s, the expansion 
of cultivated areas and irrigation seriously obstructed this migra- 
tion by cutting off access to usual travel routes. 

Most of Nigeria's remaining cattle, 3 to 4 percent, are smaller 
than the zebu type and less valuable as draft animals. However, 
they possess a resistance to trypanosomiasis that makes it possible 
to raise them in the tsetse-infested humid forest zone. The govern- 
ment improved these herds in early 1980 by importing breeding 
stock of a particularly disease-resistant strain from The Gambia. 

By the early 1970s, as the general standard of living improved, 
the demand for meat in Nigeria exceeded the domestic supply. As 
a result, 30 to 40 percent of the beef consumed in Nigeria was im- 
ported from Niger, Chad, and other neighboring countries. In the 
mid-1970s, Nigeria began importing frozen beef in response to ex- 
port restrictions initiated by its neighbors. The National Livestock 
Production Company established domestic commercial cattle 
ranches in the late 1970s, but with poor results. 



180 




Most of Nigeria's sheep and goats are in the north, where the 
Fulani maintained an approximate ratio of 30 percent sheep and 
goats to 70 percent cattle. About 40 percent of northern non-Fulani 
farming households are estimated to keep sheep and goats. Most 
pigs are raised in the south, where the Muslim proscription against 
eating pork is not a significant factor. 

Almost all rural households raise poultry as a subsistence meat. 
Chickens are predominantly of indigenous origin, and there is some 
crossbreeding with foreign stock. Egg production is low. Private 
commercial poultry operations increased rapidly during the 1970s 
and 1980s near urban areas, providing a growing source of eggs 
for the cities. But commercial operations remained largely depen- 
dent on corn and other feeds imported from the United States. 

Forestry 

Nigeria's forests can be divided into two principal categories: 
woodlands and forests of the savanna regions (four-fifths of the coun- 
try' s forest area) that are sources of fuel and poles, and rainforests 
of the southern humid zone that supply almost all domestic tim- 
ber and lumber, with fuelwood as a byproduct. Nigeria's forests 
have gradually shrunk over the centuries, especially in the north, 
where uncontrolled commercial exploitation of privately owned 
forests began in the late nineteenth century. Toward the end of the 
1800s, the colonial government began establishing forest reserves. 



181 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

By 1900 more than 970 square kilometers had been set aside. By 
1930 this reserve had grown to almost 30,000 square kilometers, 
and by 1970 to 93,420 square kilometers, mostly in the savanna 
regions. 

Through the 1950s, forest regeneration was largely by natural 
reseeding, although the government established some small plan- 
tations near larger towns for fuelwood and poles. In the early 1960s, 
the government began emphasizing the development of forest plan- 
tations, especially ones planted with fast-growing, exotic species, 
such as teak and gmelina (an Australian hardwood). By 1976 about 
1 15,000 hectares had been planted. During the late 1970s and 1980s, 
state plantations became an important source of timber, paper pulp, 
poles, and fuelwood. Despite these developments, forestry's share 
of Nigeria's expanding GDP declined from 6 percent in the late 
1950s to 2 percent in the late 1970s and 1980s. Earnings from the 
export of timber and wood products — 6 percent of export income 
in 1960 — declined to 1 percent of export income in 1970 and vir- 
tually nothing in the late 1970s and 1980s, as domestic needs 
increased rapidly. The oil boom of the 1970s slowed exports fur- 
ther, as more and more wood was diverted to the domestic con- 
struction industry. 

In the 1980s, Nigeria's demand for commercial wood products 
(excluding paper pulp and paper) threatened to exhaust reserves 
before the year 2000. To reverse this process, especially in the north- 
ern savanna, the government needed to double the rate of annual 
plantings it set in the 1980s. In June 1989, the government an- 
nounced receipt of a World Bank loan for afforestation to stabilize 
wood product output and forest reserves. 

Fisheries 

Data on fisheries output were meager in 1990. In the mid-1960s, 
estimates indicated that Nigerian fisheries brought in 120,000 tons 
of fish per year and imported 180,000 tons, mostly air-dried fish. 
Domestic production through the 1970s ranged from 600,000 to 
700,000 tons annually. 

Nigeria has declared an exclusive economic zone extending 200 
nautical miles from its coast. These waters include the continental 
shelf along more than 800 kilometers of coastline, a large area of 
brackish lagoons and creeks, and freshwater rivers and inland lakes, 
including fish-rich Lake Chad and Kainji Reservoir, among other 
artificial bodies of water. In the early 1980s, the bulk of the catch 
was taken by small businesses using large canoes (some motorized) 
along the coast, smaller canoes in the creeks and lagoons, and simi- 
lar small boats in freshwater areas. The modern commercial fishing 



182 




183 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



fleet consisted of about 300 licensed craft ranging in size from 20 
tons to more than 6,000 tons; about one-third were vessels under 
265 tons that engaged in inshore fishing and shrimping. In the 
mid-1970s, the government set up the Nigerian National Fish Com- 
pany jointly with foreign interests to operate a deep-sea fishing fleet. 
In 1975 the Nigerian National Shrimp Company was established 
in partnership with a North American firm. But deep-sea fisheries 
were, and in 1990 continued to be, dominated by foreign-owned 
trawlers, despite substantial investment in fisheries development, 
including the provision of fishing supplies and outboard motors 
to small local enterprises in the late 1970s. 

Manufacturing 

While agriculture's relative share of GDP was falling, manufac- 
turing's contribution rose from 4.4 percent in FY 1959 to 9.4 per- 
cent in 1970, before falling during the oil boom to 7.0 percent in 
1973, increasing to 11.4 percent in 1981, and declining to 10.0 per- 
cent in 1988. Whereas manufacturing increased rapidly during the 
1970s, tariff manipulations encouraged the expansion of assembly 
activities dependent on imported inputs. These activities contributed 
little to indigenous value added, or to employment, and reduced 
subsequent industrial growth. The manufacturing sector produced 
a range of goods that included milled grain, vegetable oil, meat 
products, dairy products, refined sugar, soft drinks, beer, cigarettes, 
textiles, footwear, wood, paper products, soap, paint, pharmaceu- 
tical goods, ceramics, chemical products, tires, tubes, plastics, 
cement, glass, bricks, tiles, metal goods, agricultural machinery, 
household electrical appliances, radios, motor vehicles, and jewelry. 

From 1982 to 1986, Nigeria's value added in manufacturing fell 
25 percent, partly as a result of inefficient resource allocation caused 
by distorted prices (especially for exports and import substitutes) 
and prohibitive import restrictions. Between 1986 and 1988, World 
Bank structural adjustment program (SAP) measures contributed 
to larger increases in manufacturing's contribution to GDP, which 
grew 8 percent in 1988. These measures included liberalized regu- 
lations governing the import of capital, raw materials, and com- 
ponents; the creation of import-substitution industries; and, 
beginning in 1988, privatization. The SAP increased production 
efficiency, cut into the black market, and reduced factory closures 
resulting from import bans on essential inputs. 

The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion decrees of 1972, 1977, and 
1981, by limiting foreign ownership shares in various industries, 
shifted the manufacturing sector from foreign majority ownership 
in the 1960s to indigenous majority ownership in the mid-1970s 



184 



The Economy 



and late 1970s. Businesspeople participated in economic policymak- 
ing, influencing the government's implementation of indigeni- 
zation. "Nigerianization," in which foreigners were obligated to 
sell ownership shares to Nigerians, became an instrument by which 
a few civil servants, military leaders, businesspeople, and profes- 
sionals amassed considerable wealth. In 1985 the government selec- 
tively relaxed the indigenization decrees to encourage foreign 
investment in neglected areas, such as large-scale agrobusiness and 
manufacturing that used local resources. After March 1988, for- 
eign investors were allowed to increase their holdings in a number 
of other sectors. 

Mining, Petroleum, and Energy Resources 

Petroleum products accounted for two-thirds of the energy con- 
sumed in 1990, but Nigeria also had substantial resources in the 
form of hydroelectricity , wood, subbituminous coal, charcoal, and 
lignite. In the 1980s, most cooking was done with wood fuels, 
although in urban areas petroleum use increased. Coal, originally 
mined as fuel for railroads, largely had been replaced by diesel oil 
except in a few industrial establishments. Coal production fell from 
940,000 tons in 1958 to 73,000 tons in 1986, only a fraction of 1 
percent of Nigeria's commercially produced energy. 

Tin and columbite output fell from the 1960s through the 1980s 
as high-grade ore reserves became exhausted. A fraction of the ex- 
tensive deposits of iron ore began to be mined in the mid-1980s, 
and uranium was discovered but not exploited. Almost none of these 
minerals left the country, however, as petroleum continued to ac- 
count for virtually all of Nigeria's mineral exports. 

Mining contributed 1 .0 percent of GDP in FY 1959, on the eve 
of independence. This sector's share (including petroleum) stood 
at more than 14 percent in 1988. Mining's general upward trend 
since 1959, as well as the fluctuations in the size of its contribution 
to GDP, can be attributed to the expansion and instability of the 
world oil market since 1973. 

Oil and Gas 

Nigeria's first oil refinery, at Alesa Eleme near Port Harcourt, 
began operations in late 1965 with a capacity of 38,000 barrels per 
day, enough to meet domestic requirements at the time. The 
refinery expanded production to 60,000 barrels per day after the 
civil war but failed to satisfy the demands of a rapidly growing econ- 
omy. An additional refinery, delayed by political maneuvering over 
its location, was constructed at Warri, opening in 1978 with a ca- 
pacity of 100,000 barrels per day. This plant was entirely owned 



185 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

by a parastatal, the Nigerian National Petroleum Company 
(NNPC), which starting in 1979 also held an 80 percent interest 
in the earlier plant. Technical problems and shutdowns for rou- 
tine maintenance reduced production, and the combined total of 
petroleum processed by the two plants in 1979 averaged 89,000 
barrels per day — about 83 percent of the domestic requirement. 

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the NNPC had substantial 
amounts of oil refined abroad (mostly by Shell) to make up the 
shortfall, and some oil was also processed in Cameroon, Ghana, 
and Ivory Coast. In October 1980, a third refinery, with a capaci- 
ty of 100,000 barrels per day, began operations at Kaduna, but 
did not become fully productive until the mid-1980s. A fourth 
refinery was completed in March 1989 at Alesa Eleme, increasing 
Nigeria's refining capacity to 445,000 barrels per day. Domestic 
petroleum demand stood at 250,000 barrels per day; hence a por- 
tion of the output of the four refineries could now be exported. 
However, by the early 1990s gasoline output was sufficiently short 
of the growing domestic demand to require that the NNPC still 
refine some gasoline abroad. 

In 1988 about 96 percent of the oil Nigeria produced came from 
companies in which the NNPC held at least 60 percent of the 
equity. The NNPC also was responsible for 75 percent of total in- 
vestment in petroleum. In the late 1980s, the major Western oil 
companies exploring oil resources in Nigeria (primarily in mid- 
western, southeastern, and nearby offshore wells) were (in descend- 
ing order of importance) Shell, Chevron, Mobil, Agip, Elf 
Aquitaine, Phillips, Texaco, and Ashland. In 1985-88 11 percent 
of all extracted oil (about 66 percent of domestic requirements) was 
refined in Nigerian refineries, where the NNPC owned majority 
equity shares. 

From 1974 to 1981 , while real oil prices remained high, lending 
to major oil exporting countries, such as Nigeria, was considered 
very safe. Indeed, Nigeria did not borrow extensively abroad un- 
til 1978, when a fall in the price of oil required Lagos to borrow 
US$16 million on world capital markets. Thereafter, Nigeria con- 
tinued international borrowing for an ambitious investment pro- 
gram, anticipating an oil-price recovery. The world's sixth largest 
oil exporter and the leader in oil exports in sub-Saharan Africa, 
Nigeria nonetheless experienced an external trade surplus only from 
1973 to 1975 and 1979 to 1980, during two oil price peaks, and 
in the late 1980s, when debt- servicing burdens forced import reduc- 
tions, especially in services. 

Besides oil, Nigeria had substantial reserves of natural gas. 
Although the consumption of natural gas increased steadily in the 



186 



Punch press with operators 
Courtesy Embassy of Nigeria, 
Washington 




late 1970s and 1980s, and in 1990 constituted more than 20 per- 
cent of Nigeria's total energy from commercial sources, the quan- 
tity of gas used was only a fraction of what was available. In 1988, 
with the largest natural gas reserves in Africa, Nigeria produced 
21.2 billion cubic meters per day, with 2.9 billion cubic meters used 
by the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) and other domes- 
tic customers, 2.6 billion cubic meters used by foreign oil compa- 
nies, and 15.7 billion cubic meters (77 percent) wasted through 
flaring. Small amounts of gas were also consumed by petroleum 
producers to furnish power for their own operations and as fuel 
for some equipment. Domestically, there remained a large poten- 
tial market for bottled liquid petroleum gas (LPG), which was 
produced primarily at the Kaduna refinery. 

In the early 1990s, Nigeria was undertaking a major project to 
market liquefied natural gas (LNG) instead of flaring gas produced 
in the oil fields by building a gas liquefaction plant on the Bonny 
River. Four companies signed an agreement in May 1989 to im- 
plement this plan: NNPC (60 percent share), Shell (20 percent), 
Agip (Azienda generale italiana dei petroli — 10 percent), and Elf 
Aquitaine (10 percent), with plant construction scheduled to be- 
gin in 1991 . Other aspects of the project involved Nigerian govern- 
ment construction of gas pipelines for distribution to domestic 
residential and commercial users and a supply of gas to the NNPC 
chemical complex at Port Harcourt. Much of the gas was intended 



187 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



for export, however, and the first LNG tanker was launched in 
October 1990 through the cooperative efforts of Nigeria and Japan. 

Electric Power 

Hydroelectric power furnished about 14 percent of the energy 
consumed by Nigerians in the 1980s. Total energy used in the form 
of electricity was considerably larger, however, because much of 
the energy provided by petroleum products and gas was convert- 
ed into electricity. In 1990 most electricity was supplied by NEPA. 
This agency had been established in 1972 as a semiautonomous 
government activity through the merger of the Electric Corpora- 
tion of Nigeria (ECN — created by the government in 1950 to gener- 
ate and transmit power nationally) and the Niger Dam Authority 
(NDA — set up in 1962 to develop the economic potential of the 
Niger River). As part of its mandate, the NDA had constructed 
the Kainji Dam and an associated hydroelectric plant, which be- 
gan operations in 1968. Until the late 1970s, the plant was the prin- 
cipal source of Nigeria's electrical power. 

The demand for power grew at an average annual rate estimat- 
ed at 15 to 20 percent after the start of the 1973-74 oil boom. 
NEPA's total generating plant, having an installed capacity of 881 
megawatts in FY 1976 — almost half of which was located at the 
Kainji hydroelectric plant — was unable to meet the rapidly grow- 
ing requirement. By FY 1978 an additional 250 megawatts had 
been installed, of which 200 megawatts were at Kainji, but a 
drought in 1977 and 1978 significantly lowered the level of Kainji 
Reservoir and thus reduced the plant's output. During the drought, 
blackouts were frequent, verging on the catastrophic for major in- 
dustrial establishments. Goods in the process of assembly had to 
be destroyed, and interruptions in machine operations substantially 
reduced productivity. The situation improved in the 1980s: two 
120-megawatt units were added to the Kainji hydroelectric station, 
ten units of 120 megawatts each installed in Sapele, new hydro- 
electric stations built at Shiroro on the Kaduna River and Jebba 
downstream from Kainji Reservoir, and another 200 megawatts 
added at various smaller plants. 

Power was distributed through a national grid that linked many 
of the large towns, some of which had been previously served by 
local diesel power stations. Yet the power sector, lacking spare parts, 
had neglected maintenance to the point that generating capacity 
was rapidly declining. 

Transportation and Communications 
Transportation 

Nigeria's transportation network was potentially one of the best 



188 



The Economy 



in Africa in 1990, featuring an extensive system of paved high- 
ways, railroads, airports, and ports (see fig. 10). During the oil 
boom of the 1970s, however, most government funds earmarked 
for transportation were applied to the construction of new roads, 
and maintenance of existing facilities was ignored. As a result, the 
transportation system was plagued with congestion and a deteri- 
orating infrastructure. 

Roads 

The road system began in the early 1900s essentially as a feeder 
network for the new railroads. In the 1920s, the government estab- 
lished a basic grid of two north-south trunk roads from Lagos and 
Port Harcourt to Kano, and several east-west roads, two north and 
two south of the natural division created by the Niger and Benue 
rivers. In later decades, this system was expanded until most state 
capitals and large towns were accessible by paved road. In 1978 
an expressway was constructed from Lagos to Ibadan, and a branch 
from this route was later extended east to Benin City. Another ex- 
pressway connected Port Harcourt with Enugu. In 1990 Nigeria 
had 108,000 kilometers of roads, of which 30,000 kilometers were 
paved, 25,000 kilometers were gravel, and the rest were unimproved 
earth. Carrying 95 percent of all the nation's goods and passengers, 
the roads constituted by far the most important element in the trans- 
portation network. 

The poor maintenance of past years forced the government to 
shift its emphasis in the 1980s from constructing new roads to repair- 
ing existing ones. Massive traffic jams were reported in most large 
cities, and there were long delays in the movement of goods. Safety 
standards were low; in 1988 more than 30,000 accidents and 8,000 
highway deaths were reported. 

Railroads 

In 1990 the rail system consisted of 3,500 kilometers of narrow- 
gauge (1.067-meter) track. The system's basic elements were two 
main lines running inland from the coast: one, in the west from 
Lagos to Kano, opened in 1912, and the other, in the east from 
Port Harcourt to a conjunction with the western line at Kaduna, 
opened in 1926. Three major extensions were subsequently con- 
structed. One was a branch line from Zaria to Kaura Namoda, 
an important agricultural area in the northwest, completed in 1929. 
The second was a branch from Kano to Nguru, a cattle-raising 
region in the northeast, completed in 1930. The third, a 645-kilo- 
meter branch from the eastern line to Maiduguri, was completed 



191 




190 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



in 1964. A short spur to the mining area at Jos and two short 
branches from Lagos and Kaduna rounded out the system. 

Poor maintenance, inadequate government funding, and declin- 
ing traffic all contributed to a deterioration of the rail system. A 
plan to convert the entire system to standard gauge (1.435-meter) 
by laying new track parallel to the old was shelved in the early 1980s 
for lack of funds. Construction of a new line from Oturkpo to the 
steelworks at Ajaokuta was also halted in the mid-1980s. In 1988 
the Nigerian Railway Corporation (NRC), operator of the system, 
declared bankruptcy. In an attempt to cut an inefficient and over- 
sized staff, the government laid off one-quarter of NRC's work- 
force. The remainder responded by shutting down the entire system 
for six months. In 1989 some trains were reported running again, 
but the system still was reportedly tottering on the verge of total 
breakdown. 

Airports 

In 1990 Nigeria had thirty- two airports with paved runways, 
three of which — Murtala Muhammad International at Lagos, 
Aminu Kano International at Kano, and Port Harcourt — offered 
regularly scheduled international flights. The parastatal Nigeria 
Airways provided domestic service between these three airports and 
fields in ten other Nigerian cities. Schedule irregularities and pas- 
senger complaints were common, and the government put increas- 
ing pressure on Nigeria Airways to improve its standard of service 
and reduce its financial losses. Despite the problems, the number 
of passengers on domestic flights increased throughout the 1980s, 
in part because of the poor state of other modes of transportation. 

Ports 

Nigeria's port system consisted of three complexes — Lagos, 
Rivers, and Delta — and the port of Calabar. The Lagos port com- 
plex was by far the most important, handling most of Nigeria's 
cargo. In addition to the cargo ports, two specialized tanker ter- 
minals handled crude oil exports. 

The Lagos port complex consisted of the large quays at Apapa 
and new, smaller facilities at Tin Can Island west of Apapa. Apapa 
was Nigeria's principal cargo port and had direct rail connections 
to the national system. Docking facilities at Warri, Sapele, and 
several smaller towns near the mouth of the Niger River comprised 
the Delta complex. The main element in the Rivers ports complex 
was Port Harcourt, starting point for the eastern line of the Nige- 
rian railroads and located sixty- six kilometers from the sea on 
the Bonny River. Calabar, eighty-three kilometers up the Cross 



192 



The Economy 



River, served as eastern Nigeria's main port. Nigeria's crude 
oil was exported through modern facilities at Bonny, near Port 
Harcourt, and Burutu, near Warri. 

Import restrictions imposed in 1982, a soft worldwide crude oil 
market, and a decline in the country's crude oil exports through- 
out the 1980s caused a sharp decrease in oceangoing trade. In ad- 
dition, the government shifted development funds in the last half 
of the 1980s from improving deepwater ports to building river ports 
in the hope that increased passenger traffic on the nation's inland 
waterways would relieve the strained highway system. 

Communications 

Already one of the best in sub-Saharan Africa, the domestic 
telecommunication system was undergoing a major expansion in 
1990. At the end of the 1980s, there were about 155,000 telephones 
in Nigeria. About one-third of them were in the capital. A domes- 
tic satellite system with nineteen ground stations, along with coaxial 
cable and a microwave network, linked all major urban areas. Most 
localities could receive at least one of the sixty-five amplitude-modu- 
lation (AM) radio stations. More than a dozen cities had frequency- 
modulation (FM) radio stations. Shortwave broadcasts from six 
transmitters were directed at remote rural areas; broadcasts were 
in English, Yoruba, Hausa, Igbo, and twelve other languages. Most 
urban areas also had television service. In 1990 the country had 
an estimated 10 million radios and 10 million television sets. 

International telecommunications were modern and provided 
high-quality links to the rest of the world. In coordination with In- 
ternational Telecommunications Satellite Corporation (Intelsat) At- 
lantic Ocean and Indian Ocean satellites, three ground stations 
made live television broadcasts; and direct telephone dialing was 
possible between Nigeria and the rest of the world. Lagos was the 
terminus of an undersea coaxial cable linking the West African 
countries with France and capable of carrying 960 simultaneous 
long-distance telephone calls. 

Banking, Finance, and Other Services 

In 1892 Nigeria's first bank, the African Banking Corporation, 
was established. No banking legislation existed until 1952, at which 
point Nigeria had three foreign banks (the Bank of British West 
Africa, Barclays Bank, and the British and French Bank) and two 
indigenous banks (the National Bank of Nigeria and the African 
Continental Bank) with a collective total of forty branches. A 1952 
ordinance set standards, required reserve funds, established bank 
examinations, and provided for assistance to indigenous banks. Yet 



193 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



for decades after 1952, the growth of demand deposits was slowed 
by the Nigerian propensity to prefer cash and to distrust checks 
for debt settlements. 

British colonial officials established the West African Currency 
Board in 1912 to help finance the export trade of foreign firms in 
West Africa and to issue a West African currency convertible to 
British pounds sterling. But colonial policies barred local invest- 
ment of reserves, discouraged deposit expansion, precluded dis- 
cretion for monetary management, and did nothing to train Africans 
in developing indigenous financial institutions. In 1952 several 
Nigerian members of the federal House of Assembly called for the 
establishment of a central bank to facilitate economic development. 
Although the motion was defeated, the colonial administration ap- 
pointed a Bank of England official to study the issue. He advised 
against a central bank, questioning such a bank's effectiveness in 
an undeveloped capital market. In 1957 the Colonial Office spon- 
sored another study that resulted in the establishment of a Nigerian 
central bank and the introduction of a Nigerian currency. The 
Nigerian pound (see Glossary), on a par with the pound sterling 
until the British currency's devaluation in 1967, was converted in 
1973 to a decimal currency, the naira (N), equivalent to two old 
Nigerian pounds. The smallest unit of the new currency was the 
kobo, 100 of which equaled 1 naira. The naira, which exchanged 
for US$1.52 in January 1973 and again in March 1982 (or 
NO. 67 = US$1), despite the floating exchange rate, depreciated rela- 
tive to the United States dollar in the 1980s. The average exchange 
rate in 1990 was N8.04 = US$1 . Depreciation accelerated after the 
creation of a second-tier foreign exchange market under the SAP 
in September 1986. 

The Central Bank of Nigeria, which was statutorily indepen- 
dent of the federal government until 1968, began operations on 
July 1, 1959. Following a decade of struggle over the relationship 
between the government and the Central Bank, a 1968 military 
decree granted authority over banking and monetary policy to the 
Federal Executive Council. The role of the Central Bank, similar 
to that of central banks in North America and Western Europe, 
was to establish the Nigerian currency, control and regulate the 
banking system, serve as banker to other banks in Nigeria, and 
carry out the government's economic policy in the monetary field. 
This policy included control of bank credit growth, credit distri- 
bution by sector, cash reserve requirements for commercial banks, 
discount rates — interest rates the Central Bank charged commer- 
cial and merchant banks — and the ratio of banks' long-term as- 
sets to deposits. Changes in Central Bank restrictions on credit and 



194 



The Economy 



monetary expansion affected total demand and income. For ex- 
ample, in 1988, as inflation accelerated, the Central Bank tried 
to restrain monetary growth. 

During the civil war, the government limited and later suspended 
repatriation of dividends and profits, reduced foreign travel al- 
lowances for Nigerian citizens, limited the size of allowances to over- 
seas public offices, required official permission for all foreign 
payments, and, in January 1968, issued new currency notes to 
replace those in circulation. Although in 1970 the Central Bank 
advised against dismantling of import and financial constraints too 
soon after the war, the oil boom soon permitted Nigeria to relax 
restrictions. 

The three largest commercial banks held about one-third of 
total bank deposits. In 1973 the federal government undertook to 
acquirea 40-percent equity ownership of the three largest foreign 
banks. In 1976, under the second Nigerian Enterprises Promotion 
Decree requiring 60-percent indigenous holdings, the federal 
government acquired an additional 20-percent holding in the three 
largest foreign banks and 60-percent ownership in the other for- 
eign banks. Yet indigenization did not change the management, 
control, and lending orientation toward international trade, par- 
ticularly of foreign companies and their Nigerian subsidiaries of 
foreign banks. 

At the end of 1988, the banking system consisted of the Central 
Bank of Nigeria, forty-two commercial banks, and twenty-four mer- 
chant banks, a substantial increase since 1986. Merchant banks 
were allowed to open checking accounts for corporations only and 
could not accept deposits below N50,000. Commercial and mer- 
chant banks together had 1,500 branches in 1988, up from 1,000 
in 1984. In 1988 commercial banks had assets of N52.2 billion com- 
pared to N12.6 billion for merchant banks in early 1988. In FY 
1990 the government put N503 million into establishing commu- 
nity banks to encourage community development associations, 
cooperative societies, farmers' groups, patriotic unions, trade 
groups, and other local organizations, especially in rural areas. 

Other financial institutions included government-owned special- 
ized development banks: the Nigerian Industrial Development 
Bank, the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry, and the 
Nigerian Agricultural Bank, as well as the Federal Savings Banks 
and the Federal Mortgage Bank. Also active in Nigeria were numer- 
ous insurance companies, pension funds, and finance and leasing 
companies. Nigeria also had a stock exchange (established in 
Lagos in 1961) and a number of stockbrokerage firms. The Secu- 
rities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Decree of 1988 gave the 



195 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

Nigerian SEC powers to regulate and supervise the capital market. 
These powers included the right to revoke stockbroker registrations 
and approve or disapprove any new stock exchange. Established 
in 1988, the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation increased con- 
fidence in the banks by protecting depositors against bank failures 
in licensed banks up to N50,000 in return for an annual bank pre- 
mium of nearly 1 percent of total deposit liabilities. 

Finance and insurance services represented more than 3 percent 
of Nigeria's GDP in 1988. Economists agree that services, con- 
sisting disproportionately of nonessential items, tend to expand as 
a share of national income as a national economy grows. However, 
Nigeria lacked comparable statistics over an extended period, 
preventing generalizations about the service sector. Statistics in- 
dicate, nevertheless, that services went from 28.9 percent of GDP 
in 1981 to 31.1 percent in 1988, a period of no economic growth. 
In 1988 services comprised the following percentages of GDP: 
wholesale and retail trade, 17.1 percent; hotels and restaurants, 
less than 1 percent; housing, 2.0 percent; government services, 6.0 
percent; real estate and business services, less than 1 percent; and 
other services, less than 1 percent. 

Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments 
Foreign Trade 

Until the mid-1950s, agricultural commodity exports — mainly 
cocoa, peanuts, palm oil, and palm kernels — earned more than the 
cost of merchandise imports. The demand for imports remained 
limited by the country's low income, lack of industrialization, 
negligible use of foreign inputs in agriculture, and sterling bloc 
restrictions. Nigeria had continued to specialize in primary products 
(food, raw materials, minerals, and organic oils and fats) and to 
import secondary products, such as chemicals, machinery, trans- 
portation equipment, and manufactures, used in Nigeria's develop- 
ment (see table 12, Appendix). Primary commodities comprised 
98 percent of exports and 21 percent of imports in 1955, 92 per- 
cent of exports and 19 percent of imports in 1975, and 98 percent 
of exports and 24 percent of imports in 1985. 

Minerals (largely petroleum) accounted for an increasing propor- 
tion of exports through the 1970s, increasing from 13 percent in 
1955 to 35 percent in 1965, to 93 percent in 1975, and then to 96 
percent in 1985 (see table 13, Appendix). The dependence on oil 
and a few other export commodities made Nigeria particularly vul- 
nerable to world price fluctuations. Nigeria's overall commodity 
terms of trade (price of exports divided by price of imports) fell 



196 



The Economy 



substantially, from a base of 100 (1980) to 83.8 (1984) and 35.5 
(1986), before rising to 42.6 (1987) and then falling to 34.6 (1988). 
Meanwhile, export purchasing power (quantity of exports multi- 
plied by the commodity terms of trade) declined from 100 (1980) 
to 48.3 (1984), 23.0 (1986), 23.1 (1987), and 20.4 (1988), a 79.6 
percent reduction in the purchasing power of exports in eight years. 

Nigeria traded worldwide with about 100 countries, but the com- 
position of trade by country had changed since the colonial period. 
During the colonial era, Britain was Nigeria's dominant trading 
partner. As late as 1955, 70 percent of Nigeria's exports were to 
Britain and 47 percent of its imports were from Britain. However, 
by 1976 Britain's share of Nigerian exports and imports had 
dropped to 38 percent and 32 percent respectively. In the 1970s, 
Britain was replaced by the United States as Nigeria's chief trad- 
ing partner. In 1988 the United States was Nigeria's best customer, 
buying more than 36 percent of its exports (primarily petroleum 
products); Britain was Nigeria's leading vendor, selling the nation 
more than 14 percent of its imports. 

In 1990 Nigeria had associate status, including some export 
preferences, with the European Economic Community (EEC). As 
a result, it had a number of major EEC trading partners, includ- 
ing Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands. Nigeria 
also had an active trade relationship with some members of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, notably 
the United States, Canada, and Japan (see table 14, Appendix). 
Trade with African countries, mainly neighboring countries within 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS — 
created in 1975), comprised only 3 to 4 percent of total trade. In 
the 1980s, trade with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union con- 
stituted less than 1 percent of Nigeria's total. 

Balance of Payments 

Nearly all of Nigeria's foreign exchange assets before the 1970s 
were held in British pounds sterling. Under the post- World War 
II IMF- modified gold exchange standard, which lasted until 1973, 
sterling was a key currency in international trade. A country that 
accumulated sterling, as Nigeria did in the twenty years before 1955, 
mostly years of restrictions on sterling convertibility, essentially 
extended credit to Britain. During this period, Nigeria restricted 
nonsterling imports, strengthening the balance-of-payments posi- 
tions of the sterling area and Britain's international financial po- 
sition. 

From 1956 to 1965, Nigeria had a persistent merchandise trade 
deficit, which changed to a surplus in the period between 1966 and 



197 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



1977 (including the 1967-70 civil war) with petroleum's rapid 
growth as an export commodity (see table 15, Appendix). In late 

1977 and 1978, demand for Nigeria's low-sulfur crude decreased 
as oil became available from the North Sea, Alaska, and Mexico, 
and as global oil companies reacted to the less favorable participa- 
tion terms offered by the Nigerian government. Except for the 
period from 1979 to 1980, when oil shortages and prices increased, 
demand for Nigerian crude remained sluggish until 1990. From 

1978 through 1983 the trade deficit continued. In April 1984, the 
Nigerian government closed Nigeria's land borders and interna- 
tional airports for several days, replaced all old naira notes with 
new currency bills, and introduced tough exchange-control regu- 
lations designed to reduce the repatriation of naira smuggled abroad 
and prevent future convertibility to other currencies. 

From 1984 through 1986 and in 1990, Nigeria had surpluses. 
These came, however, not because of export expansion but because 
an economic breakdown forced Nigeria to adopt severe import 
restrictions. Nigeria's structural adjustment under World Bank 
auspices brought some stability in the domestic and international 
economy but at the expense of falling real wages and decreased 
government social spending for much of the late 1980s. 

The Debt Overhang 

Among less developed countries (LDCs), Nigeria had the 
eleventh largest external public debt in 1989 (and the largest among 
sub-Saharan countries.) Its debt had increased from US$9 billion 
in 1980 to US$33 billion by 1989. The country faced persistent 
difficulties servicing its debt; in the 1980s, debt rescheduling was 
almost continuous. The secondary market price of Nigeria's bank 
debt in mid- 1989 was only 24 cents on the dollar, indicating that 
the markets were heavily discounting the probability that Nigeria 
would pay its external debt. 

Official reluctance to devalue the naira between 1981 and 1983, 
when inflation was more than 20 percent per year, discouraged 
foreign direct investment, spurred substantial capital flight, and 
encouraged firms to build up large inventories of imports (often 
with overinvoicing and concomitant foreign deposits) or to under- 
price exports (with the difference placed on deposit abroad). Having 
exhausted its official reserves and borrowing limits, Nigeria built 
up its arrears on trade credit to US$6 billion by the end of 1983. 

From 1985 to 1986, President Ibrahim Babangida skillfully 
played the World Bank against the IMF for public relations gains, 
conducting a year-long dialogue with the Nigerian public that re- 
sulted in a rejection of IMF terms for borrowing. Subsequendy, the 



198 



Outdoor market along the railroad line near Lagos 
Shopkeeper's stall in Jos, capital of Plateau State 
Courtesy Orlando E. Pacheco 



199 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



military government's agreement to impose similar terms "on its 
own" was approved by the World Bank, which in October 1986 
made available (with Western commercial and central banks) a 
package of US$1,020 million in quickly disbursed loans and 
US$4,280 million in three-year project loans. 

Nigeria's contractionary fiscal policy in 1986 and 1987 reduced 
the budget deficit substantially. During early 1988, when the poor 
1987 harvest put pressure on food prices and opposition to austerity 
mounted, authorities eased financial policy, more than doubling 
the budget deficit. Nigeria also eased monetary and fiscal policy 
in late 1989. Still, the country had managed to reduce real public 
spending since the early 1980s. 

Despite several debt reschedulings in the 1980s and early 1990s, 
Nigeria's debt overhang continued to dampen investment and 
adjustment in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Facing years of aus- 
terity and stagnation, Nigeria could not afford to reduce consump- 
tion to effect an external transfer; thus a major contributor to 
adjustment was reduced investment. A lengthy schedule of large 
loan repayments acted as a tax on investment, since a share of 
returns had to go to creditors. Substantial debt servicing often meant 
slowing economic growth to avoid an import surplus. Without con- 
cessional funds, rescheduling only postponed an external crisis. 
Moreover, Nigeria's highly oligopolistic money markets, financial 
repression of interest rates and exchange rates, and sluggish ex- 
pansion in response to improved prices in export and import- 
substitution industries prevented timely adjustments to financial 
and exchange rate changes. 

Structural Adjustment 

Under World Bank structural adjustment, the government tried 
to eliminate inefficient state intervention and obtain budgetary relief 
by abolishing agricultural commodity marketing boards and liber- 
alizing cash-crop exports. These measures, together with devalu- 
ation, increased the naira prices of export crops, especially cocoa. 
The state also privatized many public enterprises by selling equity 
to private investors, while restructuring other parastatals to improve 
efficiency. The federal government encouraged private investment 
in the late 1980s, allowed foreign ownership in most manufactur- 
ing, and liberalized and accelerated administrative procedures for 
new investment. 

The Babangida government, which came to power in August 
1985 at a time of depressed oil prices, undertook its structural 
adjustment program between 1986 and 1988. In September 1986, 
the government introduced a second-tier foreign exchange market 



200 



The Economy 



(SFEM), sold on auction for a near equilibrium price and used 
for export earnings and import trade requirements. Under SFEM, 
the naira depreciated 66 percent to Nl = US$0.64 (Nl .56 = US$1) 
and declined further in value through July 1987, when the first 
and second tiers were merged. When adopting the SFEM, Nige- 
ria abolished the ex-factory price controls set by the Prices, Produc- 
tivity, and Incomes Board, as well as the 30 percent import 
surcharge and import licensing system. It reduced its import pro- 
hibition list substantially and promoted exports through fiscal and 
credit incentives and by allowing those selling abroad to retain for- 
eign currency. Although this action opened the way for an IMF 
agreement and debt rescheduling, the military government declined 
to use an allocation of Special Drawing Rights (see Glossary) in 
IMF standby funds. 

Meanwhile, the naira continued depreciating, especially after 
the relaxation of fiscal policy early in 1988. The effect of the SFEM 
in breaking bottlenecks, together with the slowing of food price in- 
creases, dampened inflation in 1986, but the easing of domestic 
restrictions in 1988 reignited it. Real interest rates were negative, 
and capital flight and speculative imports resumed. In 1989 the 
government again unified foreign exchange markets, depreciating — 
but not stabilizing — the naira and reducing the external deficit. 
Manufacturing firms increased their reliance on local inputs and 
raw materials, firms depending on domestic resources grew rapidly, 
and capacity utilization rose, although it was still below 50 per- 
cent. Concurrently, nonoil exports grew from US$200 million in 
1986 to US$1 billion in 1988. This amount, however, represented 
only 13 percent of export value at the level of the 1970s, and cash 
crops like cocoa dominated the export market. Large firms benefited 
from the foreign exchange auction and enjoyed higher capacity use 
than smaller ones. Despite dramatically reduced labor costs, domes- 
tic industrial firms undertook little investment or technological im- 
provements. 

Structural adjustment was accompanied by falling real wages, 
the redistribution of income from urban to rural areas, and reduced 
health, education, and social spending. The decrease in spending 
on social programs contributed to often vociferous domestic un- 
rest, such as Muslim-Christian riots in Kaduna State in March 
1987, urban rioting in April 1988 in response to reduced gasoline 
subsidies, student-led violence in opposition to government eco- 
nomic policies in May and June 1989, and the second coup at- 
tempt against General Babangida in April 1990. 

* * * 



201 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



Current reliable information on the Nigerian economy is scarce. 
Central Bank of Nigeria periodicals, Annual Report and Statement of 
Accounts, Economic and Financial Review, the Economist Intelligence 
Unit's annual Country Profile, and irregularly issued Office of Statis- 
tics publications are the major sources, but income and employ- 
ment statistics are subject to a wide margin of error. The World 
Bank's annual World Development Report and frequent studies on sub- 
Saharan Africa include Nigerian statistics. African Business, Finan- 
cial Times, West Africa, Africa Research Bulletin (Economic Series), 
and Africa Report include informative articles on the economy. Pius 
N.C. Okigbo's National Development Planning in Nigeria is an excel- 
lent update. (For further information and complete citations, see 
Bibliography.) 



202 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 




Brass statue of an oni, an Ife king of the early 
fourteenth or fifteenth century 



THE STORY OF NIGERIA during the postcolonial era has been 
one of a search for the constitutional and political arrangement that, 
while allowing for the self-expression of its socially and culturally 
diverse peoples, would not hinder the construction of a nation out 
of this mosaic. In this search, the country has experienced cycles 
of military and civilian rule, civil war, and peaceful reconstruction. 

If any nation typified political scientist Richard Sklar's charac- 
terization of the African continent as a "workshop of democracy," 
it would certainly be Nigeria. The country has experimented with 
different federal, state, and local government systems, learning more 
about its needs, resources, and constraints with each experiment. 
Despite the predominance of military regimes during the three post- 
colonial decades, Nigerian society has retained many of the fun- 
damental building blocks of a democratic polity: vigorous 
entrepreneurial classes, a broad intelligentsia and numerous centers 
of higher education, a dynamic legal community and judiciary, 
diverse and often outspoken media, and, increasingly, courageous 
human rights organizations. 

Despite the differences in character and composition of the suc- 
cessive governments, it is still possible to identify the major threads 
of Nigeria's institutional evolution. As the nation finds itself once 
more on the threshold of transition from military to civilian rule, 
promised for 1992, examination of these threads is essential for un- 
derstanding the Nigeria that will become the Third Republic. 

Nigeria is essentially an artificial creation, which, like most other 
African states, is a product of colonialism. This fact is central to 
understanding the country's government and politics, which have 
been conditioned and bedeviled by the problems of accommodat- 
ing several diversities: ethnic, linguistic (there are between 250 and 
400 distinct languages), geopolitical, religious (there is a deepen- 
ing cleavage between Christians and Muslims), and class. 

Nigeria became politically independent on October 1, 1960, af- 
ter about seven decades of colonial rule by the British. Prior to 
colonial rule, most of the groups that today make up the country 
were often distinguished by differences in history, culture, politi- 
cal development, and religion. The major differences among these 
precolonial groups pertained to their sociopolitical organization: 
anthropological and historical studies usually distinguish between 
societies that were centralized ("state") and those that were noncen- 
tralized ("stateless"). To the former category belonged the Sokoto 



205 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



Caliphate and the emirates of the north that, together with the 
Kanem-Borno Empire, were advanced Islamic theocracies. Also 
included in this category were the Benin, Oyo, and other western 
kingdoms, as well as the Igala Kingdom in the middle belt (see 
Glossary) or lower north. In these centralized systems, there were 
clear divisions between the rulers and the ruled, usually based on 
wealth and ascribed status. Institutions of a distinctly political na- 
ture, as well as taxation systems, were already established. Of all 
the centralized systems, the Sokoto Caliphate with its vassal emirates 
had the most advanced form of state organization. Not surpris- 
ingly, it provided the model for the British colonial policy of in- 
direct rule, i.e., the governance of indigenous peoples through their 
own institutions and rulers. 

By contrast, in noncentralized systems such as those of the Igbo 
and other eastern and middle-belt groups, there was a diffusion 
of political, economic, and religious institutions and practices. Also 
to be found was a large measure of egalitarianism, democracy, and 
decentralized authority. Under the colonial policy of indirect rule, 
''traditional" rulers (known as warrant chiefs) were imposed on 
these stateless societies. 

In the immediate precolonial period, a pronounced religious gulf 
separated the northern from the southern peoples. Islam had been 
introduced to the Hausa states and other northern parts in the 
fifteenth century, but it did not dominate until the jihad of 1804, 
which extended Islamic influence to most parts of the north and 
even to towns on the southern fringe, such as Oyo and Auchi. The 
southern peoples were devotees mainly of traditional religions who 
underwent increasing contact with, and exposure to, Europeans 
and Christianity. In some areas of the south, such as Benin and 
Warri, the penetration of Christianity dates to the fifteenth century. 
When the north experienced contact with Europeans much later, 
the spread of Christianity and other Western influences was slowed 
by the strong attachment to Islam. This fact explains in part the 
uneven rates of economic and educational development between 
the northern and southern peoples that have persisted to this day, 
with important consequences for government and politics. 

It should not be assumed that the various population groups in 
precolonial Nigeria were completely separated from one another. 
Historians have established evidence of various forms of inter- 
action among the peoples, the major ones being trade and 
superordinate- subordinate relationships. Powerful centralized sys- 
tems, such as the Sokoto Caliphate and the Benin Empire, domi- 
nated several neighboring groups. Where no established group held 
sway over the others, as was the case among the Yoruba-speaking 



206 



Government and Politics 



people in the nineteenth century, a pattern of conflicts and wars 
prevailed. On balance, there were pronounced differences among 
the people who later came to comprise Nigeria, especially when 
the major regional groups are considered. British rule did much 
to accentuate these differences and, in some cases, created new divi- 
sive sentiments. Even the nature of British conquest and the process 
by which its rule was established encouraged separate identities. 

The conquest and colonization of the coastal area of Lagos and 
its hinterlands took place between 1861 and 1897. The conquest 
of the eastern region and the declaration of the Niger Coast Pro- 
tectorate occurred in 1894. Finally, a third wave of penetration 
led to the declaration of a protectorate over the northern areas in 
1900. In 1906 the colony of Lagos and the Protectorate of Southern 
Nigeria (which included the former Niger Coast Protectorate) were 
joined together to become the Colony and Protectorate of Southern 
Nigeria. Finally, in 1914 the northern and southern protectorates 
were amalgamated to become the Colony and Protectorate of Nige- 
ria, although both parts continued to be administered separately. 

During the period extending from amalgamation in 1914 to in- 
dependence from colonial rule in 1960, Nigeria had four major con- 
stitutions, each named after the colonial governor who formulated 
it: the Clifford Constitution (1922), Richards Constitution (1946), 
Macpherson Constitution (1951), and Lyttleton Constitution 
(1954). Although the first two constitutions were virtually imposed 
on the country, the latter two involved some consultations with 
representatives of the people through constitutional conferences. 
At the Ibadan General Conference of 1950, Nigerian leaders agreed 
that only a federal system that allowed each of the three regions 
(north, west, and east as created by the Richards Constitution) to 
progress at its own pace would be acceptable. Until that point, the 
constitutions had a unitary orientation. In creating three regions 
and delegating some powers to them, the Richards Constitution 
was a forerunner of the later federal constitutions. 

Although the regional leaders at the Ibadan conference had un- 
equivocally declared their preference for federalism, the subsequent 
Macpherson Constitution was essentially unitary. It went farther 
than the Richards Constitution in devolving power to the regions 
but left the regions subordinate and closely tied to the central 
government. Because many Nigerian political leaders favored a 
federal system in which the regions enjoyed wide autonomy, the 
Macpherson Constitution engendered continuing opposition. Fi- 
nally, in 1953, this constitution became unworkable. 

Rather than self-government for the whole nation, the north- 
erners wanted self-government as soon as practicable and only for 



207 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



any region that was ready for it. They believed that each region 
should progress politically at its own pace. When a constitutional 
conference was convened in London in 1953, a federal constitu- 
tion that gave the regions significant autonomy eventually emerged. 
This Lyttleton Constitution was the one that remained in force, 
with slight amendments, until independence in 1960. It enabled 
the regions to become self-governing at their own pace: the two 
southern regions in 1956 and the northern region in 1959. 

Several important developments that have continued to affect 
Nigeria's government and politics in the postcolonial period marked 
the period of colonial rule. First, British colonial rule nurtured 
north- south separation, which has remained the classic cleavage 
in the country. In particular, after Lord Frederick Lugard's pact 
with northern emirs to protect Islamic civilization, the north was 
shut off from much of the Westernizing influences to which the 
south was exposed. This protection gave the southern peoples a 
head start, especially in Western education. During the struggle 
for independence, northern leaders were afflicted by a constant fear 
of southern domination. Many of the northern responses to na- 
tional politics to this day can be attributed to this fear. At the same 
time, with the creation of three regions that saw the northern region 
larger in size and population than the two southern regions, there 
was also a southern fear of northern domination. The image of 
a homogenous north, although contradicted by the cultural diver- 
sity of that region, continued in 1990 to feature prominently in 
most southerners' perception of national politics. 

Second, in creating largely artificial regions, the British fostered 
the cleavage between ethnic majority and minority groups. Each 
region contained the nucleus of a majority group that dominated 
in its respective region: the Hausa-Fulani in the north, the Yoru- 
ba in the west, and the Igbo in the east. The major political par- 
ties that emerged in the regions and controlled them were based 
on these groups. With regional autonomy, the major groups be- 
came the major " shareholders" of the federation. Power-sharing 
and political calculations have consequently centered on ensuring 
a balance of power among these groups. The minorities, feeling 
oppressed and dominated, agitated for separate states in the regions. 
Although a panel was appointed in 1956 to inquire into the fears 
of the minorities and to explore ways of allaying them, their re- 
quests were not met until after independence. 

Third, the uneven rates of development among the groups, which 
generally coincided with regional boundaries, strengthened the 
forces of regionalism. The creed became north for northerners, west 
for westerners, and east for easterners. Despite the periodic creation 



208 



Government and Politics 



of more states during the postcolonial period, these regional feel- 
ings continued to affect national politics, especially in the distri- 
bution of national resources. One manifestation of this tendency 
was the ceaseless disagreements and rancor over revenue allocation. 

Another consequence of these regional and ethnic divisions was 
the fragmentation of the national elite. Unlike a few other African 
countries, Nigeria had no fully national leaders at independence. 
Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Igbo, who had the greatest potential for be- 
coming a national leader, was forced by regionalist pressures to 
become a sectional leader. The other leaders during the post- 
independence period — Ahmadu Bello, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, 
Obafemi Awolowo, Michael Okpara, Samuel Akintola, and Aminu 
Kano — are best remembered as sectional leaders, even though they 
are usually called nationalists. This fractionalization of the politi- 
cal elite in turn reinforced ethnicity, regionalism, and religious con- 
flicts, inasmuch as these sentiments were often aroused in the 
competition for power, material resources, and privileges. 

The colonial heritage, therefore, produced a country that was 
only weakly united. At some points, the regional leaders threatened 
to secede from the federation: in the early to mid-1950s northern 
leaders contemplated separation after their humiliation by southern- 
ers because of their refusal to support a motion for achieving self- 
government in 1956; in 1954 the Western Region threatened to 
separate itself if the colony of Lagos were not made a part of that 
region. There were strong countervailing factors that prevented 
breakup of the federation. First, British colonial rule had held the 
country together as one unit. Second, the regions had economic 
complementarity. In particular, given the export orientation of the 
colonial economy, the landlocked northern region depended gready 
on the southern regions that had access to the sea. Third, in the 
final days of colonial rule, Nigerian leaders recognized the advan- 
tages conferred by the country's large size and population. 

The First Republic 

Nigeria became independent on October 1, 1960. The period 
between this date and January 15, 1966, when the first military 
coup d'etat took place, is generally referred to as the First Repub- 
lic, although the country became a republic only on October 1, 
1963. After a plebiscite in February 1961, the Northern Cameroons, 
which before then was administered separately within Nigeria, voted 
to join Nigeria. 

At independence Nigeria had all the trappings of a democratic 
state and was indeed regarded as a beacon of hope for democracy. 
It had a federal constitution that guaranteed a large measure of 



209 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



autonomy to three (later four) regions; it operated a parliamen- 
tary democracy modeled along British lines that emphasized majori- 
ty rule; the constitution included an elaborate bill of rights; and, 
unlike other African states that adopted one-party systems immedi- 
ately after independence, the country had a functional, albeit region- 
ally based, multiparty system. 

These democratic trappings were not enough to guarantee the 
survival of the republic because of certain fundamental and struc- 
tural weaknesses. Perhaps the most significant weakness was the 
disproportionate power of the north in the federation. The departing 
colonial authority had hoped that the development of national pol- 
itics would forestall any sectional domination of power, but it under- 
estimated the effects of a regionalized party system in a country 
where political power depended on population. The major politi- 
cal parties in the republic had emerged in the late 1940s and early 
1950s as regional parties whose main aim was to control power 
in their regions. The Northern People's Congress (NPC) and the 
Action Group (AG), which controlled the Northern Region and 
the Western Region, respectively, clearly emerged in this way. The 
National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), which controlled 
the Eastern Region and the Midwestern Region (created in 1963), 
began as a nationalist party but was forced by the pressures of 
regionalism to become primarily an eastern party, albeit with strong 
pockets of support elsewhere in the federation. These regional par- 
ties were based upon, and derived their main support from, the 
major groups in their regions: NPC (Hausa-Fulani), AG (Yoru- 
ba), and NCNC (Igbo). A notable and more ideologically based 
political party that never achieved significant power was Aminu 
Kano's radical Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), 
which opposed the NPC in the north from its Kano base. 

There were also several political movements formed by minori- 
ty groups to press their demands for separate states. These minority 
parties also doubled as opposition parties in the regions and usually 
aligned themselves with the party in power in another region that 
supported their demands for a separate state. Ethnic minorities 
therefore enabled the regional parties to extend their influence be- 
yond their regions. 

In the general election of 1959 to determine which parties would 
rule in the immediate postcolonial period, the major ones won a 
majority of seats in their regions, but none emerged powerful 
enough to constitute a national government. A coalition govern- 
ment was formed by the NPC and NCNC, the former having been 
greatly favored by the departing colonial authority. The coalition 
provided a measure of north- south consensus that would not have 



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Government and Politics 



been the case if the NCNC and AG had formed a coalition. Nnamdi 
Azikiwe (NCNC) became the governor general (and president after 
the country became a republic in 1963), Abubakar Tafawa Balewa 
(NPC) was named prime minister, and Obafemi Awolowo (AG) 
had to settle for leader of the opposition. The regional premiers 
were Ahmadu Bello (Northern Region, NPC), Samuel Akintola 
(Western Region, AG), Michael Okpara (Eastern Region, NCNC), 
and Dennis Osadebey (Midwestern Region, NCNC). 

Among the difficulties of the republic were efforts of the NPC , 
the senior partner in the coalition government, to use the federal 
government's increasing power in favor of the Northern Region. 
The balance rested on the premise that the Northern Region had 
the political advantage because of its preponderant size and popu- 
lation, and the two southern regions (initially the Eastern Region 
and the Western Region) had the economic advantage because they 
were the source of most of the exported agricultural products and 
controlled the federal bureaucracy. The NPC sought to redress 
northern economic and bureaucratic disadvantages. Under the First 
National Development Plan, many of the federal government's 
projects and military establishments were allocated to the north. 
There was an " affirmative action" program by the government 
to recruit and train northerners, resulting in the appointment of 
less qualified northerners to federal public service positions, many 
replacing more qualified southerners. Actions such as these served 
to estrange the NCNC from its coalition partner. The reactions 
to the fear of northern dominance, and especially the steps taken 
by the NCNC to counter the political dominance of the north, 
accelerated the collapse of the young republic. 

The southern parties, especially the embittered NCNC, had 
hoped that the regional power balance could be shifted if the 1962 
census favored the south. Population determined the allocation of 
parliamentary seats on which the power of every region was based. 
Because population figures were also used in allocating revenue 
to the regions and in determining the viability of any proposed new 
region, the 1962 census was approached by all regions as a key 
contest for control of the federation. This contest led to various 
illegalities: inflated figures, electoral violence, falsification of results, 
manipulation of population figures, and the like. Although the chief 
census officer found evidence of more inflated figures in the southern 
regions than in the northern region, the latter region retained its 
numerical superiority. As could be expected, southern leaders 
rejected the results. Their response led to the cancellation of the 
census and to the holding of a fresh census in 1963. This popula- 
tion count was finally accepted after a protracted legal battle by 



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Nigeria: A Country Study 

the NCNC and gave the Northern Region a population of 
29,758,975 out of the total of 55,620,268. These figures eliminated 
whatever hope the southerners had of ruling the federation. 

Since the 1962-63 exercise, the size and distribution of the popu- 
lation have remained volatile political issues (see Population, ch. 
2). In fact, the importance and sensitivity of a census count have 
increased because of the expanded use of population figures for 
revenue allocations, constituency delineation, allocations under the 
quota system of admissions into schools and employment, and the 
siting of industries and social amenities such as schools, hospitals, 
and post offices. Another census in 1973 failed, even though it was 
conducted by a military government that was less politicized than 
its civilian predecessor. What made the 1973 census particularly 
volatile was the fact that it was part of a transition plan by the mili- 
tary to hand over power to civilians. The provisional figures showed 
an increase for the states that were carved out of the former North- 
ern Region with a combined 51 .4 million people out of a total 79.8 
million people. Old fears of domination were resurrected, and the 
stability of the federation was again seriously threatened. The provi- 
sional results were finally canceled in 1975. As of late 1990, no 
other census had been undertaken, although one was scheduled 
for 1991 as part of the transition to civilian rule. In the interim, 
Nigeria has relied on population projections based on 1963 census 
figures. 

Other events also contributed to the collapse of the First Republic. 
In 1962, after a split in the leadership of the AG that led to a crisis 
in the Western Region, a state of emergency was declared in the 
region, and the federal government invoked its emergency powers 
to administer the region direcdy. These actions resulted in removing 
the AG from regional power. Awolowo, its leader, along with other 
AG leaders, was convicted of treasonable felony. Awolowo 's former 
deputy and premier of the Western Region formed a new party — the 
Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) — that took over the 
government. The federal coalition government also supported agi- 
tation of minority groups for a separate state to be excised from 
the Western Region. In 1963 the Midwestern Region was created. 

By the time of the 1964 general elections, the first to be con- 
ducted solely by Nigerians, the country's politics had become pola- 
rized into a competition between two opposing alliances. One was 
the Nigerian National Alliance made up of the NPC and NNDP; 
the other was the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) com- 
posed of the NCNC, the AG, and their allies. Each of the regional 
parties openly intimidated its opponents in the campaigns. When it 
became clear that the neutrality of the Federal Electoral Commission 



212 



Preparations for building 
bridge over Gongola River, 
an infrastructure 
development project 
Courtesy World Bank 



Survey team for road construction 
Courtesy Embassy of Nigeria, 
Washington 




213 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

could not be guaranteed, calls were made for the army to super- 
vise the elections. The UPGA resolved to boycott the elections. 
When elections were finally held under conditions that were not 
free and were unfair to opponents of the regional parties, the NCNC 
was returned to power in the east and midwest, whereas the NPC 
kept control of the north and was also in a position to form a fed- 
eral government on its own. The Western Region became the 
' 'theater of war" between the NNDP (and the NPC) and the AG- 
UPGA. The rescheduled regional elections late in 1965 were violent. 
The federal government refused to declare a state of emergency, 
and the military seized power on January 15, 1966. The First 
Republic had collapsed. 

Scholars have made several attempts to explain the collapse. Some 
attribute it to the inappropriateness of the political institutions and 
processes and to their not being adequately entrenched under coloni- 
al rule, whereas others hold the elite responsible. Lacking a politi- 
cal culture to sustain democracy, politicians failed to play the 
political game according to established rules. The failure of the elite 
appears to have been a symptom rather than the cause of the 
problem. Because members of the elite lacked a material base for 
their aspirations, they resorted to control of state offices and 
resources. At the same time, the uneven rates of development 
among the various groups and regions invested the struggle for state 
power with a group character. These factors gave importance to 
group, ethnic, and regional conflicts that eventually contributed 
to the collapse of the republic. 

The final explanation is closely related to all the foregoing. It 
holds that the regionalization of politics and, in particular, of party 
politics made the stability of the republic dependent on each party 
retaining control of its regional base. As long as this was so, there 
was a rough balance between the parties, as well as their respec- 
tive regions. Once the federal government invoked its emergency 
powers in 1962 and removed the AG from power in the Western 
Region, the fragile balance on which the federation rested was dis- 
turbed. Attempts by the AG and NCNC to create a new equilibri- 
um, or at least to return the status quo ante, only generated stronger 
opposition and hastened the collapse of the republic. 

Military Intervention and Military Rule 

In most developing countries, there is a disruption of the civil- 
military equilibrium usually assumed in liberal democracies. In 
liberal tradition, the military is insulated from politics and subject 
to civilian control. In several developing countries, however, the mil- 
itary has not only intervened in the political process and overthrown 



214 



Government and Politics 



the constitutional civilian authority, but it also often has established 
its supremacy over elected politicians. Even in those countries where 
the military has become almost a permanent feature of politics, 
military rule is still considered an aberration and symptomatic of 
a malfunctioning political system. In Nigeria, which typifies the 
scenario just presented, military rule was usually seen as a "res- 
cue" operation necessary to save the country from civilian inepti- 
tude. Military rule was not expected to last long; once the rescue 
operation was complete, the military should return to the barracks 
where they belonged and leave the governing to civilian politicians. 
The problem, however, was that although military officers accepted 
this rationale, military rule usually became self-sustaining. 

From the onset of independent government in Nigeria in 1 960 
to the end of 1990, the military had ruled for twenty-one years. 
Altogether there were five coups d'etat involving changes of govern- 
ment: those of January 15, 1966; July 29, 1966; July 29, 1975; 
December 31, 1983; and August 27, 1985. There was also an un- 
successful coup in which the head of state, General Murtala Mu- 
hammad, was killed in February 1976, and another that was nipped 
in the bud in December 1985. An attempt to overthrow General 
Ibrahim Babangida was made in April 1990. Of these coups, only 
those of January 1966 and December 1983 were against civilian 
governments. Several explanations of military intervention have 
been added to those given by the coup plotters themselves. Whereas 
the latter have cited economic mismanagement and corruption, 
other explanations have ranged from the continuation of ethno- 
regional politics by military means to the personal ambitions of 
officers. 

The 1966 Coups, Civil War, and Gowon's Government 

At the time a disparate group of junior officers struck first in 
January 1966, the officers were still politically naive and had yet 
to master the art of coup planning and execution. This inexperience 
partly explains why Major Kaduna Nzeogwu and others who 
masterminded the coup failed to take over state power. Instead, 
Major General Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi, commander in chief of the 
army, became Nigeria's first military ruler. Some of the remote 
causes of the coup included the use of soldiers to quell unrest, such 
as the riots among the Tiv people of the lower northern region, 
and calls on the military to supervise the 1964 elections. Whereas 
the latter involvement gave the soldiers a feeling of political efficacy, 
the beginnings of what came to be known as the "federal character" 
principle that sought to give each area some parity of representation 



215 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

gave military personnel a sense of being sectional representatives. 
The coup of January 1966 was seen by many northerners as an 
attempt by the Igbo people of the east to dominate the federation. 
A successful countercoup six months later led by northern soldiers 
demonstrated the degree to which soldiers had become politicians 
in uniform. 

The immediate reasons for the first coup, however, concerned 
the nationwide disillusionment with the corrupt and selfish politi- 
cians, as well as with their inability to maintain law and order and 
guarantee the safety of lives and property. During the initial stages, 
Nzeogwu and his collaborators were hailed as national heroes. But 
the pattern of killings in the coup gave it a partisan appearance: 
killed were the prime minister, a northerner, the premier of the 
Northern Region, and the highest ranking northern army officers; 
only one Igbo officer lost his life. Also killed was the premier of 
the Western Region who was closely allied with the NPC. 

General Ironsi, an Igbo, emerged as the head of state. In his 
policies and actions, Ironsi did little to allay the fears of Igbo domi- 
nation. He failed to place the coup plotters on trial as northern 
leaders demanded, and he appointed Igbos to sensitive governmen- 
tal positions. Against all advice, Ironsi promulgated Decree Number 
34 of 1966, which abrogated the federal system of government and 
substituted a unitary system; he argued that the military could only 
govern in this way. Given the already charged atmosphere, this 
action reinforced northern fears. As the north was less developed 
than the south, a unitary system could easily lead to southerners 
"taking over control of everything," as a northern spokesperson 
put it. It was at the height of northern opposition to unitarism that 
the countercoup of July 1966 took place. Most top-ranking Igbo 
officers, including Ironsi, lost their lives; the "status quo" of north- 
ern dominance was restored. 

Lieutenant Colonel (later General) Yakubu Gowon, a Christian 
from the middle belt, became the head of state after the coup. His 
first act was to reinstate the federal system, along with the four 
regions and their allotted functions. But relations between the fed- 
eral government and the Eastern Region, led by military governor 
Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, were very strained. 
In addition to the elimination of many Igbo officers during the July 
coup, a massive pogrom against Igbos occurred in the Northern 
Region. In September Colonel Gowon summoned an ad hoc con- 
stitutional conference to deliberate on the country's political future. 
Most regional delegates to the conference, with the exception of 
those from the midwest, recommended a confederal system to 
replace the federal system. The delegates from the Eastern Region 



216 



Government and Politics 



insisted that any region wishing to secede from the federation should 
be allowed to do so. The conference was ended abruptly by in- 
creased killings of Igbos in the north and the heightening of ten- 
sions between the federal government and the Eastern Region. A 
summit of military leaders at Aburi, Ghana, in January 1967 
attempted to resolve the disagreements and recommended the estab- 
lishment of a loose confederation of regions. The Aburi Agreement 
became a source of contention, however (see Civil War, ch. 1). 

In anticipation of eastern secession, Gowon moved quickly to 
weaken the support base of the region by decreeing the creation 
of twelve new states to replace the four regions. Six of these states 
contained minority groups that had demanded state creation since 
the 1950s. Gowon rightly calculated that the eastern minorities 
would not actively support the Igbos, given the prospect of having 
their own states if the secession effort were defeated. Many of the 
federal troops who fought the civil war, known as the Biafran War, 
to bring the Eastern Region back to the federation, were mem- 
bers of minority groups. 

The war lasted thirty months and ended in January 1970. In 
accepting Biafra's unconditional cease-fire, Gowon declared that 
there would be no victor and no vanquished. In this spirit, the years 
afterward were declared to be a period of rehabilitation, recon- 
struction, and reconciliation. The oil-price boom, which began as 
a result of the high price of crude oil (the country's major revenue 
earner) in the world market in 1973, increased the federal govern- 
ment's ability to undertake these tasks. 

The postwar Gowon government issued a nine-point transition 
program that was to culminate in the handing over of power to 
a civilian government on October 1 , 1976. The agenda of the tran- 
sition included the reorganization of the armed forces, the com- 
pletion of the establishment of the twelve states announced in 1967, 
a census, a new constitution, and elections. 

Gowon initiated several nation-building policies, the most notable 
of which was the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC), a com- 
munity service institution that required one year of service by each 
Nigerian immediately after graduation from university or other 
institution of higher learning. Each member of the corps had to 
serve in a state other than his or her home state. More than 1 mil- 
lion graduates had served in this program by 1990. 

The Gowon years also saw the oil boom and a buoyant economy. 
The federal government was encouraged to take on some respon- 
sibilities formally allocated to the states, especially in the area of edu- 
cation. It embarked on major infrastructural projects to transfer 
control of the economy from foreigners to Nigerians. The Nigerian 



217 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

Enterprises Promotion decree of 1972, which was expanded in 1977, 
stipulated that only Nigerians could participate in certain categories 
of business. In those in which foreign involvement was permitted, 
controlling shares had to be owned by Nigerians. 

The structure of government under Gowon was basically uni- 
tarian. At the apex of government was the all-military Supreme 
Military Council (SMC), which was the lawmaking body for the 
entire federation. Its decrees could not be challenged in any law 
court. Most members of the SMC under Gowon were state gover- 
nors. There was also a Federal Executive Council composed of mili- 
tary and civilian commissioners. The states also had commissioners 
appointed by the governor. The states were practically reduced to 
administrative units of the federal government, which in several 
domains made uniform laws for the country. This basic structure 
of military federalism has, with amendments, remained the same 
during all military governments in the country. 

The Muhammad-Obasanjo Government 

General Gowon was overthrown in a palace coup in July 1975 
and succeeded by General Murtala Muhammad, who was in turn 
assassinated in an abortive coup on February 13, 1976. He was 
replaced by Olusegun Obasanjo, formerly his second in command. 
General Obasanjo basically continued the policies and plans of the 
Muhammad regime. 

Murtala Muhammad, a Hausa from the north (Kano State), 
ruled for only seven months. Within that short period, he endeared 
himself to most Nigerians because of his strong leadership and the 
radical reforms he introduced in domestic and foreign policies. He 
* 'purged" the public-service ministries, universities, parastatals, 
and other government agencies at the federal and state levels of 
individuals accused of being corrupt, indolent, or inefficient. He 
set up a panel headed by Justice Ayo Irikefe to advise on the crea- 
tion of more states. Its report led to the creation of seven addition- 
al states in 1976. Murtala Muhammad also set up a panel under 
Justice Akintola Aguda to consider whether a new federal capital 
should be created because of the congestion in Lagos. The panel 
recommended Abuja in the southern part of the former Northern 
Region as the site of a new capital. In economic matters, Murtala 
Muhammad introduced the "low-profile" policy, a radical depar- 
ture from the ostentation of the Gowon era. 

Although he retained the framework of military federalism, Mur- 
tala Muhammad removed state governors from membership in the 
SMC and created a new body in which they were included at the 
center, the National Council of States. Because this body was 



218 



Government and Politics 



chaired by the head of state and subordinate to the SMC , its crea- 
tion underscored the subordinate position of the state governments. 
This arrangement enabled the head of state to exert greater con- 
trol over the state governors than had been the case under Gowon. 
In the area of foreign policy, Murtala Muhammad pursued a 
vigorous policy that placed Africa at the center and that involved 
active support for liberation movements in the continent. 

Of all Murtala Muhammad's actions, however, the one that had 
the most lasting consequences was a program of transition to civilian 
rule that he initiated before his death. The program was carried 
through as planned by his successor, Obasanjo. The stages of the 
transition agenda included the creation of more states, the reform 
of the local government system, the making of a new constitution, 
the formation of parties and, finally, the election of a new govern- 
ment. The transition process was to culminate in the handing over 
of power to civilians on October 1, 1979. 

In February 1976, Murtala Muhammad was killed in an un- 
successful coup led by Colonel Bukar Dimka and officers from the 
middle belt; the coup appeared to be an attempt by middle-belt 
officers to bring back Gowon from his self-imposed exile and re- 
instate him as head of state. Obasanjo, a Yoruba and southerner, 
became head of state. Although unfavorably compared with Mur- 
tala Muhammad initially, he succeeded in many areas of his ad- 
ministration where the more intransigent Murtala Muhammad 
might have failed. Obasanjo became an adept political ruler, de- 
termined not to exacerbate north-south and Muslim-Christian 
schisms in the country. 

In addition to its methodical conduct of all the stages of the tran- 
sition to civilian government in 1979, the Obasanjo government 
initiated numerous reforms in public life. Attempts were made to 
introduce greater probity in the activities of civil servants and other 
public officials. The main vehicle for this process was the estab- 
lishment of public complaints commissions in all states of the fed- 
eration and in the capital. Despite the publicizing of particular cases 
of abuse of office and corruption, however, little progress was made 
in stopping the spread of this cancer in the society and economy. 

The Obasanjo administration expanded the economic indigeni- 
zation program started under Gowon. It also used the Land Use 
Decree of 1978 to rationalize the country's haphazard tenurial sys- 
tems, to reduce the crippling land speculation, and to curb the fre- 
quent litigation over individual and communal property rights. It 
was hoped that these reforms would facilitate the acquisition of land 
for modern agricultural purposes. In a similar vein, the Obasanjo 
regime launched Operation Feed the Nation to counter the rapid 



219 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



rise in food exports. None of these efforts was successful, but the 
programs indicated the kind of strategies that Nigeria would have 
to adopt to alter its economic imbalances. 

In view of the complex process of transition to civilian rule and 
the many reforms introduced in the four years of the Muhammad- 
Obasanjo governments, those regimes seemed in retrospect to have 
tried to do too much too soon. In the final year he was in power, 
Obasanjo introduced many austerity measures and insisted on a 
"low profile" for all government officials. He was aware that Nige- 
ria, despite its oil wealth, was still largely an underdeveloped country 
and its businesspeople mainly agents or intermediaries for foreign 
businesses. Such a salutary attitude was soon forgotten, however, 
as the successor regime rode the crest of a renewed upsurge in oil 
prices, spent resources faster than they could be realized, and left 
the country deeply in debt and its economy nearly in shambles when 
it ended in 1983 (see The Second Republic, this ch.). 

The Buhari Regime 

On December 31, 1983, the army struck again. This time the 
brazen corruption, the economic mismanagement, and the inept 
leadership of civilians provided the grounds for military interven- 
tion. Indeed, conditions had deteriorated so much in the Second 
Republic that when the coup came, it was widely acclaimed. Major 
General Muhammadu Buhari, a Hausa-Fulani northerner from Ka- 
tsina State and a former member of the SMC in the Muhammad- 
Obasanjo governments, became the head of state. Because of the 
great powers that his second in command, Major General Tunde 
Idiagbon, chief of staff at Supreme Headquarters, was believed to 
wield, many commentators refer to this government as the Buhari- 
Idiagbon regime. In broad outline, the structure of government re- 
mained essentially the same as it was under Muhammad and 
Obasanjo. At the apex was the SMC, and the subordinate bodies 
were the Federal Executive Council and the National Council of 
States. 

The urgent task before the government was to salvage the coun- 
try's economy, which had suffered from the mismanagement of the 
Second Republic and from the rapid drop in the price of crude oil. 
Nigeria had become heavily indebted to several foreign monetary 
agencies, and the price of crude oil had begun to slide. Buhari be- 
lieved that urgent economic problems required equally urgent so- 
lutions. He also thought that it was not a pressing issue to prepare 
to hand power over to civilians; in fact, all of Nigeria's military re- 
gimes have ruled without the benefit of democratic checks and 
balances. 



220 



Government and Politics 



The Buhari government investigated and detained the top political 
leaders of the Second Republic, holding them responsible for eco- 
nomic excesses of the previous regime. The government also placed 
constraints on various groups, including the Nigerian Medical Asso- 
ciation, which was outlawed, and the National Association of 
Nigerian Students, and promulgated two decrees that restricted 
freedom of the press and suppressed criticism of the government. 
Decree Number 4 forbade any journalist from reporting informa- 
tion considered embarrassing to any government official. Two jour- 
nalists, Tunde Thompson and Nduka Irabor, were convicted under 
the decree. Decree Number 2 gave the chief of staff at Supreme 
Headquarters the power to detain for up to six months without 
trial anyone considered a security risk. Special military tribunals 
increasingly replaced law courts, and the state security agency, the 
National Security Organisation, was given greater powers. 

Buhari' s controls also extended to his efforts to deal with the 
problems of "indiscipline" in the areas of environmental sanita- 
tion, public decorum, corruption, smuggling, and disloyalty to 
national symbols such as the flag and the anthem. He declared a 
War Against Indiscipline and specified acceptable forms of public 
behavior, such as a requirement to form lines at bus stops. The 
main concern, however, remained the economy. The government 
introduced a comprehensive package of austerity measures. It closed 
the country's land borders for a period to identify and expel illegal 
alien workers and placed severe restrictions on imports and heavy 
penalties on smuggling and foreign exchange offenses. The austerity 
measures made it difficult for local industries to procure essential 
imported raw materials, leading many of them to close or to oper- 
ate at greatly reduced capacity. Many workers were laid off, and 
government itself retrenched many workers to increase its "cost 
effectiveness." All of these actions were accompanied by high infla- 
tion. The price of basic food items rose, and life became increas- 
ingly difficult, even for the affluent. 

Despite the increased efficiency with which Buhari and his asso- 
ciates tackled the multifaceted national crisis, the regime's inflexi- 
bility caused discontent. The latter was the main justification given 
for the overthrow of Buhari by General Babangida in a palace coup 
on August 27, 1985, although the personal ambition of Babangida 
was an important contributing factor. 

The Babangida Government 

Babangida, of Gwari origins and a middle belt Muslim, was Ni- 
geria's sixth military ruler and, as of 1990, the most powerful. Com- 
pared with Buhari, Babangida was a somewhat more methodical 



221 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



ruler, and his style was different. Whereas Buhari was stern and 
resolute, Babangida was deft and tactical. Babangida was report- 
ed to have taken part in all coups in Nigeria, which may explain 
his confident handling of national affairs. He was, however, un- 
predictable. 

Although Babangida came to power as a champion of human 
rights, his record in this area deteriorated over time. He gradually 
released most of the politicians incarcerated by Buhari. Yet, he often 
hounded opposition interest groups, especially those of labor and 
students, and detained many radical and anti-establishment per- 
sons for various offenses. The infamous Decree Number 2 remained 
in force in 1990 to facilitate these oppressive acts. 

The year after seizing power, the Babangida regime declared 
a National Economic Emergency. The options open to the coun- 
try, Babangida said, were either to accept an International Mone- 
tary Fund (IMF — see Glossary) loan and the conditions attached or 
to embark on more austere economic measures that would require 
great sacrifices. Although the people favored a non-IMF option, 
they soon discovered that the hardships eventually imposed differed 
little from the IMF's conditions. The economic recovery program 
recommended by the World Bank (see Glossary) was instituted as 
a self-imposed structural adjustment program (SAP) that involved 
a drastic restructuring of the country's economy. Under SAP, un- 
employment rates soared, food prices increased significantly, and 
numerous user fees for education and health services were imposed. 
These hardships did not dissuade the government from SAP, which 
it believed to be the only approach to the country's social and eco- 
nomic problems. The benefits of SAP, such as lower inflation and 
a more balanced budget, began to be seen, but SAP was adhered 
to less stringently in the late 1980s. 

Babangida' s government adopted other economic reforms leading 
to a market system and political reforms leading to democratic 
processes. Important changes were made in the basic structures 
of military federalism. For the first time, a military leader was called 
president, presumably to emphasize the executive power he wielded. 
The name of the supreme lawmaking body was changed from 
Supreme Military Council to the Armed Forces Ruling Council 
(AFRC). There was also a new Armed Forces Consultative As- 
sembly, formed in 1989, which functioned as an intermediate legis- 
lative chamber between the AFRC and the rest of the military. 
In spite of these elaborate structural changes, Babangida adroitly 
increased the powers of his office. He changed his ministers and 
state governors frequently. Even supposedly powerful members of 
the government were not spared, as was demonstrated in 1986 when 



222 




View of downtown Jos, a leading northern city 
Courtesy Orlando E. Pacheco 
Apapa, a major seaport near Lagos 
Courtesy Embassy of Nigeria, Washington 



223 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

he dropped his second in command, Commodore Ebitu Ukiwe. 
In his place, he appointed Rear Admiral Augustus Aikhomu, 
former chief of the naval staff. The most dramatic of these changes 
was made at the end of 1989, when Babangida reassigned several 
ministers, including General Domkat Bali, the powerful minister 
of defense and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (see Constitu- 
tional and Political Framework, ch. 5). The changes were perceived 
by southerners and Christians as resulting in an AFRC that con- 
sisted mainly of northern Muslims. The service chiefs of the army, 
navy, and police were Muslims; only the chief of the air staff was 
a southerner. The ministries of external affairs, petroleum resources, 
internal affairs, and defense, considered the most powerful cabi- 
net posts, were held by northern Muslims (the minister of defense 
being the president himself). These changes generated heated con- 
troversy and antigovernment demonstrations by Christians in some 
northern cities. Babangida emerged from the changes more power- 
ful than before. 

Babangida also introduced far-reaching changes in the civil ser- 
vice, the police, the armed and security forces, and the political 
system. Certain actions of his government exacerbated religious 
tensions. The religious cleavage in the country had become increas- 
ingly politicized, beginning in the debates in 1977 when Muslims 
began pressing for the extension of sharia law (Muslim religious 
law) from state courts in the north to the federal courts (see Islam, 
ch. 2). In the Second Republic, activist Islamic groups emerged 
in the north, demanding the Islamization of the country. After com- 
ing to power in 1985, Babangida adopted several measures that 
were considered to favor Muslims and to threaten the secular na- 
ture of the Nigerian state. In 1986 Nigeria became a member of 
the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), an international 
association of Islamic states in which Nigeria had long held ob- 
server status; this action was very controversial. In apparent con- 
tradiction, Babangida survived several religious crises by reiterating 
that the federation remained secular. At one point, he set up a re- 
ligious advisory panel to mediate in the religious crises. 

On April 22, 1990, a coup attempt led by Major Gideon Orkar 
almost toppled the Babangida regime. The presidential residence 
in Dodan Barracks was extensively damaged by the rebellious sol- 
diers, but the head of state escaped. A unique feature of this coup 
attempt was the level of involvement of Nigerian civilians, who 
allegedly helped finance the operation. During the hours when the 
rebels controlled the radio station in Lagos, they broadcast a cri- 
tique of the regime that combined attacks on its dictatorial nature 



224 



Government and Politics 



and pervasive corruption with threats to expel the far northern states 
from the federation. 

The survival of Babangida and all senior members of the regime 
enabled the government to continue its policies, especially the 
planned transition to civilian rule in 1992. The detention of several 
journalists and other critics of the military regime and the tem- 
porary closure of some newspapers, however, indicated the govern- 
ment's awareness that it had overstayed its welcome and would 
have to govern with even stricter controls than before. The state 
congresses of the two government- sponsored political parties, the 
National Republican Convention and the Social Democratic Party, 
the only legal parties, were held in the summer of 1990, and cam- 
paigning began in earnest thereafter. 

Political Transitions and Transition Planning 

Political transition in Nigeria has been based not only on the 
military ruler's conviction that civil rule was desirable but also on 
the expectation of the people that, after the military had performed 
its rescue operation, it should turn power over to civilians. Gowon 
and Buhari failed to do so. As a result, their popular support eroded, 
and they were overthrown. In accepting demilitarization as a neces- 
sary process, political transition has been on the agenda of every 
military government since Ironsi's, with the probable exception 
of that of Buhari. Ironsi set up a Constitution Review Commit- 
tee, whose task was overtaken by the promulgation of the unitary 
decree; Gowon designed a transition plan, which he later aborted; 
the Muhammad-Obasanjo governments successfully executed a 
transition program and handed power over to civilians; and Baban- 
gida in 1990 was implementing a transition program, designed to 
culminate in civilian rule in 1992. 

The Second Republic 

In the program of transition to the Second Republic, the mili- 
tary leaders' primary concern was to prevent the recurrence of the 
mistakes of the First Republic. They believed that if the structures 
and processes of government and politics that had proved inap- 
propriate in the First Republic could be changed, a stable and ef- 
fective civilian government would emerge. The transition was 
therefore designed to address those fundamental issues, which were 
historically divisive, and to establish new political institutions, 
processes, and orientations. Except for the census, which remained 
problematic, most issues that threatened the stability and survival 
of the federation were addressed. The revenue allocation process was 
altered based on the recommendation of a technical committee, 



225 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

despite the politicians' rejection of its recommendation. Local 
governments were also streamlined and made more powerful by 
the 1976 reforms. 

The second aspect of the transition involved the making of a new 
constitution and appropriate institutions. A Constitution Drafting 
Committee (CDC) was appointed in 1975 under the chairmanship 
of a leading lawyer, Rotimi Williams, and, in 1977, a Constituent 
Assembly (CA) composed of both elected and appointed officials 
examined and ratified the draft constitution. After final ratifica- 
tion by the SMC, the constitution was promulgated in 1979. Po- 
litical parties were formed, and new corrective national bodies, such 
as the Code of Conduct Bureau, Corrupt Practices Investigation 
Bureau, and Public Complaints Commission, were established. The 
most far-reaching changes of the transition were made in the area 
of institutionalizing a new constitutional and political system. 

At the inauguration of the CDC, Murtala Muhammad outlined 
the objectives of transition as the continuation of a federal system 
of government with constitutional law guaranteeing fundamental 
human rights, maximum participation, and orderly succession to 
political power. To avoid the pitfalls of the First Republic, the new 
constitution was designed to eliminate political competition based 
on a system of winner-takes-all, broadening consensus politics to 
a national base, eliminating overcentralization of power, and en- 
suring free and fair elections. The SMC suggested that these ob- 
jectives could be met by recognition of national rather than sectional 
parties, controls on the proliferation of parties and on the creation 
of more states, and an executive presidential system similar to that 
in the United States. In addition, the federal character of the country 
was to be reflected in the cabinet; an independent judiciary was 
to be established as well as corrective institutions. 

The draft constitution incorporated these elements. When the 
CA met to ratify the constitution, a few issues were highly vola- 
tile. The most notable was the matter of sharia law, which Mus- 
lims argued should be given appellate jurisdiction at the federal 
level. Most Christian members of the assembly vehemently opposed 
this. Only the intervention of the head of state resolved the situa- 
tion. Although the sharia clause was deleted from the constitution, 
the cleavage between Christian and Muslim groups persisted. Other 
controversial issues included the creation of more states, the de- 
termination of an age limit for participation in politics (intended 
to eliminate most discredited politicians who had actively partici- 
pated in politics in the First Republic), and the scope of the execu- 
tive president's powers. After the CA completed its work, the SMC 



226 



Government and Politics 



added a few amendments, including use of Hausa, Igbo, and Yoruba 
as additional official languages in the National Assembly and ap- 
plying the federal-character principle to the composition of the 
armed forces' officer corps. 

By Decree Number 25 of 1978, the 1979 constitution was enacted. 
The constitution differed from that of the First Republic in 1963 
in that it introduced a United States-type presidential system in 
place of the parliamentary system. Previously, the executive branch 
of government derived its powers from the legislature. Under the 
1979 constitution, the president and vice president, as well as state 
governors and their deputies, were elected in separate elections. 
The elections had the federation and the state, respectively, as con- 
stituencies. Furthermore, while the Senate was largely a ceremonial 
body in the First Republic, the new constitution gave the Senate 
and House of Representatives coequal powers. 

There were other provisions in the 1979 constitution that aimed 
at eliminating past loopholes. The first was the federal-character 
principle, which sought to prevent the domination of power by one 
or a few states, ethnic groups, or sections at the federal center, and 
by one or more groups in the states and local government areas. 
The principle required that the composition of the cabinet, boards, 
and other executive bodies, as well as appointments to top govern- 
ment positions, should reflect the federal character or diversity of 
the country at the particular level of government. This principle 
also applied to the composition of the armed forces. The principle 
was extended to the distribution of national resources, such as the 
siting of schools and industries. 

The question of party politics became a constitutional matter. 
In view of the need for a limited number of national political par- 
ties, the constitution specified certain criteria that parties had to 
meet in order to be registered: the name, emblem, or motto of the 
party could not contain any ethnic or religious connotation or give 
the party the image of a sectional party; membership in the party 
must be open to all Nigerians irrespective of ethnic or religious 
affiliation; the party headquarters must be in the federal capital; 
and the executive committee of the party must reflect the federal 
character of the country. The task of registering political parties 
and conducting elections was given to the Federal Electoral Com- 
mission (FEDECO). The necessity for national parties resulted from 
the conviction that the disunity of the First Republic was engen- 
dered by the regional parties then operating. When the ban placed 
on political activities in 1966 was lifted in September 1978, at least 
fifty-three political associations were formed. Seventeen of them 
applied for registration, but only five were registered: the National 



227 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



Party of Nigeria (NPN), the Nigerian People's Party (NPP), the 
United Party of Nigeria (UPN), the Great Nigeria People's Party 
(GNPP), and the People's Redemption Party (PRP). In 1981 a 
sixth party, the Nigeria Advance Party (NAP), was registered. 

Contrary to the expectations of the drafters of the constitution 
and the military rulers, most of these parties resembled the ethno- 
regional ones of the pre- 1966 period although legally parties were 
required to transcend ethnoregional bases. The only exceptions were 
the NAP, which proclaimed itself a "new breed" party, and the 
NPN, which despite its regional antecedents, was probably the only 
national party in Nigeria. The UPN was a resurrection of the AG 
with its Yoruba core; the NPP was a rejuvenation of the NCNC 
with its Igbo core and strands of middle-belt support; the PRP 
recalled Kano's NEPU; and the GNPP, which appeared initially 
to be a new minorities formation, had its strength within the Kanuri 
section of the north. Apart from the PRP, which flickered as a rad- 
ical party, and the populist NAP, the other parties appeared to 
be parties of the wealthy class or those who aspired to join it, for 
whom politics was a means of enriching themselves and consolidat- 
ing their material base. Given this character of the registered par- 
ties, it can be argued that the perceived need to balance the power 
groups in the country rather than the constitutional requirements 
decided which parties were registered. 

In the 1979 presidential election, NPN candidate Shehu Shagari 
was declared the winner, even though many people thought he did 
not meet the full requirements. He obtained a simple majority of 
the total votes cast in the federation but failed to get 25 percent 
of the total votes cast in thirteen states of the federation. The lat- 
ter was the generally accepted interpretation of the constitutional 
requirement that the winner of the presidential election should ob- 
tain 25 percent of the total votes cast in two-thirds of the nineteen 
states of the federation. Shagari obtained 25 percent of the votes 
in twelve states but got only 19 percent in the thirteenth state. When 
FEDECO declared Shagari the winner ''in the absence of any le- 
gal explanation or guidance in the electoral decree," Awolowo, 
the presidential candidate and leader of the UPN, led other defeated 
candidates and their parties to challenge the declaration in the elec- 
toral tribunal and later in the Supreme Court. But the challenge 
was to no avail. The controversy led to strong anti-NPN, anti- 
Shagari sentiments in several states controlled by the other par- 
ties. Once the NPN had succeeded in consolidating power at the 
center, the attraction it held was strong enough to tear the other 
parties asunder. Consequently, the history of the Second Republic 



228 



Government and Politics 



is replete with interparty and intraparty schisms and federal-state 
conflicts. 

At the domestic level, the NPN-controlled federal government 
embarked on politically expedient but uneconomic projects, such 
as establishing a federal university in every state, commissioning 
iron and steel plants that remained unfinished in 1990, and in- 
discriminately awarding contracts to build the new federal capital 
at Abuja. To finance these projects, the government relied heavi- 
ly on foreign loans and aid. While the external debt of the country 
increased, the lot of the common citizen worsened. The global eco- 
nomic recession in the early 1980s and the collapse of crude oil 
prices in the world market accelerated the economic decline of the 
Second Republic (see Oil and Gas, ch. 3). By the time Shagari 
decided to initiate IMF-inspired austerity measures under the Eco- 
nomic Stabilization Act (1982), the problems of the economy re- 
quired more drastic measures. This act, however, provided the 
blueprint for the austerity measures subsequently introduced by 
Buhari and by Babangida. 

The demise of the Second Republic was accelerated by the ten- 
sion generated by the 1983 general elections, which were similar 
to those of 1964-65. As in the earlier elections, two major political 
camps were involved in the contest: the NPN and the Progressive 
Parties Alliance, comprising the UPN, the NPP, and factions of 
the PRP and the GNPP. The NPN won landslide victories even 
in states considered traditional strongholds of the other parties. In 
several places, violence erupted, and every election was contested 
in court. A number of the electoral verdicts were rescinded in view 
of evidence that results were falsified. Under these circumstances, 
the military intervened in December 1983 (see The Buhari Regime; 
The Babangida Government, this ch.). 

The Third Republic 

The transition program of the military rulers toward the estab- 
lishment of civilian rule in the Third Republic was more elaborate 
and deliberate than was the process followed in setting up the Sec- 
ond Republic. The goal was to prevent a recurrence of past mis- 
takes. It was recognized that far-reaching changes involving more 
than the constitution and political institutions must be introduced. 
Consequendy, as much attention was paid to restructuring the econ- 
omy through the SAP as to fostering a new social order and a po- 
litical culture through a program of social mobilization. In 1990 
the transition program was tighdy controlled, based on the assump- 
tion that desirable changes must occur through government inter- 
vention. It was also the most extended transition thus far, and this 



229 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

protracted schedule contributed to frequent changes in the agen- 
da (see table 16, Appendix). The date of the final handing over 
of power was shifted from 1990 to 1992, state gubernatorial and 
assembly elections from 1990 to 1991, and the census from 1990 
to 1991. Apart from these changes, major decisions frequendy were 
reversed. Although President Babangida claimed that the transi- 
tion was "sequential and methodical," it was actually responsive 
and ad hoc. 

The transition to the Third Republic began with the setting up 
of a seventeen-member Political Bureau in 1986 to formulate a 
blueprint for the transition, based on ideas collated during a nation- 
wide debate. In its report, the bureau recommended that a socialist 
ideology be introduced through a process of social mobilization, 
that local governments be strengthened as an effective third tier 
of government, and that a two-party system be created. The govern- 
ment accepted the recommendations except for the proposal advo- 
cating socialism. Most knowledgeable observers believed, however, 
that the Political Bureau was largely a facade created by the mili- 
tary, who had little intention of following the advice of the young 
intellectuals who composed the bureau. 

Of all the recommendations, the two-party system was the most 
significant because it marked a departure from the multiparty sys- 
tem of the past. A majority in the bureau thought that a two-party 
system was the best way to ensure that the parties would be na- 
tional and that they be financed largely by the state, as recommended. 
The bureau argued that in the First Republic and the Second Repub- 
lic, the electoral alliances pointed to a two-party system. The north- 
versus-south character of these alliances led many to fear that a 
two-party system would function along similar lines, especially given 
the increasing sensitivity of the Muslim-Christian division. The 
government decreed the formation of two new parties in October 
1989, requiring that the parties draw from a national, as opposed 
to a regional, constituency to prevent such a dichotomy. 

Other aspects of the transition included a new Constitution 
Review Committee, a National Electoral Commission (NEC), 
strengthened local governments, the creation of local councils 
through nonpartisan elections, and the setting up of a Constituent 
Assembly (CA) to ratify the draft constitution, subject to final ap- 
proval by the AFRC. The government, however, forbade the CA 
to deliberate on sensitive matters on which decisions had already 
been made or were to be made by the AFRC : the creation of more 
states and local government areas, the census, revenue allocation, 
the two-party system, and sharia (the latter was added to the list 



230 



Government and Politics 



after the issue again threatened to tear the assembly apart, as it 
did in 1978). 

In May 1989, after introducing eleven amendments, the AFRC 
promulgated the new constitution by Decree Number 12. The first 
amendment covered the deletion of Section 1 5 of the new consti- 
tution that pronounced the country a welfare state and of Sections 
42 and 43 that provided for free education to age eighteen and free 
medical care for persons up to age eighteen or older than sixty- 
five, the handicapped, and the disabled. The second amendment 
provided for streamlining the jurisdiction of sharia and customary 
courts of appeal to make them apply at the state level only to mat- 
ters relating to the personal status of Muslims. Amendment three 
described civil service reforms. Amendment four reduced the mini- 
mum age requirements for federal and state elective offices from 
forty to thirty-five for the president, thirty-five to thirty for sena- 
tors and governors, twenty-five for members of the House of 
Representatives, and twenty-one for members of state houses of 
assembly and local government councillors. The fifth amendment 
replaced the six-year, single-term tenure for the president and gover- 
nors with a four-year, maximum two-term tenure. Amendment 
six removed from the National Assembly control over matters of 
national security because, in the view of the AFRC, it ' 'exposes 
the chief executives and the nation to clear impotence in the face 
of threats to security." The seventh amendment made the federal 
Judicial Service Commission accountable in the hope that this ac- 
tion would enhance the independence of the judiciary. Amendment 
eight eliminated provisions establishing an armed forces service 
commission to supervise compliance with provisions of the federal- 
character principle, i.e., that government bodies, such as the mili- 
tary, the civil service, and university faculties, reflect the various 
elements of the population. Amendment nine covered the reduc- 
tion of the number of special advisers to the president from seven 
to three and alteration of the provisions for gubernatorial advisers. 
Amendment ten eliminated Section 1 (4) of the draft constitution 
outlawing coups and making them a criminal offense. The eleventh 
amendment deleted the provisions forbidding the federal govern- 
ment to obtain external loans without the approval of the Nation- 
al Assembly. 

These amendments ensured that some of the changes introduced 
by the Babangida government would remain binding after the 
government had handed over power. In spite of those amendments, 
the 1989 constitution is similar to that of 1979; the presidential sys- 
tem is retained with minor amendments, such as the reduction in 



231 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



the number of senators from each state from five to three. The major 
difference in the new political arrangement is the two-party system. 

Two unique aspects of the transition program since 1989 require 
emphasis. One was the blanket ban placed on all former politicians 
and top political officeholders, especially those found guilty of abuse 
of office. In effect, the new political order was to be built around 
the ' 'new breed" politicians, namely, those who supposedly had 
not been affected by corruption, ethnicity, religious fanaticism, and 
other vices that characterized the ''old brigade." A corollary of 
this ban was the government's opposition to the participation of 
ideological and religious "radicals" and "extremists." To partic- 
ipate in the Third Republic, each prospective politician needed a 
clearance certificate from the National Electoral Commission. 

The second important factor was the decision to create in Oc- 
tober 1989 two parties wholly run and financed by the state. After 
the ban on political activities was lifted in May 1989, a number 
of political associations were formed, and thirteen applied for regis- 
tration. The requirements for registration were very strict and 
almost impossible to fulfill in the time allotted: the submission of 
the names, addresses, and passport photographs of all members 
of the association in the federation was required to facilitate physi- 
cal confirmation of the claims by the NEC. In its report to the 
AFRC, the NEC gave low scores to the associations, including the 
"big four" that were the strongest — the People's Solidarity Party, 
the Nigerian National Convention, the Patriotic Front of Nigeria, 
and the Liberal Convention. The report stated that most of the 
membership claims were found to be false, their manifestos and 
organization were very weak, and most of the associations were 
affiliated with banned politicians. 

The AFRC's reaction to the report was unanticipated. It dis- 
solved all the political associations and decreed two new parties — the 
National Republican Convention (NRC) and the Social Democratic 
Party (SDP). It arranged for constitutions and manifestos of these 
two parties to be written by the NEC and by specially constituted 
panels based on a synthesis of those of the dissolved associations. 
The difference between the two parties was made a supposed ideo- 
logical divide: "a little to the right" and "a little to the left." The 
finances of the parties, their secretariats in every local government 
area of the country, the appointment of their administrative secre- 
taries, and their membership drives were now the responsibility 
of the federal government. The government described this new sys- 
tem as a "grass-roots democratic model" anchored in the rural 
and local groups rather than the "moneybags" and city elites that 
had allegedly hijacked the political process in the past. 



232 



Government and Politics 



A connection has also been made between these political changes 
and attempts to alter the economic and social realms. The economic 
transition centered on the SAP, whereas the social component in- 
cluded the process of social mobilization aimed at fostering a new 
social order and political culture. The general process was coordi- 
nated by the Directorate of Social Mobilization; the declared goals 
were social justice, economic recovery, mass mobilization, and po- 
litical education under the acronym MAMSER (Mass Mobiliza- 
tion for Self-Reliance). MAMSER has been popularized, but time 
will be needed to gauge how far its goals have been realized. An 
emphasis has also been placed on rural development through 
strengthening of local governments, the Directorate of Rural De- 
velopment, and improving facilities for the rural women's program. 

The transition program toward the establishment of the Third 
Republic was the most ambitious undertaken in Nigeria. The suc- 
cess and stability of the republic, however, depended on the degree 
to which inherent structural problems could be overcome. Much 
depended on the orientations and on the actions of the politicians 
themselves, as well as on the dispositions of the military. Above all, 
the republic's success depended on the accompanying economic and 
social transformations. The stability of the Third Republic, there- 
fore, would rest not only on the operation of the new two-party sys- 
tem but also on the effectiveness of the SAP and MAMSER. 

The 1989 constitution provided for more than twenty ministers 
in the executive branch, in addition to various councils and com- 
missions (see fig. 11). The names and numbers of these ministries 
and commissions, which, generally speaking, were responsible 
direcdy to the president, have changed occasionally since early 1990. 
Reportedly, Babangida was considering reducing the number of 
ministries to economize. 

Federalism and Intragovernmental Relations 

Given the territorially delineated cleavages abounding in Nigeria 
and the historical legacy of divisions among ethnic groups, regions, 
and sections, the federal imperative was so fundamental that even 
military governments — characteristically unitarian, hierarchical, 
and centralist — attached importance to the continuation of a fed- 
eral system of government. The federation began as a unitarian 
colonial state but disaggregated into three and later four regions. 
In 1967 the regions were abrogated and twelve states created in 
their place. The number of states increased to nineteen in 1976, 
and to twenty-one in 1987 (see fig. 7). In addition, in 1990 there 
were 449 local government areas that had functioned as a third 
tier of government since the late 1980s. 



233 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



PRESIDENT 

(HEAD OF STATE AND 
GOVERNMENT, COMMANDER 
IN CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES) 



PRESIDENTIAL STAFF, 
SPECIAL ADVISERS, 
AND ASSISTANTS 



MINISTRIES 



AGRICULTURE AND 
NATURAL RESOURCES 



AVIATION 



BUDGET AND PLANNING 



COMMUNICATIONS 



CULTURE AND SOCIAL 
WELFARE 



DEFENCE 



EDUCATION 



EMPLOYMENT, LABOUR, 
AND PRODUCTIVITY 



EXTERNAL AFFAIRS 



FEDERAL CAPITAL 
TERRITORY 



FINANCE AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 



HEALTH 



INDUSTRIES 



INTERNAL AFFAIRS 



MINES, POWER, AND STEEL 



PETROLEUM RESOURCES 



SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 



TRADE 



TRANSPORT 



WATER RESOURCES 



WORKS AND HOUSING 



YOUTH AND SPORTS 



- — — — — • 



1 VICE PRESIDENT 

(CHAIRS NATIONAL 
I BOUNDARIES COMMISSION 
AND NATIONAL 
ECONOMIC COUNCIL) 



FEDERAL COUNCILS 
AND COMMISSIONS 



CODE OF CONDUCT BUREAU 



FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE 
COMMISSION 



FEDERAL JUDICIAL SERVICE 
COMMISSION 



NATIONAL BOUNDARIES 
COMMISSION 



NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE 



NATIONAL DEFENCE COUNCIL 



NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL 



NATIONAL ELECTORAL 
COMMISSION 



NATIONAL POPULATION 
COMMISSION 



NATIONAL PRIMARY 
EDUCATION COMMISSION 



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 



NIGERIA POLICE COUNCIL 



PUBLIC COMPLAINTS 
COMMISSION 



REVENUE MOBILIZATION, 
ALLOCATION, AND FISCAL 
COMMISSION 



Source: Based on information from Constitution of Nigeria, 1989, Abuja, 1989. 

Figure 11. Executive Branch, According to 1989 Constitution 



234 



Government and Politics 



In 1990 the Federal Military Government (FMG) included the 
president, the AFRC, the Federal Executive Council, the civil ser- 
vice, and a federal judiciary made up of federal high courts, courts 
of appeal, and the Supreme Court. The locus of power was the 
president and the AFRC , which possessed all law-making powers 
that could not normally be challenged in any court of law. The 
Federal Executive Council was an enlarged instrument of the presi- 
dent. The federal judiciary had appellate jurisdiction in appeals 
emanating from the state judiciaries. It did not have much indepen- 
dence because the government was direcdy involved in the appoint- 
ment of judges and in the finances of the federal Judicial Service 
Commission. The integrity of the judiciary was constantly weakened 
by the setting up of special tribunals. Some of these tribunals were 
responsible for conducting trials of politicians of the Second Repub- 
lic, and a few tried "miscellaneous" cases involving drug, smug- 
gling, or foreign exchange offenses. 

The state governments consisted of the military governor, a cabi- 
net, the civil service, and the state judiciary. In most policy mat- 
ters and in matters of finance, the state governments had to abide 
by federal directives and were subject to coordination by the Na- 
tional Council of States. The local governments had elected manage- 
ment councils comprising a chairman and councillors until June 
1989, when these councils were dissolved. They were replaced by 
sole administrators, state civil servants appointed by the state gover- 
nors. New local government elections were held in December 1989. 
In spite of the increasing powers of local governments, they re- 
mained subordinate to the state and federal governments and could 
be described as administrative agencies of these two higher levels 
of government. 

"Civilian federalism" and "military federalism" correspond- 
ed to civilian government and to military government, respective- 
ly. According to federal theory, civilian federalism was the true 
form of federalism. It entailed government based on a constitu- 
tional sharing of power between the federal and state governments 
(and local government as well), using the principle of decentrali- 
zation of powers. It was marked by party politics, which determined 
the nature of the federation, the configuration of powers, and the 
prevalence of the rule of law. The major elements of military fed- 
eralism included the suspension and modification of the constitu- 
tion; the omnipotence of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) 
at the center, and therefore the existence of only one decision- 
making level of government; and the ban on all (civilian) political 
activities. Because military federalism had been more common than 



235 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

civilian federalism, this model made the federal government the 
1 i master" in relation to the "dependent" state governments. 

At independence largely autonomous regions possessed the 
residual powers in the federation and functioned almost indepen- 
dentiy. Even before the First Republic collapsed, the federal govern- 
ment was asserting greater powers. In particular, it controlled the 
national economy and possessed emergency powers to intervene 
in any region where law and order had broken down, as it did in 
the Western Region in 1962. Relative to the powers of the states 
in 1990, however, the regions were very powerful; they had separate 
constitutions, foreign missions, and independent revenue bases. 
All this changed under military rule. 

The FMG expanded its control over the economy to the extent 
that in 1 990 the states depended on it for up to 90 percent of their 
revenues. The federal government also took over such matters as 
education, which formerly had belonged to the states. Because state 
governors were appointed on military assignment by the president, 
the states had little autonomy except in deciding how to implement 
policies formulated by the federal government. Attempts by state 
governments to reassert their autonomy during the Second Republic 
were aborted by the return of military rule. Some state govern- 
ments that were controlled by parties other than the NPN took the 
NPN-controlled federal government to court on many occasions 
over matters of jurisdictional competence. This trend was likely 
to recur during the Third Republic, when the states would seek 
to regain powers lost under military rule. 

Another area in which successive military governments had 
changed intragovernmental relations was in the bolstering of local 
governments as a third tier of government. This process began with 
the 1976 local government reforms, which introduced a uniform 
local government system; gave local governments jurisdictional 
competence in matters such as markets, parking lots, and collec- 
tion of local taxes; and made it statutory for both the federal and 
state governments to give specified percentages of their revenues 
to local governments. Although these reforms were embodied in 
the 1979 constitution, state governments in the Second Repub- 
lic refused to allow local governments any measure of autonomy, 
partly because they were themselves struggling to reclaim their 
autonomy. With the return of military rule, and as part of the tran- 
sition toward the Third Republic, local governments were further 
strengthened. 

Because the federal government accepted the recommendation 
of the Political Bureau that local governments should be made an 
effective tier of government, efforts had been made to reduce their 



236 



Government and Politics 



control by state governments. In 1988 state ministries of local 
government, the major instrument of control, were replaced by 
directorates of local government in the governors' offices. All local 
government funds were paid directly to the local governments by 
the federal government rather than through the state governments. 
The functions and jurisdiction of local governments were stream- 
lined, and state governments were asked to stay out of local affairs. 

These measures increased the importance of local governments 
and infused in their civilian-elected functionaries a certain stub- 
bornness that led to open conflicts with state governments over mat- 
ters of jurisdiction. In several cases, these conflicts became the 
subject of litigation. State governments resisted the loss of juris- 
diction, and many underscored the subordinate status of local 
governments at every opportunity. It would be a mistake, however, 
to conclude that local governments were sufficiently autonomous 
to be an effective tier of government. 

The allocation of federal revenues was a problematic aspect of 
fiscal federalism because the states were unequally endowed and 
were virtually dependent on allocations from the federal govern- 
ment. Several revenue allocation commissions were set up, among 
them the National Revenue Mobilization, Allocation, and Fiscal 
Commission established during the 1980s. The major problem arose 
from disagreements over the criteria that should be used in 
allocations — derivation, population, need, equality, or minimum 
government responsibility. 

The federal-character principle emerged as a balancing formu- 
la in the 1979 constitution to forestall the domination of the govern- 
ment or any of its agencies or resources by persons from one or 
a few states, ethnic groups, or sections. The uneven rates of de- 
velopment among the states and sections was largely responsible 
for the tension and controversy associated with the application of 
this principle, complicated by the pattern of distribution of the major 
ethnic groups. 

The issue of state creation derived from the very nature of the 
federation. From three regions in 1960, the number of constituent 
units had increased to twenty-one states and the Federal Capital 
Territory. It was likely that a few more would be created (see 
Introduction). The increasing number of states was a direct response 
to the demands and agitations of groups that were not satisfied with 
their positions in the federation. Initially, it was the minorities who 
agitated for more states, but in 1990 the need for states had changed. 
They were no longer needed to protect group identity and auton- 
omy. Any group that sought a share of the "national cake" or that 
wanted to maximize its share of the cake demanded more states, 



237 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

although states were not designed to have an ethnic basis. An ex- 
ample of the latter was the Igbo, who constituted the majority in 
only two states, Anambra and Imo; the other major groups, the 
Hausa-Fulani and the Yoruba, represented majorities in about five 
states each. The Igbo had persistendy pressed for equality with other 
major groups by demanding new states. Realizing that the crea- 
tion of states could go on endlessly, the federal government tried 
to bolster local governments as another way of meeting the de- 
mands. The subordinate status of local governments, however, cou- 
pled with the continued use of the states as units for distributing 
national resources, made demands for more states a recurrent theme 
in Nigerian federalism. 

According to the 1989 constitution, representation in the legis- 
lative branch was based both on population (the House of Represen- 
tatives, with 453 members) and on states (the Senate with 64 
members, 3 from each of the 21 states and 1 from the Federal Cap- 
ital Territory), which together composed the National Assembly 
(see fig. 12). These figures were subject to change to reflect a pos- 
sible increase in the number of states and the redistribution of popu- 
lation. The judicial branch consisted of the Federal High Court, 
the Court of Appeal, and, at the top, the Supreme Court with a 
chief justice and up to fifteen other justices. 

The Civil Service 

The civil service in 1990 consisted of the federal civil service, 
the twenty-one autonomous state civil services, the unified local 
government service, and several federal and state government agen- 
cies, including parastatals and corporations. The federal and state 
civil services were organized around government departments, or 
ministries, and extraministerial departments headed by ministers 
(federal) and commissioners (state), who were appointed by the 
president and governors, respectively. These political heads were 
responsible for policy matters. The administrative heads of the 
ministry were the directors general, formerly called permanent 
secretaries. The "chief" director general was the secretary to the 
government and until the Second Republic also doubled as head 
of the civil service. As chief adviser to the government, the secre- 
tary conducted liaison between the government and the civil service. 

The major function of the director general, as of all senior civil 
servants, was to advise the minister or the commissioner directly. 
In doing so, the director general was expected to be neutral. In 
the initial periods of military rule, these administrative heads wield- 
ed enormous powers. For some time, the military rulers refused 
to appoint civilian political heads. Even after political heads were 



238 



Government and Politics 



appointed, it was years before the era of 1 ' superpermanent secre- 
taries" ended. That happened in 1975 when, after Gowon's fall, 
the civil service was purged to increase its efficiency. Many of the 
superpermanent secretaries lost their jobs, and the subordinate sta- 
tus of permanent secretaries to their political bosses was reiterated. 
Another consequence of the purge, reinforced subsequently, was 
the destruction of the civil service tradition of security of tenure. 
The destruction was achieved by the retirement or dismissal of many 
who had not attained retirement age. 

Until the 1988 reforms, the civil service was organized strictly 
according to British traditions: it was apolitical, civil servants were 
expected to serve every government in a nonpartisan way, and the 
norms of impersonality and hierarchical authority were well en- 
trenched. As the needs of the society became more complex and 
the public sector expanded rapidly, there was a corresponding need 
to reform the civil service. The Adebo Commission (1970) and the 
Udoji Commission (1972) reviewed the structure and orientations 
of the civil service to make it more efficient. Although these com- 
missions recommended ways of rationalizing the civil service, the 
greatest problems of the service remained inefficiency and red tape. 
Again in 1985, a study group headed by Dotun Phillips looked into 
the problems. It was believed that the 1988 reforms, the most cur- 
rent measures aimed at dealing with the problems of the service 
as of 1990, were based on this report. 

Compared with the 1960s and 1970s, the civil service by 1990 
had changed dramatically. It had been politicized to the extent that 
most top officials openly supported the government of the day. The 
introduction of the quota system of recruitment and promotion, 
adherence to the federal-character principle, and the constant in- 
terference of the government in the day-to-day operation of the 
civil service — especially through frequent changes in top officials 
and massive purges — meant that political factors rather than merit 
alone played a major role in the civil service. 

The 1988 reforms formally recognized the politicization of the 
upper echelons of the civil service and brought about major changes 
in other areas. The main stated objective of the reforms was "to 
ensure a virile, dynamic and result-oriented civil service." As a 
result, ministers or commissioners vested with full executive pow- 
ers were fully accountable for their ministries or commissions. The 
director general had become a political appointee whose length of 
tenure was dependent on that of the government of the day; in prac- 
tice, this fact meant that directors general need not be career civil 
servants, thereby reducing the latter' s career prospects. Each minis- 
try had been professionalized so that every official, whether specialist 



239 



Nigeria: A Country Study 







LEGISLATIVE BRANCH 



NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 



SPEAKER 



DEPUTY 
SPEAKER 

1 



HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES 



453 MEMBERS 



PRESIDENT OF 
THE SENATE 



DEPUTY PRESIDENT 
OF THE SENATE 



\ I 



SENATE 

64 MEMBERS 
(3 FROM EACH STATE AND 
1 FROM THE FEDERAL CAPITAL 
TERRITORY OF ABU J A) 



! 



JOINT COMMITTEE 
ON FINANCE 



OTHER JOINT 
COMMITTEES 



COMMITTEES 



JUDICIAL BRANCH 



SUPREME COURT 

CHIEF JUSTICE AND 
UP TO 15 OTHER JUSTICES 



COURT OF APPEAL 

PRESIDENT OF THE COURT 
OF APPEAL AND AT LEAST 
15 OTHER JUSTICES 




FEDERAL HIGH COURT 

CHIEF OF THE FEDERAL HIGH 
COURT PLUS A NUMBER OF 
JUDGES AS PRESCRIBED BY 
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 



Source: Based on information from Constitution of Nigeria, 1989, Abuja, 1989. 



Figure 12. Legislative and Judicial Branches, According to 1989 Constitution 



240 



Government and Politics 



or generalist, made his career entirely in one ministry, whereas pre- 
viously an official could move among ministries. A new depart- 
ment — the Presidency — comprising top government officials was 
created at the federal level to coordinate the formulation of poli- 
cies and monitor their execution, thus making it a clearinghouse 
between the president and all federal ministries and departments. 

The reforms created a new style of civil service, but the struc- 
ture might change under later governments with different priorities. 
In the past, the attempt by every government to effect changes in 
the civil service produced many discontinuities. Ministries have 
been constantly restructured, new ones created, and existing ones 
abolished. Nevertheless, the 1988 reforms might solve some of the 
problems of the civil service because most civil servants tended to 
remain in their jobs despite reorganizations. Also, the move of the 
capital from Lagos to Abuja in the early 1990s will provide new 
opportunities to apply the federal- character principle in replacing 
Lagosian civil servants unwilling to move. 

Interest Groups and National Politics 

Organized interest groups played a crucial role in national po- 
litics, especially under military regimes when other forms of direct 
political participation were prohibited. 

Professional Associations 

Professional associations were the most established interest groups 
in the country and included the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA), 
the Nigerian Medical Association (NMA), the Nigerian Society 
of Engineers, the Nigerian Economic Society, and the Nigerian 
Political Science Association. Many of these associations were main- 
ly concerned with matters relating to the professional interests of 
their members. In pursuing professional concerns, however, they 
articulated and demanded important political actions. Between 1983 
and 1985, for example, the NMA called a strike of medical doc- 
tors to demand an improvement in health care delivery. Its lead- 
ers were detained, and the union banned until 1986. The NBA 
has been at the forefront of the movement for the observance of 
the rule of law and human rights in Nigeria. Most other associa- 
tions held annual conferences at which positions were taken on na- 
tional issues. The most distinguishing characteristics of professional 
associations were their elitist and urban base, and the nonviolent 
pursuit of their interests. 

Trade Unions 

The central trade union in the country was the Nigerian Labour 



241 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

Congress (NLC), which was formed in 1975 as the umbrella trade 
union and recognized by Decree Number 44 of 1976 as the sole 
representative of all trade unions in the country (see Labor Unions, 
ch. 3). The NLC had a national executive and secretariat, as well 
as state councils in all states. It had more than 100 affiliated 
unions. Although most labor matters were channeled through the 
NLC, the affiliate unions had engaged individually in union 
activities, such as strikes and lockouts. In the 1980s, the NLC was 
torn apart by leadership struggles, ideological differences, and 
ethnoregional conflicts. The NLC nearly broke up in 1988 after 
disagreements over elections of its leadership, resulting in the fed- 
eral government's appointing an administrator for several months. 
The NLC organized a nationwide workers' strike in 1986 to de- 
mand the retention of government subsidies on petroleum products 
and continued to articulate workers' demands on matters such as 
minimum wages and improved welfare conditions. Several other 
trade unions were also active. A few, such as the Academic Staff 
Union of Universities, were proscribed for alleged antigovernment 
activities. 

The Media 

The press was a specialized interest group in Nigeria. As the 
fourth estate or the * ' societal watchdog, ' ' it was the most vocal and 
effective interest group in the country, especially because other in- 
terest groups channeled their demands and support through the 
press. The media could act as a watchdog because of the large num- 
ber of newspapers and radio and television stations, and because 
of the wide degree of press freedom. 

In 1990 Nigeria had more than thirty national and provincial 
newspapers, more than twenty general magazines and journals, 
and more than 100 television and radio stations. Although the radio 
and television stations were owned by the federal and state govern- 
ments, most of the newspapers and magazines were privately owned 
and were, in general, seen as instruments of partisan political in- 
terests. Thus, the latter could afford to be critical of the govern- 
ment. At some points, newspapers and magazines have been 
proscribed, as happened to Newbreed in 1977, the Tribune in 1984, 
and Newswatch in 1988. Individual journalists have been harassed 
and intimidated by government security agents. In 1971 Minere 
Amakiri, a Nigerian Observer correspondent, was detained and his 
hair shaved. Since then, numerous editors and reporters have been 
detained. 

The organized interest groups representing the press included the 
Nigeria Union of Journalists, the Newspaper Proprietors Association, 



242 



Government and Politics 



and the Nigerian Guild of Editors. These associations mainly pur- 
sued the professional interests of their members but also played 
active roles on broader social issues. 

Student Associations 

Since 1962, when students prevented the government from sign- 
ing the Anglo-Nigerian Defense Pact, they have played an active 
role in influencing government actions. From the 1970s on, they 
have engaged in violent protests and riots that have sometimes 
resulted in fatalities. The grounds for these riots have ranged from 
narrow concerns, such as unacceptable dining facilities and boarding 
conditions, to broader national issues, such as the removal of 
government subsidies on petroleum products, the SAP, and repres- 
sive government. Since 1977 no year has passed without one univer- 
sity or other institution of higher learning being closed because of 
violent student protests. The most dramatic were the 1978 "Ali 
must go" riots, in which all universities in the country protested 
a rise in the costs of university education; and the 1989 anti-SAP 
riots, which claimed many lives. 

Student activities were coordinated nationally by the National 
Association of Nigerian Students (NANS), which has operated un- 
derground since its proscription in 1986. Every institution of higher 
learning had a student union. Until 1986, when the Justice Mu- 
hammad panel recommended voluntary membership as a way to 
check student protests, membership in student unions was com- 
pulsory. There were several other student associations, such as 
voluntary groups and religious associations, which also articulated 
students' interests. 

Women's Organizations 

Nigeria had several women's organizations, most of them profes- 
sional and social clubs. The umbrella organization, recognized as 
the voice of women on national issues, was the National Council 
of Women's Societies (NCWS). Many of the women's groups were 
affiliated with the NCWS, which tended to be elitist in organiza- 
tion, membership, and orientation. Another major women's as- 
sociation was Women in Nigeria, composed primarily of university 
women and inclined toward Western feminist views. Conservative 
Nigerian Muslim women in the late 1970s began to indicate dis- 
content with the liberal trends of these two organizations and in 
the mid-1980s created the Federation of Muslim Women's Associ- 
ations of Nigeria, which had about 400 member bodies through- 
out the country. In the 1980s, women from lower social strata in 
the towns, represented mainly by the market women's associations, 



243 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



became militant and organized mass protests and demonstrations 
in several states. Their major grievances ranged from narrow con- 
cerns such as allocation of market stalls to broader issues such as 
increased school fees. 

Other Interest Groups 

Other notable interest groups included social clubs and frater- 
nities, old boys' and alumni associations, and various voluntary 
associations. On the whole, the activities of interest groups and 
the roles they played in national politics depended on how narrow 
or broad the group's interests were, the resources available to it, 
its ties with those in authority, its affiliation with other groups, and 
the ideological character of its membership. The major interest 
groups were elitist, but other groups were also active at times. 

Foreign Relations 

A 1989 publication by the Federal Military Government, Four 
Years of the Babangida Administration, summarized the priority issues 
of Nigerian foreign policy: the abolition of apartheid in South Afri- 
ca; the enhancement of Nigeria's relations with member countries 
of the European Economic Community (EEC), the United States, 
the Soviet Union, and with other major industrialized countries 
to increase the flow of foreign investments and capital into Nigeria; 
and continued support for international organizations, such as the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Or- 
ganization of African Unity (OAU), and the Non- Aligned Move- 
ment (NAM). Relations with other African states constituted the 
cornerstone of Nigerian foreign policy. 

The Ministry of External Affairs was directly responsible for for- 
eign policy formulation and implementation. Because matters were 
usually left in the hands of the minister and his officials, foreign 
policy positions could change radically from one minister to another, 
depending on the minister's orientation. In addition to the 
minister's immediate staff, there was a small foreign policy elite 
comprising other top government officials, interest group leaders, 
academicians, top military officers, religious leaders, and journalists. 
This elite exerted indirect influence through communiques and press 
releases, as well as direct pressure on the government. In 1986 a 
conference — to which every stratum of this elite was invited — was 
held to review Nigeria's foreign policy and recommend broad policy 
frameworks for the 1990s and beyond. 

Several factors conditioned Nigeria's foreign policy positions. 
First, the ethnic and religious mix of the country required cautious 
positions on some issues, such as policy toward Israel. Nigeria found 



244 



President Ibrahim Babangida, 
1990 

Courtesy Embassy of Nigeria, 
Washington 



it difficult to restore diplomatic ties with Israel and had not done 
so as of 1990 because of Muslim opposition and sympathy with 
the rest of the Arab Muslim world. Second, Nigeria's legacy as 
an ex-British colony, combined with its energy-producing role in 
the global economy, predisposed Nigeria to be pro-Western on most 
issues despite the desire to maintain a nonaligned status to avoid 
neocolonialism. In 1990 this pro-Western posture was reinforced 
by Nigeria's * 'economic diplomacy," which involved negotiating 
trade concessions, attracting foreign investors, and rescheduling 
debt repayment to Western creditors (see The Debt Overhang, ch. 
3). Third, the country's membership in and commitment to several 
international organizations, such as the United Nations and bod- 
ies mentioned earlier, also affected foreign policy positions. Fourth, 
and most important, as the most populous country in Africa and 
the entire black world, Nigeria perceived itself as the "giant" of 
Africa and the potential leader of the black world. Thus, Nigerian 
external relations have emphasized African issues, which have be- 
come the avowed cornerstone of foreign policy. 

These factors have caused certain issues to dominate Nigerian 
foreign policy across various governments, but each government 
has had distinctive priorities and style. During the 1950s and ear- 
ly 1960s, foreign policy aimed at proper behavior in the interna- 
tional system, and British authorities played a major role in Nigerian 
foreign relations. Consequently, the Balewa government stressed 



245 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

world peace, respected sovereign equality, and maintained 
nonalignment based on friendship with any country that took a 
reciprocal position. After the fall of the First Republic, critics as- 
serted that the government had been too pro-Western and not strong 
enough on decolonization or integration, and that the low profile 
had been embarrassing. Nonetheless, Gowon continued to keep 
a low profile by operating within the consensus of the OAU and 
by following routes of quiet diplomacy. 

The civil war marked a distinct break in Nigerian foreign policy. 
The actions of various countries and international bodies during 
the war increased awareness of the alignments within Africa and 
appreciation of the positive role that the OAU could play in African 
affairs. Whereas some European countries had supported Biafra, 
the OAU sided with the federation by voting for unity. The OAU 
stance proved helpful for Nigerian diplomacy. Nigeria first turned 
to the Soviet Union for support after the West refused to provide 
arms to the federation, and after the war, a less pro-Western stance 
was maintained. At the same time, Africa remained Nigeria's top 
priority. In the mid- to late 1970s, attention focused on the libera- 
tion of southern Africa, on the integration of ECOWAS, and on 
the need for complete economic independence throughout Africa. 
These goals were included in the 1979 constitution: promotion of 
African unity; political, economic, social, and cultural liberation 
of Africa; international cooperation; and elimination of racial dis- 
crimination. 

Relations with Neighboring States 

Nigeria had cordial relations with all its neighbors — Benin, Niger, 
Chad, Cameroon, and Equatorial Guinea — as well as with other 
countries in the West African subregion, with most of which it had 
bilateral agreements. There had been occasional border disputes 
with Chad and Cameroon, and military action against these neigh- 
bors was contemplated by the civilian government in 1982 and 1983. 
Another problem arose in the early 1980s, when Nigeria decided 
to expel many illegal immigrants, mainly Ghanaians, but this dis- 
pute also was resolved amicably. The guiding principle of Nige- 
ria's regional foreign policy was that of good neighborliness and 
friendship. In this spirit, it helped to resolve conflicts between Libe- 
ria and Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso and Mali, and Togo and Ghana. 
Nigeria also tried to make its neighbors "safe" friends, partly to 
reenforce boundary claims and protect human rights of Nigerian 
citizens who were migrant-workers and partly to stabilize relations 
between the immediate neighboring countries. For example, since 
1988 it has established a strong presence in Equatorial Guinea. 



246 



Government and Politics 



To pursue its economic interests through foreign relations within 
West Africa, Nigeria championed the formation of ECOWAS and, 
in spite of competing allegiances to rival organizations within the 
subcontinent, continued to support the organization's objectives. 
Strengthening ECOWAS promoted Nigeria's national interests 
through encouraging development of the region's economy and dis- 
couraging its neighbors' reliance on extra- African countries for mili- 
tary, political, and economic survival. ECOWAS thus served such 
security interests as weakening colonial divisions within West Africa, 
ending border disputes, contributing to African unity, and strength- 
ening West Africa's bargaining positions vis-a-vis the EEC. 

Relations with the Rest of Africa 

The prevailing perception in Nigeria's foreign policy was that, 
as the predominant African leader, it should play a big-brother role 
in relations with African states. Nigeria was a founding member 
of the OAU and often channeled major policy initiatives through 
that organization. Most of its relations with other African states 
took place outside the OAU framework but were guided by OAU 
principles. Nigeria's primary African commitment was to liberate 
the continent from the last vestiges of colonialism and to eradicate 
apartheid in South Africa. Promoting liberation had grown from 
a weak and conservative stance during the 1960s to an increasingly 
firm push after the civil war. This commitment was pursued most 
actively after Murtala Muhammad successfully backed the 
Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola's ascent to power 
in Angola in 1975 by providing the swing vote in the OAU deci- 
sion to recognize the MPLA. Nigeria had played a role in the in- 
dependence of Zimbabwe and in the late 1980s was active in 
assisting Namibia to achieve independence. In the latter case, it 
contributed about US$20 million to assist the South West Africa 
People's Organization in the 1989 elections and other preparations 
for Namibian independence. The country also contributed 
financially to liberation movements in South Africa and to the front- 
line states of Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, 
which were frequently harassed by South Africa. 

Although Nigeria's armed forces were among the largest in black 
Africa in the early 1990s, sizable military might has rarely been used 
in foreign policy (see Local and Bilateral Issues; African and Re- 
gional Issues, ch. 5). The army participated in peacekeeping 
forces, either alone or through the OAU and contributed personnel 
to United Nations peacekeeping missions. In line with its ECOWAS 
commitment, Nigeria was one of the main contributors of 
troops to the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) 



247 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

sent to Liberia August 23, 1990, after the peace talks there failed. 
Additional forces were sent in late September 1990 under a Nigerian 
field commander, General Doganyaro. Threats to fight for southern 
African liberation were made but not acted on, but Nigeria did 
give military and financial aid to the African National Congress 
for its efforts against the apartheid regime in South Africa and 
provided military equipment to Mozambique to help its struggle 
against South African-backed guerrillas. 

In addition, Nigeria gave aid and technical assistance to several 
African states, often through the African Development Bank of 
which it was a major benefactor. In 1987 a Technical Aid Corps, 
operating along the lines of the United States Peace Corps, was 
established. Under it, young Nigerian professionals served in other 
African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries where their expertise was 
needed. Nigeria also provided scholarships and fellowships, train- 
ing facilities, grants, equipment, and medical supplies, and subsi- 
dized oil during the 1970s' oil crisis to African countries under 
certain conditions. 

In July 1974, the Go won government decided to sell crude oil 
at concessionary rates to African countries on condition that they 
had their own refineries and would not re-export to third coun- 
tries. The decision came after more than two years of deliberations 
and despite Nigeria's role as a member of the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) that generally favored 
higher prices. Nigeria acted largely in response to external pres- 
sures: international actors attempted to divide Third World coun- 
tries into OPEC members and nonoil producers; various African 
countries, especially Liberia, begged for less expensive oil; and both 
the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Organization 
of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries had established programs 
to aid poor countries while encouraging other oil producers, espe- 
cially African nations, to follow suit. Providing subsidies for Afri- 
can countries was a safe move for Nigeria because Africa comprised 
only a small portion of the country's total oil export market, it en- 
hanced Nigeria's position and influence in Africa while building 
African solidarity, and it protected security interests by prevent- 
ing economic decline. Moreover, this example of generosity aided 
Nigeria in its efforts to create ECOWAS. In November 1990, 
Babangida suggested that Nigeria might again offer concession- 
ary prices to other African countries as the Middle East crises 
pushed oil prices upward. 

Relations with Major Powers 

During the Gulf crisis that began with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait 



248 



Government and Politics 



in the summer of 1990 and that marked the end of the Cold War 
and the beginning of a coalition, Nigeria kept a low profile. It did 
not send troops to engage in the Persian Gulf war but continued 
to be an active supporter of UN policy. Buying the bulk of Nige- 
ria's crude oil, the United States was Nigeria's most important trad- 
ing partner. Until the civil war, Nigeria had had no significant 
relationship with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Since then, 
ties with the Soviet Union had increased, although they remained 
minimal in comparison with ties to the West. Nigeria's other major 
trading partners were Japan and the EEC, from which it continued 
to obtain loans and aid. 

Although Nigeria has always leaned toward the West, the close- 
ness of the relationship has varied. Nigeria's Western ties were origi- 
nally strongest with Britain, its former colonial ruler. The special 
relationship, which lasted until the 1966 coup, led Nigeria to side 
with Britain on most issues. After the coup and the civil war, the 
new Nigerian leaders were less favorable toward Britain, especially 
after Britain took a position of neutrality in the civil war, refused 
to sell arms to the federation, and ignored the blockade against 
Biafra. Nigerian leaders also were rankled by Britain's support of 
white-dominated governments in southern Africa. Several Nigerian 
groups pressured the new government to weaken ties with Britain 
as the only way to true independence. To appease popular senti- 
ment, Nigerian leaders at times made statements or took actions 
of a symbolic nature that made it appear that relations with Brit- 
ain were more damaged than they were in reality. 

Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union 
were interested in Nigeria because of its size, population, economic 
and military potential, and, especially for the United States, its oil. 
From 1966 to 1977, Nigeria was very cool toward the United States. 
The two countries took opposing positions over southern African 
liberation. Nigerians were angered by pro-Biafran propaganda in 
the United States and by the United States refusal to sell arms to 
the federation during the civil war. United States involvement 
was even suspected by Nigeria in the assassination of Murtala 
Muhammad. In 1977 Jimmy Carter became president, and Nigerian 
relations with the United States suddenly changed. The United States 
recognized Nigeria as a stabilizing force in Africa and was willing 
to consult with Nigeria on African issues. The two governments 
appeared to have similar interests in southern Africa. The special 
relationship had a weak basis, however, depending mosdy upon con- 
tinuing agreement and cooperation over southern African issues. 
Once Ronald Reagan replaced Carter as president (1981-89), the 
countries again had divergent interests in southern Africa. 



249 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

Just as the balance of trade was not expected to shift dramati- 
cally with the opening of Eastern Europe so, too, Nigeria's politi- 
cal position was not expected to change greatly. In a time of shifting 
world coalitions, a position of nonalignment with a leaning toward 
the West provided more options for Nigeria than ever. Events in 
southern Africa, including Namibia's independence and the open- 
ing of debate for eliminating apartheid in South Africa, removed 
the largest obstacles to closer relations with the United States without 
excluding the Soviet Union or other leading powers. 

Relations with International Organizations 

Nigeria played active roles in various international organizations 
and vied for positions in them. For example, Joseph Garba, Nige- 
ria's former permanent representative to the UN, was elected in 
1989 to a one-year term as president of the UN General Assem- 
bly; Adebayo Adeedji was executive secretary of the Economic 
Commission for Africa, a UN affiliate; and Emeka Anyaoku be- 
came secretary general of the Commonwealth of Nations in 1989. 
Former military head of state Obasanjo also had become a recog- 
nized world statesman and spokesman on African issues. Nigeria 
contributed personnel to many UN peacekeeping missions, includ- 
ing operations in Congo, Tanzania, and the UN India-Pakistan 
Observer Mission in the 1960s, the UN Interim Force in Leba- 
non in 1978, and UN forces observing the Iran-Iraq cease-fire and 
the Angola-Namibia accords in 1988. 

The importance that Nigeria placed on international organiza- 
tions grew out of a striving for peace and international coopera- 
tion. In the cases of the OAU and ECOWAS, these organizations 
also served to increase African unity, another important Nigerian 
goal. Nigeria played an initiating role in the creation of both or- 
ganizations and was active in both thereafter. Although Nigeria's 
positions on various issues have changed over the years, its level 
of activity in international organizations has increased. 

In 1987 Nigeria initiated a Concert of Medium Powers, more 
widely known as the Lagos Forum, to facilitate multilateral cooper- 
ation and to enable member states to exert greater collective in- 
fluence on world affairs. Forum members included Sweden, 
Austria, Zimbabwe, and Egypt. The initiative, which could be seen 
as an effort preceding the end of the Cold War, seemed to collapse, 
however, after its initiator, Boleji Akenyemi, was removed as 
minister for external affairs in 1987. 

A wide range of books and articles exists on Nigerian govern- 
ment and politics. On the colonial period and the First Republic 



250 



Government and Politics 



(1960-66), the major studies are those by Erne O. Awa, Federal 
Government in Nigeria; James Smoot Coleman, Nigeria: Background 
to Nationalism; Larry Diamond, Class, Ethnicity, and Democracy in 
Nigeria: The Failure of the First Republic; Billy J. Dudley, Parties and 
Politics in Northern Nigeria; Robin Luckham, The Nigerian Military: 
A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt: 1960-67; J. P. Mackin- 
tosh, Nigerian Government and Politics; Kenneth W J. Post, The Nigerian 
Federal Election of 1959; Richard L. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties; 
and C. Sylvester Whitaker, The Politics of Tradition: Continuity and 
Change in Northern Nigeria, 1946-66. 

On the Gowon government (1966-75), there are major studies 
by Henry Bienen, Political Conflict and Economic Change in Nigeria; 
Billy J. Dudley, Instability and Political Order; Oye Oyediran, Nigerian 
Government and Politics under Military Rule, 1966-79; and S.K. Panter- 
Brick, Nigerian Politics and Military Rule: Prelude to the Civil War. 
A.H.M. Kirk-Greene's two- volume Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: 
A Documentary Sourcebook is a valuable resource on the civil war 
period. There are also excellent studies by John J. Stremlau, The 
International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970, and by John 
de St. Jorre, The Nigerian Civil War. 

On the Obasanjo government and the transition to the Second 
Republic, the central studies are those by J. Bayo Adekson, Nige- 
ria in Search of a Stable Civil-Military System; Larry Diamond et al., 
Democracy in Developing Countries; Richard A. Joseph, Democracy and 
Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic; 
and Shehu Othman, * 'Classes, Crises, and Coups: The Demise 
of Shagari's Regime." 

Overviews on Nigerian politics and government can be found 
in Peter P. Ekeh and E.E. Osaghae, Federal Character and Federalism 
in Nigeria and William Graf, The Nigerian State. (For further infor- 
mation and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



251 



Chapter 5. National Security 



Benin bronze statue of warrior chief of the seventeenth century 



ON DECEMBER 29, 1989, Nigerian president General Ibrahim 
Babangida, a Muslim, abruptly executed a major reshuffle of his 
ministers, the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC), the nation- 
al security organs, military state governors and important military 
commands, and took personal control of the Ministry of Defence 
and the security services. Ten days later, Lieutenant General Dom- 
kat Bali, a Christian, the erstwhile minister of defense who had 
been reassigned as minister of internal affairs, refused to accept 
his new post and resigned from the army. Nigeria's vice president 
since 1988 has been Admiral Augustus Aikhomu, a Christian. 
Babangida and Aikhomu have sought to share responsibilities so 
as to diffuse the "religious" factor in national politics. Despite these 
efforts, public protests erupted almost immediately against the presi- 
dent's alleged arbitrary decisions and discrimination against Chris- 
tian middle belt (see Glossary) officers like Bali who lost their posts 
to northern Muslims. Then, on April 22, 1990, antinorthern 
rebel officers launched a bloody abortive coup against Babangi- 
da' s regime, resulting in the arrest of 14 officers and more than 
200 soldiers. After regaining control, Babangida announced his in- 
tention to overhaul the security system and to press ahead with 
his plan to restore civilian rule by October 1, 1992. Forty-two of 
the military rebels, including ten officers, were executed in July 
after sentencing by a special military tribunal; an additional twenty- 
seven were executed in September. Nine others, including three 
civilians, received prison terms ranging from seven years to life. 
Reports of army restiveness continued. 

This dramatic series of events underscored the instability and 
uncertainty that have pervaded Nigeria's politico-military system 
for more than a quarter of a century. It also emphasized the tran- 
sience of any description of Nigeria's national security apparatus. 
Indeed, even if the Federal Military Government (FMG) were to 
achieve its goal of civilian restoration, the new government would 
almost certainly again restructure the armed forces and national 
security organs. Notwithstanding such anticipated changes, how- 
ever, underlying conditions and trends continued to affect Nigeria's 
security environment into the 1990s. 

At the onset of the 1990s, Nigeria was a regional power with 
a growing sense of self-assurance and a developing capability to 
demonstrate it. In the three decades since independence, its original 
Western orientation had shifted toward more neutral, autonomous, 



255 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



and Afrocentric strategic directions. Although still seeking a co- 
herent vision of its role in Africa and the world, Lagos sought and 
played various roles as regional leader, peacekeeper, mediator, and 
arbiter. Domestically, the Nigerian polity had endured a civil war 
(1967-70); frequent political crises punctuated by military coups, 
attempted coups, and regime reshuffles; and the boom-and-bust 
cycle of an oil-based economy. As General Babangida's military 
government prepared to restore elected civilian rule in 1992, the 
armed forces were being drastically reduced in size and profession- 
alized. External and internal security thus were closely linked. 

Nigeria's size, demography, economic strength, and military capa- 
bilities set it apart as the dominant regional power. It was surrounded 
by smaller and weaker states, whose vulnerability to external in- 
fluence and pressure could adversely affect Nigeria's security. The 
lack of regional rivals made large-scale conflicts unlikely but did not 
spare Nigeria border clashes with neighboring Cameroon and Chad, 
peacekeeping deployments to Chad and Liberia, a leadership role 
in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
peacekeeping force in Liberia, or strategic maneuvering against 
France and South Africa in Equatorial Guinea. 

Nigeria's armed forces, estimated to be at least 94,500 in 1990, 
and among the largest in Africa, were modest in relation to the 
country's territory, population, and economic resources. The diver- 
sity of foreign-origin armaments reduced dependence on any sin- 
gle supplier but imposed significant logistical constraints; a fledgling 
domestic arms industry had also been established. Nigeria acquired 
naval, amphibious, and airlift forces and created a rapid deploy- 
ment force for African contingencies, thus confirming its inten- 
tion and capacity for power projection abroad. Externally, therefore, 
Nigeria remained basically secure and its defenses adequate. 

The same could not be said, however, about internal security. 
A political formula for stability continued to elude successive Nigeri- 
an governments, economic and social conditions worsened during 
the 1980s, and the military became entrenched as the ultimate ar- 
biter of power. Indeed, the future role of the military and the fear 
of coups, resulting especially from radicalization of frustrated junior 
officers and soldiers, haunted Babangida's regime as it attempted 
to create a durable constitutional government in a highly uncer- 
tain political environment. Ethnic, sectional, and religious cleavages 
marked the underlying political fault lines, from which the mili- 
tary itself was not immune, and organized labor and students con- 
tinued to be the agents of public discontent. These internal sources 
of instability could be incited or intensified by an array of external 
forces, such as foreign subversion, oil prices, and foreign debt. To 



256 



National Security 



make matters worse, the national police and criminal justice sys- 
tem were strained beyond capacity. Crime was increasing, prisons 
were grossly overpopulated, and military rule by decree bred hu- 
man rights abuses that were the object of public and international 
reproach. 

On balance, one could find grounds for either optimism or pes- 
simism about Nigeria's national security prospects. Indeed, there 
was an essential ambivalence among Nigerians and observers alike 
about the state's increasing autonomy and capability amidst coun- 
tervailing threat perceptions. An increasing sense of national 
"manifest destiny" was thus tempered by limited capacity, and 
Nigeria's international power remained more potential than actual. 
Whether Nigeria would become more activist, interventionist, or 
assert overweening regional hegemony remained contingent on 
many external factors, such as its threat perceptions, the degree 
of regional stability, and the regional distribution of military capa- 
bilities. Much also depended on how well Nigeria coped with its 
social and economic crises, on the process and outcome of restora- 
tion of civilian rule, and, ultimately, on the political disposition 
and competence of the military. 

National Security Issues and Perceptions 

Safeguarding the sovereign independence and territorial integrity 
of the state was the central pillar of Nigerian national security policy. 
Other guiding principles were African unity and independence, 
nonintervention in the internal affairs of other states, and region- 
al economic development and security cooperation. Subordinate 
goals included military self-sufficiency and regional leadership. In 
pursuing these goals, Nigeria was diplomatic and flexible, but it 
employed coercive methods or measured force when necessary. 
Nigeria was an active participant in the United Nations (UN), the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU), and ECOWAS. In 1990 
the leadership seemed intent on retrenchment, according priority 
to domestic political and economic problems, and displayed a ma- 
ture and conciliatory approach to foreign policy (see Foreign Re- 
lations, ch. 4). 

Nigeria's location on the Gulf of Guinea, straddling western and 
equatorial Africa, its long land and coastal boundaries, and its off- 
shore oil deposits defined the country's regional geostrategic situ- 
ation (see fig. 1). A British colonial background set it apart from 
its francophone neighbors, an historical anomaly that affected the 
local security milieu. Nigeria's relations with the major powers were 
shaped, in the case of Britain and France, largely by this postcolonial 
heritage. A short-lived defense pact with Britain after independence 



257 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

was terminated in 1962. In the case of the superpowers, whose in- 
terests in the region until the late 1980s were functions of their global 
rivalry and resource needs, Lagos deliberately balanced its rela- 
tions with Washington and Moscow. 

Nigeria's security concerns and threat perceptions emanated from 
many quarters. The country's dependence on the production and 
export of oil was aggravated by naval deployments of the major 
powers along the maritime transit routes of the South Atlantic and 
the Gulf of Guinea. Its experience of incursions by neighbors, cou- 
pled with fears of foreign influence or of subversion of neighbors 
by such potential adversaries as France, Libya, and South Africa, 
heightened Lagos 's sensitivities about border security. Regional 
conditions also produced a sense of isolation and uncertainty, par- 
ticularly shifts in the balance of power across northern Africa, po- 
litical instability in West Africa, and encirclement by relatively weak 
francophone states with residual or formal defense ties to their 
former colonial power. More generally, conflicts throughout Africa 
and the related propensity for great power intervention (for exam- 
ple, in Chad, Zaire, Angola, and Ethiopia) and occasional erup- 
tions of radicalization or militant pan- Africanism were inimical to 
Nigeria's interest. Finally, South Africa's apartheid policy, regional 
dominance in the continent, and nuclear capability constituted 
threats to Nigeria's national security goals throughout the 1980s. 
Broadly speaking, therefore, Nigeria's security conditions and con- 
cerns could be grouped into three separate but related categories: 
local and bilateral, African and regional, and global. 

Local and Bilateral Issues 

Oil was the most important single factor in Nigerian economic 
life throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. Consequently, the 
exploitation and protection of oil deposits and of distribution infra- 
structure (including about 5,500 kilometers of pipelines), concen- 
trated offshore in the southeast, were inextricably linked to national 
security. Nigeria's recognition of this vulnerability was magnified 
by its conflict with Cameroon over contested offshore oil rights. 
On the other hand, Nigeria could and did use its "oil weapon" 
against Ghana, Chad, and European companies by cutting off oil 
supplies to induce compliance with its demands. 

Nigeria's 853-kilometer irregular coastiine boasted several major 
port complexes. Such seaward assets served to justify the notable 
expansion of Nigeria's naval capabilities (see fig. 13; Navy, this ch.). 

Border security with each of its neighbors was a constant problem 
for Nigeria. The Nigeria-Benin Joint Border Commission was re- 
activated in 1981 to deal with minor incursions by Beninese troops 



258 



National Security 



and with increased smuggling into Nigeria. In 1986, in response 
to increasing clashes between communities along the Benin bor- 
der, Nigeria decided to establish about 100 additional border posts 
staffed by customs and immigration officials. A major conference 
on Nigeria-Benin border cooperation in Lagos in 1 988 agreed that 
proper border demarcation would help control smuggling, illegal 
aliens, and harassment of people. In September 1988, the presi- 
dents of the two nations agreed to relax formalities so that their 
respective local authorities could establish direct contacts on ille- 
gal immigration and on traffic matters. In April 1989, Lagos be- 
gan a yearlong effort to survey the 773-kilometer border with Benin. 

Illegal immigrants and smuggling from Niger, with which Nigeria 
shared a 1 ,497 -kilometer border, posed perennial problems. In April 
1984, Nigeria recalled all its existing currency notes in exchange 
for new notes. This step was designed to preempt the return of 
the old currency, much of which had been smuggled out of the coun- 
try by politicians, and to establish a new baseline for Nigeria's finan- 
cial system that could more readily be monitored. To prevent the 
reentry of the smuggled currency, Nigeria closed all its borders. 
Although gasoline and meat, on which landlocked Niger depend- 
ed, were excepted, Niger lost nearly one-fourth of its 1984 cus- 
toms revenue. Nigeria also resorted to mass deportations of illegal 
aliens in 1983 and 1985, the latter including an estimated 100,000 
Nigerois. A clash occurred near the Borno State border in May 
1989, when Nigerian soldiers and immigration officials investigated 
reported crop damage by a cattle herd from Niger. Many regional 
issues and problems were handled by tripartite meetings of the heads 
of Katsina State and the Maradi and Zinder regions of Niger. 

The approximately eighty-five-kilometer border with Chad 
through Lake Chad witnessed more serious hostilities. Clashes be- 
tween Nigerian and Chadian soldiers in April 1983 resulted in more 
than 100 casualties; the tensions were resolved temporarily by an 
agreement to revive joint border patrols (which had lapsed) and 
to have the four-nation Lake Chad Basin Commission take up bor- 
der security issues and demarcate their common borders. After 
further clashes, however, Nigerian president Shehu Shagari and 
Chadian president Hissein Habre agreed to military disengage- 
ment, to an exchange of prisoners, to reopening the frontier, to 
reactivation of joint frontier patrols, and to a special joint com- 
mission on border demarcation among the states touching on Lake 
Chad. Nigeria postponed reopening the Chad border until Novem- 
ber 1986, eight months after other borders closed in April 1984 
were reopened, to prevent the feared mass influx of refugees from 
that war- torn country. 



259 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



y \ 

: SokotO 



Kano 



Kaduna 
^ # IH! 1st Mechanized 
Infantry Division 

• 4 IHl 3d Armored 
JOS Division 




^ Ibadan 2d Mechanized 
• IHl Infantry Division 



Lagos western 
Naval 
Command 



4- Benin City 



Makurdi 



•Enugu S 

±^i82d (Airbo/rie) 
Division^-' 




/ \ 



Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 



International boundary 
National capital 
Populated place 
Army division 

headquarters 
Air base 
Naval command 

headquarters 
Naval base 



100 



150 Kilometers 



Figure 13. Prinicipal Military Installations, 1990 



Nigeria's longest frontier, the 1 , 690-kilometer border with Camer- 
oon, witnessed several clashes. (Neither Cameroon nor Chad was 
a signatory of the ECOWAS protocols on the free movement of 
community citizens and hence greater border tensions existed be- 
tween these countries and Nigeria.) In 1981 five Nigerian soldiers 
were killed and three wounded when a Cameroonian patrol boat 
fired on a Nigerian vessel off the contested Rio-del-Rey area, which 
was thought to be rich in oil, gas, and uranium deposits. Coming 
in the wake of an incursion by Beninese troops, this incident pro- 
voked public demands for compensation, for punitive measures, 
and even for war. The crisis was settled peaceably; tensions along 
the frontier continued, however, and in May 1987, Cameroonian 
gendarmes allegedly occupied sixteen border villages in Borno State 
until repulsed by Nigerian army units. Lagos issued orders to state 



260 



National Security 



governors "to take military reprisals against any belligerent neigh- 
boring country," and tension remained high until Babangida's De- 
cember visit to Yaounde, capital of Cameroon, yielded mutual 
pledges of steps to prevent a recurrence of border clashes, includ- 
ing joint border patrols. In October 1989, Cameroonian gendarmes 
allegedly abducted four Nigerian customs officials on routine border 
patrol duties. In mid- 1990 boundary demarcation was still in 
process, and minor clashes between border residents and transients 
continued. Deeper divisions were apparent when Yaounde media 
charged Nigerian agitators with instigating illegal demonstrations 
in Bamenda and at Yaounde University in May 1990 and with 
seeking to incite a popular revolt; the Nigerian media made counter- 
charges that Nigerians were being systematically harassed, detained, 
tortured, or murdered by Cameroonian security forces. 

Nigeria took several measures during the 1980s to improve and 
to strengthen overall border management. After the 1981 clash with 
Cameroon, Nigeria decided to fence its entire international bound- 
ary, to enclose each border beacon, and to augment its immigra- 
tion staff by 1,000. In the mid-1980s, Nigeria's 2,100 immigration 
officers were given a four- week weapons training course, new border 
posts were established, and modern border-patrol and surveillance 
equipment was procured. The 1984 border closure was designed 
to control widespread currency trafficking and smuggling. The 
borders reopened only after Nigeria set up trade corridors and joint 
border patrols with its neighbors and began a program to strengthen 
and expand customs and patrol posts. In late 1986, after signing 
phase two of the ECOWAS protocols on free movement of com- 
munity citizens, Nigeria said it would deploy immigration officers 
to each local government to regulate movement in and out of the 
country and proposed to open 100 new control posts — there had 
been 45. In addition, Lagos planned to purchase aircraft, helicop- 
ters, boats, vehicles, and communication and surveillance equip- 
ment; the initial US$13 million phase included 25 speedboats, more 
than 1,400 Land Rovers and patrol cars, and 200 motorcycles. After 
the mid- 1987 clash with Cameroon, the Nigerian army intensified 
its border patrols and considered permanently stationing units on 
the frontiers. 

Finally, in an effort to regularize boundary management, in July 
1988 Babangida appointed a nine-member National Boundaries 
Commission under the chief of General Staff. The commission was 
empowered to coordinate the activities of all agencies involved in 
internal and international borders and to inquire into and to resolve 
any boundary problem or issue between Nigeria and its neigh- 
bors, and between states within the federation. The president also 



261 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



announced a five-year plan to demarcate, survey, and map all bor- 
ders, and the establishment of joint boundary commissions with 
each of Nigeria's neighbors. 

To bolster its influence and prestige, Nigeria also engaged in 
bilateral military cooperation programs with African states. For 
example, in 1977 Ghana and Nigeria set up a joint committee for 
military cooperation under which ten Nigerian officers attended 
each session of the Ghana Senior Staff College's yearlong course. 
Nigeria also supplied twelve combat-capable L-39 training aircraft 
to Ghana in 1990. Likewise, in 1979 Nigeria and Benin conclud- 
ed an agreement providing for joint border patrols and for Beninese 
to attend Nigerian military training institutions. Military cooper- 
ation with Togo included sending Nigerian army units and jet air- 
craft to Lome's national parade in January 1988. Nigeria also 
participated in the eight-nation Commonwealth of Nations team 
formed to retrain the Ugandan army in 1982, after President Mil- 
ton Obote's return to power. Military training was also provided 
to Zimbabwe and Botswana. Since 1986 military personnel from 
Equatorial Guinea have attended Nigerian military academies and 
trained with Nigerian forces, and Nigerians have manned one of 
the Equatorial Guinea patrol boats. 

France was Nigeria's only perceived extracontinental threat. The 
validity of that perception varied over time and was based on several 
factors including Nigeria's own strategic vision. Paris disregarded 
African and world opinion by conducting atomic tests in the Sa- 
hara Desert in the early 1960s. Particularly galling to Nigeria was 
France's recognition of secessionist Biafra, a move joined by franco- 
phone Ivory Coast and Gabon, two of France's closest African 
allies. Nigeria believed that France's close cultural, political, eco- 
nomic, and military ties with its former colonies perpetuated 
metropolitan loyalties at the expense of inter- African identity and 
ties. Its pervasive economic ties stymied efforts toward self-reliance 
and regional economic integration, such as ECOWAS. Further- 
more, France maintained defense pacts with several West African 
states; stationed troops permanendy in Senegal, Chad, Ivory Coast, 
Gabon, and Central African Republic; and intervened directly to 
make or break local regimes. Paris was also seen as the spearhead 
of Western security interests and interventions in local African con- 
flicts, such as in Zaire and Chad, thus thwarting the emergence 
of African collective security arrangements. In short, France's 
hegemonic interests and regional penetration constrained Nigeria 
politically and strategically, frustrating its ' 'natural" emergence 
as the preeminent regional power. The Nigerian government never 
explicitly articulated this threat assessment, but such concerns 



262 



National Security 



underlay its regional policies. However, the convergence of French 
and Nigerian interests in containing Libya, stabilizing Chad, and 
expanding economic ties reduced mutual anxieties after the 
mid-1980s. 

Libya and South Africa were the only perceived continental 
threats. Both were geographically remote, and their threats emanated 
more from their peculiar regimes than from underlying historical 
or geopolitical rivalry. In the 1980s, Libya's military intervention 
in Chad and subversive activities in Nigeria and neighboring states, 
often through the agency of illegal immigrants, strained relations 
with Nigeria. Although relations improved after Babangida's visit to 
Tripoli in mid- 1988, Nigeria remained wary of the unpredictable 
Muammar al Qadhafi. 

South Africa was a perpetual security concern until the late 1980s. 
Its apartheid regime deeply offended African dignity and was seen 
as the root cause of regional insecurity. In 1985 the Nigerian Na- 
tional Petroleum Corporation stopped selling oil to a Swiss-owned 
company suspected of diverting oil to South Africa in contraven- 
tion of UN sanctions. Pretoria also could pose direct threats to 
Lagos. In 1986 Nigerian army and air force headquarters confirmed 
reported South African plans to attack Nigeria from an unnamed 
neighboring state, widely rumored to be Equatorial Guinea. 
Whether or not such a plot existed, the incident demonstrated 
Nigeria's extreme suspicions of South Africa's intentions. 

Nigeria's handling of the Equatorial Guinea crisis underscored 
its determination to protect its strategic interests against perceived 
threats from both South Africa and France. Relations with this small 
neighboring state had been strained periodically over alleged harass- 
ment and maltreatment of Nigerian migrant laborers. In 1976 
Nigeria evacuated 10,000 of its nationals and later landed a mili- 
tary transport in Malabo, the capital, to demand compensation 
for the death of a Nigerian at the hands of Guinean security per- 
sonnel. In the late 1980s, Nigeria's concerns were heightened by 
French economic penetration and by reports that South Africa had 
established an air base in Malabo, within twenty minutes' strik- 
ing distance of Nigeria. Lagos reacted swiftly to remove these poten- 
tial threats by using both diplomacy and threats. In January 1987, 
at Nigeria's request, Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria agreed to con- 
clude several accords to facilitate and to expand bilateral coopera- 
tion, reaffirmed their shared strategic interests, and signed a defense 
pact. In mid- 1988, however, reports that South Africa had bought 
Nigerian oil through Malabo, was upgrading Malabo's airport, 
and planned secredy to build a satellite tracking station again raised 
Nigeria's fears. Lagos demanded and achieved the expulsion of 



263 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



South Africans from Equatorial Guinea, and Babangida's Janu- 
ary 1990 state visit concluded an effective campaign using diplo- 
matic pressure and military and economic aid to solidify ties with 
Malabo at the expense of South African and French interests. 
However, South Africa's decided shift toward regional peace and 
domestic reform, including progressive dismantling of apartheid, 
substantially reduced Nigerian security concerns from that quarter. 

African and Regional Issues 

Nigeria has been a leading spokesman on African security is- 
sues, such as internal and interstate conflicts, foreign intervention, 
colonialism, and regional defense arrangements. It supported the 
strengthening of the OAU and the use of diplomacy to resolve intra- 
African conflicts, and it played an active role in continental secu- 
rity issues. The Nigerian head of state, Lieutenant General Oluse- 
gun Obasanjo, and Mali's president, Colonel Moussa Traore, 
undertook a mission in 1980 on behalf of the OAU's "committee 
of wise men" to mediate the Western Sahara dispute. Complain- 
ing of Moroccan inflexibility, Nigeria withdrew from the OAU Im- 
plementation Committee on Western Sahara and recognized the 
Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic in 1984. Obasanjo also accused 
Tanzania of setting "a dangerous precedent of unimaginable con- 
sequences" by overturning Idi Amin's regime in Uganda and by 
starting the conflict between the two countries. Although Nigeria 
steadfastly opposed foreign interference in Africa, it acknowledged 
Zaire's right to call on French and Belgian paratroopers during 
the 1978 crisis in Shaba Region, Zaire. Obasanjo gave qualified 
endorsement to Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola because 
they had been invited "to assist in the liberation struggle and the 
consolidation of national independence," but he warned that "they 
should not overstay their welcome." 

Nigeria actively participated in OAU discussions on the forma- 
tion of a pan- African defense force, to be either a peacekeeping 
force on the UN model for African interstate conflicts or an Afri- 
can high command to defend African states against outside pow- 
ers and South African aggression. In 1972 Nigeria proposed 
formation of a joint African military task force to which all OAU 
members would contribute. It would be stationed in independent 
states bordering the Portuguese colonies to defend sanctuaries and 
rear areas of the liberation movements and to defend independent 
host states from colonialist attacks. In 1981 Nigeria hosted an emer- 
gency summit of the southern Africa frontline states that called on 
all OAU members to extend urgent assistance, especially military 
aid, to Angola to repel South African forces. The concept of an 



264 



National Security 



African high command has not gained widespread support, 
however. Some African states advocated a mission limited to defense 
against racist and imperialist threats, but not intra- African con- 
flicts or insurgencies within independent African states. Others ar- 
gued for a continental military command to deter external attacks, 
to intervene in domestic disorders to prevent or suppress military 
coups, and to counter South African forces. 

Although Africa lacked a continent-wide collective security sys- 
tem, both informal and formal regional mutual defense arrange- 
ments have developed. Nigeria participated in the defense pact of 
the sixteen-nation ECOWAS, the only regional economic organi- 
zation with such a collective security arrangement. 

ECOWAS was established by a treaty ratified by fifteen states 
in May 1975 — Cape Verde joined in 1977 — to promote trade, eco- 
nomic development, and cooperation in West Africa. In 1978 ECO- 
WAS adopted a nonaggression protocol, and in 1981 thirteen of 
its members signed a mutual defense pact providing for collective 
military response against attack from non-EC O WAS countries, 
mediation and peacekeeping missions in the event of armed con- 
flict between member states, and defense against external states 
that initiate or support insurgencies within member states. It also 
provided for a Defence Council, a Defence Commission, and joint 
exercises, but no standing regional force or command structure. 
ECOWAS has a mixed record in mediating disputes between mem- 
ber states, particularly in attempting to resolve the civil war in Li- 
beria. An ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) 
comprising about 8,000 troops led by Nigeria was dispatched to 
Liberia in August 1990. It succeeded in implementing a cease-fire 
agreement between the main rival factions and in appointing an 
interim president. 

In this loosely structured defense system, only Nigeria's armed 
forces had the size, experience, equipment, and logistical resources 
to provide or serve as the core of an ECOWAS rapid deployment 
force. On the other hand, ECOWAS members were wary of Nige- 
ria's aspirations to regional dominance. Many francophone states 
had long-standing military aid and security agreements with France, 
and seven of them were already parties to the nonaggression and 
mutual defense pact of the francophone West African Economic 
Community (Communaute Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest — 
CEAO). Moreover, many ECOWAS members, including Nige- 
ria, had found bilateral and less formal means to pursue their region- 
al security objectives, sometimes under the auspices of ECOWAS. 
For example, Nigeria and Guinea were mandated in 1986 to medi- 
ate between Liberia and Sierra Leone after Liberia had closed its 



265 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



border in the wake of a coup attempt allegedly launched from Sierra 
Leone. In mid- 1990 Babangida also offered to mediate Liberia's 
civil war within the ECOWAS framework, but at the same time 
Nigeria was reportedly arming the armed forces of Liberia that 
supported President Samuel K. Doe (killed in September 1990) 
against the rebels. Although Nigeria's creation of a rapid deploy- 
ment force during 1988-89 suggested its intent to rely on unilateral 
means to intervene in regional crises, it did not rule out participa- 
tion in multilateral deployments (see Army, this ch.). Indeed, the 
history of Nigeria's participation in international peacekeeping mis- 
sions was second to none among African states. 

In the late 1980s, ECOWAS became the focus of regional efforts 
to deal with emerging environmental and security threats posed 
by toxic waste, international smuggling, and narcotics trafficking. 
Two incidents affecting Nigeria attracted international attention. 
In May 1988, after an Italian ship dumped toxic industrial waste 
at the port of Koko in Bendel State, Nigerian authorities evacuated 
the local population and seized the ship until the waste was removed 
by the Italian government. In October 1989, Nigeria ordered out 
of its territorial waters a Greek ship allegedly carrying frozen meat 
contaminated by nuclear fallout from Chernobyl', Soviet Union. 
At the eleventh ECOWAS summit in June 1988, chaired by Baban- 
gida, members agreed to make the dumping of toxic and nuclear 
waste in the region a criminal offense and approved a Nigerian 
plan to set up a "dump watch' ' alert and information-sharing sys- 
tem. Babangida also urged ECOWAS members to set up mechan- 
isms to counter smuggling. 

Nigeria's most significant regional deployments were its inter- 
cession in the complex Chadian and Liberian civil wars, experiences 
fraught with lessons for future African peacekeeping missions. In 
1979 it mediated between rival Chadian factions and Libya at two 
conferences in Kano and sent an 850-member peacekeeping force 
to N'Djamena to police the cease-fire. However, within three 
months Nigeria was asked to evacuate after a dispute about com- 
pliance with Chadian government orders. Nigeria hosted a sum- 
mit in August 1980, at which all eleven rival Chadian groups 
entered into the Lagos Accord on National Reconciliation in Chad. 
Conditions continued to deteriorate, however, as Libyan interven- 
tion persisted and as French troops pulled out. A summit of four 
African presidents in May 1981 failed to find a formula for Libyan 
withdrawal and for introduction of an African peacekeeping force. 
France urged Nigeria and friendly francophone states to consti- 
tute an OAU-sponsored joint force having logistical support from 
France. 



266 



National Security 



In November 1981, six African states — Nigeria, Senegal, Zaire, 
Benin, Togo, and Guinea — pledged to form a joint 6,000-member 
force under a Nigerian commander. Financial constraints prevented 
half of them from meeting their commitments, and only Senegal, 
Zaire, and Nigeria provided troops for this second Chadian oper- 
ation. Lagos had to bear most of the burden, including provision 
of three of the five army units and the airlift and logistical units 
the others failed to provide. Worse still, the mission itself failed. 
The OAU's inability to affect internal Chadian politics, the delayed 
deployment of the ill-equipped force, and its limited, uncertain man- 
date left Nigeria in a difficult military situation. Habre's forces en- 
tered the capital victoriously in June 1982. This episode undermined 
military and popular confidence in the government of Shagari and 
contributed to its downfall. Although stung by this experience, 
Nigeria continued to pursue its security interests in Chad by ac- 
tive diplomacy, including mediation between Chad and Libya. 

In the case of Liberia, when the seven-nation ECOWAS medi- 
ation committee failed to end the three-way civil war, ECOWAS 
decided to send a peacekeeping force, ECOMOG, in August 1990. 
Nigeria's 5,000 troops, logistical support, and naval and air force 
units provided the bulk of this five-nation effort. Thousands of Ni- 
gerians were evacuated from the war-torn country, but ECOMOG' s 
mission as a neutral peacekeeping force was soon compromised. 
Nigerian units became embroiled in the conflict, which spilled over 
into Sierra Leone, staging point for the ECOMOG operation. At 
least 500 fresh Nigerian troops were then deployed to Sierra Leone 
to defend the supply lines and assist the Sierra Leone army in fend- 
ing off Liberian rebel incursions. 

Nigeria has been in the vanguard of African support for the liber- 
ation of southern Africa and defense of the frontline states. It was 
one of the most consistent and generous providers of political, finan- 
cial, and material assistance to the Namibian liberation movement, 
the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), includ- 
ing substantial support to help organize pre-independence elections. 
Nigeria donated several million dollars' worth of military and finan- 
cial aid to the African National Congress in its struggle against 
South Africa's apartheid regime. Nigeria also sent military equip- 
ment to Mozambique, which was attempting to suppress South 
African-backed Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana (Renamo) 
guerrillas. 

Global Interests 

Nigeria's global interests and roles were demonstrated in different 
ways, most notably in its contribution of military units to several 



267 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

UN peacekeeping missions, its leadership in various international 
fora, and its participation in the global nuclear nonproliferation 
movement. Nigeria's only foreign military deployments other than 
its border clashes with Chad and Cameroon have been multilateral 
missions. Nigerian units took part in operations beyond the colo- 
ny's borders in both world wars. Since independence, Nigeria has 
proudly boasted Africa's longest and most distinguished record of 
participation in UN peacekeeping operations. Nigeria dispatched 
two infantry divisions under UN command to Congo in the early 
1960s, and a battalion to Tanzania after the 1964 mutiny. It also 
contributed to the UN India-Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM) 
in 1965, the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 1978, 
and the UN observer mission to oversee the Iran-Iraq cease-fire 
and the Angola-Namibia accords in 1988. For reasons of internal 
politics and security, however, Nigeria did not send troops to par- 
ticipate in the 1990 Persian Gulf war. All told, Nigeria has con- 
tributed about 16,000 troops to UN peacekeeping functions. Nigeria 
also called for a permanent African seat on the UN Security 
Council. 

Nigeria's internationalism also was manifest in its initiative to 
create a Concert of Medium Powers among nonaligned states in 
March 1987, at which Nigeria was appointed chair of the group 
and coordinator of its program. Also known as the Lagos Forum, 
the group held a September 1987 meeting attended by more than 
twenty countries. Nigeria also hosted the second meeting of the 
twenty- three-nation Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South 
Atlantic in July 1990. 

Nuclear nonproliferation was another important global security 
issue for Nigeria. Lagos signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
on the day it was opened for signature in 1968 and has made 
proposals at the UN for an African nuclear-free zone. Nigeria has 
made clear, however, that its continued nuclear forbearance is con- 
tingent on other signatories honoring their obligations and on the 
behavior of nonsignatories, such as South Africa. Various Nigerian 
academicians and officials have spoken in favor of keeping open 
or even of exercising the military "nuclear option" to enhance Nige- 
ria's power and prestige and to avoid nuclear blackmail by South 
Africa, Libya, or the superpowers. In early 1988, Nigeria signed a 
safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
ensuring peaceful uses of its nuclear reactor project. 

Armed Forces 

Although the military history of the West African region extends 
back a millennium or more, Nigeria's present-day armed forces, 



268 



National Security 



like those of most African states, are the direct descendants of colonial 
military units. The officer corps was made fully indigenous by the 
mid-1960s, and in 1990 the Nigerian armed forces were among the 
largest and most professional in Africa. The military and political 
functions and international peacekeeping roles of the armed forces 
have expanded significantly but remained subject to several con- 
straints. Nigeria was still heavily dependent on foreign arms but 
had embarked on a program of military industrialization. Volun- 
tary military service and a large demographic base made recruit- 
ment easy, and training was highly professional. Nigeria's long-term 
challenge was to define its strategic interests and military missions 
more precisely and to achieve an appropriate modernized force struc- 
ture to meet them. 

Early Development 

The Nigerian army traces its historical origins to three nineteenth- 
century military formations. The first dates from the establishment 
in 1862 by Captain John Glover of a small Hausa militia (dubbed 
Glover's Hausas) to defend the British colony of Lagos. Its mission 
was expanded to include imperial defense when dispatched to the 
Gold Coast during the Asante expedition of 1873-74. Enlarged and 
officially entitled the Hausa Constabulary in 1879, this unit per- 
formed both police and military duties until 1895, when an indepen- 
dent Hausa Force was carved out of the constabulary and given 
exclusively military functions. This demographic recruitment base 
perpetuated the use of Hausa as the lingua franca of command in 
Ghana and Nigeria, where it persisted into the 1950s. It also marked 
the historical origin of the ethnic imbalance that has characterized the 
Nigerian armed forces to this day (see Regional Groupings, ch. 2). 

In addition to the Hausa Constabulary, the Royal Niger Com- 
pany Constabulary was raised in 1888 to protect British interests 
in Northern Nigeria. It later provided the nucleus of the Northern 
Nigeria Regiment of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF). 
A third formation, the Oil Rivers Irregulars, was created during 
1891-92; it was later redesignated the Niger Coast Constabulary 
and formed the basis of the WAFF's Southern Nigeria Regiment. 

In 1897 WAFF was founded under the command of Colonel 
Frederick (later Lord) Lugard to counter French encroachments 
from the north. By 1901 WAFF was an interterritorial force com- 
posed of the Nigeria and Gold Coast regiments, the Sierra Leone 
Battalion, and the Gambia Company, and commanded by a small 
number of British army officers and noncommissioned officers 
seconded to the force. WAFF was under the Colonial Office in Lon- 
don, but each regiment was commanded by an officer responsible 



269 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

directly to the local colonial governor. The two regiments were con- 
solidated into the Nigeria Regiment of the WAFF when the North- 
ern and Southern Nigeria Protectorates were amalgamated on 
January 1, 1914 (see Unification of Nigeria, ch. 1). These colonial 
units fought in World War I, in the German colonies of Camer- 
oons and Togoland, and in German East Africa. In 1928 the WAFF 
became the Royal West African Frontier Force, and in 1939 con- 
trol of RWAFF shifted from the Colonial Office to the War Office. 

In 1930 the Nigeria Regiment had about 3,500 men. During 
the 1930s, as part of a RWAFF reorganization, its four battalions 
were reorganized into six, and the colony was divided into north- 
ern and southern commands; major units were at Sokoto, Kano, 
Zaria, Kaduna, Maiduguri, Yola, Enugu, and Calabar. Although 
Hausa and their language predominated in the infantry and general 
support units, specialists were recruited mainly from the south. For 
example, the signals company required fluency in English, so Yoruba 
were recruited for that unit. 

In World War II, Nigerians saw action in Kenya and the Italian 
East Africa and Burma campaigns, and Nigeria was the assembly 
and training site for the two West African divisions dispatched to 
Burma. In 1941 auxiliary groups, consisting of 630 porters or- 
ganized into three companies for each infantry brigade, were also 
formed. After the war, the auxiliaries were disbanded, but some 
locally recruited carriers continued to be employed. In the 1950s, 
expansion to a two-brigade army was undertaken, and specialized 
combat and service units such as light artillery, communications, 
signals, medical, engineers, and motor transport were formed. 

In the postwar years, RWAFF resumed its primary mission of 
internal security. Nigerian units undertook police actions and puni- 
tive expeditions to break strikes, to control local disturbances, to 
enforce tax collection, and to support police anticrime operations. 
They also mounted a major internal security operation in the 
southern part of British Cameroons to counter secessionists rebel- 
ling against colonial authority. 

In 1956 the Nigeria Regiment was renamed the Nigerian Mili- 
tary Forces, RWAFF, and in April 1958 the colonial government 
of Nigeria took over from the War Office control of the Nigerian 
Military Forces. Africanization of the officer corps began slowly 
but accelerated through the 1950s. The first Nigerian officer was 
appointed in 1948; by independence in 1960, there were eighty- 
two Nigerian officers, mostly Igbo from the southeast. This ethnic 
imbalance within the officer corps contrasted with that in the rank 
and file, where northerners predominated. 



270 



National Security 



Constitutional and Political Framework 

Section 197 of the 1979 constitution provides for establishing, 
equipping, and maintaining an army, a navy, an air force, and 
"any other branches of the armed forces" deemed necessary for 
defending against external aggression, for ensuring territorial in- 
tegrity and security of the nation's land, sea, and airspace, for sup- 
pressing insurrection and aiding civil authorities when so directed 
by the president, and for performing other such functions as may 
be legally prescribed. The president, as commander in chief of the 
armed forces, is empowered to determine their operational use and 
to appoint the chief of the Defence Staff and the heads of the mili- 
tary services. Section 265 authorizes the president, subject to 
parliamentary action under certain conditions, to issue a procla- 
mation of emergency only when the federation is at war, in immi- 
nent danger of invasion or involvement in war, in cases of natural 
disaster or an actual or imminent breakdown of public order and 
public safety. 

The regime of General Muhammadu Buhari (which held power 
for twenty months from December 1983), in Decree Number 1, 
suspended and modified parts of the constitution to empower the 
FMG to issue decrees signed with the force of law. It also vested 
all executive authority in the head of the FMG, who exercised it 
in consultation with the Supreme Military Council (SMC). The 
SMC was composed of the head of the FMG as president of the 
council; the chief of staff, Supreme Headquarters; the minister of 
defense; the chiefs of the army, navy, and air staffs; the general 
officers commanding the four army divisions; the commander of 
the Artillery Command; the attorney general; the inspector general 
of police; six other appointed senior military officers; and other 
members that the SMC might appoint. Its principal functions were 
to determine national policy on major issues and on all constitu- 
tional and national security matters and to appoint and to ratify 
appointments of top government, military, and public officials. 

A National Council of States, composed essentially of the same 
officials as the SMC except for the line military commanders, was 
also established. Finally, Decree Number 1 provided for a National 
Defence and Security Council, which, under the direction of the 
SMC, was responsible for matters of defense and public security. 
This council, which replaced the National Defence Council of the 
Second Republic, had as its members the head of the FMG as chair- 
man; the chief of staff, Supreme Headquarters; the ministers of 
defense, of external affairs, and of internal affairs; the three ser- 
vice chiefs of staff; the director general of the Nigerian Security 



271 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



Organisation; the inspector general of police; and others appointed 
ad hoc by the head of the FMG. 

After ousting Buhari on August 27, 1985, General Babangida 
issued Decree Number 1 7 , amending Decree Number 1 to estab- 
lish the institutional basis of his regime. In place of the title head 
of the FMG, Babangida assumed the new dual title of president 
and commander in chief of the armed forces. A chief of General 
Staff, General Staff Headquarters, replaced the chief of staff, 
Supreme Headquarters; the minister of defense was also chairman, 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Buhari 's Federal Executive Council was 
replaced by the Council of Ministers. The Armed Forces Ruling 
Council (AFRC), which replaced the SMC, originally had an en- 
larged all-service membership of nearly thirty, consisting of the same 
functional posts as the SMC plus the flag officers commanding the 
Eastern Naval Command, the Western Naval Command, and the 
Naval Training Command; the air officers commanding the Train- 
ing, Tactical Air, and Logistics commands; and twelve other ap- 
pointed senior military officers. In February 1989, however, 
Babangida reconstituted the AFRC with only nineteen members. 
The National Council of State (thus renamed) and the National 
Defence Council and National Security Council, separated into two 
bodies, were retained. In the December 1989 government reorgani- 
zation, Babangida assumed the defense portfolio but assigned the 
functions of chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the chief of army 
staff (see fig. 14). In September 1990, the Supreme Headquarters 
was replaced by the Defence Headquarters, and large-scale re- 
assignments and retirements of senior army, navy, and air force 
officers occurred. Babangida simultaneously relinquished the post 
of minister of defense to General Sanni Abacha, who also assumed 
the new position of chief of Defence Staff. 

Organization, Mission, and Order of Battle 

Nigeria's armed forces, sharply reduced from about 300,000 after 
the 1967-70 civil war (see Civil War, ch. 1) and undergoing con- 
tinuing reductions into the 1990s, included the army, the navy (in- 
cluding coast guard), and the air force. Estimates of its size in late 
1990 ranged from 94,500 to well over 100,000. In addition to mili- 
tary personnel, the defense establishment employed about 25,000 
civilians. The military head of state, as commander in chief, exer- 
cised his authority through the AFRC , and operationally through 
the minister of defense and chief of Defence Staff, and the chiefs 
of staff of the three armed services. In September 1990, the post 
of chief of Defence Staff was elevated to full general and the ser- 
vice chiefs were also upgraded. The post of chief of General Staff, 



272 



National Security 



General Staff Headquarters, created after the August 1985 coup, 
was a political rather than a military post. It was abolished in Sep- 
tember 1990, and its incumbent, Vice Admiral Augustus Aikhomu, 
was appointed to the new position of vice president. The National 
Defence Council and the National Security Council were respon- 
sible for deliberating on strategic national and international issues 
affecting the political stability or security of Nigeria and the region. 
Their specific functions were thought to include threat assessment, 
overall defense planning, coordination of military procurement, 
and joint operations. In 1989 a 265-member Armed Forces Con- 
sultative Assembly consisting of battalion commanders and above, 
their equivalents in all services, and selected staff officers was in- 
augurated to discuss military matters, meeting perhaps quarterly 
(see fig. 15). 

The armed forces' missions and roles were to defend the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation and other African 
states against external aggression; and to contribute to international 
peace and security through service in multilateral peacekeeping 
operations of the UN, the OAU, ECOWAS, or other prospective 
pan- African military operations. They also were charged with sup- 
porting and reinforcing the border security efforts of the immigra- 
tion and customs departments, with providing internal security in 
support of the police and local law enforcement authorities, and 
with contributing to nation building through inculcation of patri- 
otism and technical skills. 

Army 

In preparation for the restoration of civilian rule in 1979, speci- 
fied geographic areas of responsibility defined from north to south 
were assigned to the army's three infantry divisions. By design these 
divisional areas cut across ethnic, regional, and state boundaries, 
thus denying division commanders a ready base for political mobili- 
zation. Each division had a mobile brigade as a protective screen 
for the capital. A fourth formation, composed mostly of logistical 
units, was deployed around Lagos. 

By 1990 the army, which numbered at least 80,000, had been 
restructured into four divisions to accommodate the formation of 
an airborne division in 1981. The First Mechanized Infantry Di- 
vision, headquartered at Kaduna, had brigades at Sokoto, Kano, 
and Minna. The Second Mechanized Infantry Division was head- 
quartered at Ibadan. The Third Armored Division was based at 
Jos, with one mechanized and two armored brigades. The Eighty- 
second (Airborne) Division, stationed at Enugu in the southeast, 
had three brigades (airborne, airmobile, and amphibious) to defend 



273 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



PRESIDENT 




COMMANDER IN CHIEF 




OF THE ARMED FORCES 





MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 



_ARMY_ _ 
CHIEF OF 
ARMY STAFF* 



1ST MECHANIZED 
INFANTRY DIVISION 
(KADUNA) 



2D MECHANIZED 
INFANTRY DIVISION 
(IBADAN) 



3D ARMORED 
DIVISION 
(JOS) 



82D (AIRBORNE) 
DIVISION 
(ENUGU) 



_NAVY__ 
CHIEF OF 
NAVAL STAFF 



FLAG OFFICER 
COMMANDING, 
WESTERN 
COMMAND 
(LAGOS) 



FLAG OFFICER 
COMMANDING, 
EASTERN 
COMMAND 
(CALABAR) 



ARTILLERY 
COMMAND 



FLAG OFFICER 
COMMANDING, 
NAVAL TRAINING 
COMMAND 



GUARD 
BRIGADE 



The chief of army staff also serves as chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. 



_AmjORCE_ 
CHIEF OF 
AIR STAFF 



TACTICAL AIR 
COMMAND 
(MAKURDI) 



TRAINING 
COMMAND 
(KADUNA) 



LOGISTICS 
COMMAND 
(IKEJA) 



AIRLIFT 
COMMAND 
(IBADAN) 



Figure 14. Organization of the Ministry of Defence and of the Armed Forces, 
1990 



the Cameroon border and for other foreign commitments. Each 
of the four divisions had an artillery and engineering brigade and 
a reconnaissance battalion. Finally, a Guard Brigade of three battal- 
ions and an armored reconnaissance battalion near Lagos provided 
security for army logistical units and the seat of government. The 
guard battalions were rotated periodically, as evidenced by the move 
of the Sixth Guard Battalion from Lagos to Port Harcourt in 
mid- 1986. The guards thwarted the April 1990 coup attempt, los- 
ing five members in defense of Dodan Barracks. The army was 
equipped with tanks and other armored vehicles, and with artillery 
of various kinds (see table 17, Appendix). 

In October 1986, Nigeria announced a plan to set up a reserve 
army under the Directorate of Army Recruitment, Resettlement, 



274 



National Security 



and Reserve. By 1990, however, the reserve force was still in the 
planning stage. Also under consideration for several years was the 
creation of an army light aviation force, for which American Bell 
412 helicopters were being considered. It was not clear whether this 
force was to be part of the new airborne brigade, or another unit. 

In 1989 the army established a rapid deployment force to be used 
for any contingency, particularly in relation to neighboring Afri- 
can countries. This unprecedented formation might have resulted 
from concern about reported South African attempts to gain a 
foothold in Nigeria's "soft underbelly" in Equatorial Guinea, to 
deter such actions in the future, and to ensure combat readiness 
for any foreign contingency. Nigerian spokesmen stressed that the 
force was not intended to intimidate Nigeria's neighbors, but to 
fight external and internal threats. 

The Nigerian army and headquarters were undergoing restruc- 
turing in late 1990. As part of the continuing reorganization, army 
headquarters redesignated and upgraded the authority of the officers 
reporting to the chief of staff. The director of training and opera- 
tions was renamed chief of operations, and the director of staff duties 
and plans was retitled chief of policy and plans. 

Navy 

Nigeria's navy dated to 1914, when the northern and southern 
marine detachments were merged to form the Nigerian Marine 
Department. In 1956 eleven small boats and harbor craft and about 
200 officers and men were transferred from the then defunct Nigeri- 
an Marine to an independent naval force. In 1958 the British Parlia- 
ment formally reconstituted the colony's small Naval Defence Force 
as the Royal Nigerian Navy. The term Royal was dropped when 
Nigeria became a republic. The 1964 Navy Act assigned to the 
navy the tasks of defending territorial waters, of training in naval 
duties, of conducting hydrographic surveys, of assisting in the 
enforcement of customs laws, and of undertaking other missions 
assigned by the government. Its specific tasks in the 1990s included 
defense against seaborne attack and protection of international ship- 
ping, and of offshore oil and sea resources, particularly preven- 
tion or prosecution of illegal bunkering and lifting of petroleum. 

Administrative and operational control of the navy was vested 
in the chief of naval staff (CNS), under the broad policy direction 
of the Navy Board. The latter was composed of the armed forces 
commander in chief as chairman, the chief of General Staff, the 
minister of defense, and the CNS as members, and the director 
general of the Ministry of Defence as secretary. In the late 1980s, 
naval headquarters at Lagos was organized into five staff branches 



275 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



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276 



National Security 



under branch chiefs, who were principal staff officers responsible 
to the CNS: accounts and budget; logistics (responsible for provi- 
sioning, procurement, and maintenance of all equipment and in- 
stallations, with directorates for supply, ship spares, projects, and 
armament supply); materiel; operations (responsible for daily oper- 
ations and training, with directorates for plans, operations, intel- 
ligence, hydrography, and weapons and tactics); and personnel. 
Each directorate was headed by a director whose immediate subor- 
dinates were staff officers. 

During 1990 naval headquarters was restructured into 4 'corps- 
like" organizations. By the end of 1990, five such corps had been 
established: the Fleet Maintenance Corps, the Naval Materiel Sup- 
ply Corps, the Building and Engineering Service Corps, the Naval 
Information Management Corps, and the Naval Ordnance Corps. 
The intent of this reorganization was to make headquarters func- 
tion in a manner that resembled field formations. 

During the 1970s, the navy was organized into three commands: 
the Western Naval Command and the Flotilla Command head- 
quartered at Apapa near Lagos, and the Eastern Naval Command 
based in Calabar. The Flotilla Command was responsible for oper- 
ations and for deployment of warships, the Western Naval Com- 
mand for most of the logistics and repair facilities, and the Eastern 
Naval Command for naval bases and training facilities. The defects 
of this functional type of organization were the vulnerable concen- 
tration of ships and command facilities at Apapa, and the lack of 
warships based in the east where oil resources were concentrated. 
The naval establishment was therefore reorganized in 1983 by 
abolishing the Flotilla Command and by regrouping the warships 
into eastern and western fleets under independent commands. 

In 1990 the navy was composed of the two geographical fleet 
commands and the Naval Training Command (see Training, this 
ch.). The latter, established in November 1986, included all training 
facilities, some of which were collocated with fleet commands. The 
senior Western Naval Command, commanded by a rear admiral, 
had operational responsibility for the area from the Brass River, 
in the Niger Delta, to the border with Benin. Its main shore es- 
tablishments were Nigerian Naval Station (NNS) Olokun; NNS 
Quorra in Apapa; and the Navy Helicopter Squadron, the Naval 
Hospital, the Navy Secondary School, and the Navy Diving School, 
all at Ojo near Lagos. West of the Niger Delta were NNS Umalo- 
kum, an operational base in Warri, which was to be expanded with 
a shipbuilders' workshop and jetties to accommodate ships of up 
to 2,000 deadweight tons; and NNS Uriapele, commissioned in 



277 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

1986 as a logistics base, and the Navy Technical Training Centre, 
both at Sapele. 

The Eastern Naval Command, usually headed by a commodore, 
had operational responsibility from the Brass River to the Camer- 
oon border. Its principal shore establishments were the operation- 
al base NNS Anansa and the Navy Supply School in Calabar. In 
the Port Harcourt area were NNS Akaso at Borokiri, a training 
base; the Nigerian Naval College near Bonny; NNS Okemiri, a 
naval base commissioned in late 1986 in the Port Harcourt area; 
the Navy Hydrographic School at Borokiri; and the Basic Seaman- 
ship Training School in Port Harcourt. Other naval bases were 
located at James Town and Bonny, and a special forces base was 
located on the Escravos River. 

The largest maritime force in West Africa, the Nigerian navy 
had about 500 officers and 4,500 enlisted men and women in 1990. 
Its balanced fleet of modern warships, auxiliaries, and service craft 
was acquired from Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany (West 
Germany), France, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United States. 
The fleet consisted of two frigates, six missile craft, two corvettes, 
eight large patrol craft, forty-one coastal patrol craft, two mine- 
sweepers, two amphibious vessels, and various support ships (see 
table 18, Appendix). However, most ships were in disrepair and 
had not been overhauled since the early 1980s. 

A naval aviation arm was inaugurated in May 1986 with three 
Westiand Lynx Mk 89 MR/SR helicopters for maritime reconnais- 
sance, search and rescue, and antisubmarine warfare; the air arm 
was based at Navytown at Ojo, near Lagos. The first naval air 
station of its kind in black Africa, Navytown provided ground sup- 
port for helicopters deployed aboard the multipurpose frigate flag- 
ship, Aradu. The navy lacked only submarines; negotiations 
reportedly had begun to acquire one, but fiscal constraints precluded 
procurement. The small Nigerian Coast Guard of about eighteen 
patrol craft was controlled and manned by the navy. 

Nigeria increasingly asserted its maritime interests and long-range 
goal of becoming a regional sea power. Although its coastline is 
only 853 kilometers, the seaward environment is of crucial impor- 
tance to the nation's economic life: Nigeria's registered merchant 
marine consisted of about 220 vessels; it accounted for 70 percent 
of seaborne trade in West Africa and Central Africa; and 70 per- 
cent of its petroleum production — oil accounted for about 87 per- 
cent of the country's exports in 1988 — came from six offshore oil 
platforms. Two official acts set forth Nigeria's maritime interests 
and policy. Decree Number 10 of April 1987 promulgated a national 
shipping policy, and the Navy Board's approval of a maritime 



278 



Army Armoured Corps personnel checking vehicles 
Army Signal Corps members testing equipment 
Courtesy Embassy of Nigeria, Washington 



279 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

defense strategy, announced in April 1988, shifted Nigeria's stra- 
tegic focus toward the South Atlantic because of external threats 
to its economic lifeline to the southeast. Operational preparedness 
to carry out this new strategy was demonstrated by the first fleet- 
level exercise involving both the Eastern Naval Command and the 
Western Naval Command in 1987 after a joint training exercise, 
including a cruise to neighboring African states. Nigeria also ex- 
panded international naval cooperation, hosting visits by Brazilian 
task forces in 1985 and 1986, and holding joint naval exercises with 
Brazil in March 1987 to gain experience in antisubmarine warfare. 

Nigerian naval strategists conceptualized the navy's maritime 
mission as defense in depth within three overlapping perimeters. 
Level One, the highest priority, was coastal defense and inshore 
operations involving surveillance, early warning, antismuggling and 
piracy operations; protecting offshore oil installations; search and 
rescue; and policing out to 100 nautical miles. Level Two encom- 
passed the maintenance of a naval presence in the Exclusive Eco- 
nomic Zone (EEZ) for monitoring, policing, and sea control; and 
for coordinating regional efforts, such as prevention of poaching, 
dumping of hazardous materials or toxic waste, and marine 
research. Level Three, the outer ring, involved surveillance, intelli- 
gence-gathering, training and flag-showing cruises; independent 
and joint exercises; and allied operations. 

The navy's maritime defense roles, officially known as the Tri- 
dent Strategy, comprised three elements contributing toward na- 
tional military strategy. The first element was subregional sea 
control to defend Nigeria's national and maritime interests and to 
execute the national shipping policy by protecting sea-lanes. The 
second element, coastal defense, included protection of the coastal 
zone's approaches, territorial waters, and the EEZ. In the third 
element, the navy was to provide adequate sealift and gunfire sup- 
port to the army in amphibious operations. This ambitious strate- 
gy may require increased resources in the future. In an effort to 
increase navy appropriations, in 1988 the service began an impres- 
sive public relations effort, including a ' 'navy-citizens dialogue" 
to promote the navy as a cost-effective investment and publications 
extolling the navy's contributions to national security. It also pub- 
lished in 1 989 a book entitled Sea Power: Agenda for National Survival 
and an article on Nigeria's naval roles and aspirations in the Proceed- 
ings of the United States Naval Institute. In a 1990 article in the 
African Defence Journal, the Nigerian naval information director called 
for strong naval or coastal surveillance capabilities to combat mar- 
itime security threats and to realize "tremendous indirect economic 



280 



Naval gunnery exercise at sea 
Minister of defense and chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff 
observes first Naval Small Arms Competition at Ibadan, 1989. 

Courtesy Embassy of Nigeria, Washington 



281 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

gains" by defending vital maritime and fisheries interests against 
unauthorized foreign exploitation. 

Air Force 

The Nigerian National Assembly approved the creation of an 
air force in 1962, and the government sought assistance initially 
from Ethiopia, India, Britain, the United States, Canada, and par- 
ticularly West Germany. West Germany received a contract in 1963 
to create the Nigerian air force from scratch, including designing 
and setting up its legal and organizational framework; recruiting 
and training personnel; furnishing equipment, supplies, main- 
tenance, and construction services; and providing the first gener- 
ation of twenty Dornier Do- 2 7 liaison/transports and fourteen 
Piaggio 149D primary trainer aircraft. The Nigerian air force 
(NAF) was officially established by the 1964 Air Act, which also 
provided for an air force reserve to which officers and enlisted per- 
sonnel would be transferred on completion of active service. An 
assistance group provided by the West German air force departed 
in 1966, at the onset of the disturbances preceding the civil war, 
leaving behind a fledgling air force of 800 army officers and enlist- 
ed personnel seconded to it. The civil war precipitated a period 
of rapid growth and the first acquisition of combat aircraft, Soviet 
MiG-17Fs, which played substantial roles in the interdiction of gun- 
running and tactical air support to the army. Afterward, the NAF 
undertook a massive relief effort to the former secessionist region. 

From the 1970s onward, the NAF expanded considerably, ac- 
quired a large and diversified inventory of combat and support air- 
craft, and substantially improved its ability to perform its primary 
missions of defending the country's airspace, of supporting the army 
and navy, and of conducting rescue operations over land and sea. 
In 1990 its estimated strength was 9,500 officers and enlisted 
personnel. Nigeria ranked eighth among African states in the 
number of combat aircraft, and sixth in total aircraft; among sub- 
Saharan states, only the South African air force exceeded Nigeria's 
combat aircraft assets. In 1989 the NAF unveiled its first locally 
built trainer aircraft, dubbed the Air Beetle. Training and main- 
tenance deficiencies in the air force, however, resulted in high loss 
of aircraft and pilots. Long-range needs included adequate com- 
munication systems, search and rescue units, improved armament 
storage facilities, strategic fuel reserves, combat training, and 
weapons delivery ranges. 

The NAF was organized into four specialized air commands: 
Tactical Air (headquartered in Makurdi), Training (Kaduna), 
Logistics (Ikeja), and Airlift (Ibadan), which was formed in June 



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1988. There were fifteen major air bases, the largest located at 
Benin, Enugu, Kaduna, Kano, Lagos, Makurdi, and Port Har- 
court. In December 1986, the Tactical Air Command announced 
the establishment of a unit of Aermacchi MB-339AN trainers at 
Calabar to defend the airspace in the region and to support inter- 
national missions necessitated by Nigeria's prominent role in Afri- 
can defense. The chief of air staff announced in October 1987 that 
the NAF would build an air base in Sokoto State to check viola- 
tions of the country's airspace. 

In 1990 the NAF had about 260 aircraft, including three squad- 
rons with 69 attack/fighters, one maritime reconnaissance squad- 
ron, five transport squadrons, and 51 training aircraft. Budgetary 
constraints disrupted air force procurements in the last half of the 
1980s. A 1985 order for fifty Brazilian Embracer Tucano trainers 
as part of an oil-for-goods agreement was shelved in late 1986 when 
barter deals were suspended; apparently no deliveries were made. 
The purchase of Boeing CH-47 Chinook helicopters was also 
delayed, and reportedly the NAF was considering disposing of its 
Aermacchi MB-339AN trainers and Aeritalia G-222 transports 
(see table 19, Appendix). 

In addition to its small naval air arm, the NAF operated a squad- 
ron of maritime patrol aircraft and search-and-rescue helicopters 
in support of the navy. The first combined fleet exercise in late 
1987 included air force strike aircraft in flights over the Atlantic. 
Although the NAF had exclusive responsibility for long-range mar- 
itime patrol, this function could be transferred to the navy as the 
latter service expanded its missions and capabilities. 

The NAF's air defense capabilities were limited as a result of 
incomplete airspace control, of command and communications defi- 
ciencies, and of aircraft shortfalls relative to territory. The Selenia 
radar system installed at Murtala Muhammad International Air- 
port satisfied both civilian and military purposes, including con- 
trol of nearby air defense units equipped with antiaircraft guns and 
Roland surface-to-air missiles. Similar systems were in place at 
Enugu, Kano, and Kaduna. In March 1987, the NAF completed 
installation of an intercommand communication system. 

Arms Procurement and Defense Industries 

Like most Third World states, Nigeria depended largely on for- 
eign sources for arms and military materiel. However, its arms 
acquisitions exhibited two distinctive features. First, Nigeria had 
one of the most internationally diversified and balanced defense 
procurement strategies. Nigeria acquired arms from about eight 
suppliers during 1978-82, tying Zaire as the most diversified 



283 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

sub-Saharan state (see table 20, Appendix). Its largest supplier dur- 
ing that period, West Germany, provided only about one-third of 
its US$845 million total. This diversified pattern became even more 
pronounced in the mid-1980s. During 1983-87, Nigeria imported 
military materiel valued at US$1.5 billion from about ten major 
suppliers — more than any other African state, and Italy, its larg- 
est supplier, accounted for only 23 percent. 

Nigeria relied on equally diverse foreign suppliers of military 
technical services, while making gradual progress toward indigeni- 
zation. A long-standing, military training arrangement with Brit- 
ain ended in late 1986 with the Nigerianization of training. West 
German assistance was engaged to improve the Navy Technical 
Training Centre at Sapele, which was set up and operated with 
the help of Dornier (Nigeria). A West German firm also received 
a contract in late 1987 to upgrade radar and weapons systems for 
Aradu, the German Meko-360H class frigate. The Czechoslovak 
defense minister visited Nigeria in late 1987 and offered to assist 
in expanding arms production efforts. Yugoslavia offered to train 
NAF pilots, and Bulgaria provided equipment maintenance ser- 
vices. In May 1989, Nigeria discussed with Romania cooperation 
between their air forces and the manufacture and maintenance of 
tanks, armored personnel carriers, and other military vehicles and 
possible modernization of Nigeria's T-55 tanks. In October 1989, 
the chief of army staff made a ten-day official visit to France and 
China to explore military cooperation. 

Defense ties with Third World countries were especially nota- 
ble. In addition to military cooperation with African countries, 
Nigeria concluded defense cooperation, military personnel, and ex- 
change agreements with the Republic of Korea (South Korea); 
Nigeria also discussed naval cooperation, especially officer train- 
ing, with India (see Local and Bilateral Issues; African and Regional 
Issues, this ch.). Military ties with Brazil expanded considerably 
after conclusion of a 1983 military cooperation accord. The two 
countries established a joint committee in December 1985 to exam- 
ine military training and exchange programs, and their joint 
military-naval exercise in December 1987 ended with a pledge to 
pursue more extensive cooperation. 

United States arms transfers and security assistance to Nigeria 
were modest. During fiscal years (FY) 1972-90, United States For- 
eign Military Sales deliveries and licensed commercial exports of 
defense articles and services totaled US$63 million and US$110.8 
million, respectively. Previously, during FY 1962-72 the United 
States had provided International Military Education and Train- 
ing (IMET) grants valued at US$1 .5 million to train 480 Nigerian 



284 



Air Force NCO receiving his sergeant's stripes 
Courtesy Embassy of Nigeria, Washington 

military personnel. After a thirteen- year hiatus, IMET grants were 
renewed in FY 1 986 and have been funded annually since at more 
than US$90,000 for more than twenty students. A total of 585 
Nigerian military students had participated in the IMET program 
by FY 1990. 

Nigeria's fledgling domestic defense industry was the second dis- 
tinctive source of military materiel, particularly for small arms, 
ammunition, and maintenance and repair services. The state-owned 
Defence Industries Corporation (DIC), established in 1964, geared 
up to produce ammunition during the civil war. By the 1970s, its 
facilities in Kaduna produced West German-designed HK G-3 
rifles, BM-59 and PM-12 handguns, and 7.62mm and 9mm para- 
bellum ammunition. Lack of financial and management support, 
however, impeded further progress until the DIC was reenergized 
in 1984 by then army chief of staff Babangida. After becoming presi- 
dent, Babangida expanded the DIC to increase Nigeria's self- 
reliance. 

In 1977 the army decided to standardize its infantry weapons 
with Belgian FAL assault rifles, Browning GP pistols, and MAG 
machine guns. In 1978 licensed production rights were acquired, 
and in 1980 the DIC's facilities in Kaduna were adapted and upgrad- 
ed by Belgian technicians to assemble these weapons. Production 



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Nigeria: A Country Study 



began in 1983; full production capacity was achieved in 1987; and 
the next year the DIC was reported to be relying entirely on local 
raw materials and to be producing all the basic rifles and ammu- 
nition the army and police used. Its annual production capacity 
was 15,000 FAL rifles, 9,000 to 10,000 GP pistols, and 1,000 MAG 
machine guns. The FAL rifle entered service in 1989 as the NR-1 . 

In addition to the small arms and ammunition factories at Kadu- 
na, newer facilities for the assembly of armored fighting vehicles 
and light tanks were under development at Bauchi in 1990. Aus- 
trian Steyr 680M 4x4 tactical military trucks were reportedly as- 
sembled there, and it was also planned to produce Pinzgauer light 
tracked armored vehicles and Steyr 4K 7 FA tracked armored per- 
sonnel carriers. By 1987 the DIC employed 2,000 to 3,000 people 
at its Kaduna and Bauchi plants. Indications of a nascent com- 
mercial defense industry included a manufacturer in Anambra State 
whose inexpensive jeeps included military models being tested by 
the army; a local service industry to supply uniforms, accoutre- 
ments, and selected ordnance materiel; and increased domestic 
sourcing for aircraft and naval ship components and maintenance 
services. Local assembly of West German MBB Bo- 105 helicop- 
ters for the air force was also contemplated. Further progress hinged 
on the availability of foreign capital and technology, joint ventures, 
and export opportunities, especially for rifles and ammunition. 

On its silver anniversary April 22, 1989, the air force unveiled 
and conducted a test flight of a prototype of Nigeria's first domes- 
tically built aircraft, the Air Beetle. Jointly built over two years 
by the NAF and a West German Kaduna-based firm from the de- 
sign of the United States Van RV-6 sport aircraft, the Air Beetle 
had the unique feature of being able to fly on standard automobile 
fuel. This two- seat, single engine airplane was intended to be the 
primary trainer for the NAF, replacing the aging British Bulldog 
trainers. The production program called for sixty units by 1992 
and eventual development of an improved version, the Super Air 
Beetle. In early 1990, the first export orders were reported, and 
forty aircraft of the first production run were scheduled for deliv- 
ery to foreign customers. 

Under a national aircraft maintenance policy approved in 1987, 
depots were being set up around the country with the aim of achiev- 
ing complete overhaul capability for all civil and military aircraft. 
In July 1988, a task force to implement the national aircraft main- 
tenance center was inaugurated. The center will be a civilian or- 
ganization with the capability to service, maintain, and overhaul 
military aircraft and components. In 1989 the air force was directed 
to indigenize 50 percent of its maintenance work within ten years. 



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National Security 



The manufacture of such basic aircraft components and spare parts 
as hydraulic units and actuators, brakes, and plastic passenger cabin 
parts had also begun by the late 1980s. These domestic produc- 
tion and technical service industries were intended to save foreign 
exchange, to foster self-reliance, and to promote a local techno- 
logical and industrial base. 

The navy also turned increasingly to local suppliers for spare 
parts and maintenance services. In mid- 1989 about 40 percent of 
the spare parts for naval vessels reportedly had been produced in 
Nigeria, and the navy saved N20 million at that time (for value 
of the naira — see Glossary) by using locally made parts, including 
propeller shafts and generator parts. The new navy dockyard, 
opened at the end of 1990 at Victoria Island near Lagos, will even- 
tually have the capacity to boost domestic production of spare parts 
for ships to 70 percent of requirements and to permit future modifi- 
cation and even construction of ships. 

Recruitment and Conditions of Service 

Nigeria's large population and the decreasing size of the armed 
forces made recruitment relatively easy. More than 15 million men 
were fit for military service, and each year about 1.2 million reached 
the military age of eighteen. Military service was voluntary, but 
Section 200 of Nigeria's 1979 constitution provided for the estab- 
lishment and maintenance of adequate facilities for carrying out 
any law requiring compulsory military service or training. Fur- 
ther, until such an act passed, the president was authorized to main- 
tain facilities for military training in any secondary or postsecondary 
education institution that desired such training. The new draft con- 
stitution, promulgated by Decree Number 12 of 1989, to become 
effective on October 1, 1992, contains identical provisions. 

Since 1973 Nigeria has had a National Youth Service Corps 
(NYSC); graduates of polytechnic schools and universities at home 
or abroad were obligated to serve one year in the corps in a state 
other than their native one. The NYSC expanded from about 5,000 
men and 1,100 women during 1976-77 to 30,000 men and 13,000 
women in 1985. The corps was primarily a technical and educa- 
tion program for national development, and it had no paramili- 
tary functions or relationship to the armed forces. 

Military recruitment was highly selective and subject to a con- 
stitutional mandate that the composition of both the officer corps 
and other ranks should reflect Nigeria's "federal character." The 
minimum educational qualification was a West African School Cer- 
tificate. Reports that more than 20,000 applicants had sought 1,760 
places in the army during one recruitment period underscored its 



287 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

selectivity. Nigerian law required the army to recruit equal quo- 
tas from among the states and to mix recruits in units. Northern- 
ers were overrepresented, however, especially in the infantry, in 
which soldiers from the states of Sokoto, Niger, Kaduna, Kano, 
and Borno predominated. In 1985 it was estimated that 70 per- 
cent of senior officers came from the northern or middle belt region, 
whereas the administrative, technical, and logistic formations were 
dominated by southerners. The highest ranking women in 1984 
were one army colonel, one air force wing commander, and one 
navy commander, all in the Medical Corps. 

In early 1989, the Directorate of Army Recruitment, Resettle- 
ment, and Reserve reported that almost 43,000 Nigerians had 
joined the army during the previous decade: 18,981 between March 
1979 and January 1988, and 23,971 between April 1983 and De- 
cember 1988. Army enrollments were also expected to double from 
3,000 to 6,000 as a one-time measure under the revitalization pro- 
gram under which entrants from 1963 or earlier were discharged 
to make room for younger soldiers who had joined in 1979 or later. 
To meet targeted force reduction levels, in 1990 the army began 
discharging soldiers who could not read or write after the four-year 
literacy campaign (1986-89), strictly enforcing disciplinary codes, 
and encouraging early retirements. The navy accepted about 500 
recruits per year. In 1989 the navy announced that it was sus- 
pending recruitment of women, except nurses, until adequate and 
appropriate conditions of service had been devised, such as accom- 
modations, training, promotions, and authorization for marriages 
and pregnancies. 

Military pay and benefits were generally adequate if not attrac- 
tive, although their value in real terms eroded during the period 
of economic austerity in the late 1980s. A new salary and benefits 
structure for the armed forces was announced in December 1990, 
to be implemented in January 1991. Benefits included a basic 
benevolent fund plan that provided immediate but token relief to 
dependents of deceased service personnel. In 1989 benefits were 
increased to N4,000 for noncommissioned officers (NCOs), N5,000 
for senior NCOs, and N 10,000 for commissioned officers; personnel 
contributed a premium of about N36 yearly. The army introduced 
an insurance plan in 1988, a benefit soon emulated by the other 
services. An Air Force Welfare Insurance Scheme was introduced 
in April 1 989 to provide life insurance with death benefits ranging 
between N10,000 to N80,000 depending on rank. Members' con- 
tributions varied by rank, from N10 monthly for airmen to N 100 
monthly for air commodores. The new plan supplemented the ex- 
isting benevolent fund and special coverage for pilots and flight 



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National Security 



technicians. The NAF also announced plans to establish its own 
bank. In 1989 an impending Nigerian Navy Welfare Insurance 
Scheme was also announced. 

Several problems were apparent, however. During 1986 a cen- 
sus of army personnel and dependents was conducted to determine 
needs for adequate housing, utilities, and medical care and to iden- 
tify and eject persons illegally occupying military accommodations. 
It found uniforms in such short supply that all sorts of irregular 
attire and accoutrements were in use. Thousands of soldiers and 
their families lived in bashas, shanty-like structures that the army 
hoped to replace with suitable housing before October 1992. In 
late 1988, Babangida expressed deep concern about general social 
malaise and economic crimes, which were aggravated by the use 
of sophisticated weapons obtained with the connivance of military 
personnel. In early 1990, the army chief of staff noted the con- 
tinued problem of service personnel engaged in smuggling, armed 
robbery, and other antisocial activities. 

The most demanding personnel problem was managing the 
steady demobilization of the armed forces from about 300,000 in 
the early 1970s to a scheduled number of perhaps 75,000 by 1993. 
An Armed Forces Rehabilitation Centre was set up in 1972 to re- 
settle disabled soldiers. It has continued to operate with a broader 
mission and under various names but has lacked direction. It has 
pensioned off disabled soldiers, discharged police, reenlisted ex- 
servicemen, and handled voluntary discharges. Most of the volun- 
tary discharges were skilled technicians retained on active duty until 
1980. Discharged service personnel experienced massive adminis- 
trative problems, such as delays or failure to receive pensions and 
gratuities, whereas other ex-service personnel received discharges 
or benefits to which they were not entided. Finally, in January 1989, 
the government announced a major resettlement program, includ- 
ing guidance and counseling, job placement, and technical and 
vocational training. Taken together with the new welfare insur- 
ance plans, this program promised to improve conditions of ser- 
vice and release. 

In 1989 the army announced it would undertake a review of mili- 
tary laws to correct deficiencies. Among measures contemplated 
were plans to educate lawyers about military laws and to develop 
better procedures for trying soldiers accused of violations. Exist- 
ing laws only stated offenses for which a soldier could be charged 
but did not prescribe procedures. The army also called for inclu- 
sion of military law in the teaching curricula of university law 
faculties. 



289 



Nigeria: A Country Study 
Training 

Nigeria boasted comprehensive and almost completely indige- 
nized professional military training institutions, including the 
national triservice Nigerian Military University, the Command and 
Staff College, and the National Institute for Policy and Strategic 
Studies. In addition, each service maintained extensive training 
programs for its own needs. 

The central pillar of the military training establishment was the 
Nigerian Military University. Founded in 1964 in Kaduna as the 
Nigerian Defence Academy, this unique academy for regular com- 
missioned officer candidates in 1983 had a staff of about 1,100. 
The academy was upgraded and redesignated as the national Nige- 
rian Military University in 1985 and awarded its first degrees in 
September 1988. By 1989 it had trained about 5,300 officers, in- 
cluding 300 from other countries. In a message to the 104 gradu- 
ating officers in September 1990, President Babangida announced 
that the academy would be moved to a permanent site by mid- 1992. 
For prospective army officers, the academy offered a two-and-a- 
half-year program leading to commissions as second lieutenants. 
Naval and air force cadets attended an eighteen-month joint training 
program, after which successful candidates advanced to special- 
ized training with their chosen service before commissioning. Dur- 
ing the 1970s, to meet the demand for officers the academy also 
offered a six-month short service commission course for army and 
air force personnel selected from the ranks. In June 1980, Presi- 
dent Shagari announced plans to establish both a naval and an air 
force academy, but as of 1990 they had not been implemented. 

The need for both a national defense academy and a command 
and staff college was occasioned by the manpower explosion dur- 
ing the civil war, the acute shortage of officers , c the poor quality 
of professional training, and the diversity of foreign training ex- 
periences. In 1975 the Nigerian army sought assistance from Brit- 
ain in establishing a staff college at Jaji, near Kaduna, the site of 
the Nigerian Army School of Infantry. The college opened in May 
1976 with two senior officers' courses lasting five and one-half 
months, with a curriculum derived from the British Army Staff 
College at Camberley but specially tailored to Nigerian circum- 
stances and needs. The first course had forty army officers and the 
second fifty officers, including two each from the navy and air force. 

Concurrently, planning proceeded for an eleven-month course 
for field-grade officers, which began in September 1977 with 70 
officers; this course was increased to the planned 100 the next year. 
This five- term course covered staff duties, organizations, and 



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National Security 



logistics; operational staff duties, command, and intelligence; basic 
tactics; training and counterrevolutionary warfare; advanced counter- 
revolutionary warfare; and other general subjects. Students from 
Guyana, Ghana, Kenya, and Tanzania also attended the 1978 
course, by which time air and naval wings had been formed. 

The junior division of the Army Command and Staff College 
for senior lieutenants and junior captains opened in April 1978 (it 
was renamed the Command and Staff College later in 1978). Four 
ten- week courses were offered annually, initially with thirty stu- 
dents but later increased to forty. By 1987 the course had expand- 
ed to eighteen weeks and was run generally along the lines of the 
junior division of the British Staff College at Warminster. Also at 
Jaji was a Demonstration Battalion, the Army School of Artillery, 
and armor support from a composite armored battalion in Kaduna. 

The air faculty opened with twenty students in September 1978, 
the same year the NAF set up a junior division at the air base in 
Kaduna. At that time, the joint service nature of the college at Jaji 
resulted in its being redesignated the Command and Staff College. 
The navy faculty was established in September 1981 with twelve 
students, and in August 1984 a junior navy division was set up 
with assistance from the British Royal Navy. The transfer of the 
junior air faculty from Kaduna to Jaji completed the process of 
expansion and consolidation of this unique full-fledged staff col- 
lege, with junior and senior divisions of all three services at the 
same campus. 

In addition to technical military training, the Command and Staff 
College increased attention to internal security and aid to the civil 
authority. Students and instructors from the Police Staff College 
at Jos, Nigerian Prison Service officers, and senior Ministry of 
Defence civil servants joined the army senior division. Jaji also at- 
tracted officers from other African states. Students from Benin, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe 
regularly attended, and the first Botswanan officers attended the 
1986-87 course. In 1986 it was decided that the training program 
would be fully indigenized. Henceforth, contracts with expatriate 
staff were not renewed, and foreign faculty members were accepted 
only on an exchange basis. At that time, there were forty- seven 
directing staff — thirty-eight Nigerian, seven British, and two 
Ghanaian, the latter under a long-standing exchange program. By 
1986, 1,172 officers had graduated from Jaji's senior divisions and 
1,320 from the junior divisions. 

Each service also operated its own training institutions and fa- 
cilities. The army's Training and Doctrine Command, based at 
Minna, had overall responsibility for developing, conducting, and 



291 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

evaluating army training and doctrine. It was organized into six 
directorates and two departments with sixteen training schools, in- 
cluding infantry, intelligence, signals, airborne, and amphibious 
warfare. Since 1985 it has used the United States-designed Sys- 
tems Approach to Training, under which each of the army's four 
divisions prepared and conducted a comprehensive annual train- 
ing program. 

The multiprogram Nigerian Army School of Infantry (NASI) 
was the largest single- service school. In late 1988, it was announced 
that 5,040 officers and soldiers and 13 NAF officers had complet- 
ed instruction at NASI during the previous three years; other gradu- 
ates included 146 police, 2 civilians from the DIC, and 145 military 
personnel from other African countries, mainly Zimbabwe. The 
number of officers in the various courses in 1988 was 273 airborne, 
376 young officers course, 112 range management course, 67 quar- 
termaster and direct short commission, 75 company commanders 
course, 15 unit sappers, and 23 mortar platoon. 

The navy's schools for officer and basic seamanship technical train- 
ing were at the training complex at NNS Quorra, where the cur- 
riculum included navigation, diving, communications, and gunnery. 
Officer training at the Nigerian Naval College, Onura, entailed a 
two-year military and academic program followed by two years' ship- 
board and operational experience before commissioning as sub- 
lieutenants. The last class of forty-five midshipmen graduated in 
July 1990, after which the Nigerian Military University took over 
officers' training. 

The Naval Training Command, established in November 1986, 
included several major subordinate facilities: NNS Onura and NNS 
Akaso near Port Harcourt; NNS Quorra at Apapa; the Diving 
School at Navy town in Ojo; the Navy Technical Training Centre, 
Sapele; the Dockyard Apprentice School near Lagos; and the NNS 
Logistic Centre. The navy relied primarily on West German and 
British firms to help establish its technical and professional schools. 
A new Underwater Warfare School, built by Dornier of Germany, 
opened in 1990 with more than 600 students. In late 1989, plans 
to set up a naval military school were still delayed by budgetary limi- 
tations, but officer training cooperation was being explored with 
India. By 1990 about 85 percent of naval training had been localized, 
resulting in annual savings of N100 million. 

For its part, the NAF Training Command operated three flying 
schools offering comprehensive flight, armaments, helicopter, and 
paratrooper training, and a Technical Training Group (TTG). The 
air force had specialized schools for such subjects as primary and 
advanced flying, helicopter weapons, and tactical training. Primary 



292 



General Babangida and senior armed forces officers 
overseeing Exercise Fast Strike 
Courtesy Embassy of Nigeria, Washington 

flight training was conducted at the 301 Flying Training School 
at the Nigerian air base in Kaduna, under the air force Tactical 
Training Group. British Bulldogs were the primary trainers, and 
Aermacchi MB-339ANs were used for basic and advanced flight 
training. In July 1989, the Student Pilot School graduated eleven 
of the fourteen candidates who had started the course. Since its 
inception in 1964, more than 600 pilots from the NAF and from 
other African countries have graduated. In 1987 the Tactical Air 
Command at Makurdi acquired sophisticated British Aerospace 
flight simulators to reduce accidental crashes. When fully opera- 
tional, the NAF helicopter training school at Enugu also planned 
to train pilots from other African countries. 

The TTG at Kaduna comprised officers' schools for engineer- 
ing, logistics management, communication and electronics, air 
management, and aircraft maintenance. Its modern aircraft train- 
ing and maintenance support equipment included electroplating 
shops, a heat-treatment laboratory, and forging and welding shops, 
and permitted the NAF to achieve a high degree of self-sufficiency. 
In 1987 the NAF ceased aircraft maintenance training abroad 
and began to set up an armament engineering department. The 
TTG fabricated nearly all the spare parts and components used 



293 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

to maintain the NAF's equipment; by then about 80 percent of 
NAF training was done locally. In 1989 it was announced that the 
TTG would be affiliated with the Nigerian Military University in 
Kaduna and redesignated the NAF Institute of Technology. Com- 
parable to university-level colleges of technology, the new insti- 
tute would offer degree programs and train air force personnel in 
automotive and aircraft trades and weapon services. 

Finally, the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies 
at Kuru, near Jos, afforded senior officers an opportunity to study 
and to reflect on domestic and international security affairs. Its pro- 
grams were similar to those of senior service schools and "war col- 
leges" in other countries. A separate national defense institute was 
reported to be in planning in 1990. 

Military Capabilities 

Compared with its neighbors, Nigeria possessed overwhelming 
military strength. Its sizable and relatively well-equipped armed 
forces were capable of defending the country against any likely 
external threat and of projecting power in the region. In fact, as 
of December 1990, Nigeria was the only country in west-central 
Africa to mount and sustain military operations abroad. Although 
the army had been cut by more than one-half since 1970, its fire- 
power and mobility have increased considerably. The other ser- 
vices have grown little, but their combat systems increased in num- 
ber and sophistication. The navy expanded its mission from coastal 
defense to sea-lane protection and acquired modest amphibious and 
antisubmarine warfare capabilities. Likewise, the NAF developed 
and improved its capacity for ground attack, air support, interdic- 
tion, air defense, airlift, and air mobility operations. 

Nigeria's military capabilities were subject to several systemic 
constraints, however. Economic difficulties and budgetary limita- 
tions slowed the pace of military modernization, delayed new equip- 
ment procurements, hindered defense industrial growth, reduced 
training, and magnified logistical and maintenance deficiencies. 
The diversity of equipment of foreign origin precluded standardi- 
zation and compounded logistics and maintenance deficiencies. In- 
deed, in the 1980s it was estimated that, at any given time, one-third 
of Nigeria's major systems was operational, another third could 
be made operational within a few weeks, and the remainder was 
indefinitely unserviceable. Moreover, the top military echelons had 
become politicized, engrossed in government functions, and preoccu- 
pied with internal security at the expense of professional military de- 
velopment. Inefficiency and corruption exacerbated these problems, 



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all of which combined to hurt operational readiness and effec- 
tiveness. However, the progressive withdrawal of the military from 
politics during the transition to the Third Republic (expected to 
begin with the completion of the return to civilian rule in late 1992), 
the restructuring of the armed forces, and the emphasis on profes- 
sionalism since the late 1980s were intended to remedy these 
problems. 

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 

Each component service fosters allegiance through its own dis- 
tinctive uniforms and its system of ranks and insignia. In 1963 the 
Nigerian army discarded the ceremonial dress of the RWAFF in 
favor of a uniform of indigenous design. Since then a peaked cap, 
a dark green tunic with patrol collar, and light-colored trousers 
have comprised the army's ceremonial uniform. The field and ser- 
vice uniforms follow the British pattern, as does the service cap 
with its use of gold braid. In late 1990, reports indicated that new 
uniforms were to be introduced in 1991 . Badges of rank were pat- 
terned on those of the British army, except that the Nigerian eagle 
had replaced the British crown on the insignia of majors and higher 
ranking officers (see figs. 16 and 17). Rank titles in the Nigerian 
navy generally follow those of the Royal Navy. The Nigerian air 
force originally adopted titles identical to those of the army for 
officers below the general officer grades. In 1976 this system was 
discarded in favor of the rank tides used in the Royal Air Force. 

Armed Forces and Society 

The military has been the dominant institution of the Nigerian 
polity since the mid-1960s when it became professional. The armed 
forces cannot rule the country indefinitely. However, no civilian 
successor regime can ignore the military's institutional demands 
and ultimate power to remove civilian authority. Long periods of 
military rule, concomitant claims on national resources, and the 
proliferation of linkages between the military and the economy have 
expanded military roles and evoked pronounced public responses. 

Attitudes Toward the Military 

Attitudes toward the military in Nigeria were ambivalent in the 
early 1990s. On the one hand, it was well regarded. Despite repeated 
interventions, the military as an institution has remained intact 
and not succumbed to radicalization; it has ruled firmly and, with 
a few notable exceptions, humanely; and it has made the restora- 
tion of stable civilian rule a high priority. The repeated turnovers 



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297 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

among the generals occasioned by coups and intraregime power 
realignments accelerated upward mobility for capable officers and 
attracted high-quality volunteers. In addition, the political and 
managerial experience acquired by senior officers in government 
posts during long periods of military rule offered exceptional and 
lucrative postservice business opportunities. These "up or out" 
conditions created what critics dubbed a ''baby general" boom. 

On the other hand, Nigeria's highly charged and pluralistic po- 
litical culture afforded ample latitude to criticize the military, 
although with some inhibitions during periods of military rule. 
Nigerian scholar Ikenna Nzimiro decried the "military psychosis" 
that beset Nigeria and the class nature of the military as part of 
a privileged ruling class. In his view, this military oligarchy re- 
warded itself with sharply increased but socially unproductive mili- 
tary spending. Other human rights advocacy groups and prominent 
individuals often protested the military regime's incompetence and 
misuse of power (see Human Rights, this ch.). A July 1990 poll 
conducted by the Ministry of Information found widespread pub- 
lic dislike of coups and military regimes. 

Political Role of the Military 

Although Babangida announced in January 1986 that restora- 
tion of an elected civilian government would occur by October 1 , 
1990, he later postponed the changeover by two years. In the in- 
terim, the government undertook not only to mobilize the body 
politic for the transition to democracy, but also to transform the 
military from ruling institution to loyal servant of the Third Repub- 
lic. For example, the new constitution will ban any person or group 
from taking over the government by force. In July 1987, the 
minister of defense announced a plan to establish a special unit 
to educate military personnel in their primary role as guardians 
of national security. In particular, they were to be instructed to 
tolerate the deficiencies of civilian rule and not to engage in plot- 
ting coups. Members of the armed forces were also admonished, 
under penalty of dismissal, neither to support politicians or politi- 
cal parties nor to canvass or assist any political party in campaign- 
ing on military bases. Similarly, the chief of naval staff directed 
all commands to establish education programs to prepare for the 
restoration of democracy. The armed forces also planned to assist 
with logistical arrangements for the elections; both navy and air 
force units would transport materiel and personnel in remote areas. 

As Babangida made clear, however, the military continued to 
regard itself as the custodian of the polity and the ultimate politi- 
cal arbiter. He justified military intervention to preserve national 



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unity and stability when the conditions for democracy were on the 
verge of collapse. The armed forces were first and foremost pa- 
triots dedicated to the defense of the nation; they had been forced 
into a governing role, not by design but to prevent anarchy. Above 
all, the military forces were professionals convinced of their righ- 
teous cause. For them, withdrawal from politics must be a strategic 
move to bring about a true and enduring democratic process. 
Hence, the military was crucial to the political life of the country, 
and the primary aim during the transitional period was to achieve 
the conditions for return to a civilian government whose conduct 
would obviate future coups. 

Whether or not civilian restoration endures, the political land- 
scape has been altered by the large number of retired senior officers 
who will continue to play leading political and economic roles. Accord- 
ing to one observer, no other country has promoted and retired 
its generals faster than Nigeria, where political imperatives led to 
pensioning off potential opponents or officers of questionable loyalty. 
More than forty senior officers were retired or dismissed after 
Babangida's coup, and thirty-eight army officers were retired in 
the wake of the foiled coup attempt in December 1985. By 1989 
more than 200 generals, many of them "baby generals" only in 
their forties, had been retired with full pay and with allowances 
for life. Since the mid-1970s, the military produced more million- 
aires than any other profession. Many were chairmen or directors 
of parastatals or private companies and were eagerly sought by bus- 
iness because of their personal ties to the regime. Such conditions 
increased opportunities for corruption. The prospects for political 
stability were enhanced, however, to the extent that ambitious mili- 
tary officers who had tasted power were pensioned off and rewarded 
in the private sector. 

Demographic Factors and the Defense Budget 

The civil war and extended periods of military rule created con- 
ditions that sustained the military's rising claims on national 
resources. There were few opponents of defense spending, given 
increasing national security challenges and Nigeria's self-image as 
regional leader and power broker. The main reason for the sharp 
rise in defense spending in the 1970s was the large postwar mili- 
tary establishment and the associated costs of foreign arms procure- 
ment, military housing construction, substantial salary increases, 
expansion of the officer corps, and the retirements and self- 
promotions after the 1975 coup. 

During the civil war, Nigeria's armed forces, arms imports, 
and defense spending swelled, and military personnel levels were 



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Nigeria: A Country Study 

maintained at between 200,000 and 300,000 until the late 1970s. 
Defense spending as a percentage of total federal spending surged 
from about 6 percent before the war to 43 percent in the last year 
of the conflict. It remained high — 34 percent during 1970-71 and 
about 20 percent from 1971 to 1974 — before beginning a down- 
ward trend that continued through the 1980s. The 1970s also fea- 
tured rapid economic expansion and budget growth driven by oil 
exports. As a result, absolute levels of military spending rose sub- 
stantially during peacetime even though the level declined relative 
to available resources. According to some analysts, such "militar- 
ization" led to declining gross national product (GNP — see Glos- 
sary), to increasing inflation, and to an unfavorable balance of trade 
(see Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments, ch. 3). 

In comparative global terms, however, Nigeria's level of "militar- 
ization" was remarkably low and had been decreasing since the 
mid-1970s. According to a survey of 144 countries compiled by 
the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Nige- 
ria's ranking on five key measures of "militarization" declined 
sharply between 1975 and 1985. Nigeria's average global ranking 
on indicators of "military buildup" (armed forces per 1,000 popu- 
lation and the ratios of military expenditure to GNP, central govern- 
ment expenditure, population, and armed forces) fell from 47 in 
1975, to 88 in 1980, and to 118 in 1985. 

The steep downward trends in defense expenditure were appar- 
ent across the board. Military spending plunged precipitously from 
US$906 million to US$180 million (in constant 1987 dollars) be- 
tween 1977 and 1987 — an astounding reduction of 80 percent. Rela- 
tive to GNP, military spending dropped steadily from 3.5 percent 
to less that 1 percent in 1987, while as a portion of total govern- 
ment expenditure it fell from more than 14 percent to 2.7 percent 
in 1987. The value of arms imports (measured in constant 1987 
dollars) averaged US$93 million annually between 1977 and 1980, 
surged to an average of US$434 million annually between 1981 
and 1984, dropped to about US$340 million during 1985-86, and 
fell to US$60 million in 1987. Likewise, the armed forces personnel 
numbers declined from 3.7 per 1,000 persons in 1977 to 1.3 in 1987. 

Defense spending in 1988 and 1989 was about N1.3 billion and 
N1.7 billion, but high inflation reduced its real value by at least 
30 percent. Capital expenditure nominally trebled, from N256.6 
million in 1986 and 1987 to N750 million in 1988 and 1989. This 
increase reflected new investments in equipment, construction, and 
other long-term capital improvements, although at levels substan- 
tially lower than in the early 1980s. The N2. 1 billion defense budget 
for 1990, however, represented a real growth of 16 percent over 1989. 



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As in most Third World states, Nigeria's military spending was 
dedicated largely to recurrent costs of salaries, allowances, train- 
ing, and other personnel-related overhead expenses. Such operat- 
ing costs had ranged from 55 to 88 percent of the defense budget 
almost every year since independence. General Staff Headquar- 
ters, which operated under a separate account budgeted at N35 
to N55 million annually between 1984 and 1987, received N124 
million in 1988. The pattern of defense spending during the peri- 
od 1988-90, particularly the increases in capital investment and 
equipment procurement relative to personnel-related expenditures, 
reflected in part determined efforts to modernize and to upgrade 
capabilities and readiness while completing demobilization. It also 
represented the military's last opportunities to attend to defense 
needs on its own terms, in anticipation that the Third Republic 
might be less generous in allocating scarce budgetary and foreign 
exchange resources to the armed forces. 

Civic Action and Veterans' Groups 

As of 1990, army engineers built bridges and roads in rural areas, 
and consideration was being given to a more vigorous civic action 
role for the military in general. Agricultural work was excluded, 
however, because farming was thought to result in loss of military 
skills. 

After World War II a very small number of veterans received 
vocational training or loans to establish farms; businesses with more 
than ten workers had to employ a quota of veterans. In the early 
1950s, training programs were discontinued. In the early 1960s, 
plans to establish industries for ex-servicemen foundered. However, 
an Education Corps was set up to provide rudimentary reading 
and writing skills in English to recruits during their first six months 
in uniform. As a result, virtually all ex-servicemen found employ- 
ment after service. No information was available concerning civilian 
employment of thousands of veterans since the 1970s. 

Internal Security 

Threats to internal security in Nigeria have been persistent and 
chronic. They stemmed from endemic divisions that were aggra- 
vated by rapid socioeconomic changes and by deteriorating eco- 
nomic trends. Political and civil disorder, extended periods of 
military rule, human rights violations, rampant crime, and inade- 
quate security forces and penal institutions defined the internal secu- 
rity environment at the beginning of the 1990s. 



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Nigeria: A Country Study 



Domestic Security 

Nigeria has experienced substantial internal insecurity. Mass vio- 
lence erupted frequently. During the five years immediately preced- 
ing the civil war, 124 riots were reported. The civil war between 
1967 and 1970 produced about 2 million deaths. Regime instabil- 
ity also came to characterize political life, which was punctuated 
by a number of coups between 1966 and 1985; several attempted 
coups, often accompanied or followed by violent retribution; and 
periodic government reorganizations and leadership changes. 
Primary sources of potential dissent and opposition were illegal 
aliens, sectional-ethnic cleavages, religious sectarianism, the labor 
force and labor unions, and intellectuals. Although none of these 
groups was capable of overthrowing the government or of offering 
an alternative political formula, recurring and sometimes wide- 
spread violence involving one or more of these interests precipi- 
tated major security crises. 

Nigeria's relative wealth, particularly during the oil-fueled boom 
of the 1970s, was a magnet for alien migrant laborers, many of 
whom entered illegally. Relations with these workers were tense 
and marked by two large-scale expulsions. In early 1983, Nigeria 
ordered all foreigners illegally residing and working in the coun- 
try to leave within a matter of weeks; most had entered under the 
ECOWAS protocol on free movement of people and goods but had 
overstayed. At least 1.3 million West Africans — mainly from 
Ghana, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon — were expelled despite in- 
ternational protests. A second campaign to expel 700,000 illegal 
aliens took place in May 1985, but it was not clear how many were 
actually repatriated. 

Nigeria's ethnic and religious heterogeneity was the most per- 
sistent source of violent conflicts. Although the issue of secession 
based on regional ethnic nationalism was settled by the unsuccess- 
ful Biafran experience and later muted politically by the abolition 
of the regions in favor of twenty-one states, the assertion or re- 
assertion of the country's primordial 1 'nations" remained a latent 
threat to national unity. 

Religious Sectarianism 

Whereas ethnic cleavages generally remained dormant, religious 
sectarianism emerged as the most potentially explosive social divi- 
sion. Islam and Christianity spread rapidly in the twentieth cen- 
tury at the expense of indigenous religions. About half of all 
Nigerians were Muslims in 1990, most of whom lived in the north- 
ern two- thirds of the country. About 40 percent were Christians, 



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residing predominantly in the south, and particularly in the 
southeast. Since 1980 there had been several outbreaks of sec- 
tarian violence, resulting in thousands of deaths, injuries, and ar- 
rests, mostly attributable to sectarian tensions and also to some 
fringe quasi-Islamic groups. 

The first and most dramatic eruption in a series of religious dis- 
turbances incited by the Maitatsine, or Yan Tatsine, movement 
was an eleven-day emergency in Kano in late December 1980 (see 
Islam, ch. 2). Led by Alhajji Muhammadu Marwa (alias Tatsine 
or Maitatsine), followers of this heretical Muslim sect of perhaps 
3,000 persons opposed secular authority, were willing to use vio- 
lence if necessary, and demanded absolute obedience to Marwa. 
The Kano riots were suppressed by the army and the air force after 
the police failed to restore order. More than 4,000 deaths resulted, 
including that of Marwa; there were also 1 ,000 arrests, including 
arrests of 224 foreigners. 

In addition, another Muslim movement known as Yan Izala, 
which began in Zaria and Kaduna in the 1960s, also caused dis- 
turbances. This group, which created unrest in the early 1980s, 
protested innovations in Islam and was particularly opposed to the 
Sufi brotherhood movement. 

Renewed rioting in Kano in July 1981 that destroyed or dam- 
aged several state government buildings was attributed to Muslim 
extremists opposed to the proposed removal of the emir of Kano. 

More riots by Maitatsine followers broke out in Maiduguri 
in late October 1982 and spread to Kaduna, where thirty-nine 
sect members were killed by vigilantes. The official death toll 
was 188 civilians and 18 police (mostly in Maiduguri) and 635 ar- 
rested, but the commission of inquiry afterward concluded that 
deaths probably exceeded 500 . The sect was banned in November 
1982, and its adherents have been subject to surveillance and arrest. 

Nevertheless, in February 1984 members of the proscribed 
Maitatsine sect struck again, this time in northeastern Nigeria and 
in Yola, the capital of Gongola State. The army was again obliged 
to intervene, using artillery to quell the disturbances, but between 
1980 and 1985 it was ill-equipped for riot control. As a result, more 
than 700 persons died, 30,000 were left homeless, and about 2,000 
homes were destroyed and 1,500 damaged. In April 1985, riots 
inspired by Maitatsine adherents in Gombe claimed more than 100 
lives and resulted in 146 arrests of suspected sect members. 

Another violent incident occurred in November 1988 over the 
disputed succession of a new sultan of Sokoto. Ten persons died 
and fifty were arrested. 



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Nigeria: A Country Study 

In 1987, in contrast to previously mentioned intra-Muslim dis- 
putes, religious conflict took on new and ominous dimensions when 
unprecedented violence between members of Nigeria's two largest 
faiths — Muslims and Christians — erupted at secondary schools and 
universities. Clashes between Muslim and Christian students in 
March 1987 at the College of Education in Kafanchan, Kaduna 
State, left at least twelve dead and several churches burned or 
damaged. The rioting spread to Zaria, Katsina, and Kano within 
a few days. Police reportedly arrested 360 in the city of Kaduna 
alone and about 400 in the university city of Zaria. Army troops 
again intervened, and the commander warned that the army would 
shoot anyone committing arson or murder. Bayero University in 
Kano was closed after about twenty students were injured in 
Muslim-Christian clashes. In Zaria Muslim students burned the 
chapel at the College of Advanced Studies and attacked Christian 
students; the riots spilled over into the town, where more than fifty 
churches were burned. A curfew was imposed in Kaduna State, 
and outdoor processions and religious preaching were banned in 
Bauchi, Bendel, Benue, Borno, and Plateau states. All schools in 
Kaduna and five in Bauchi State closed. Babangida denounced these 
outbreaks as " masterminded by evil men ... to subvert the Fed- 
eral Military Government." He also issued a Civil Disturbances 
(Special Tribunal) Decree establishing a special judicial tribunal 
to identify, arrest, and try those responsible and banned preach- 
ing by religious organizations at all institutions of higher learn- 
ing. In June and July 1987, Kaduna State authorities twice closed 
the exclusive Queen Amina College girls' high school in Zaria af- 
ter clashes between Muslim and Christian students. 

Relative calm prevailed among religious elements until Janu- 
ary 1990, when thousands of Christians in the northern states of 
Plateau, Kaduna, Bauchi, and Gongola demonstrated against 
Babangida' s cabinet reshuffle, which appeared to penalize Chris- 
tian officers. Protesters of the Christian Association of Nigeria from 
all eleven northern states and the Abuja capital district marched 
on the Kaduna State government to protest the perceived religious 
imbalance and to present a petition signed by the top Roman 
Catholic clerics and the archbishop of Kaduna. 

Labor Organizations 

Nigeria's labor force numbered about 50 million in 1990. About 
3.5 million wage earners belonged to forty-two recognized trade 
unions under the single national labor federation, the Nigerian 
Labour Congress (NLC). The Socialist Working People's Party 



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National Security 



reportedly had considerable influence in the NLC , although it was 
banned along with other parties in 1 983 . The police prevented the 
inauguration of the Nigerian Socialist Party in May 1989, citing 
the "general insecurity in the country." 

Organized labor has been more a nuisance than a menace to 
national security. For example, a 1985 strike by public health doc- 
tors ended when the FMG arrested its leaders, outlawed the Nigeri- 
an Medical Association (NMA) and the National Association of 
Resident Doctors (NARD), dismissed sixty-four doctors includ- 
ing officers of the NMA and the NARD, and imposed financial 
penalties on others. Likewise, when the NLC threatened a twenty- 
four-hour general strike and demonstrations in June 1986 to pro- 
test the May killing of more than a dozen Ahmadu Bello Univer- 
sity students by police, the police broke up NLC meetings and 
detained its leaders, and the FMG warned that any strike would 
be put down with "all the means at its disposal." In May 1987, 
Babangida lifted the ten-year-old ban on Nigeria's veteran labor 
leader, Chief Michael Imoudu, and ten others, but in late 1987, 
thirteen senior NLC officials were detained after union demon- 
strations, and in February the AFRC dissolved the NLC execu- 
tive. Serious industrial union demonstrations occurred in April 1988 
to protest the government's austerity measures under the struc- 
tural adjustment program (SAP), especially the increase in gaso- 
line prices and the perceived excessive use of force by police in 
putting down a strike by students and workers in Jos. In Decem- 
ber 1989, the government acceded to NLC demands for a negotiat- 
ing forum to resolve a long-standing minimum-wage dispute after 
the union threatened to call a nationwide general strike. 

Academic unionists also clashed with the authorities on several 
occasions in 1986 and 1988. The protests resulted in 1988 in the 
detention of eight Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) 
leaders. Finally, the government banned the ASUU, and its in- 
timidations were denounced by human rights monitoring groups 
and the Nigerian Bar Association. The ban was lifted in August 
1990. 

Student Organizations 

Students were a perpetual source of dissent. During the 1970s, 
the National Union of Nigerian Students (NUNS), a government- 
sanctioned federation of all student unions in Nigeria and of Ni- 
gerian students abroad, actively opposed government policies 
on several issues, including students' rights and educational condi- 
tions. In April 1978, NUNS instigated or participated in nationwide 



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Nigeria: A Country Study 

campus protests against increased university fees, during which 
police and army units killed or seriously wounded at least twenty 
students. The FMG responded by closing three universities in- 
definitely, by banning NUNS, and by appointing a commission 
of inquiry, after which several senior university officials and stu- 
dents were dismissed. 

The next major round of violent student demonstrations occurred 
in May 1986, when police killed more than a dozen Ahmadu 
Bello University students protesting disciplinary action against 
student leaders who had been observing 4 ' Ali Must Go' ' Day (refer- 
ring to the minister of education), in memory of students killed 
in the 1978 demonstration. Disorders spread rapidly to other cam- 
puses across the country. The government imposed a national ban 
on demonstrations and closed nine of Nigeria's fifteen universi- 
ties; they were not reopened until July. The National Association 
of Nigerian Students (NANS), founded in 1980 to replace the 
banned NUNS and itself theoretically banned as a result of the 
May 1986 riots, called for dismissals of government, university, 
and police officials. Its call was supported by the NLC. After 
a commission of inquiry, the government accepted some recom- 
mendations for removals but dissolved all student unions for the 
remainder of the academic year. NANS, however, rejected the com- 
mission's findings and, in May 1987, five universities were closed 
in connection with campus incidents involving remembrances of 
the anniversary of Ahmadu Bello University students' slayings the 
year before. 

In February 1988, the government closed Ahmadu Bello Univer- 
sity and the University of Nigeria campuses at Nsukka and Enugu 
and narrowly averted a NANS-supported nationwide student strike 
by rescinding a decision to try nine Nsukka students for arson and 
property damage. Two months later, five universities were shut 
down after student riots in Jos to protest a 3-percent rise in gaso- 
line prices, during which several persons, including two police 
officers, died. Between May and July 1989, student riots in sev- 
eral southern states again led to closure of several universities and 
a secondary school and forced Babangida to cancel an official 
visit to France. Student rioters in Benin City, joined by towns- 
people, burned vehicles, government buildings, and two prisons 
from which about 600 inmates escaped; the riot was put down by 
police and army units two days later. Rioting soon spread to Ibadan 
and Lagos where soldiers again were called in to restore order; 
to Obafemi Awolowo University School of Agriculture's Akure cam- 
pus near Ibadan, where about seventy students were arrested; and 
to the College of Agriculture in Yande, near Loko, in Benue State. 



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The government closed six schools until March 1990 but permit- 
ted them to reopen on October 30 after requiring returning stu- 
dents to sign a formal pledge of good behavior. To deter further 
student unrest, in early 1990 the AFRC issued Decree Number 
47. It imposed a five-year jail term and/or a N50,000 fine on any 
student found guilty of organizing or participating in demonstra- 
tions, set up special tribunals to try offenders, and again banned 
the NANS. 

Human Rights 

Nigeria was party to several international human rights treaties, 
including the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967) 
and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, the Conven- 
tion on the Political Rights of Women (1953) and the Internation- 
al Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (1977), the International Convention on the Elimi- 
nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1966) and the In- 
ternational Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the 
Crime of Apartheid (1981), and the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples' Rights (1981). Nigeria also ratified the Slavery Con- 
vention of 1926, the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition 
of Slavery of 1956, and the 1949 Geneva Conventions Relative to 
the Treatment of Prisoners of War and the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War. However, it had not signed the Conven- 
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(1948); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1966); the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cul- 
tural Rights (1966); or the Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 

The government's human rights record was mixed and gener- 
ally worse during military rule, when decrees were exempt from 
legal challenge. Until the late 1970s, when military rulers deprived 
many citizens of their rights through detention without trial, physical 
assault, torture, harassment, and intimidation, the issue of human 
rights was not a major concern. It had been taken for granted that 
having a bill of rights guaranteed human rights. Thus, the indepen- 
dence (1960), republican (1963), Second Republic (1979), and 
Third Republic (1989) constitutions had elaborate sections on fun- 
damental human rights. The fact that Nigeria did not become a 
one-party state as most other African states did immediately after 
independence forestalled the emergence of repressive measures, such 
as the preventive detention acts prevalent in Africa. 



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Nigeria: A Country Study 

By the early 1970s, however, the days of "innocence" in rela- 
tion to human rights were over. As Major General Yakubu Gowon's 
popularity declined, especially after he reneged on his promise to 
hand over power to civilians in 1976, criticisms of him and his co- 
horts increased. He reacted by detaining these critics for indefinite 
periods. This trend of abuse of the rights of regime opponents con- 
tinued under the Muhammad-Obasanjo government and, after the 
creation of the Nigerian Security Organisation (NSO) in 1976, hu- 
man rights violations became frequent. The return of constitutional 
government in the Second Republic (1979-83) reduced the viola- 
tions, although the human rights record was poor because of the 
increasing powers of the police force and the NSO and the con- 
stant harassment of political opponents. 

Under the Buhari regime, military security was the criterion for 
judicial action, often in the form of military tribunals. The govern- 
ment not only gave the NSO greater powers but also promulgated 
decrees that directly violated human rights. The most notable were 
State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree Number 2 of 1984, 
which empowered the chief of staff at Supreme Headquarters to 
detain indefinitely without trial anyone suspected of being a secu- 
rity risk (detention was for three months initially, and then renew- 
able), and Decree Number 4, which made the publication of any 
material considered embarrassing to any government official a 
punishable offense. Under Decree Number 2, many people consid- 
ered ' 'enemies' ' of the government were detained in NSO cells 
and allegedly tortured. Second Republic government officials, 
whom the Buhari regime held collectively responsible for the eco- 
nomic mess, were detained without trial or were tried by special 
military tribunals. At these tribunals, the accused was assumed 
guilty until proved innocent rather than innocent until proved 
guilty. Journalists and media organizations were regularly harassed 
by security agents; organized interest groups whose members dared 
to criticize the government openly or engage in demonstrations or 
strikes were proscribed. 

The most active human rights group in Nigeria in 1990, the Civil 
Liberties Organisation (CLO), founded by a group of young law- 
yers led by Olisa Agbakobe, emerged during the Buhari days. 
Before its emergence, human rights groups included the local 
branches of Amnesty International, far less effective than the par- 
ent organization, and the Nigeria Council for National Awareness, 
founded after the assassination of Murtala Muhammad to protect 
a just and humane society. Several other organizations criticized 
the government's violations of civil rights and urged remedial 



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National Security 



measures. These groups included NANS, the NBA, the NLC, and 
the Nigeria Union of Journalists. In 1988 another human rights 
organization, the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights, 
was founded by Dr. Beko Ransome-Kuti, the radical deputy chair- 
man of the NMA detained under the Buhari government. 

When Babangida toppled Buhari in August 1985, one of his main 
arguments was the need to restore civil liberties. The new regime 
prided itself on being a defender of human rights, and many of 
Babangida' s initial acts justified his human rights posture. He 
scrapped the NSO, threw open its cells and replaced it with the 
State Security Service (SSS) and other agencies; he released most 
of the politicians detained without trial and drastically reduced the 
jail terms of those already convicted; he appointed Bola Ajibola, 
the NBA president noted for his human rights advocacy, as minister 
of justice and attorney general; he scrapped Decree Number 4 and 
reduced the punishment for drug traffickers from public execution 
to jail terms; he annulled the proscription of "radical" groups such 
as the NMA and NANS; and he persisted with plans to restore 
civilian rule by 1992. 

In other ways, however, human rights remained substantially 
circumscribed in 1990. Decree Number 2 remained in place, and 
numerous citizens had been incarcerated under it, although the 
allowable period of detention without charge was reduced from six 
months to six weeks in January 1990. With the aid of this and other 
decrees that restricted freedom, usually promulgated retrospectively, 
such radical and outspoken critics of the government as Gani Fawe- 
hinmi, Tai Solarin, and Balarabe Musa were regularly detained. 
Despite having annulled Decree Number 4, the government had 
several brushes with media organizations. In 1988 Newswatch was 
proscribed for six months, and journalists, academics, and civil 
rights activists continued to be harassed by state security agents. 
Although the notorious NSO was dissolved in 1986, the new secu- 
rity establishment in 1990 continued to act arbitrarily and with 
impunity. The government proscribed radical interest groups like 
NANS and the Academic Staff Union of Universities, the central 
body of all university professors and lecturers. Several innocent 
citizens were subjected to physical assault without government 
reparations. 

Internal Security Forces and Organizations 

Between 1976 and 1986, internal security responsibilities in 
Nigeria were divided among the NSO, a central state security or- 
gan reporting to the president; the Ministry of Internal Affairs; 



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Nigeria: A Country Study 

the national police force; and the Ministry of Defence. As noted, 
the army was called upon to suppress domestic disorders on several 
occasions. 

Intelligence Services 

The NSO was the sole intelligence service for both domestic and 
international security during its ten-year existence. It was charged 
with the detection and prevention of any crime against the security 
of the state, with the protection of classified materials, and with 
carrying out any other security missions assigned by the president. 
Under the Buhari administration, the NSO engaged in widespread 
abuses of due process, including detention without charge and trial, 
arrests without pretext, and wiretapping. 

The NSO's performance was bluntly criticized after the 1980 
uprisings by the Maitatsine movement. It had penetrated the move- 
ment but failed to prevent it from instigating bloody riots. 

Fulfilling one of the promises made in his first national address 
as president, Babangida in June 1986 issued Decree Number 19, 
dissolving the NSO and restructuring Nigeria's security services 
into three separate organizations under the Office of the Co-ordina- 
tor of National Security. The new State Security Service (SSS) was 
responsible for intelligence within Nigeria, the National Intelligence 
Agency (NIA) for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, and 
the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) for military-related intelli- 
gence outside and inside the country. This reorganization followed 
a formal investigation of the NSO by former director Umaru 
Shinkafi. 

Notwithstanding this rationalization and depoliticization of the 
national security services, they remained deficient in intelligence 
collection and analysis capabilities; they also were poorly equipped 
to counter security threats, such as covert foreign operations, dis- 
sident movements, coup plots, and border violations. The integrity 
of the new agencies also eroded after the prosecution in 1988 of 
the director of the DIA and the deputy director of the SSS, for the 
1986 murder of Newswatch publisher Dele Giwa. 

In the government reshuffle of December 29, 1989, Vice Ad- 
miral Patrick S. Koshoni, chief of naval staff since October 1986, 
became head of the National Commission for the Reorganisation 
of Internal Security; the Office of the Co-ordinator of National Secu- 
rity was abolished; and the SSS and NIA remained independent 
agencies directly responsible to the president. 

Ministry of Internal Affairs 

The public security functions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 



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included passport and immigration control, prison administration, 
fire service, and oversight of compliance with certain commercial 
and civic regulations. Immigration control was regarded as impor- 
tant and such steps as expulsions, expanded border controls, and 
acquisition of surveillance and communications equipment, and 
of weapons for immigration officers had been taken to enforce im- 
migration laws. Immigration officer training schools were located 
in Kano, in Lagos, and at state headquarters. In 1983 the main 
ministry staff consisted of about 5,300 persons; the Immigration 
Department employed about 2,900, the Fire Service Department 
900, and the Nigerian Prison Service 23,000. In August 1988, the 
authority to arrest and detain suspects without trial, formerly as- 
signed to the chief of General Staff and to the inspector general 
of police, was extended to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The 
ministry also had a paramilitary Security and Civil Defence Force, 
whose size, mission, and organization were unknown. In August 
1989, it was announced that this unit was to be reorganized. 

Nigeria Police Force 

The Nigeria Police Force (NPF) is designated by Section 194 
of the 1979 constitution as the national police with exclusive juris- 
diction throughout the country. Constitutional provision also ex- 
ists, however, for the establishment of separate NPF branches 
"forming part of the armed forces of the Federation or for their 
protection of harbours, waterways, railways and airfields." One 
such branch, the Port Security Police, was reported by different 
sources to have a strength in 1990 of between 1,500 and 12,000. 

Nigeria's police began with a thirty-member consular guard 
formed in Lagos Colony in 1861 . In 1879 a 1,200-member armed 
paramilitary Hausa Constabulary was formed. In 1896 the Lagos 
Police was established. A similar force, the Niger Coast Constabu- 
lary, was formed in Calabar in 1894 under the newly proclaimed 
Niger Coast Protectorate. Likewise, in the north, the Royal Niger 
Company set up the Royal Niger Company Constabulary in 1888 
with headquarters at Lokoja. When the protectorates of Northern 
and Southern Nigeria were proclaimed in the early 1900s, part of 
the Royal Niger Company Constabulary became the Northern 
Nigeria Police, and part of the Niger Coast Constabulary became 
the Southern Nigeria Police. Northern and Southern Nigeria were 
amalgamated in 1914, but their police forces were not merged un- 
til 1930, forming the NPF, headquartered in Lagos. During the 
colonial period, most police were associated with local governments 
(native authorities). In the 1960s, under the First Republic, these 
forces were first regionalized and then nationalized. 



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Nigeria: A Country Study 

The NPF performed conventional police functions and was 
responsible for internal security generally; for supporting the pris- 
on, immigration, and customs services; and for performing mili- 
tary duties within or outside Nigeria as directed. Plans were 
announced in mid-1980 to expand the force to 200,000. By 1983, 
according to the federal budget, the strength of the NPF was almost 
152,000, but other sources estimated it to be between 20,000 and 
80,000. Reportedly, there were more than 1,300 police stations na- 
tionwide. Police officers were not usually armed but were issued 
weapons when required for specific missions or circumstances. They 
were often deployed throughout the country, but in 1989 Baban- 
gida announced that a larger number of officers would be posted 
to their native areas to facilitate police-community relations. 

The NPF was under the general operational and administrative 
control of an inspector general appointed by the president and 
responsible for the maintenance of law and order. He was supported 
at headquarters in Lagos by a deputy inspector general and in each 
state by police commissioners. The 1979 constitution provided for 
a Police Service Commission that was responsible for NPF policy, 
organization, administration, and finance (except for pensions), 
promotion, discipline, and dismissal of police officers. In Febru- 
ary 1989, Babangida abolished the Police Service Commission and 
established the Nigeria Police Council in its stead, under direct 
presidential control. The new council was chaired by the president; 
the chief of General Staff, the minister of internal affairs, and the 
police inspector general were members. As part of the government 
reorganization in September 1990, Alhajji Sumaila Gwarzo, for- 
merly SSS director, was named to the new post of minister of state, 
police affairs. 

In late 1986, the NPF was reorganized nationwide into seven 
area commands, which superseded a command structure cor- 
responding to each of Nigeria's states. Each command was under 
a commissioner of police and was further divided into police 
provinces and divisions under local officers. NPF headquarters, 
which was also an area command, supervised and coordinated the 
other area commands. 

The 1986 NPF reorganization was occasioned by a public erup- 
tion of tensions between the police and the army. A superinten- 
dent was suspended for a time for grumbling that the army had 
usurped police functions and kept police pay low, and there were 
fights between police and army officers over border patrol juris- 
diction. The armed forces chief of staff announced a thorough reor- 
ganization of the NPF into the seven new area commands and five 
directorates (criminal investigations, logistics, supplies, training, 



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National Security 



and operations) under deputy inspectors general. About 2,000 con- 
stables and 400 senior police officers were dismissed by mid- 1987, 
leaving senior police officers disgruntled. 

In mid- 1989 another NPF reorganization was announced after 
the AFRC's acceptance of a report by Rear Admiral Murtala 
Nyako. In 1989 the NPF also created a Quick Intervention Force 
in each state, separate from the mobile police units, specifically 
to monitor political events and to quell unrest during the transi- 
tion to civil rule. Each state unit of between 160 and 400 police 
was commanded by an assistant superintendent and equipped with 
vehicles, communications gear, weapons, and crowd control equip- 
ment, including cane shields, batons, and tear gas. Under the new 
structure, a Federal Investigation and Intelligence Bureau (FIIB) 
was to be set up as the successor to the Directorate of Intelligence 
and Investigation; three directorates were established for opera- 
tions, administration, and logistics, each headed by a deputy in- 
spector general. The Directorate of Operations was subdivided into 
four units under a deputy director — operations, training, commu- 
nications, and the police mobile force. The Directorate of Adminis- 
tration was composed of an administration unit headed by an 
assistant inspector general (AIG), and of budget and personnel units 
under commissioners. The Directorate of Logistics had four units — 
procurement, workshop/transport, supply, and work/maintenance — 
under AIGs. The zonal arrangements were retained. However, 
AIGs were authorized to transfer officers up to the rank of chief 
superintendent, to set up provost units, to deploy mobile units, 
and to promote officers between the ranks of sergeant and inspector. 

The NPF operating budget between 1984 and 1988 remained 
in the N360 million to N380 million range, and in 1988 increased 
to N521 million. More notable were large capital expenditure in- 
fusions of N206 million in 1986 and N260.3 million in 1988, 
representing 3.5 and 2.5 percent of total federal capital expendi- 
tures in those years. These increases were used to acquire new com- 
munications equipment, transport, and weapons to combat the 
rising crime wave, such as 100 British Leyland DAF Comet trucks 
delivered in 1990 (see Incidence and Trends in Crime, this ch.). 
Despite these purchases, an NPF study in late 1990 concluded that 
the force's budget must double to meet its needs. 

Although generally considered an attractive career, the NPF ex- 
perienced endemic problems with recruiting, training, inefficiency, 
and indiscipline, and it lacked expertise in specialized fields. Cor- 
ruption and dishonesty were widespread, engendering a low level 
of public confidence, failure to report crimes, and tendencies to re- 
sort to self-help. Police were more adept at paramilitary operations 



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Nigeria: A Country Study 

and the exercise of force than at community service functions or 
crime prevention, detection, and investigation. During the Obasanjo 
period, an attempt was made to expand the NPF by reducing the 
recruitment age from nineteen to seventeen and by enrolling 
demobilized soldiers, but it failed. In mid- 1980 the then federal 
police minister acknowledged that the police had recovered only 
14 percent of the US$900 million worth of property reported sto- 
len in the preceding six months and that only 20 percent of the 
103,000 persons arrested had been found guilty, a performance 
record about the same as that reported in the 1960s. The use of 
excessive violence in quelling student disorders led the AFRC in 
June 1986 to direct the police to use only rubber bullets in con- 
taining student riots. Reports of police collusion with criminals were 
common, as were official appeals to police officers to change their 
attitude toward the public, to be fair and honest, and to avoid cor- 
rupt practices. In an effort to reduce bribery and to make identifi- 
cation of offenders easier, police officers on beats and at checkpoints 
were not allowed to carry more than N5 on their person. 

Police training was directed from headquarters by a deputy in- 
spector general designated as commander. Recruits were trained 
at police colleges in Oji River, Maiduguri, Kaduna, and Ikeja, 
which also offered training to other security personnel, such as 
armed immigration officers. The Police College at Ikeja trained 
cadet assistant superintendents and cadet subinspectors. There were 
also specialized schools for in-service training, including the Police 
Mobile Force Training School at Guzuo, southwest of Abuja, the 
Police Detective College at Enugu, the Police Dogs Service Training 
Centre, and the Mounted Training Centre. The NPF inspector 
general visited Algeria in January 1988; as a result, new training 
practices were under consideration. 

In August 1989, Babangida laid the foundation stone for a Nige- 
ria Police Academy (NPA) in Kano State. The NPA was to be af- 
filiated with Bayero University until adequate infrastructure was 
available for independent operation. Admission was to be regulat- 
ed by merit, by the quota system, and by federal character. The 
commandant was to be at least an AIG and assisted by a provost 
who would oversee the academic program. Modeled after the 
Nigerian Military University in Kaduna, the NPA would offer a 
five-year academic and professional degree program for new cadets 
and an eighteen-month intensive course for college graduates aspir- 
ing to a police career. Babangida also disclosed plans to obtain tech- 
nical assistance from Britain to establish a central planning and 
training program to modernize and upgrade police training. 



314 



National Security 



Finally, mention should be made of the establishment in 1989 
of a paramilitary National Guard direcdy under the president. This 
new security force, set up by decree to combat crime and terrorism, 
became controversial because its mission overlapped both the police 
and the army, and it could be used for political witch-hunting and 
intimidation. Apparently, only a few police mobile units bore the 
guard's insignia before the government decided to reconsider its 
formation. The matter was still under review in 1990. 

Crime and Punishment 

Nigeria had a dual prison system for more than a half century 
until the consolidation of the federal and local prisons in 1968. The 
Nigerian Prison Service, a department of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, was headquartered in Lagos and headed by a director 
responsible for administering nearly 400 facilities, including regu- 
lar prisons, special penal institutions, and lockups. All of these fa- 
cilities since 1975 came under federal control. Each state had its 
own prison headquarters under the supervision of assistant direc- 
tors of prisons, and the prisons themselves — depending on type, 
size, and inmate population — were variously under chief superin- 
tendents, superintendents, or assistant superintendents. 

In 1989 the prison staff was reported to be 18,000, an apparent 
decrease from the 23,000 level in 1983. The average daily prison 
population in 1976 was nearly 26,000, a 25-percent increase from 
1975. Ten years later, Nigeria's prison population was about 
54,000. Lagos State accounted for the largest number, about 6,400; 
Anambra, Borno, and Kaduna housed more than 4,000 each; and 
Kwara, Niger, and Ondo, with fewer than 1,000 each, had the 
smallest inmate populations. By 1989 the prison population had 
increased to 58,000. 

Prison admissions increased steadily from about 130,000 in 1980 
to more than 206,000 in 1984. The most common offenses were 
theft, assault, traffic violations, and unlawful possession, which 
together accounted for 53 percent of prison admissions between 
1982 and 1984. Thieves represented the largest single category of 
offenders, accounting for between 37 and 46 percent of prison ad- 
missions between 1982 and 1984. Admissions to prisons in Kadu- 
na, Lagos, Borno, Kano, Plateau, Gongola, and Benue exceeded 
10,000 in 1983. This figure did not reflect the geographical distri- 
bution of crimes, however, because more than 10,000 prisoners 
each were from Anambra, Benue, Borno, Cross River, Gongola, 
Imo, Kaduna, Kano, and Sokoto. People between the ages of 
twenty-six and fifty consistently constituted the largest category of 
prisoners, ranging between 53 and 78 percent between 1980 and 



315 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



1984. In 1984 Christians and Muslims accounted for 45 and 37 
percent of prison admissions, respectively, and women for almost 
4 percent. In the same year, only 32 percent of prisoners admitted 
were convicted, whereas the rest were on remand or awaiting trial. 
Among those convicted, about three-fourths served terms of less 
than two years, while 59 percent were first-time offenders and 41 
percent were recidivists. Foreigners constituted an unknown propor- 
tion; in 1989, for example, about 2,000 aliens from other West 
African states were held in Kaduna's federal prisons for illegal emer- 
ald mining. 

Although prison policy called for provision of legal, religious, 
educational, vocational, and social welfare services, Nigeria's pris- 
on system, as in most Third World countries, was grossly inade- 
quate. There was no systematic classification of prisoners, so that 
young and old, and suspects for minor offenses — most of whom 
were pretrial detainees and first-time offenders incarcerated for ex- 
tended periods and eventually released upon acquittal — were inter- 
mixed with dangerous and deranged criminals or repeat offenders. 
Despite ever-increasing prison admissions and an inmate popula- 
tion more than double the prison system's capacity, after a develop- 
ment project allocation of N50 million in 1983, capital expenditures 
for prisons between 1985 and 1988 ranged only between N3 mil- 
lion and Nil. 6 million. Overall, by the late 1980s the overcrowd- 
ing rate of the prison systems exceeded 200 percent, with 58,000 
inmates housed in facilities designed to accommodate 28,000; in 
some prisons the situation was much worse. Although the govern- 
ment had announced a prison construction program, little progress 
was evident and conditions were projected to worsen: by the year 
2000, Nigeria's prison population was expected to be almost 
700,000. 

Apparendy unable to deal with the prison crisis systematically, 
the government resorted to periodic amnesties to reduce the in- 
mate population, usually on the occasion of a regime anniversary 
or a national holiday. General Buhari freed 2,500 prisoners, in- 
cluding 144 political detainees, in early 1985; the AFRC directed 
state governors to release old, sick, underaged, and handicapped 
prisoners on independence day in 1989; and the government 
granted general amnesty in 1990 to more than 5,000 inmates who 
had served three-fourths of their sentences, been jailed for minor 
offenses with terms that did not exceed one year, or who had served 
at least ten years of a life sentence. 

The criminal justice system was so backlogged that at least three- 
fifths of the country's prison population consisted of pretrial de- 
tainees rather than convicts. Reform and rehabilitation programs 



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National Security 



were nominal, and the prisons were aptly dubbed "colleges for 
criminals" or "breeding grounds for crime." For example, in the 
late 1980s the majority of the 2,000 inmates awaiting trial at Ikoyi 
spent nine years in detention for minor offenses, which, on con- 
viction, would have carried prison terms of less than two years. 
The egregious conditions at the Kirikiri maximum- security facili- 
ty were highlighted when Chief Ebenezer Babatope's 1989 prison 
memoir, Inside Kirikiri, was published. In mid- 1990 the govern- 
ment was considering an advisory committee recommendation to 
separate detainees from prisoners. 

Most prisons had no toilet facilities, and cells lacked water. Med- 
ical facilities were severely limited; food, which represented 80 per- 
cent of annual prison expenditures, was inadequate, despite a prison 
agricultural program designed to produce local foodstuffs for the 
commercial market. Malnutrition and disease were therefore ram- 
pant. In March 1990, the minister of justice said that the prisoners' 
feeding allowance had been increased from N1.5 to N5 and that 
health and other problems were being studied. 

Mistreatment of inmates was common, abuse frequent, and tor- 
ture occasional. In May 1987 at Benin prison, armed police killed 
twenty-four inmates rioting over food supplies, and in 1988 a 
"secret" ten-year-old detention camp on Ita Oko Island, off La- 
gos, was exposed and closed. Nearly 300 prisoners died of "natural 
causes" in 1984, and 79 committed suicide, a dramatic increase 
from the average of 12 suicides per year between 1980 and 1983. 
Ikoyi alone recorded more than 300 deaths in 1988, and 42 deaths 
in the first three months of 1989. In June 1989, the Civil Liberties 
Organisation filed suit on behalf of 1,000 detainees held without 
trial at Ikoyi, charging the government with mistreatment and urg- 
ing that the 113-year-old prison be closed. 

Incidence and Trends in Crime 

In the 1980s, serious crime grew to nearly epidemic proportions, 
particularly in Lagos and other urbanized areas characterized by 
rapid growth and change, by stark economic inequality and depri- 
vation, by social disorganization, and by inadequate government 
service and law enforcement capabilities. Published crime statis- 
tics were probably grossly understated because most of the coun- 
try was virtually unpoliced — the police were concentrated in urban 
areas where only about 25 percent of the population lived — and 
public distrust of the police contributed to underreporting of crimes. 

Annual crime rates fluctuated around 200 per 100,000 popula- 
tion until the early 1960s and then steadily increased to more than 
300 per 100,000 by the mid-1970s. Available data from the 1980s 



317 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

indicated a continuing increase. Total reported crimes rose from 
almost 211,000 in 1981 to between 330,000 and 355,000 during 
1984-85. Although serious crime usually constituted the larger 
category, minor crimes and offenses accounted for most of the in- 
crease. Crimes against property generally accounted for more than 
half the offenses, with thefts, burglary, and breaking and entering 
covering 80 to 90 percent in most years. Assaults constituted 70 
to 75 percent of all offenses against persons. The British High Com- 
mission in Lagos cited more than 3,000 cases of forgeries annually. 

In the late 1980s, the crime wave was exacerbated by worsen- 
ing economic conditions and by the ineffectiveness, inefficiency, 
and corruption of police, military, and customs personnel who col- 
luded and conspired with criminals or actually engaged in crimi- 
nal conduct. In 1987 the minister of internal affairs dismissed the 
director and 23 other senior officials of the customs service and 
"retired" about 250 other customs officers for connivance in or 
toleration of smuggling. In October 1988, Babangida threatened 
to execute publicly any police or military personnel caught selling 
guns to criminals. Indeed, one criminologist argued that the com- 
bination of discriminatory law enforcement and official corruption 
served to manage rather than reduce crime, by selectively punish- 
ing petty offenders while failing to prosecute vigorously major crimi- 
nals and those guilty of white collar crime. 

The public response to official misconduct was to take matters 
into its own hands. In July 1987, butchers, traders, and unem- 
ployed persons in Minna vented their wrath over police harass- 
ment, intimidation, and extortion in a six-hour rampage against 
police and soldiers that was quelled by military units. In Novem- 
ber 1989, when a police team raided suspect stores in Katsina mar- 
ket, the merchants feared it was a police robbery and sounded the 
alarm, attracting a mob that was then dispersed by riot police. As 
loss of confidence in law enforcement agencies and public insecu- 
rity increased, so also did public resort to vigilante action. Onit- 
sha vigilantes killed several suspected criminals in 1979. In July 
1989, after a gang of about thirty armed men terrorized and loot- 
ed a neighborhood in Onitsha without police intervention, resi- 
dents vented their rage on known and suspected criminals and 
lynched four before riot police eventually restored order. 

Drug- related crime emerged as a major problem in the 1980s. 
At least 328 cocaine seizures were made between 1986 and 1989, 
and the number of hard drug convictions surged from 8 in 1986 
to 149 in 1989, with women accounting for 27 percent of the 275 
total convictions during this period. Drug- induced psychoses ac- 
counted for 1 5 percent of admissions to four psychiatric hospitals 



318 



National Security 



in 1988. In a related development, the federal Ministry of Health 
reported in 1989 that about one-half of the drugs available in Nigeria 
were imitations, leading to a series of counterfeit and fake drugs 
decrees imposing increasingly higher penalties for violations. 

Nigerians also participated heavily in international drug traffick- 
ing. One study found that 65 percent of the heroin seizures of 50 
grams or more in British airports came from Nigeria, which was 
the transit point for 20 percent of all heroin from Southwest Asia. 
Another study disclosed that 20 percent of the hard drug cases in 
Britain involved ships of the Nigerian National Shipping Line. By 
the late 1980s, Nigerians were arrested almost daily in foreign coun- 
tries, and hundreds languished in foreign jails for drug trafficking. 

Security and Anticrime Measures 

The Buhari and Babangida military administrations relied heavily 
on decrees and special tribunals to regulate public life and punish 
offenders. Soon after his takeover on December 31, 1983, Buhari 
issued a decree imposing life imprisonment on anyone found guilty 
of corruption, and he set up four tribunals consisting of three senior 
officers and a judge to try almost 500 political leaders detained since 
the coup. State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree Number 
2 of 1984 suspended constitutional freedoms, empowered the chief 
of staff, Supreme Headquarters, to detain indefinitely (subject to 
review every three months) anyone suspected of ' ' acts prejudicial 
to state security or . . . [contributing] to the economic adversity 
of the nation." The decree also authorized any police officer or 
member of the armed forces to arrest and imprison such persons. 
Likewise, the Recovery of Public Property (Special Military 
Tribunals) Decree Number 3 of 1984 set up tribunals to try former 
officials suspected of embezzlement and of other forms of misap- 
propriation, also without right of appeal. The Exchange Control 
and Anti- Sabotage Tribunal dealt with certain economic crimes; 
a new press control law, Decree Number 4 of April 1984 (rescind- 
ed August 1985), was enforced by a similar special tribunal, without 
appeal rights. The Special Tribunal (Miscellaneous Offences) 
Decree covered a wide range of offenses, including forgery, arson, 
destruction of public property, unlawful vegetable cultivation, postal 
matters, and cheating on examinations. By July 1984, Buhari had 
issued twenty- two decrees, including two retroactive to December 
31, 1983, prescribing the death penalty for arson, drug traffick- 
ing, oil smuggling, and currency counterfeiting. In a related attempt 
to combat public indiscipline, Buhari 's chief of staff, Brigadier 
General Tunde Idiagbon, launched a largely symbolic and ineffective 



319 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

nationwide War Against Indiscipline (WAI) campaign in the spring 
of 1984. 

Babangida's AFRC allowed the WAI campaign to lapse and took 
several other measures to mitigate Buhari's draconian rule, includ- 
ing abolition in July 1986 of the death sentence under Decree Num- 
ber 20 of 1984 for illegal ship bunkering and drug trafficking, and 
setting up an appeal tribunal for persons convicted under decrees 
2 and 3 of 1984. However, the Babangida regime continued the 
Armed Robbery and Firearms Tribunals under which most of the 
death sentences were carried out without appeal. By early 1987, 
more than 300 people had been executed after conviction by these 
tribunals, and in 1988 another 85 executions were known to have 
been carried out under their sentences. The Treason and Other 
Offences (Special Military Tribunal) Decree of 1986 empowered 
the AFRC to constitute another special tribunal to try military and 
civilian personnel for any offenses connected with rebellion. Spe- 
cial tribunals were also set up to hear cases arising out of civil dis- 
orders, such as the religious riots in Zaria in March 1987. 

The most controversial decree remained Decree Number 2. In 
1986 Babangida extended the initial detention period from three 
to six months but rescinded the extension after a public outcry. 
However, he extended detention authority to the Ministry of In- 
ternal Affairs in addition to the police and military authorities. In 
mid- 1989 seventy to ninety persons were being held under its pro- 
visions, and in October the Civil Liberties Organisation appealed 
to the government to abrogate the decree and to release all those 
detained under it. In January 1990, the FMG amended the decree 
to shorten the precharge detention period to six weeks from six 
months, but in March the minister of justice stated that the decree 
would continue until the inauguration of the Third Republic. 

Babangida's regime took additional legal and enforcement mea- 
sures to combat illegal drug smuggling, including setting up spe- 
cial drug tribunals that meted out long prison terms and heavy fines; 
under these tribunals 120 convictions were attained by late 1987. 
Air transport laws were also toughened to deal with drug traffick- 
ing, and in November 1989 the minister of justice announced that 
a special tribunal would be set up to try air transport crimes. In 
October 1988, the minister of defense announced the establishment 
of a special "drug squad" to apprehend drug traffickers at home 
and abroad. Decree Number 48 of January 1990 established a Na- 
tional Drug Law Enforcement Agency to eliminate the growing, 
processing, manufacturing, selling, exporting, and trafficking of 
hard drugs, and the decree prescribed stiffer penalties for convict- 
ed offenders. Although Babangida had abolished the death penalty 



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National Security 



for convicted drug dealers, by the end of the decade there were 
public calls to restore it. Stricter security measures were introduced 
at Murtala Muhammad International Airport in 1989 to curb a 
crime wave there, and a plan was instituted in August 1989 to con- 
trol black market activities. 

The worldwide scope of crime demanded international cooper- 
ation to combat it. In 1982 Nigeria and Cameroon decided to con- 
clude extradition agreements. Nigeria also signed a regional 
security, law enforcement, and extradition treaty with Benin, 
Ghana, and Togo in December 1984; the treaty covered criminal 
investigation, dissident activities, currency and drug trafficking, 
and other criminal and security matters. In 1987 Nigeria and the 
United States concluded a mutual law enforcement agreement 
covering narcotics trafficking and expanded cooperation in other 
key areas. A related antidrug memorandum of understanding with 
the United States in March 1990 provided for a joint task force 
on narcotics and assistance to the new National Drug Law Enforce- 
ment Agency. A similar legal assistance pact with Britain to com- 
bat crime and drug trafficking was signed in September 1989. 
Nigeria also concluded an antidrug trafficking accord with Saudi 
Arabia in October 1990. 

In the final analysis, domestic conditions will likely determine 
the fate of the Babangida regime and its successors for the foresee- 
able future. Although externally secure, Nigeria's internal problems 
were legion and daunting. The most salient were political fragility 
and instability; a military determined to be the final arbiter of po- 
litical life; endemic domestic discord deeply rooted in ethnic and 
religious cleavages; overtaxed, ineffective, corrupt, and politicized 
internal security forces and penal institutions; and anticrime mea- 
sures hopelessly inadequate to the task. Under such conditions, 
Nigeria faced major challenges in its political transition to the Third 
Republic. 

* * * 

There is voluminous literature on Nigerian military history and 
national security affairs. Much relevant material is published in 
Nigeria but is not readily accessible abroad. 

Nigeria's regional strategic situation and outlook are evaluated 
by John M. Ostheimer and Gary J. Buckley's chapter, " Nige- 
ria," in Security Policies of Developing Countries; and by Pauline H. 
Baker's "A Giant Staggers: Nigeria as an Emerging Regional Power" 
in African Security Issues and "Nigeria: The Sub-Saharan Pivot" in 
Emerging Power: Defense and Security in the Third World. Its participation 



321 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

in the ECOWAS defense pact is examined in Michael J. Sheehan's 
"Nigeria and the ECOWAS Defence Pact"; its maritime interests 
and strategy are discussed in Sheehan's "Nigeria: A Maritime Pow- 
er?" and in Olutunde A. Oladimeji's "Nigeria on Becoming a Sea 
Power." Bassey Eyo Ate's "The Presence of France in West- 
Central Africa as a Fundamental Problem to Nigeria" and Ekido 
J.A. MacAnigboro and Aja Akpuru Aja's "France's Military Policy 
in Sub-Saharan Francophone States: A Threat to Nigeria's National 
Security" have analyzed the Franco-Nigerian security dilemma. 
Julius Emeka Okolo's "Nuclearization of Nigeria" and Oye Ogun- 
badejo's "Nuclear Capability and Nigeria's Foreign Policy" dis- 
cuss Nigeria's nuclear policy options. 

Data on military forces and order of battle are available in such 
annual publications as The Military Balance, published by the In- 
ternational Institute for Strategic Studies in London, and the var- 
ious Jane's yearbooks. Supplementary information is available in 
John Keegan's World Armies and in the annual Defense and Foreign 
Affairs Handbook. Statistics and other information on arms trans- 
fers, military spending, and armed forces are contained in the Unit- 
ed States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's annual World 
Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers and in the Stockholm Inter- 
national Peace Research Institute's annual World Armaments and Dis- 
armament. 

Internal security and human rights conditions are evaluated an- 
nually in the Amnesty International Report and in the United States 
Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. The 
International Law of Human Rights in Africa, compiled by M. 
Hamalengwa et al., is a useful reference for African states. 

Country briefs on police forces are found in John M. Andrade's 
World Police and Paramilitary Forces and in Harold K. and Donna 
Lee Becker's Handbook of the World's Police. Alan Milner's now-dated 
The Nigerian Penal System provides essential historical background 
that is supplemented by Oluyemi Kayode's chapter, "Nigeria," 
in International Handbook of Contemporary Developments in Criminology. 

Finally, specialized current news sources and surveys are in- 
dispensable for research on contemporary national security affairs. 
The most useful and accessible include the annual Africa Contem- 
porary Record and such periodicals as Africa Research Bulletin, Africa 
Confidential, Defense and Foreign Affairs Weekly, Jane 's Defence Weekly, 
International Defense Review, and the most useful single source, Afri- 
can Defence/ Afrique Defense. (For further information and complete 
citations, see Bibliography.) 



322 



Appendix 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Population Estimates by State, 1987 

3 Enrollment, Number of Schools, and Number of Teachers in 

Public Primary Schools by State, 1983-84 to 1985-86 

4 Enrollment in Secondary Schools by State, 1980-81 to 1983-84 

5 Enrollment in Federal Universities by State, 1980-81 to 

1984-85 

6 Medical Personnel and Facilities, 1985 

7 Federal Government Budget, 1986-90 

8 Labor Force by Sector, 1983 

9 Gross Domestic Product by Sector, 1986-88 

10 Balance of Payments, 1984-88 

11 Production of Major Agricultural Commodities, 1985-88 

12 Major Imports, 1985-88 

13 Major Exports, 1984-88 

14 Major Trading Partners, 1985-88 

15 Crude Petroleum Production, Selected Years, 1967-89 

16 Revised Transition Timetable, 1987-92 

17 Major Army Equipment, 1990 

18 Major Navy Equipment, 1990 

19 Major Air Force Equipment, 1990 

20 Arms Imports by Supplier, 1978-87 



323 



Appendix 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 



When you know Multiply by To find 



Millimeters 0.04 inches 

Centimeters 0.39 inches 

Meters 3.3 feet 

Kilometers 0.62 miles 

Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) 2.47 acres 

Square kilometers 0.39 square miles 

Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet 

Liters 0.26 gallons 

Kilograms 2.2 pounds 

Metric tons 0.98 long tons 

1.1 short tons 

2,204 pounds 

Degrees Celsius 9 degrees Fahrenheit 

(Centigrade) divide by 5 

and add 32 



Table 2. Population Estimates by State, 1987 



State 



Population 



State 



Population 



Akwa Ibom 5,100,000 

Anambra 7,200,000 

Bauchi 4,800,000 

Bendel 4,900,000 

Benue 4,800,000 

Borno 6,000,000 

Cross River 1,900,000 

Gongola 5,200,000 

Imo 7,300,000 

Kaduna 3,300,000 

Kano 11,500,000 

Katsina 4,900,000 



Kwara 3,400,000 

Lagos 4,100,000 

Niger 2,200,000 

Ogun 3,100,000 

Ondo 5,500,000 

Oyo 10,400,000 

Plateau 4,000,000 

Rivers 3,400,000 

Sokoto 9,000,000 

Federal Capital 

Territory (Abuja) 300,000 

TOTAL 112,300,000 



Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Nigeria 
[London], No. 1, 1990, 10. 



325 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



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326 



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327 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



Table 5. Enrollment in Federal Universities by State, 
1980-81 to 1984-85 



State 1 


1980-81 


1981-82 


1982-83 


1983-84 


1984-85 2 


AnamKra 


10 290 


11 838 


12 139 


12 193 


12 200 


RailPnl 


o 


263 


512 


595 


700 




5 694 


6 489 


7 005 


9 528 


Q 000 


Benuc 


o 


193 


366 


451 


600 


Borno 


2 569 


3,244 


4,131 


5,505 


5,600 




2 798 


3 687 


4 816 


4 816 


5 000 


firm gtoIji 


o 


o 


128 


221 


350 




o 


224 


364 


565 


600 


rv urii in ;i 


11 681 


12 586 


14 029 


13 374 


13 400 




2,479 


2^861 


3^376 


3,777 


4^000 


Kwara 


. . . 2,010 


2,784 


3,512 


4,622 


5,000 




12 365 


12 757 


9 891 


10 800 


11 000 













'l60 


'300 













236 


350 


Ondo 








148 


274 


400 


Oyo 


. . 17,855 


21,095 


22,454 


24,007 


24,000 




. . 3,047 


3,933 


4,798 


4,983 


5,000 


Rivers 


1,754 


2,428 


2,916 


3,302 


3,500 




883 


1,366 


2,063 


2,534 


3,000 


TOTAL 


. .. 73,425 


85,748 


92,648 


101,943 


104,000 



1 Akwa Ibom and Katsina did not become states until September 1987 and are therefore not included. 

2 As published. 



Source: Based on information from Nigeria, Office of Statistics, Social Statistics in Nigeria, 
1985, Lagos, 1986, 83. 



Table 6. Medical Personnel and Facilities, 1985 

Per 100,000 
Number Population 



Doctors 14,757 15.3 

Nurses 45,976 47.6 

Midwives 39,137 40.5 

Dentists 899 0.9 

Hospital beds 

Federal 11,793 n.a. 

State 41,371 n.a. 

Local 9,272 n.a. 

Private 12,751 n.a. 

Missions 10,020 n.a. 

Community, corporation, and industrial 1,319 n.a. 

Joint public/private sector 1,279 n.a. 

Total hospital beds 87,805 



n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from Nigeria, Office of Statistics, Social Statistics in Nigeria, 
1985, Lagos, 1986, 45. 



328 



Appendix 



Table 7. Federal Government Budget, 1986-90 
(in millions of naira) 1 





1986 


1987 


1988 2 


1989 3 


1990 3 


Revenues 

Other 


, 8,108 
. . 4,194 
. . 12,302 


19,027 
6,072 
25,099 


20,934 
6,377 
27,311 


22,521 
6,893 
29,414 


38,627 
9,138 
47,765 


Expenditures 


. . 7,697 
. . 8,527 
. . 16,224 


15,646 
6,373 
22,019 


19,409 
8,340 
27,749 


21,235 
9,797 
31,032 


27,208 
12,555 
39,763 


Allocations to state and local 


4,333 


. . -8,255 


8,970 


-5,890 


11,722 


-12,160 


12,197 


-13,815 


20,442 
-1,892 
-14,332 



1 For value of the naira — see Glossary. 

2 Provisional. 

3 Projected. 



Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Nigeria, 
1990-91, London, 1990, 37. 



Table 8. Labor Force by Sector, 1983 







Number 




Sector 


(ir 


i thousands) 


Percentage 


Employed 




9,296 
103 

1,343 
318 


33.5 
0.4 
4.8 






909 


3.3 






6,534 


23.5 


Transportation, communications, and storage 
Finance, insurance, real estate, and business 




1,123 


4.1 






204 


0.7 


Community, social, and personal services . . . 
Other 




7,081 
865 


25.5 
3.1 






27,776 
1,677 


100.0 
n.a. 


TOTAL 




29,453 


n.a. 


n.a. — not applicable. 








Source: Based on information from Paul Hackett, 


''Nigeria- 


-Economy,' 


in Africa South 



of the Sahara, 1990, London, 784. 



329 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



Table 9. Gross Domestic Product by Sector, 1986-88 1 
(in billions of naira) 2 



Sector 


1 Qftfi 


1Qft7 


1 Qftft 

lyoo 


A : 1* „ c . „ ] r- 1 • 


91 O 


31 .9 


32.3 






10.2 


11.3 






0.4 


0.5 




7 3 


7 7 
/ . / 


O.O 




n a. 


n £ 
U.o 


n i 

VJ.O 




1.3 


1.1 


1.1 




2.7 


2.7 


2.9 




f\ o 


0.^ 


A 1 




....... 12.1 


13.6 


14.1 




0.7 


0.7 


0.7 




2.4 


2.6 


3.0 




0.3 


0.3 


0.3 




1.9 


1.9 


2.0 




5.0 


5.0 


5.0 


Other 


0.6 


0.6 


0.7 


TOTAL 3 


77.9 


79.3 


82.6 



1 At 1984 factor cost. 

2 For value of the naira — see Glossary. 

3 Figures may not add to total because of rounding. 



Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Nigeria, 
1990-91, London, 1990, 15. 



330 



Appendix 



Table 10. Balance of Payments, 1984-88 
(in millions of United States dollars) 





1984 


1985 


1986 


1987 


1988 




, , 11,827 


13,369 


6,599 


7,702 


7,419 




. . . 8,844 


7,634 


4,063 


4,178 


5,000 




. , 2,983 


5,735 


2,536 


3,524 


2,419 




4.ftQ 




9.4.4. 




jOU 




. . -3,034 


-3,254 


-2,371 


-3,845 


-3,800 




-299 


-260 


-131 


-20 


-34 




-26 


-1 


-5 


-5 


-22 


Current account balance . . 


113 


2,623 


373 


-70 


-1,057 




200 


489 


199 


67 


881 




CIO 




1 A A A 

-1 ,44U 


-3,olo 


9 a no 




. . -912 


-1,920 


-91 


1,167 


1,273 




. . -1,350 


-3,738 


-1,332 


-2,382 


-1,338 




271 


-138 


-191 


-311 


-63 




-9 


-445 


-40 


56 


-58 


Foreign authorities reserves . . 











1,829 







. , 1,446 


1,753 


612 


4,641 


4,503 


Change in reserves 














. . . -471 


-55 


578 


-104 2 


514 2 



1 f.o.b. — free on board. 

2 As published. 



Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Nigeria, 
1990-91, London, 1990, 46. 



331 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



Table 11. Production of Major Agricultural Commodities, 1985-88 
(in thousands of tons unless otherwise indicated) 



Commodity 


1985 


1986 


1987 


1988 


Food crops 












611 


732 


688 


690 




. . . 1,378 


1,546 


1,486 


1,587 


r~\ 




1,336 


1,202 


1,370 






153 


145 


150 


Millet 


. . . 3,684 


4,111 


3,905 


4,170 




. . . 1,113 


1,127 


1,071 


1,549 






283 


297 


307 






5,455 


5,182 


5,534 




. . . 4,738 


5,209 


4,886 


5,042 






19,952 


18,862 


20,399 


Commercial crops 












110 


100 


105 


200 


. 




104 


105 


108 


Cottonseed 


46 


30 


32 


38 




360 


350 


353 


545 




. . . 4,882 


4,940 


4,951 


4,986 




621 


640 


657 


706 


Rubber 


58 


60 


51 


81 




35 


35 


34 


36 




100 


103 


104 


109 




, , 114 


100 


107 


121 




862 


897 


852 


888 


Total commercial crops . . . 


. . . 7,290 


7,359 


7,351 


7,818 


TOTAL 


... 25,338 


27,311 


26,213 


28,217 



* In thousands of liters. 



Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Nigeria, 

1989- 90, London, 1989, 18; and Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Nigeria, 

1990- 91, London, 1990, 18-19. 



332 



Appendix 



Table 12. Major Imports, 1985-88 
(in millions of naira) * 



Commodity 


1985 


1986 


1987 


1988 




, 1,200 


802 


1,874 


1,948 




y 


14 


31 


06 


Animal and vegetable fats and oils . 


71 


125 


66 


83 




. 350 


194 


800 


667 




61 


42 


77 


255 




, 1,108 


1,039 


3,017 


4,838 




. 1,612 


1,237 


4,485 


5,650 


Machinery and transportation 












, 2,414 


2,278 


6,828 


10,282 


Other 


. 238 


253 


684 


1,091 


TOTAL 


. 7,063 


5,984 


17,862 


24,900 



* For value of the naira — see Glossary. 

Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Nigeria, 
1990-91, London, 1990, 43-44. 



Table 13. Major Exports, 1984-88 
(in millions of naira) 1 



Commodity 


1984 


1985 


1986 


1987 


1988 2 




183 


182 


371 


1,498 


2,627 




32 


57 


54 


62 


86 




16 


6 


8 


30 


103 




8,841 


11,224 


8,368 


28,209 


29,293 




17 


4 


29 


61 


290 


Other 3 


-1 


248 


91 


501 


739 


TOTAL 


9,088 


11,721 


8,921 


30,361 


33,138 



1 For value of the naira — see Glossary. 

2 Provisional. 

3 Includes statistical discrepancy, which accounts for negative figure. 



Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Nigeria, 
1990-91, London, 1990, 43. 



333 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



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334 



Appendix 



Table 15. Crude Petroleum Production, Selected Years, 
1967-89 
(in millions of barrels per day) 

Year Quantity Year Quantity 

1967 333 1979 2,306 

1969 564 1981 1,440 

1971 1,628 1983 1,235 

1973 2,140 1985 1,491 

1975 1,861 1987 1,270 

1977 2,184 1989 1,662 

Source: Based on information from E. Wayne Nafziger, The Economics of Political Instabili- 
ty: The Nigerian-Biafran War, Boulder, Colorado, 1983, 150; Central Bank of Nigeria, 
Economic and Financial Review [Lagos], 23, June 1985, 80; and Economist Intelli- 
gence Unit, Country Profile: Nigeria, 1990-91, London, 1990, 25. 



Table 16. Revised Transition Timetable, 1987-92 
(as of December 1990) 



Year 



Quarter 



Event 



1987 



1988 



1989 



1990 



1991 



1992 



Third quarter 

Fourth quarter 
First quarter 



Second quarter 
Third quarter 

Fourth quarter 

First and 

second quarter 

Third quarter 

Fourth quarter 

First, second, and 
third quarters 

Fourth quarter 

First and 

second quarters 

Third and 

fourth quarters 



Establishment of Directorate of Social 
Mobilization, National Electoral 
Commission, and Constitution Draft- 
ing Committee. 

Elections to local governments on non- 
party basis. 

Establishment of National Population 
Commission, Code of Conduct 
Tribunal, and Constitutional As- 
sembly. 

Lift of ban on party politics. 

Announcement of two recognized and 
registered political parties. 

Election of local governments on political 
party basis. 

Election of state legislatures and state 
executives. 

Convening of state legislatures. 

Swearing in of state executives. 

Census. 

Local government elections. 

Elections of federal legislature and con- 
vening of National Assembly. 

Presidential elections. Swearing in of new 
president and final withdrawal by the 
armed forces. 



335 



Nigeria: A Country Study 

Table 17. Major Army Equipment, 1990 

Country of In 

Type and Description Origin Inventory 

Tanks 

T-55 main battle tanks Soviet Union 60 

Vickers Mk 3 main battle tanks Britain 97 

Scorpion light tanks -do- 100 

Scimitar light tanks -do- 5 

Armored vehicles 

Saladin Mk 2 reconnaissance Britain 20 

AML-60 reconnaissance France 120 

AML-90 reconnaissance -do- 60 

Ferret reconnaissance Britain 25 

Fox reconnaissance -do- 55 

VBL M-ll reconnaissance France 10 

Steyr 4K-7FA armored personnel carriers Austria 300 

Saracen armored personnel carriers Britain 10 

Panhard M3 armored personnel carriers France n.a. 

ERC-90 Lynx armored cars -do- 40 

ERC-90 Sagaie armored cars -do- 40 

EE-9 Cascavel armored cars Brazil 100 (on 

order) 

Artillery 

M1942 76mm guns n.a. n.a. 

M-56 105mm guns n.a. 200 

D-30/-74 122mm guns, howitzers n.a. 200 

M46 130mm howitzers n.a. n.a. 

Bofors FH-77B 155mm howitzers Sweden 24 

Palmaria 155mm self-propelled howitzers Italy 25 

81mm mortars n.a. 200 

BM-21 122mm rocket launchers Soviet Union n.a. 

Antitank weapons 

Carl Gustav 84mm Sweden n.a. 

M-40A1 106mm n.a. n.a. 

Air defense weapons 

ZPU 14.5mm Soviet Union n.a. 

20mm n.a. 60 

ZU-23 23mm Soviet Union n.a. 

ZSU-23-4 23mm self-propelled , -do- 30 

L/60 40mm n.a. n.a. 

Roland missile launchers France 16 

Blowpipe man-portable missiles Britain 48 

n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1990-1991, London, 1990, 139; 
and World Defense Almanac (Special Issue: Military Technology), January 1989, 231. 



336 



Appendix 



Table 18. Major Navy Equipment, 1990 



Type and Description 



Country of 
Origin 



In 

Inventory 



Frigates 

Meko-360H with 1 Westland Lynx 
Mk 89 MR/SR helicopter and 8 
Otomat surface-to-surface missile 

(SSM) launchers West Germany 1 

Training vessel with helicopter deck . Netherlands 1 

Missile craft 

Ltirssen-57 patrol frigates with 4 

Otomat SSMs West Germany 3 

Combattante IIIB with 4 Exocet 

MM-38 SSMs France 3 

Corvettes 

Vosper Mk 9 with Seacat triple 

surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) Britain 1 

Vosper Mk 3 -do- 1 

Large patrol craft 

Brooke Marine -do- 4 

Abeking and Rasmussen West Germany 4 

Coastal patrol craft 

Intermarine Italy 14 

Simoneau France 6 

Danen Netherlands 6 

Van Mill -do- 5 

Watercraft Britain 2 

Swiftships United States 4 

Rotork Sea Truck n.a. 4 

Minesweepers 

Intermarine Lerici-class Italy 2 

Amphibious 

FDR type Ro-Ro-1300 tank landing 
ships West Germany 2 

Support ships 

Bulldog-class survey ship Britain 1 

Van Lent training ship Netherlands 1 

Tugs (1 firefighter) Netherlands/ 

West Germany 8 

Launchers n.a. 56 

Naval aviation 

Westland Lynx Mk 89 MR/SR 
helicopters Britain/France 3 

n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1990-1991, London, 1990, 139; 
and Jane's Fighting Ships, 1989-90, London, 1989, 399-404. 



337 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



Table 19. Major Air Force Equipment, 1990 



Type and Description 



Country of 
Origin 



In 

Inventory 



Fighters 

Alpha Jet light attack/trainer West Germany 

MiG-21 MF Fishbed Soviet Union 

MiG-21 MF (being modernized) -do- 

MiG-21 UTI Mongol -do- 
Jaguar deck Britain 

Trainers 

L-39 Czechoslovakia 

MB-339AN Italy 

MiG-21 UTI Soviet Union 

Bulldog Britain 

Transports 

C-130H United States 

C-130H-30 -do- 

Do-228 VIP West Germany 

F-28 -do- 

G-222 Italy 

Do-28D transport/liaison West 

Germany 

Do- 128-6 transport/liaison -do- 

Gulfstream II VIP United States 

Boeing 727-30 VIP -do- 
Piper PA-31 Navajo -do- 

BAe 125-700 Britain 

Maritime patrol/search and rescue 

F-27 Netherlands 

Helicopters 

Bo-105D attack West Germany 

Bo-105D maritime reconnaissance/search 

and rescue -do- 
Bo- 105C/D transport -do- 

SA-316B Alouette III France 

SA-3300 Puma transport -do- 

AS-332M Super Puma transport -do- 

CH-47 Chinook United States 

Hughes 300 training -do- 



21 
6 

12 
4 

15 



12 
12 
2 
25 



6 
3 

3(?) 

1 

5 

18 
18 

2 

1 

3 

1 



15 

4 
4 
10 

2 

6 (on 
order) 

5 (on 
order) 
14 



338 



Appendix 



Table 20. Arms Imports by Supplier, 1978-87 
(in millions of United States dollars) 



Supplier 


1978-82 


1983-87 




150 


340 







20 







5 




5 


60 




250 


130 


Italy 


40 


350 




90 


90 


United States 


20 


140 




280 


70 


Other 


10 


310 



TOTAL 845 1,515 



Source: Based on information from United States, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1972-1982. Washington, April 1984, 
table III, 95; and United States, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World 
Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1988, Washington, June 1989, table III, 111. 



339 



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Taylor, Michael J. H. "Nigeria." Page 112 in Encyclopedia of the 
World's Air Forces. New York: Facts on File, 1988. 

United States. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Mili- 
tary Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1972-1982. Washington: 
GPO, 1984. 

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Military 

Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1988. Washington: GPO, 1989. 

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Military 

Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1989. Washington: GPO, 1990. 

Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Prac- 
tices for 1989. (Report submitted to United States Congress, 101st, 
2d Session, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, and House 
of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs.) Washing- 
ton: GPO, 1990. 

World Armaments and Disarmament: Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute Yearbook, 1989. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. 

World Defense Almanac (Special Issue: Military Technology), January 
1989. 

(Various issues of the following publications were also used in 
the preparation of this chapter: Africa Confidential [London]; Afri- 
can Defence/ Afrique Defense [Paris]; Africa Research Bulletin [Exeter, 
United Kingdom]; Defense and Foreign Affairs Weekly; Jane's Defence 
Weekly [Coulsdon, Surrey, United Kingdom]; and International 
Defence Review [Coulsdon, Surrey, United Kingdom].) 



361 



Glossary 



fiscal year (FY) — An annual period established for accounting 
purposes. Through FY 1979-80 the Nigerian government's fis- 
cal year ran from April 1 to the following March 31 . The lat- 
ter fiscal year was succeeded by a nine-month FY 1980 that 
ended December 31, 1980. From January 1, 1981, the fiscal 
year was made coterminous with the calendar year. 

GDP (gross domestic product) — A value measure of the flow 
of domestic goods and services produced by an economy over 
a period of time, such as a year. Only output values of goods 
for final consumption and for intermediate production are as- 
sumed to be included in final prices. GDP is sometimes ag- 
gregated and shown at market prices, meaning that indirect 
taxes and subsidies are included; when these have been elimi- 
nated, the result is GDP at factor cost. The word gross indi- 
cates that deductions for depreciation of physical assets have 
not been made. 

GNP (gross national product) — GDP (q. v. ) plus the net income 
or loss stemming from transactions with foreign countries. GNP 
is the broadest measurement of the output of goods and ser- 
vices by an economy. It can be calculated at market prices, 
which include indirect taxes and subsidies. Because indirect 
taxes and subsidies are only transfer payments, GNP is often 
calculated at a factor cost, removing indirect taxes and subsidies. 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established along with 
the World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agen- 
cy affiliated with the United Nations and is responsible for 
stabilizing international exchange rates and payments. The 
main business of the IMF is the provision of loans to its mem- 
bers (including industrialized and developing countries) when 
they experience balance of payments difficulties. These loans 
frequendy carry conditions that require substantial internal eco- 
nomic adjustments by the recipients, most of which are develop- 
ing countries. 

Lome Convention — A series of agreements between the Euro- 
pean Economic Community (EEC) and a group of African, 
Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states, mainly former Euopean 
colonies, that provide duty-free or preferential access to the EEC 
maket for almost all ACP exports. The Stabilization of Export 
Earnings (Stabex) scheme, a mechanism set up by the Lome 
Convention, provides for compensation for ACP exports lost 



363 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



through fluctuations in the world prices of agricultural com- 
modities. The Lome Convention also provides for limited EEC 
development aid and investment funds to be disbursed to ACP 
recipients through the European Development Fund and the 
European Investment Bank. The Lome Convention is updated 
about every five years. Lome I took effect on April 1, 1976; 
Lome II, on January 1, 1981; Lome III, on March 1, 1985; 
and Lome IV, on December 15, 1989. 

middle belt — Traditionally an ethnic and political zone stretch- 
ing from east to west across the central section of Nigeria and 
inhabited by many minor ethnic groups who had been unable 
to obtain significant political influence because of long-term 
dominance by the Hausa-Fulani and Kanuri emirates. As used 
by economists and geographers, the term does not always coin- 
cide with ethnic and political divisions but usually designates 
the area between the characteristic northern and southern econ- 
omies; in this context the area extends roughly from 7°30'N 
to 11°N. Since the civil war of 1967-70 and the replacement 
of the former administrative regions by states, use of the term 
has diminished among Nigerians who wish to downplay the 
regional connotation formerly attached to it. 

naira (N) — Nigeria's basic currency unit. It is subdivided into 
100 kobo (k). The naira was introduced on January 1, 1973, 
replacing the Nigerian pound (q. v. ) at the rate of two naira for 
one pound. At that time Nl equaled US$1 .52. The naira sub- 
sequently lost value against the dollar; average exchange rate 
in 1990: N8.04 per US$1.00. 

Nigerian pound (N£) — Basic currency unit until January 1 , 1973, 
when it was replaced by the naira (q.v.). N£l was valued 
at US$2.80 until December 1971; thereafter N£l equaled 
US$3.04. 

Paris Club — The informal name for a consortium of Western 
creditor countries that have made loans or have guaranteed 
export credits to developing nations and that meet in Paris to 
discuss borrowers' ability to repay debts. The organization has 
no formal or institutional existence and no fixed membership. 
Its secretariat is run by the French treasury, and it has a close 
relationship with the World Bank (q.v.), the International 
Monetary Fund (q.v.), and the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 

Sahel — A narrow band of land bordering the southern Sahara, 
stretching across Africa, and including northern Nigeria. It is 
characterized by an average annual rainfall of between 1 50 and 
500 millimeters and is mainly suited to pastoralism. 



364 



Glossary 



Special Drawing Right(s) (SDR) — A monetary unit of the In- 
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) (q. v. ) based on a basket of 
international currencies consisting of the United States dollar, 
the German deutsche mark, the Japanese yen, the British pound 
sterling, and the French franc. 

Sudan — Geographical region (northern reaches now more com- 
monly referred to as the Sahel) stretching across Africa from 
Cape Verde on the Atlantic Coast to the Red Sea between 8° 
and 16° north latitude, just south of the Sahara Desert, charac- 
terized by savanna and semiarid steppe. Term derived from 
Arabic bilad as sudan (literally "land of the blacks"). Not to 
be confused with Sudan, the country. 

World Bank — Informal name used to designate a group of three 
affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International 
Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the 
primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for 
productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund but 
administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to 
furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much eas- 
ier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, 
founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD 
through loans and assistance specifically designed to encourage 
the growth of productive private enterprises in the less devel- 
oped countries. The president and certain senior officers of the 
IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The three institu- 
tions are owned by the governments of the countries that sub- 
scribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group, 
member states must first belong to the International Mone- 
tary Fund (IMF — q.v.). 



365 



Index 



Aba, 136 

Abacha, Sanni, 272 
Abakaliki Uplift, 87 
Abd as Salam, 20 
Abdullahi, 21 
Abeokuta, 22, 131, 144 
Abiodun (King), 17 
abortion, 96 

Abuja, 20, 76, 134, 218; religion in, 129; 
transfer of capital to, xxx, 72, 137, 229, 
241 

Aburi Agreement: implemented, 58; op- 
position to, 58, 217 

academic associations, xxxii, 242, 305 

Academic Staff Union of Universities, 
242, 305, 309 

acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
(AIDS) xxvi, 144; carriers of, xxvi 

Action Group (AG), 50, 51, 53, 54, 73, 
74, 161, 210, 212, 228; cleavage in, 49; 
creation of, 40, 41; in House of 
Representatives, 47; platform of, 42; 
role of, in Western Region, 48-49 

Adamawa, 21 

Adebo Commission (1970), 239 

Adeedji, Adebayo, 250 

AFRC . See Armed Forces Ruling Council 

African- American churches, 128 

African Association, 26 

African Banking Corporation, 193 

African Charter on Human and Peoples' 

Rights (1981), 307 
African Continental Bank, 193 
African Defence Journal, 280-82 
African Development Bank, 248 
African National Congress, 248, 267 
African Shield, 87 
African socialism, 160-61 
African unity, 246, 250 
AG. See Action Group 
Agades, 14 
Agbakobe, Olisa, 308 
Agip, 186, 187 

agriculture, 174-81; expansion of, 65, 72, 
163; export crops, 159, 166, 200; im- 
ports, 166; integration of, with indus- 
try, xxviii; as percentage of gross 
domestic product, xxvii-xxviii, 164, 



174; privatization in, xxviii; self- 
sufficiency in, xxvii; value of exports, 
174 

agricultural: commodity marketing 
boards, 200; development, 66, 81; 
prices, 170; production, 96, 164-66, 
170, 179 

agricultural products (see also under in- 
dividual crops), 178-79; commercial 
crops, 178; as export earner, 4, 46; 
grain, 178; root crops, 178; tree crops, 
178 

Aguda, Akintola, 218 

Ahmadu Bello University, 120, 143; 

demonstrations at, 81, 305, 306 
AIDS. See acquired immune deficiency 

syndrome 

Aikhomu, Augustus, xxxii, 224, 255, 273 

Air Act (1964), 282 

Air Beede, 282, 286 

air force, 282-83; aircraft of, 282, 283; 
bases, 283; capabilities of, 294; crea- 
tion of, 282; helicopter training school, 
293; maintenance, 286-87, 293-94; 
maritime patrol of, 283; materiel, 282; 
number of personnel, 282; organization 
of, 282-83; problems in, 282, 283; 
procurements, 283; uniforms, ranks, 
and insignia, 295 

Air Force Training Command, 292 

Air Force Welfare Insurance Scheme, 
288-89 

Airlift Command, 282 

airports, 192, 198 

Ajaokuta steelworks, xxviii, 72, 75 

Ajibola, Bola, 309 

Akenyemi, Boleji, 250 

Akintola, Samuel, 42, 53, 209; assassinat- 
ed, 56; expelled from Action Group, 
49; as prime minister of Western 
Region, 49, 50, 211 

Akwa Ibom, xxviii, 82 

Ala, 9 

Aladje steelworks, 75 

Aladura Church, 120, 129; movement, 

xxvi, 128 
Alesa Eleme oil refinery, 185, 186 
Algeria, 314 



367 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



"Ali Must Go" Day, 243, 306 
Alkali courts, 126 
Al Kanemi, 21 
Aloma, Idris, 14 
Amakiri, Minere, 242 
Amin, Idi, 264 

Aminu Kano International Airport, 192 
Amnesty International, 308 
Anambra Basin, 87 

Anambra State, 238, 315; health care in, 
147; industry in, 286; politics in, 74; 
yellow fever in, 150 

Anang, 107 

Anas, Malik ibn, 126 

Anglican Church, 105, 128, 129 

Anglo-Nigerian Defense Pact, 243 

Angola, 16, 69, 258, 264 

Angola-Namibia accords, 250, 268 

Anyaoku, Emeka, 250 

Apapa, 277 

Arab-Israeli dispute, xxxi 
Aradu, 278, 284 
Arafat, Yasir, xxxi 
archaeological research, 4-5, 10 
area, 87 
Argungu, 20 

armed forces, 268-301; attitudes toward, 
295-98; buildup, 300; capabilities of, 
294-95; civic action role of, 301; con- 
ditions in, 288-89; under constitution 
of 1979, 271; constraints on, 294-95; 
cooperation programs, 262; corruption 
in, 295, 299, 318; demobilization of, 
xxv, 65-66, 69, 256, 289, 301; educa- 
tional qualification for, 287; federal 
principle applied to, 227; missions of, 
273; organization of, 272-73; pay and 
benefits in, 81, 288; peacekeeping role 
of, 269; personnel turnover in, 299; po- 
litical neutrality in, 298; political role 
of, 298-99; problems in, 289; profes- 
sionalization of, xxxiii; public disen- 
chantment with, xxxii; quotas in, 288; 
recruitment for, 287-88, 298; reduced, 
272; restructuring of, xxxi, 217, 224, 
272, 295; selectivity of, 287-88; size of, 
xxxii, 256, 272; technical assistance to, 
284; training, 262, 290-94; uniforms, 
ranks, and insignia, 295; women in, 288 

Armed Forces Consultative Assembly, 
222, 273 

Armed Forces Rehabilitation Centre, 289 
Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC), 



xxv, 81, 222, 230, 232, 272, 305, 307; 
ethnic distribution in, 78; personnel 
changes in, 255; prisoner amnesties un- 
der, 316 

Armed Robbery and Firearms Tribunals, 
320 

arms: diversity in, 283-84; domestic, 256, 
286; foreign, 256, 269, 284, 294, 299; 
procurement, 283-87, 294; standardi- 
zation of, 285-86; value of, 284, 300 

army, 273-75; capabilities of, 294; 
demobilization of, xxxi, 78; Eighty- 
second (Airborne) Division, 273-74; 
enrollments, 288; First Mechanized In- 
fantry Division, 273; geographic areas 
of responsibility, 273; Guard Brigade, 
274; historical origins of, 269; internal 
security by, 310; light aviation force, 
275; number of troops in, 273; organi- 
zation of, 273; rapid deployment force, 
275; reserves, 274-75; restructuring of, 
275; role of, in return to civilian rule, 
273; Second Mechanized Infantry Di- 
vision, 273; tensions of, with police, 
312; Third Armored Division, 273; 
uniforms, ranks, and insignia, 295 

Army Command and Staff College, 291 

Army School of Artillery, 291 

Arochukwu, 18 

Aro confederacy, 17-18, 19, 33; commer- 
cial empire, 18; oracle of, 18; religious 
influence, 18; slave trade by, 17, 23; 
trade by, 25 

Asante expedition (1873-74), 269 

Ashland Oil, 186 

Asika, Ukapi, 61 

associations (see also under individual types 

of associations), 39, 308 
Auchi, 205 

austerity: under Babangida, 81, 222; un- 
der Buhari, 77, 78; demonstrations 
against, 305; under Obasanjo, 220; op- 
position to, 200; under Second Repub- 
lic, 229 

Australia, 64 

Austria, 250; materiel acquired from, 286 
Awolowo, Obafemi, 39, 47, 49, 58, 66, 
70, 209, 211, 228; Action Group under, 
40, 42, 73, 161, 212; convicted of trea- 
son, 50, 52; released from prison, 57 
Azikiwe, Nnamdi, 40, 41, 47, 74, 209; 
as governor general, 47-48, 211; as 
president of republic, 50, 54, 55 



368 



Index 



Babangida, Ibrahim, xxv, 248, 266, 285, 
290, 304, 306; background of, 221; 
career of, 78; personnel changes by, 
222-24, 255, 310; as president of 
Nigeria, 78, 221-25; as president of 
OAU, xxxi; state visits by, 261, 263, 
264; style of, 222 

Babangida regime, 78-82, 221-25, 225, 
320; austerity under, 81, 222; debt re- 
structuring under, 198; economic plan- 
ning under, 166; foreign policy under, 
244; health care under, xxvi, 149; hu- 
man rights under, 309; liberalization 
under, 78-81; structural adjustment 
program under, 200 

Babatope, Ebenezer, 317 

Badagri, 131 

Bakalori Project, 75, 180 

balance of payments, 197-98 

balance of trade, 46, 300 

Balewa, Abubakar Tafawa, 43, 44, 209; 
assassinated, 56; foreign policy under, 
245-46; as prime minister, 47, 48, 50, 
52, 54, 55, 211 

Bali, Domkat, 78, 224, 255 

Bamenda, Cameroon, 261 

banking, 193-95; customs in, 194; 
privatization in, xxviii; system, 195 

Bank of British West Africa, 193 

banks: commercial, 195; community, 
195; development, 195; foreign, xxviii, 
195; merchant, 195 

Barclays Bank, 193 

Barth, Heinrich, 26 

Basic Seamanship Training School, 278 

Bauchi State: health care in, 147; irriga- 
tion projects in, 72; politics in, 74; re- 
ligious violence in, xxx, 304 

Bayero University, 304, 314 

Bayinjida, 11 

Beecroft, John, 26 

Belgium, 264, 285 

Bello, Ahmadu, 43, 47, 209, 211; assas- 
sinated, 56; as Northern Region prime 
minister, 52 

Bello, Muhammad, 21 

Bendel State, 266; health care in, 147; po- 
litics in, 74 

Benin, Bight of, 17, 26, 29 

Benin City, 283, 306 

Benin Gap, 17 

Benin, kingdom of, 6, 16, 31, 107, 206; 
administration of, 9; Christianity in- 



troduced into, 28; cities in, 131; decline 
of influence of, 16; dependencies of, 9; 
government of, 8; influence of, on Igbo, 
10; political system of, 206; and Por- 
tugal, 9, 16; rise of, 7, 8; and slave 
trade, 16 

Benin, People's Republic of, 9, 19; border 
problems with, 258-59; extradition 
agreement with, 321; military cooper- 
ation with, 262, 267, 291; relations 
with, 246 

Benin prison, 317 

Benue Basin, 87, 90 

Benue River, 90 

Benue River valley; climate in, 91 

Benue State, 306, 315; health care in, 
147; politics in, 74; religious violence 
in, xxx, 304; yellow fever in, 150 

Berlin Conference (1885), xxiii, 29 

Biafra, Bight of, 26, 29 

Biafra, Republic of, 59, 163, 166; in- 
ternational assistance to, 59-60, 246; 
recognition of, 60, 262; surrender of, 
60 

Biafran War. See civil war 

Bida, 31 

Bilma, 14 

Bini language, 107 

Birni Gazargamu, 14, 20, 130 

birth control, 95, 96, 150 

Bisalla, I.D., 71 

Biu, 97 

Biu Plateau, 90 

Bonny, xxix, 18, 131, 278; rainfall 
around, 91 

border problems, xxxi, 246; with Benin, 
258-59; with Cameroon, xxxi, 246, 
256, 258, 260-61, 268; with Chad, 
xxxi, 246, 256, 259, 268; with Niger, 
xxxi, 246, 259 

border security, 258-59, 273; measures 
to strengthen, 261-62 

Borgu, 31 

Borgu kingdom, 7 

Borno, 6, 10, 13, 19, 74, 130; British oc- 
cupation of, 32; as center of Islamic cul- 
ture, 11; empire of, 13, 14; Fulani in, 
13, 15; history of, 11; independence of, 
11; Islamic jihad in, 20; Kanuri in, 
100-101; religious violence in, 304; 
trade in, 11 

Borno State, 99, 288, 315; Cameroon- 
ian invasion of, 259, 260; health care in, 



369 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



147; irrigation projects in, 72, 180; po- 
litics in, 74 

Borokiri, 278 

Botswana, 262, 291 

Brandenburg, 17 

Brass, 131 

Brazil, 30; materiel acquired from, 283; 

military cooperation with, 280, 284; 

role of, in slave trade, 23 
Brethren, 128 

Britain, 36; aid from, xxviii, 64, 282; 
colony of, at Lagos, xxiii, 24, 29; debts 
with, xxviii; expansion of, 29; interven- 
tion by, in Nigeria, xxiii, 24, 158; law 
enforcement agreement with, 321; 
materiel from, 278, 286, 293; military 
training provided by, 284; relations 
with, 249, 257; role of, in slave trade, 
16-17; slave trade outlawed by, xxiii, 
19, 22-23; technical assistance from, 
292, 314; trade with, xxvii, 197 

British and French Bank, 193 

British Army Staff College, 290 

British Commonwealth, 47-48; assistance 
from, 64; Nigeria as republic in, 50, 64 

British Empire, 29 

British High Commission, 318 

British Petroleum, 46 

British Staff College, 291 

budget deficit, 164; reduced, 200, 222; ef- 
forts to limit, xxvii; federal, 167; as per- 
centage of gross domestic product, 
xxvii; state, 167 

Buhari, Muhammadu, xxv, 225; career 
of, 76-77; ouster of, 272 

Buhari regime, 166, 220-21, 308, 319; 
austerity under, 77, 78; government 
structure under, 220; internal security 
under, 310, 316; prisoner amnesties un- 
der, 316 

Bura: ethnic group, 97-98; language, 97 
Burkina Faso, 246 
Burma, 270 

business associations, 39 

CA. See Constituent Assembly 

cacao (see also cocoa), 178 

Calabar, 16, 18, 30, 31, 131, 277, 278, 
283, 311; as exporter of palm products, 
25; growth of, 136; port of, 192; Roy- 
al West African Frontier Force in, 270 

Cameroon, 26, 35, 36, 127, 270; border 
problems with, xxxi, 246, 256, 258, 



260-61, 268; illegal workers from, 302; 
extradition agreement with, 321; oil 
processing in, 186; relations with, 246, 
261 

Cameroon Highlands, xxiii, 90; climate 

in, 91 
Cameroons, 48 

Canada: assistance from, 64, 282; trade 
with, 197 

Carter, Jimmy, 249 

Catholicism, Roman, 129; African priests 
in, 129; by ethnic group, xxvi, 128; in- 
troduction of, 28; missionaries, 28; per- 
centage of followers in population, 120 

Catholic missions: health care by, 144; 
hospitals of, 144-46; schools of, 141 

CDC. See Constitution Drafting Com- 
mittee 

CEAO. See West African Economic Com- 
munity 

cement scandal, 67, 75 

census, 93-94, 225, 230; of 1952-53, 
xxiv, 52, 93; of 1962, xxiv, 52, 94, 211; 
of 1963, xxiv, 52, 94, 120, 211-12; of 
1973, xxiv, 66-67, 69, 94, 212; of 1991, 
xxiv, 94 

Central African Republic, 22; French 
troops in, 262; jihad in, 22 

Central Bank of Nigeria, 171, 194-95; es- 
tablished, 194; role of, 194; scandal in, 
76 

Chad, 258; border problems with, xxxi, 
246, 256, 259, 268; French troops in, 
262; illegal workers from, 302; jihad in, 
22; peacekeeping forces in, 256, 266, 
267; relations with, 246 

Chad Basin, 87, 90 

Chevron Oil, 186 

chief of naval staff (CNS), 275-77 

China, 284 

Christian Association of Nigeria, 81, 304 
Christianity (see also under individual denomi- 
nations), xxxii, 128-29, 206; introduc- 
tion of, to Benin kingdom, 28; 
introduction of, to Nigeria, xxiii; per- 
centage of followers in population, 120, 
302; regional distribution of, xxvi, 303; 
and slavery issues, 4; syncretic, 123; 
under unification, 34-35 
Christianity, African, xxvi, 128-29; op- 
position in, to colonial rule, 39; percen- 
tage of followers in population, 120; 
polygyny in, 129 



370 



Index 



Christianity, Protestant (see also under in- 
dividual denominations), xxvi; African 
priests in, 129; ethnic affiliations with, 
128; evangelical, 120; missionaries, 28; 
percentage of followers in population, 
120 

Christianity, Roman Catholic. See Cathol- 
icism, Roman 

Christian missions. See missions; mis- 
sionaries 

Christian-Muslim discord, 103, 224, 226, 
230, 302, 303, 304 

Church Missionary Society (CMS), 28, 
30, 141; native church policy of, 28 

cities (see also urbanization; urban migra- 
tion): historical development of, 
130-33; population densities of, 131 

Civil Disturbances (Special Tribunal) 
Decree (1987), 304 

civilian federalism, 235-36; elements of, 
235 

civilian government, transition to, 205, 
212; under Babangida, xxv, xxxi, 82, 
225, 229-33, 255, 298, 309; under Bu- 
hari, 225; under Gowon, xxv, 217, 225; 
under Ironsi, 56, 225; issues addressed 
in, 225, 226; under Murtala Muham- 
mad, 70-71, 219, 225-28; under 
Obasanjo, xxv, 219, 225-28; role of 
military in, 273, 299; role of police in, 
313 

Civil Liberties Organisation (CLO), 308, 
317, 320 

civil service, 235, 238-41; call for 
Africanization of, 40; components of, 
238; cuts in, xxv, 221; director gener- 
al of, 238-39; hierarchy of, 238-39; 
politicization of, 239; professionaliza- 
tion of, 239-41; purged, 69, 239; re- 
form of, 219, 224, 231 

civil war (1967-70) (see also Biafra), xxv, 
xxix, 4, 59-61, 64, 217, 256, 299-300; 
casualties in, xxv, 60, 302; costs of, 163; 
economic elements of, 160, 195; effects 
of, 60-61, 108, 217, 246; military as- 
sistance in, 60; international reaction 
to, 249; relief effort following, 61; 
revenue crisis in, 167 

Clapperton, Hugh, 26 

Clifford, Hugh, xxiv, 37-38; approach of, 
37; economic development under, 37; 
elite under, 37; north under, 37; south 
under, 37 



Clifford Constitution. See constitution of 
1922 

climate, 90-92; characteristics of, 90-91; 

northeast trade winds (harmattan), 91; 

rainfall, 91-92, 178; temperature, 92 
CLO. See Civil Liberties Organisation 
CMS. See Church Missionary Society 
CNS. See chief of naval staff 
Coast Guard, 278 
coastline, 258, 278 

cocoa (see also cacao), xxiii; export of, 
xxvii, 35, 46, 159, 178-79, 196; as 
major foreign exchange earner, xxv, 
65, 72, 200; trade in, xxiii 
Code of Conduct Bureau, 226 
College of Advanced Studies, 304 
College of Agriculture, 306 
College of Education (Kafanchan), 304 
Colonial Development and Welfare Act 

(1940), 172 
colonial era, 29-47, 158-59; impact of, 4 
colonial rule, 111; discrimination exacer- 
bated by, 159, 207; exports under, 209; 
land tenure under, 176-77; medical 
services under, 146; regional autono- 
my under, 208-9; resistance to, 33, 39; 
wages under, 172; in World War II, 
159 

Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, 3, 
207 

Colony and Protectorate of Southern 
Nigeria, 207 

Command and Staff College, 290-91; air 
faculty, 291; curriculum of, 290; enroll- 
ment, 291; internal security studies, 
291; navy faculty, 291 

Committee for the Defence of Human 
Rights, 309 

commodity trade (see also under individual 
commodities), 24-26, 46, 196-97 

Commonwealth of Nations, 250, 262 

communications, 193; privatization in, 
xxviii 

Communaute de l'Afrique de l'Ouest. See 
West African Economic Community 

Company of the Royal Adventurers, 158 

Concert of Medium Powers (Lagos Fo- 
rum), 250, 268 

Congo, 250, 268 

Constituent Assembly (CA), 148, 226, 
230 

constitutional conference: of 1950, 45, 
207; of 1966, 216-17; of 1989, 148 



371 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



constitution of 1922 (Clifford Constitu- 
tion), xxiv, 38, 39, 207 

constitution of 1946 (Richards Constitu- 
tion), 207; promulgation of, 44; sus- 
pended, 44 

constitution of 1951 (Macpherson Con- 
stitution), 45, 207 

constitution of 1954 (Lyttleton Constitu- 
tion), 45, 207 

constitution of 1960: human rights under, 
307 

constitution of 1963: human rights under, 
307 

constitution of 1979, xxv, 78, 219; armed 
forces under, 271; drafting committee 
for, 70, 71, 226; executive under, 227; 
federal principle under, 237; human 
rights under, 307; legislature under, 
227; model for, 71-72, 227; police un- 
der, 311, 312; political parties under, 
110, 219; promulgated, 226, 227 

constitution of 1989, xxix; amendments 
to, 231-32; human rights under, 307 

Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC), 
226 

Constitution Review Committee, 82, 225, 
230 

constitutions, regional, 48 
consumer goods, 72, 137 
consumption, 170 

Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treat- 
ment or Punishment, 307 

Convention on the Political Rights of 
Women (1953), 307 

Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(1948), 307 

Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (1967), 307 

corruption, xxix, 111, 221; in customs, 
318; in education, 143; in First Repub- 
lic, xxiv, 50, 52-53, 216; under Gowon 
regime, 67; in military, 299, 318; in oil 
boom, 161; penalty for, 319; in police 
force, 313-14, 318; in Second Repub- 
lic, 75-76, 77, 220, 228; to supplement 
income, 115 

Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, 
226 

cotton: export of, xxvii, 46, 72, 159, 178 
Council of Ministers, 45, 47, 272 
coup d'etat of January 1966, xxiv, 56, 



160, 214, 215-16, 249; causes of, 
215-16; killings in, 216; reaction to, 
56-57 

coup d'etat of July 1966, xxiv, 57, 68, 

160, 216 
coup d'etat of 1975, 68, 164, 218 
coup d'etat of 1976, 70-71, 218 
coup d'etat of 1983, xxv, 76 
coup d'etat of 1985, xxv, 78, 168, 221 
coups d'etat (see also under individual coups), 
xxxii, 4, 111, 256, 302; civilian involve- 
ment in, 224; effect of, on military, 298; 
legality of, 231, 298; public reaction to, 
298 

coups d'etat, attempted, 256, 302; of 
1966, xxiv; of 1976, 219; of 1985, 81, 
299; of 1990, 201, 224-25, 255, 274; 
of 1991, xxxii 

Court of Appeal, 235, 238 

crime, 257, 317-19; drug-related, xxxii, 
68, 235, 266, 309, 318-19, 320-21; un- 
der Gowon, 67-68; rate, xxxii, 313, 
317-18; types of, 315 

criminal justice system (see also sharia 
courts), 257, 315-17; backlogs in, 
316-17 

Cross River State, 17, 315; health care 
in, 147; politics in, 74; yellow fever in, 
150 

Crowther, Samuel Adjai, 28, 105 
Cuba, 30, 264; role of, in slave trade, 23 
currency (see also naira): introduction of 

Nigerian, 194; new, issued, 195, 259; 

smuggling, 261 
customs, 318 
Czechoslovakia, 284 



Dahomey, 22, 26, 30 

Dala Hill, 5 

Davies, H.O., 40 

death, maternal and child, 96 

debt, 32; crisis, 111; incurred under 
Obasanjo, 220; incurred under Second 
Republic, 220; overhang, 198-200; ser- 
vicing, 186, 200; of state governments, 
75 

debt rescheduling, xxvii, 77, 245; effects 
of, 200; with International Monetary 
Fund, 201; with Paris Club, xxviii 

decrees: Decree Number 1, 271; Decree 
Number 2, xxxii, 221, 222, 308, 309, 
319, 320; Decree Number 3 (1984), 



372 



Index 



319; Decree Number 4, 221, 308, 309, 
319; Decree Number 10 (1987), 278; 
Decree Number 12 (1989), 231, 287; 
Decree Number 19 (1986), 310; Decree 
Number 20 (1984), 320; Decree Num- 
ber 25 (1978), 227; Decree Number 34 
(1966), 216; Decree Number 44 (1976), 
242; Decree Number 47 (1990), 307 

Defence Headquarters, 272 

Defence Industries Corporation (DIC), 
285-86 

Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), 310 
Defence, Ministry of, 255, 275, 291, 310 
Defence Staff, 271 
defense industry, domestic, 285-87 
defense spending, 298, 299-301; budget, 

300-301; pattern of, 301; as percentage 

of federal spending, 300 
de Klerk, Frederik W., xxxi 
Delta port system, 192 
Demonstration Battalion, 291 
demonstrations, xxix, 81, 243, 305-6, 308 
Denmark, 17 

DIA. See Defence Intelligence Agency 
DIC . See Defence Industries Corporation 
diet, 170 

Dikko, Umaru, 76 
Dimka, Bukar, 71, 219 
Directorate of Administration, 313 
Directorate of Army Recruitment, Reset- 
tlement, and Reserve, 274-75, 288 
Directorate of Intelligence and Investiga- 
tion, 313 
Directorate of Logistics, 313 
Directorate of Operations, 313 
Directorate of Rural Development, 233 
Directorate of Social Mobilization, 233 
Diving School, 292 
divorce, 32 

Dockyard Apprentice School, 292 
Dodan Barracks, 224, 274 
Doe, Samuel K. , 266 
Doganyaro, 248 
Dori, 21 

Dornier (Nigeria), 284, 292 

drought, 14-15, 92, 100, 111; of 17th cen- 
tury, 14; of 18th century, 14-15; of 
1913-14, 35; of 1972-74, xxv, 66, 179; 
of 1977-78, 188; of 1991, xxviii 

drug trafficking, xxxii, 68, 235, 266, 
318-19, 320-21; punishment for, 309 

dual mandate, 29 

Du Bois, W.E.B., 38 



East Africa, 270 

East Central State, 61 

Eastern Europe, 197 

Eastern Naval Command, 272, 277, 278 

Eastern Region, 42, 217; control of, by 
National Council of Nigerian Citizens, 
48; division of, into states, 61-62; eco- 
nomic advantage of, 211; export com- 
modities of, 46; federal powers in, 45; 
political parties in, 210; revenue allo- 
cation to, 166; secession of, 58, 107, 
166; self-government in, 45, 208, 236 

ECN. See Electric Corporation of Nigeria 

ECOMOG. See ECOWAS Cease-Fire 
Monitoring Group 

economic: downturn, 136, 157, 164; poli- 
cy, 194; reform, 222 

Economic Commission for Africa, 250 

Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), xxx, 246, 250, 262; 
activities in, 257, 265-66, 273; creation 
of, 64, 247, 248; Defence Commission 
of, 265; Defence Council of, 265; pro- 
tocols, 260, 261, 265, 302; relations 
with, 244; trade with, 197 

economic development, xxviii, 40, 43; un- 
der Clifford, 37; and fertility rate, 96; 
under Gowon, 65-66; indicators of, 
169; under Lugard, 33; uneven rates 
of, 208, 214, 237; during World War 
I, 35 

Economic Development, Ministry of, 164 
economic growth, 4, 200; negative, 162; 

1970-74, 163 
economic planning (see also under individu- 
al plans), 162-66; goals of, xxvii, 
162-63; three-year rolling, 166 
Economic Stabilization Act (1982), 229 
economy: effect of, on migration, 138; 
government control of, 236; informal, 
134; mixed, 161 ; role of government in, 
160-66 

ECOWAS. See Economic Community of 
West African States 

ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG), xxx, 247-48, 265, 267 

Edo, 16, 51; political origins of, 6 

education, 111, 112, 140-44, 170, 231; 
apprentice systems in, 140; budgets for, 
142; in community responsibilities, 
140; corruption in, 143; of elite, 117, 
142; and fertility rate, 96; government 
responsibility for, 167; government 



373 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



spending on, 201; importance of, 142; 
under Lugard, 141-42; of middle class, 
116; in north, 142; political, 233; post- 
secondary, 143; problems in, 143-44; 
progress in, 142; qualification for mili- 
tary recruits, 287; requirements for oc- 
cupations, 113-14; in rural areas, 112; 
secondary, 143; and social advance- 
ment, 112; in south, 142, 208; univer- 
sal primary, 142; user fees for, 222; in 
Western Region, 142; of women, 118; 
among Yoruba, 105 

educational development, 40, 43, 72-73; 
under Third National Development 
Plan, 163; after World War II, 146-47 

Education Corps, 301 

education, European- style, xxvi, 34, 
112-13, 140, 141-42; colonial school 
inspectorate, 141; curriculum, 141; ex- 
aminations in, 141-42; mission schools 
in, 140 

education, indigenous system of, xxvi, 
113, 140; population in, 140; regula- 
tion of, 140 

Education, Ministry of, 162 

education, Quranic, xxvi, 112-13, 
140-41; curriculum of, 140; govern- 
ment control of, 141; schools of, 141 

EEC. See European Economic Com- 
munity 

EEZ. See Exclusive Economic Zone 
Effiong, Philip, 60 
Efik, 18, 107 
Egba, 104 

Egbe Omo Oduduwa (Society of the 

Descendants of Oduduwa), 39, 42 
Egypt, 250 
Ekiti, 104 
elderly, 152 

elections: of 1954, 47; of 1959, 47; of 
1964-65, xxiv, 51, 53-55, 214; of 1979, 
xxv, 74, 227, 228; of 1983, xxv, 76, 77; 
of 1989, 235; of 1991, xxix-xxx; of 
1992, xxxiii 
elective office: age requirement for, 231 
Electric Corporation of Nigeria (ECN), 
188 

electric power, 188; generation, develop- 
ment of, xxviii, 163; distribution of, 
188; stations, 188 

Elem Kalahari, 18 

Elf Aquitaine, 186, 187 

elite, 117, 133, 214, 232, 241; under 



British occupation, 30, 36, 37, 159; cor- 
ruption among, 228; economic power 
of, 160; education of, 117, 142; frag- 
mentation of, 209; housing of, 117; 
medical care of, 148; modern, 117; 
religion of, 129; role of, in government, 
244; traditional, 117-18; women, 118, 
243; Yoruba, 105 
Elmina, 15 

employment, 111; moonlighting to sup- 
plement, 114, 117-18, 143; require- 
ments for, 113-14; of veterans, 301; of 
women, 118-19 

Enahoro, Anthony, 50, 52; released from 
prison, 57 

energy resources, 185 

English, 193; as language of instruction, 
xxvi, 143; as language of military, 270; 
as language of modern sector, 116; as 
official language, 35, 98; teaching of, 
143 

Enugu, 93, 273, 283, 293, 314; growth 
of, 136; Royal West African Frontier 
Force in, 270 

environmental sanitation, 77, 221 

Equatorial Guinea, 256, 267, 275; mili- 
tary training for, 262; peacekeeping 
forces in, 246-47; relations with, 246, 
263-64 

Escravos River, 278 

Ethiopia, 258, 282, 291 

ethnic associations, 39 

ethnic cleavage, 45, 205, 209, 302; un- 
der British rule, 207, 208; conflict and, 
302 ; exacerbated by resource distribu- 
tion, 110; religious element of, 129; 
suppression of, 108 

ethnic consciousness, 38 

ethnic discrimination, 45, 97; exacerbat- 
ed by colonial rule, 159, 207; in medi- 
cal care, 146; in national security, 108 

ethnic groups (see also under individual 
groups), 3, 216, 227, 244; associations 
of, 39; balance of power among, 208; 
discrimination against, 97; diversifica- 
tion of representation by, xxx, 78; in 
Federal Military Government, 61-62; 
interaction among, 206; marriage be- 
tween, 108-10; in middle belt, 108; in 
military, 270; in north, 107-8; number 
of, xxv, 97; political origins of, 6, 7, 11; 
political parties of, 44, 110; protection 
of rights of, 111; relations among, 



374 



Index 



107-11; and slavery, 4; sociopolitical 

organization of, 205; stereotypes of, 

111; tribalism and, 97 
ethnicity, 96-98; class formation and, 110 
European Economic Community (EEC): 

alignment with, xxxi; development 

grant from, xxviii; relations with, 244; 

trade with, 197, 249 
European Investment Bank, loan from, 

xxviii 
Europeans, 25-26 

Exchange Control and Anti-Sabotage 

Tribunal, 319 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), 280 
execution, 68, 309, 318 
executive branch (see also president), 227; 

components of, 233; established, 226; 

powers of, 226 
Executive Council, 47 
Expanded Programme on Immunization 

(EPI), 149 
exports (see also under individual products), 

xxvii, 46, 72; under colonial rule, 209; 

commodity, 46, 196; of crops, 159, 166, 

200; decline in, 164-66; mineral, 196; 

promotion of, 201; purchasing power, 

197; receipts from, 157, 167; value of, 

174 

External Affairs, Ministry of, 244 
external debt, 201, 231; market price of, 
198; in 1989, 198; in 1991, xxviii; pay- 
ments, 162; rescheduling, 198; sources 
of, xxviii 



Fachi, 14 
families, 152 

FAO. See Food and Agriculture Organi- 
zation of the United Nations 
farmers: Fulani relations with, 100; in- 
comes of, 170-71; off-farm occupations 
of, 99, 113-14 
farming, 112; techniques, 178 
Fawehinmi, Gani, 309 
Federal Capital Territory, 237 
Federal Capital Territory Administration, 
76 

Federal Executive Council, 47, 62, 218, 
220, 235, 272; banking authority of, 
194; purged by Gowon, 68; purged by 
Murtala Muhammad, 69 

federal government (see also federal prin- 
ciple), 45, 48, 236 



Federal High Court, 235, 238 

Federal Housing Scheme, 76 

Federal Investigation and Intelligence 
Bureau (FIIB), 313 

Federal Military Government (FMG), 73, 
255; under Buhari, 271; components 
of, 235; economic control of, 236; eth- 
nic representation in, 61-62; under Go- 
won, 57, 61; under Ironsi, xxiv, 56; 
pan- African policies of, 63; public reac- 
tion to, 298 

Federal Mortgage Bank, 195; scandal in, 
76 

federal principle, 44, 227, 237; in civil 
service, 239, 241; cultural importance 
of, 233; under Ironsi, 56; applied to 
military, 227 

Federal Savings Banks, 195 

Federation of Muslim Women's Associ- 
ations of Nigeria, 243 

feminist movement, 120, 243 

Fernando Po, 23, 26, 30 

fertility rate, 95-96, 149 

FESTAC. See Second World Black and 
African Festival of Arts and Culture 

FIID. See Federal Investigation and In- 
telligence Bureau 

finance services, 196 

firearms, 22 

Fire Service Department, 311 

First Republic (1960-66), xxiv, xxix, 

209- 14; coalition government in, 

210- 11; collapse of, 214, 236; corrup- 
tion in, xxiv, 50, 52-53, 216; 
democracy in, 209-10; foreign policy 
of, 246; government of, 48; problems 
in, xxiv, 210 

fisheries, 182-84; output of, 182 

fishing, 182-84; commercial, 182-84 

Flotilla Command, 277 

Flying Training School, 293 

FMG. See Federal Military Government 

Fodio, Usman dan, 19-22; jihad of, 15, 

19-20; support for, 19 
food: demand, 139; import of, 180; 

prices, 201, 222; production, 137, 174, 

179 

Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO), 176 

foreign assistance, 157, 163, 168, 229; 

from Britain, 292, 314; from British Com- 
monwealth, 64; from Canada, 64, 282; 
in civil war, 60; from West Germany, 



375 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



284, 292; from Japan, 161; from Unit- 
ed States, 64, 284-85 

foreign borrowing, xxvii, 186, 231; for de- 
velopment, xxviii, 229 

foreign currency, 201 

foreign debt, xxxii, 75; attempts to re- 
schedule, 78, 81; payment deficit, 162; 
and political instability, 256 

foreign exchange, 161; assets, 197; 
crimes, 221, 235; effect of structural ad- 
justment program on, 170, 194; mar- 
kets, 201; oil as major earner of, xxv 

foreign investment, 81, 185, 198, 245 

Foreign Office, 31 

foreign policy, 257; under Babangida, 
244; after civil war, 246; conference of 
1986 on, 244; factors in, 244-45; un- 
der Gowon, 62-64, 246; issues, 245; 
under Murtala Muhammad, 219; neu- 
trality, 69; nonalignment, 69; priorities 
of, 244 

foreign relations, 244-50; with Ghana, 
64; major powers, 248-50, 257-58 

forests, 176, 178; categories of, 181; ex- 
ploitation of, 181; regeneration, 182; 
reserves, 181-82 

forestry, 181-82; demand for products of, 
182; earnings from, 182; reforestation 
plans in, 66; share of gross domestic 
product, 182 

Four Years of the Babangida Administration 
(Federal Military Government), 244 

France, 27, 29, 258, 266, 306; atomic 
tests by, 262; as external threat, 
262-63; materiel from, 278; military 
cooperation with, 284; military rela- 
tions of, with Africa, 262, 264; relations 
with, 256, 257; role of, in slave trade, 
16-17, 23; trade with, 197 

Fulani (see also Hausa-Fulani), 99, 100, 
104; under British rule, 32; intermar- 
riage of, with Hausa, 13; land tenure 
under, 176; marriage of, with other eth- 
nic groups, 108; migrations of, 15; no- 
madic lifestyles of, 100, 180; origins of, 
13; political parties of, 41, 210; raids 
on, 137; religion of, 13; as supporters 
of Usman dan Fodio, 19 

Fulbe. See Fulani 



Gabon, 262; French troops in, 262 
Gaha, 17 



Gambia Company (WAFF), 269 
Gambia River, 26 
gangs, 67-68 
Gao, 10 

Garba, Joseph, 250 

Garvey, Marcus, 38 

gas, natural, 186-88; consumption of, 
186-87; export of, xxix; marketing of, 
187; reserves, 187 

GDP. See gross domestic product 

General Staff, 261, 272, 312 

General Staff Headquarters, 301 

Geneva Conventions Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War and the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War (1949), 307 

geostrategic situation, 257 

German East Africa, 35, 270 

Germany, Federal Republic of (West 
Germany), 27, 29; arms licensing from, 
285, 286; materiel from, 278, 284; tech- 
nical assistance from, 284, 292; trade 
with, 197 

Ghana, 10, 15, 47, 49, 179, 258, 269; ex- 
tradition agreement with, 321; illegal 
immigrants from, 246, 302; military 
cooperation with, 262, 291; oil process- 
ing in, 186; peacekeeping forces in, 
246; ties with, 64 

Ghana Senior Staff College, 262 

Giwa, Dele, 310 

Global 2000, 151 

Glover, John, 269 

Glover's Hausas, 269 

GNP. See gross national product 

Gobir, 11, 13, 14 

Gold Coast, 15, 37; slave trade on, 16 
Gold Coast regiment (WAFF), 269 
Goldie, George, 27 
gold trade, 15 
Gombe, 303 

Gongola State, 315; health care in, 147; 
politics in, 74; religious violence in, 
303, 304 

government (see also federal government; 
local government; state government): 
control of organized labor by, 174; con- 
trol of private sector by, 161 ; demilitar- 
ization of, xxxii-xxxiii; economic role 
of, 160-66; favoritism in, 161-62 

government finance, 166-68 

government reserve areas (GRAs), 132, 
133 



376 



Index 



government spending, 167, 198, 200, 
201, 300 

governor general, 48 

governors: term of, 231 

Gowon, Yakubu, xxiv, 57, 216, 225, 308; 
exile of, 68, 164; state of emergency 
declared by, 58 

Gowon regime, 62-68; corruption under, 
67; crime under, 67-68; economic de- 
velopment under, 65-66; foreign poli- 
cy under, 62-64, 246; nine-point 
program of, 62; political unrest under, 
66; scandals in, 76 

GRAs. See government reserve areas 

Great Nigerian People's Party, 74, 228 

gross domestic product (GDP): agriculture 
as percentage of, 164, 174; budget deficit 
as percentage of, xxvii; during the 
1950s, 46; expenditures as percentage 
of, 157; finance services as percentage 
of, 196; forestry as percentage of, 182; 
government services as percentage of, 
196; hotels and restaurants as percen- 
tage of, 196; housing as percentage 
of, 196; insurance services as percen- 
tage of, 196; livestock sector as per- 
centage of, 180; manufacturing as 
percentage of, xxviii; mining as percen- 
tage of, 185; real estate business ser- 
vices as percentage of, 196; trade as 
percentage of, 196 

gross national product (GNP): decline in, 
157, 169; effect of militarization on, 
300; in 1983, xxvii; in 1988, 169; in 
1989, xxvii 

Gulf of Guinea, 258 

Guyana, 291 

Guzuo, 314 

Gwandu, 21, 27 

Gwarzo, Alhajji Sumaila, 312 

Gwatto, 16 



Habre, Hissein, 259, 267 
Harding, A.J., 37 
Hausa Constabulary, 269, 311 
Hausa Force, 269 

Hausa language, 35, 100, 193, 227; in 
military, 269, 270 

Hausa people (see also Hausa- Fulani), 
xxiii, xxv, 3, 54, 99, 132; agriculture 
by, 11; characteristics of, 100; in coloni- 
al militia, 269, 270; dominance of, 



103-4; marriage of, with other ethnic 
groups, 13, 108; political origins of, 6, 
10; political parties of, 41, 210; as 
slaves, 17; women, 118 

Hausa-Fulani, 100, 101, 238; domination 
by, under British, 32, 208; domination 
of federal government by, 54; political 
parties of, 210 

Hausaland, 13; cities in, 130; Fulani in, 
13, 15 

Hausa language, 98 

Hausa states, 19; domination of, 12, 
13-14, 20; independence of, 14, 20; Is- 
lam in, 12-13, 206; origins of, 11-12; 
raids on, 137; religion in, 13; taxes in, 
12; trade by, 11, 12; wars of, 12, 14, 15 

health (see also medical services), 144-52; 
development plan (1946), 146; govern- 
ment spending on, 201 ; risk to, by cor- 
ruption, 67 

health care (see also medical services): 
availability of drugs in, 148, 150, 319; 
demands for improvement in, 241; of 
elite, 148; policies, 148-49; user fees 
for, 222; after World War II, 146 

health facilities, xxvi; development of, 
163; general clinics, 147; health centers, 
147; hospitals, 144-48; inadequacy of 
rural, 147; maldistribution of, 147; 
maternal health centers, 147; materni- 
ty homes, 147 

Health, Ministry of, 147, 149 

hospitals: conditions in, 148; distribution 
of, 148; government, 144-46; mission, 
144-46; number of, 147 

House of Representatives, 45, 48, 227; 
elections, 47, 55, 74, 76; representation 
in, 238 

housing: construction, 136; development 
of, 163; of elite, 117; government 
responsibility for, 167; as percentage of 
gross domestic product, 196; in rural 
areas, 112 

human rights, 222, 226, 241, 307-9; 
abuses, 257; advocacy groups, 298; un- 
der Babangida, 309; under constitu- 
tion, 307; under military rule, 307; in 
Second Republic, 308 

Ibadan, 21, 22, 28, 132, 273, 282; schools 
in, 143; student riots in, 306; rainfall 
around, 92 

Ibadan General Conference of 1950, 45, 
207 



377 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



Ibibio, 107; in Federal Military Govern- 
ment, 61; religion in, 128; as slaves, 17 

Ibrahim, Waziri, 74 

IDA. See International Development As- 
sociation 

Idiagbon, Tunde, 220, 319 

Ife, 6, 35, 42, 104; decline of, 7; found- 
ed, 6; schools in, 143 

Igala Kingdom, 206 

Igbo Federal Union, 39 

Igboland, 9, 18; education in, 106; elite 
in, 160; exports from, 25; population 
of, 93; religion in, 128; secret societies 
in, 122 

Igbo language, 193, 227 

Igbo people, xxiii, xxvi, 3, 51, 54, 98, 
104, 129, 216, 238; ancient, 9-10; un- 
der British rule, 33; discrimination 
against, 45; ethnic consciousness 
among, 38, 107; ethnic traditions of, 
106; groupings of, 105; individuality 
among, 106; influence of kingdom of 
Benin on, 10; language of, 105; mar- 
riage of, with other ethnic groups, 108; 
in military, 270; missionaries among, 
28; pogrom against, 57, 216, 217; po- 
litical parties of, 41, 210, 228; political 
system of, 206; protection of rights of, 
111; religion among, xxvi, 9; as slaves, 
17; slaves among, 4, 107; social organi- 
zation of, 106; status among, 106-7; 
unemployment among, 65; urbaniza- 
tion among, 136 

Igbo Ukwu, 10 

Igbo-Yoruba rivalry, 40, 45-46 

Ijaw, 18, 107; in Federal Military Govern- 
ment, 61; government of, 18; role of, 
in slave trade, 18 

Ijebu, 31, 104 

Ikeja, 282, 314 

Ikoyi prison, 317 

illegal workers, xxxii, 157, 221; expulsion 
of, 302 

Ilorin, 21, 30, 31, 42, 51, 104 

IMF. See International Monetary Fund 

immigration: control of, 311; illegal, xxxi, 

246, 259, 302 
Immigration Department, 311 
immunization, 149 

Imo State, 315; demographics in, 138, 
238; health care in, 147; politics in, 74; 
yellow fever in, 150 

Imoudu, Michael, 305 



imports, 46; demand for, 196; restrictions 
on, 81, 184, 193, 198, 201 

income: corruption to supplement, 115; 
concentration, 169; decline in, 118; in- 
formal, 114-15; moonlighting to sup- 
plement, 114, 117-18 

income distribution, 168-70; effect of 
structural adjustment program on, 170, 
201; interurban, 170 

independence, xxiv, 111; achieved, 47, 
205, 209; conference to prepare for, 47 

India, 282; military cooperation with, 284 

indigenous ownership, xxviii; decrees re- 
quiring, 65, 184, 217-18; program un- 
der Obasanjo, 219 

indirect rule, 34, 206; under Harding, 
37-38; under Lugard, xxiv, 32; in the 
south, 33, 34; in Yorubaland, 33 

industrial: development, 111, 163; 
growth, 65, 72; output, 96, 170 

industry: indigenous ownership in, 
184-85; integration of, with agricul- 
ture, xxviii 

inefficiency, xxix, 239; under Gowon re- 
gime, 67; in police force, 313-14 

IMET. See International Military Educa- 
tion and Training 

infant mortality, 96, 169 

inflation, xxvii, 118; attempts to reduce, 
69, 201; under economic planning, 
xxvii; effects of, 114, 117; rate of, 171; 
as result of militarization, 300; under 
structural adjustment program, 222 

infrastructure: development of, 4, 33; un- 
der economic planning, xxvii; improve- 
ment of, xxviii, 35, 217; investment in, 
72; transportation, 35, 191 

Inside Kirikiri (Babatope), 317 

Institute of Technology at Benin, 143 

insurance services, 196 

intellectuals, 302, 309 

interest groups, 241-44 

interest rates, 201 

Internal Affairs, Ministry of, 309, 

310- 11, 316; detention by, 320; secu- 
rity functions of, 310-11 

internal security, 301-21, 309-15; army's 
role in, 310; intelligence services, 310; 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, 310-11; as 
mission of armed forces, 273; as mis- 
sion of Royal West African Frontier 
Force, 270; Nigeria Police Force, 

311- 15; responsibility for, 309-10; 



378 



Index 



threats to, 67-68, 301 

Intelsat. See International Telecommuni- 
cations Satellite Corporation 

International Atomic Energy Agency, 268 

International Confederation of Trade 
Unions, 173 

International Convention on the Elimi- 
nation of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (1977), 307 

International Convention on the Elimi- 
nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimi- 
nation (1966), 307 

International Convention on the Suppres- 
sion and Punishment of the Crime of 
Apartheid (1981), 307 

International Covenant on Civil and Po- 
litical Rights (1966), 307 

International Covenant on Economic, So- 
cial, and Cultural Rights (1966), 307 

International Development Association 
(IDA), 157 

International Military Education and 
Training (IMET), 284-85 

International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
157, 162, 198, 229; debt rescheduling 
with, 201; loan from, 81, 222; negoti- 
ations with, 78 

International Telecommunications Satel- 
lite Corporation (Intelsat), 193 

intragovernmental relations, 236-38; liti- 
gation in, 236, 237 

investment, 161 

Irabor, Nduka, 221 

Iran-Iraq cease-fire, 250, 268 

Irikefe, Ayo, 218 

Iron Age, 5 

Ironsi, Johnson Aguiyi, xxiv, 63, 215, 
225; assassinated, 57, 68; federal prin- 
ciple under, 56; as military head of 
state, 56, 216; political unrest under, 57 

irrigation, 66, 179-80; projects, 72, 75, 
114, 180; traditional methods of, 179 

Islam (see also jihad of 1804-8; Sokoto 
Caliphate), xxxii, 123-28; conversion 
to, 127; hajj in, 125, 126; history of, 
123; introduction of, to Nigeria, xxiii, 
10, 12, 206; Maitatsine, 127-28; ori- 
gins of, 123-24; percentage of follow- 
ers in population, 120, 302; place of, 
in Nigerian society, 125-28; regional 
distribution of, xxvi, 302; ritual obli- 
gations of, 126; sharia, xxx, 32, 126, 
224, 226, 230-31; Shia, 126; and slav- 



ery issues, 4; spread of, 3, 10, 11; Sufi 
brotherhoods in, 126-27, 303; Sunni, 
126; syncretic, 123; theology of, 
124-25; ulama in, 126; under unifica- 
tion, 34; as unifying force, 127 

Islamic emirates, 99, 108; administration 
of, 99; political system of, 206 

Islamic learning and culture: Borno as 
center of, 11; under Songhai empire, 13 

Israel, xxxi, 244-45 

Italy, 270; debts with, xxviii; materiel 
from, 278, 284; trade with, 197 

Ita Oko Island, 317 

Ityavyar, Dennis, 148 

Ivory Coast, 179, 262; French troops in, 
262; jihad in, 22; oil processing in, 186 

I wo Elero, 4 



JAC. See Joint Action Committee 
Jaji, 290, 291 
James Town, 278 

Japan: assistance from, 151; debts to, 

xxviii; trade with, 197, 249 
Jebba, 188 

Jehovah's Witnesses, 128 
Jibril, 20 

jihad of 1804-8, xxiii, 3, 15, 19-20, 123, 
127, 206; ethnic character of, 20; as in- 
spiration for other jihads, 21-22; 
resistance to, 21 
Joint Action Committee (JAC), 173 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 78, 224, 272 
Jos, 75, 104, 133, 291, 305; student riots 
in, 306 

Jos Plateau, xxiii, 87, 90; ancient histo- 
ry of, 5; climate on, 91; ethnic groups 
in, 102; tin mines on, 35, 133 
journalists: harassment of, 77, 308, 309 
Judicial Service Commission, 231, 235 
judiciary: components of, 235, 238; in- 
dependence of, 226; weakness of, 235 
Jukun, 12 

Justice Muhammad panel, 243 



Kabba, 104 

Kaduna, xxviii, 36, 133, 273, 282, 283, 
291, 293, 314; industry in, 285, 286; 
oil refinery in, 186; religious violence 
in, xxx, 303, 304; Royal West African 
Frontier Force in, 270 

Kaduna Polytechnic, 81 



379 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



Kaduna State, 129, 288, 315; corruption 
in, 119-20; health care in, 147; poli- 
tics in, 74, 76; religious violence in, 75, 
304; yellow fever in, 150 

Kafanchan, 129, 304 

Kainji Dam, 5, 188 

Kainji Reservoir, 182 

Kanem, 6, 10, 13; under Borno, 13, 14; 
civil war in, 11; government of, 11; 
women in, 11 

Kanem-Borno Empire, 12; political sys- 
tem of, 206 

Kano, 11, 14, 21, 127, 130, 266, 273, 
283, 311; ancient history in, 5, 99; un- 
der Borno, 14; British occupation of, 
32, 34; Islam in, 13; rainfall around, 
92; religious violence in, xxx, 303, 304; 
Royal West African Frontier Force in, 
270; rural area around, 131, 132 

Kano, Aminu, 43, 74, 209, 210 

Kano Chronicle, 12 

Kano River Project, 180 

Kano State, 288, 314, 315; health care in, 
147; irrigation projects in, 72; politics 
in, 74, 76; religious violence in, 75 

Kanuri language, 97 

Kanuri people, xxv, 101, 228; cultural 
identity of, 101; emergence of, as eth- 
nic group, 11; history of, 100-101; lan- 
guages spoken by, 97, 101; marriage 
of, with other ethnic groups, 108; wom- 
en, 118 

Katsina, 11, 13, 14, 75, 76, 99, 130, 131; 
under Borno, 14; Islam in, 13; rainfall 
around, 92; religious violence in, 304 

Katsina Dynasty, 20 

Katsina State, 259; creation of, 82 

Kebbi, 13, 14, 20 

Kenya, 270, 291 

King's College, 141 

Kirikiri prison, 317 

Koko, 266 

Komadugu Yobe River, 14 
Korea, Republic of, 284 
Koshoni, Patrick S., 310 
Kuka, 130 
Kuru, 294 

Kwara State, 72, 75, 315; creation of, 62; 
health care in, 147; politics in, 74 



labor force, 171-74, 302; manufacturing, 
171-72; rural, 171; size of, 171, 304 



labor movement, xxiv, 81, 159 

labor unions, xxxii, 41, 111, 172-74, 302, 
304-5; demonstrations by, 305; during 
World War II, 172; government con- 
trol of, 174; legalized, 172; under mili- 
tary rule, 173-74, 222; number of, 173; 
number of members of, 173, 304 

Lagos, 16, 28, 36, 131, 134, 274, 283; 
British presence in, 158; growth of, 
136; mission schools in, 141; over- 
crowding in, 218; population in, 93; 
problems in, 136, 137; rainfall around, 
92; religion in, 129; schools in, 143, 
310; student riots in, 306; transfer of 
capital from, xxx, 72, 241 

Lagos Accord on National Reconciliation 
in Chad, 266 

Lagos Colony, xxiii, 24, 29, 30 

Lagos Daily News, 40 

Lagos Forum (Concert of Medium Pow- 
ers), 250, 268 

Lagos Legislative Council, 38 

Lagos Police, 311 

Lagos port system, 192 

Lagos State, 315, 315; health care in, 147; 
politics in, 74 

Laird, Macgregor, 26 

Lake Chad, 14, 101; boundary dispute 
over, xxxi, 259; fishing in, 182; irriga- 
tion project on, 114 

Lake Chad Basin Commission, 259 

land: arable, 176; degradation, 139; dis- 
putes, 32 

land tenure, 176-77; under British, 176- 
77; under Fulani, 176; in north, 177; 
under Obasanjo, 219; reform of, 177; 
in south, 177 

Land Use Decree (1978), 177, 219 

Lander, John, 26 

Lander, Richard, 26 

language {see also under individual languages): 
as ethnic marker, 97; facility, 98; 
groupings, 97, 102, 205; official, 98, 
227; pidgin, 98 

Laski, Harold, 40 

League of Nations, 36 

legal system: British, 32; Islamic, 32 

legislative branch: representation in, 238 

Legislative Council, xxiv, 35, 38, 39; un- 
der 1946 constitution, 44 

Lewis, W. Arthur, 163 

Liberal Convention, 232 

Liberia: civil war in, 266; ECOMOG 



380 



Index 



peacekeeping force in, xxx, 246, 248, 
258, 265; peacekeeping efforts in, 266, 
267 

Libya, 258, 263, 266, 267 

life expectancy, 169 

livestock, 180-81; cattle, 180; of Fulani, 
180; goats, 181; holdings, 180; as per- 
centage of gross domestic product, 180; 
pigs, 181; poultry, 181; sheep, 181 

local government, 226, 233, 235, 236-37; 
control of, 237; reforms in, 236 

Logistics Command, 272, 282 

Lokoja, 27, 30, 31 

Lome, 262 

Lome Convention: Fourth, xxviii; Third, 
xxviii 

London School of Economics, 40 

lower class: living conditions of, 115; oc- 
cupations of, 115 

Lugard, Frederick, xxiii-xxiv, 3, 208; 
career of, 31 ; chain of command under, 
32; economic development under, 33; 
education system under, 141-42; goals 
of, 36; indirect rule under, xxiv, 32; 
merger of north and south under, 
34-36; objectives of, 32; West African 
Frontier Force under, 269 

Lyttleton Constitution. See constitution of 
1954 

Macauley, Herbert, 40, 41 
Macpherson Constitution. See constitution 
of 1951 

Maiduguri (city), 97, 101, 314; religious 

violence in, 303; Royal West African 

Frontier Force in, 270 
Maiduguri State, 75 
Maitatsine (see also Marwa, Alhajji Mu- 

hammadu), 75, 127-28; riots by, 303, 

310 

Makurdi, 282, 283, 293 
Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, 263 
Mali, 10, 12, 13, 246; jihad in, 22 
MAMSER. See Mass Mobilization for 

Self- Reliance 
Manga language, 97 
Mangari, 14 

manufacturing, 184-88; indigenous owner- 
ship in, 184-85; production, 184; sec- 
tors, 134; share of gross domestic 
product, xxviii, 184; value added in, 
184 

marriage: interethnic, 108-10; north- 



south, 108; poly gynous, 118-19, 120, 

129; women in, 118-19 
Marwa, Alhajji Muhammadu, 303 
Massina, 21 

Mass Mobilization for Self-Reliance 
(MAMSER), 233 

materiel: air force, 282; from Austria, 
286; from Brazil, 283; from Britain, 
278, 286, 293; from France, 278; from 
West Germany, 278, 284; from Italy, 
278-84; navy, 278; from the Nether- 
lands, 278; from the Soviet Union, 282; 
from United States, 275, 278, 284-85 

MDF. See Midwest Democratic Front 

Mecca, 125 

media, xxix, xxxii, 242-43; federal mo- 
nopoly on, 69; harassment of, 308, 309 

Medical Corps, 288 

medical services, 231; under British co- 
lonial rule, 146; history of modern, 
144-49; impact of World War I on, 
146; introduction of Western, 144 

medical training, 140; role of missions in, 
146, 147 

Michigan State University, 106 

middle belt: agriculture in, 178; ethnic 
distinctions in, 4; ethnic groups in, xxv, 
99, 101-3, 108; health care in, 147; Is- 
lam in, xxiii, xxvi, 123; language in, 
101-3; localized villages of, 103; mis- 
sion schools in, 141; political activity 
in, 228; population in, 137; religion in, 
xxvi, 128; urbanization in, 137 

middle class, modern: education of, 116; 
living conditions of, 116-17; occupa- 
tions of, 116-17 

middle class, traditional: education of, 
116; living conditions of, 116-17; oc- 
cupations of, 16-17 

Midwest Democratic Front (MDF), 51 

Midwestern Region: creation of, 51, 212; 
National Council of Nigerian Citizens 
control of, 53, 210 

migration, 4, 104, 110, 171 

military: law, 289; security, 308; service, 
269; training, 269; tribunals, 308 

military conference of 1966, 58 

military federalism, 218, 235-36; changes 
in, 222; elements of, 235 

military personnel: crimes committed by, 
289; number of, 300; resettlement pro- 
gram for, 289; unemployment among, 
65-66 



381 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



military rule, 256, 299; labor unions un- 
der, 173-74 
mineral \exports, 196 
mining, 185 
ministries, 233 
Minna, 291, 318 

missionaries, 28; barred from north, 34; 

influence of, 103, 128; racism of, 39; 

social services under, 33 
missions, Christian: health services of, 

144-46; influence of, 28; role of, in 

medical training, 146, 147 
Mobil, 186 

moonlighting, 114, 117-18; by teachers, 
143 

Morocco, 14, 15 

Mounted Training Centre, 314 

Mozambique, 247, 248, 267 

MPLA. See Popular Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola 

Muhammad (the Prophet), 123-24 

Muhammad, Murtala Ramat, 247, 308; 
assassination of, xxv, 70-71, 218, 219, 
249; career of, 68; foreign policy un- 
der, 219; purges by, 69, 218; regime 
of, xxv, 218-19, 225, 308; role of, in 
1966 coup, 68; transition to civilian rule 
under, 226 

Muniyo, 14 

Murtala Muhammad. See Muhammad, 
Murtala Ramat 

Murtala Muhammad International Air- 
port, 192, 283, 321 

Musa, Balarabe, 309 

Muslims {see also Islam): divisions among, 
127; duties of, 125; hajj made by, 125, 
126; as percentage of prison admis- 
sions, 316; respect for devout, 126; 
sharia courts demanded by, 224 

Muslim courts. See sharia courts 

Muslim scholars (mallams), 19 

Muslim uprising, 33 



naira (see also currency), 198; depreciation 
of, 194, 201; devaluation of, 82, 162, 
166, 179, 200; exchange rate of, 194; 
floated against international currencies, 
xxvii; introduction of, 194; replacement 
of, 198; under structural adjustment 
program, xxvii 

NAM. See Non-aligned Movement 



Namibia, 247, 267 

NANS. See National Association of 

Nigerian Students 
NAP. See Nigeria Advance Party 
National Assembly, 227, 231, 238, 282 
National Association of Nigerian Students 

(NANS), 221, 243, 306, 309 
National Association of Resident Doctors, 

305 

National Bank of Nigeria, 193 
National Boundaries Commission, 261 
National Commission for the Reorgani- 
sation of Internal Security, 310 
National Council of Nigeria and the 

Cameroons, 41 
National Council of Nigerian Citizens 
(NCNC), 41-42, 52, 54, 74, 212, 228; 
coalitions of, 48, 50, 53; ethnic distri- 
bution in, 41-42, 210; in House of 
Representatives, 47; membership of, 
41; platform of, 41-42, 51; regional 
control by, 48, 53; role of, in Western 
Region, 53 
National Council of State, 272 
National Council of States, 218-19, 220, 
235, 271 

National Council of Women's Societies 

(NCWS), 243 
National Defence Council, 271, 272, 273 
National Defence and Security Council, 

271-72 

national development plans: First Nation- 
al Development Plan (1962-68), 65, 
162; goals of, 169; weaknesses of, 163, 
211; Second National Development 
Plan (1970-74), 163; goals of, 163; in- 
come distribution in, 170; Third Na- 
tional Development Plan (1975-80), 
69, 163; income distribution in, 170; 
irrigation development under, 179; 
Fourth National Development Plan 
(1981-85), 164-66; Fifth National De- 
velopment Plan (1988-92), 166, 168 

National Drug Law Enforcement Agen- 
cy, 321 

National Economic Emergency (1986), 

xxv, 81, 222 
National Electoral Commission (NEC), 

212, 227, 230, 232 
National Electric Power Authority 

(NEPA), 187, 188 
National Guard, 315 
nationalism, xxiv; emergence of, 38-47; 



382 



Index 



goal of, 38-39; inspiration for, 38; in 

the north, 38; in the south, 38 
National Institute for Policy and Strategic 

Studies, 294 
National Intelligence Agency (NIA), 310 
nationalist movement, 159 
National Livestock Production Company, 

180 

National Party of Nigeria (NPN), 73, 74, 

76, 228, 236 
National Population Commission, 94 
National Republican Convention, 225, 

232 

National Revenue Mobilization, Alloca- 
tion, and Fiscal Commission, 237 

national security, 299; ethnic discrimina- 
tion in, 108; issues, 257-68; oil and, 
258; organized labor as problem of, 
305; principles, 257 

National Security Council, 272, 273 

National Security Organisation (NSO), 
77-78, 309; abolished, 78, 310; under 
Buhari, 310; expanded, 221; responsi- 
bility of, 310 

National Shipping Line, 319 

National Union for the Total Indepen- 
dence of Angola (Uniao Nacional para 
a Independencia Total de Angola — 
UNIT A), 70 

National Union of Nigerian Students 
(NUNS), 305-6 

National Youth Movement (NYM), 40 

National Youth Service Corps (NYSC), 
217; number of personnel in, 287; 
scandal in, 76; service requirement 
in, 148, 287 

Naval Hospital, 277 

Naval Training Command, 272, 277, 292 

navy, 275-82; branches of, 275-77; 
Building and Engineering Service 
Corps, 277; capabilities of, 294; con- 
trol of, 275-77; defense strategy, 
278-80; enrollments, 288; fleet, 278; 
Fleet Maintenance Corps, 277; main- 
tenance, 287; materiel, 278; merchant 
marine, 278; mission, 280; naval avi- 
ation, 278; Naval Information 
Management Corps, 277; Naval 
Materiel Supply Corps, 277; Naval 
Ordnance Corps, 277; number of 
personnel in, 278; organization of, 
277; origins of, 275; tasks of, 275; 
Trident Strategy, 280-82; uniforms, 



ranks, and insignia, 295; women in, 
288 

Navy Act (1964), 275 

Navy Board, 275 

Navy Diving School, 277 

Navy Helicopter Squadron, 277 

Navy Hydrographic School, 278 

Navy Secondary School, 277 

Navy Supply School, 278 

Navy Technical Training Centre, 278, 
284, 292 

Navytown at Ojo, 278, 292 

Navy Welfare Insurance Scheme, 289 

NCNC. See National Council of Nigeri- 
an Citizens 

NCWS. See National Council of Women's 
Societies 

N'Djamena, 266 

NEC. See National Electoral Commission 
NEPA. See National Electric Power 
Authority 

NEPU. See Northern Elements Progres- 
sive Union 

Netherlands: materiel from, 278; role of, 
in slave trade, 16-17; trade with, 197 

Newbreed, 242 

Newspaper Proprietors Association, 242 

newspapers (see also journalists; media), 
242; federal takeover of, 69; national- 
ism in, 39-40; number of, 242 

Newswatch, 242, 309, 310 

NIA. See National Intelligence Agency, 
310 

Niger: border problems with, xxxi, 246, 

259; illegal workers from, 302; relations 

with, 246, 259 
Niger Basin, 29, 87, 90; exploration of, 26 
Niger Coast Constabulary, 269, 311 
Niger Coast Protectorate, 31, 207, 311 
Niger Dam Authority, 188 
Niger Delta, 30; British presence in, 158; 

oil discovered in, 46; people of, 98; 

physical features of, 90; as source of 

palm products, 25 
Nigeria Advance Party (NAP), 228 
Nigeria Airways, 192 
Nigeria-Benin Joint Border Commission, 

258-59 

Nigeria Council for National Awareness, 
308 

Nigerian Agricultural Bank, 195 
Nigerian Air Force Institute of Technol- 
ogy, 294 



383 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



Nigerian Army School of Infantry, 290, 
292 

Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Indus- 
try, 195 

Nigerian Bar Association, 241, 305, 309 
Nigerian Council, 34, 38 
Nigerian Defence Academy, 290 
Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
196 

Nigerian Economic Society, 241 
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion decrees, 

xxviii, 65, 72, 184, 195, 217-18 
Nigerian External Telecommunications, 

76 

Nigerian Guild of Editors, 243 
Nigerian Industrial Development Bank, 
195 

Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC), 81, 

174, 241-42, 304, 305, 306, 309 
Nigerian Law Association, 39 
Nigerian Marine Department, 275 
Nigerian Medical Association, 221 , 241 , 

305, 309 
Nigerian Military Forces, 270 
Nigerian Military University, 290, 292, 
294, 314 

Nigerian National Alliance (NNA), 

53-54, 55, 212 
Nigerian National Convention, 232 
Nigerian National Democratic Party 

(NNDP), 40, 53, 53, 212 
Nigerian National Fish Company, 184 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corpora- 
tion (NNPC), 168, 186, 187, 263 
Nigerian National Shrimp Company, 184 
Nigerian Naval College, 278, 292 
Nigerian Naval Station (NNS), 277-78 
Nigerian Observer, 242 
Nigerian People's Party (NPP), 73-74, 
228 

Nigerian Political Science Association, 
241 

Nigerian Prison Service, 291, 311, 315 
Nigerian Produce Traders' Association, 
39, 42 

Nigerian Railway Corporation (NRC), 
192 

Nigerian Railway Workers Union, 172 
Nigerian Security Organisation (NSO), 

271-72, 308, 309 
Nigerian Socialist Party, 305 
Nigerian Society of Engineers, 241 
Nigerian Union of Civil Servants, 172 



Nigerian Union of Teachers, 39, 172 

Nigeria Police Academy, 314 

Nigeria Police Council, 312 

Nigeria Police Force (NPF), 224, 257, 
310, 311-15; under constitution, 311, 
312; corruption in, 313-14, 318; equip- 
ment of, 313; under First Republic, 
311; functions of, 312; number of police 
in, 312; officers, 312; operating bud- 
get of, 313; origins of, 311; perfor- 
mance of, 313-14; reorganization of, 
312-13; role of, in transfer to civilian 
government, 313; tensions of, with 
army, 312; training in, 314 

Nigeria Regiment (RWAFF), 35, 40, 270 

Nigeria Union of Journalists, 242, 309 

Niger River, 90 

Niger River valley, xxiii, 91 

Niger State, 288, 315; health care in, 147; 
politics in, 74; yellow fever in, 150 

Nkrumah, Kwame, 49 

NLC. See Nigerian Labour Congress 

NNA. See Nigerian National Alliance 

NNDP. See Nigerian National Democrat- 
ic Party 

NNPC. See Nigerian National Petroleum 

Company 
NNS. See Nigerian Naval Station 
NNS Akaso, 278, 292 
NNS Anansa, 278 
NNS Logistic Centre, 292 
NNS Okemiri, 278 
NNS Olokun, 277 
NNS Onura, 292 
NNS Quorra, 277, 292 
NNS Umalokum, 277 
NNS Uriapele, 277-78 
Nok, xxiii, 5 

Non- Aligned Movement (NAM), 244 

nonalignment, 64, 69, 245 

north (see also Northern Region; north- 
south divergence): agriculture in, 178; 
cities in, 130, 131; under Clifford, 37; 
divisions in, 3; education in, 142; elite 
in, 160; ethnic groups in, xxv, 99, 
107-8; ethnic relations in, 108; fear of 
dominance by, 21 1 , 216; health care in, 
147; land tenure in, 177; mission 
schools in, 141; nationalism in, 38; 
orientation of, 18-19; political activity 
in, 228; political power of, 210; rain- 
fall in, 178; religion in, xxvi; urbani- 
zation in, 136, 137 



384 



Index 



Northeast State, 101 

Northern Cameroons, 209 

northern cities: close settled zones, 
131-32; history of, 133; organization 
of, 131; Sabon Gari, 131; Tudun 
Wada, 131 

Northern Elements Progressive Union 
(NEPU), 43-44, 54, 74, 210, 228 

northern kingdoms, 10 

Northern Nigeria, xxiv 

Northern Nigeria Police, 311 

Northern Nigeria Regiment (WAFF), 269 

Northern People's Congress (NPC), 41, 
53, 73, 210, 216; coalition of, with Na- 
tional Council of Nigerian Citizens, 48, 
53; disagreements within, 43-44; domi- 
nation of Northern Region by, 48, 210; 
in House of Representatives, 47; ori- 
gins of, 43; platform of, 43 

Northern Region, 41, 42, 43, 51, 216; 
census controversy in, 52, 212; consti- 
tution of, 48; desire to break up, 51; 
division of, into states, 61-62, 212; ex- 
port commodities of, 46; fear of 
dominance by, 211, 224; federal pow- 
ers in, 45; irrigation in, 179; political 
parties in, 210; political power of, 211; 
role of NPC in, 48; secession threat of, 
209; self-government in, 45, 208, 236 

north- south divergence, xxv, 3, 18, 98, 
219; background of, 206; under Brit- 
ish, 33, 45, 208 

NPC. See Northern People's Congress 

NPF. See Nigeria Police Force 

NPN. See National Party of Nigeria 

NPP. See Nigerian People's Party 

NRC. See Nigerian Railway Corporation 

Nri Kingdom, 10 

NSO. See National Security Organisation 
Nsukka University, 106 
nuclear nonproliferation, 268 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, 268 
NUNS. See National Union of Nigerian 
Students 

Nupe, xxv, 27, 102, 104; domination of, 
7; Islam in, 123; political origins of, 6; 
wars of, 12 
Nyako, Murtala, 313 
Nyasaland, 31 

NYM. See National Youth Movement 
Nzeogwu, Kaduna, 215, 216 
Nzimiro, Ikenna, 298 



OAU. See Organization of African Unity 
OAU Implementation Committee on 

Western Sahara, 264 
Obafemi Awolowo University, 306 
Obasanjo, Olusegun, xxv, 218, 250, 264 
Obasanjo regime, 71-73, 225, 308, 314; 
austerity under, 220; economic pro- 
grams of, 164 
Obote, Milton, 262 

occupations, 112; gender division in, 
138-39; in rural areas, 113-14; train- 
ing for, 113 

Ockar, Gideon, xxxii 

Oduduwa (see also Egbe Omo Oduduwa), 
6 

OECD. See Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development 

Office of the Co-ordinator of National 
Security, 310 

Office of Statistics, 172 

Ogboni, 123 

Ogun State: health care in, 147; politics 
in, 74 

oil, 185-88; dependence on, xxvi, 157; ex- 
port of, 46, 193, 196, 258; export in- 
come from, xxvi, 157; federal revenues 
from, xxvi; government control of, 161; 
as major foreign exchange earner, xxv, 
65; military defense for, 275, 277, 280; 
refineries, 185; revenues, 168; search 
for, 46; and security issues, 258 

oil boom, 72, 73, 111, 217; corruption in, 
161; effects of, 65, 136, 138, 163, 164, 
170, 195, 300; end of, xxv, 193; 
government profligacy during, 167, 
220; revenue from, 167; road construc- 
tion under, 191 

oil prices: decline of, 76, 220, 229; fluc- 
tuation of, xxxii, 72; and political in- 
stability, 256 

oil production, 185, 186; expansion of, 
xxviii 

Oil Rivers Irregulars, 269 

Oil Rivers Protectorate: formation of, 30; 

purpose of, 30-31 
Oji River, 314 
Ojo, 278 

Ojukwu, Chukwuemeka Odumegwu, 57, 

60, 61, 216 
Okpara, Michael, 209, 211 
Olobiri, 46 

omuogun (war boys), 22 
Ondo, 104 



385 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



Ondo State, 315; health care in, 147; 
politics in, 74 

Onitsha, 25, 105; growth of, 136; 
vigilantes in, 318 

OPEC . See Organization of the Petrole- 
um Exporting Countries 

Operation Feed the Nation, 219-20 

Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), 164, 197 

Organization of African Unity (OAU), 

xxx, 62, 246, 247, 250, 264; activities 
in, 63, 69-70, 247, 257, 264-65, 273; 
relations with, 244, 247 

Organization of Arab Petroleum Export- 
ing Countries, 248 
Organization of the Islamic Conference, 

xxxi, 81, 248; membership in, 224 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 

Countries (OPEC), xxv, xxxi; mem- 
bership in, 65, 248 

Orkar, Gideon, 224 

Osadebey, Dennis, 211 

Oshogbo, 75 

Owerri, 93, 136 

Owo, 22 

Oyo, 104 

Oyo kingdom, 31, 206; under British 
rule, 34; collapse of, 22; expansion of, 
17, 19; government of, 7, 206; in- 
fluence of slave trade on, 23; religion 
in, 123; rise of, 7; slave trade by, 17 

Oyo Mesi, 7, 17, 21 

Oyo State: health care in, 147; politics in, 
74; yellow fever in, 150 



Pabir, 97-98 

Palestine Liberation Organization, xxxi 

palm oil, 178; export of, 196; trade in, 
xxiii, 158, 159 

palm products: as alternative commodi- 
ty to slaves, 24; export of, xxvii, 25, 35, 
46, 72, 178-79; as major foreign ex- 
change earner, xxv, 65; sources of, 25 

pan- African defense force, proposed, 
xxxi, 264 

pan- African solidarity, 62, 63, 245, 258 
parastatals, 72 
Paris Club, xxviii 
Park, Mungo, 26 

party politics, 227, 235; religious factor 
in, 255 



Patriotic Front of Nigeria, 232 

patron-client relationship, 46, 106, 160; 
in cities, 136 

peacekeeping role, 256-57, 269; in Chad, 
256, 266, 267; in Equatorial Guinea, 
246-47; in Ghana, 246; in Liberia, xxx, 
246, 248, 258, 265, 266, 267; in Sierra 
Leone, 265, 267; United Nations, 63, 
250, 268, 273 

peanuts: export of, xxvii, 46, 178, 196; 
as major foreign exchange earner, xxv, 
65, 72 

pensions, 152 

Pentecostalism, 128 

People's Redemption Party, 74, 228 

People's Solidarity Party, 232 

periodicals: number of, 242 

Persian Gulf war, 248-49, 268 

petroleum, 185; demand for, 186, 198; in- 
vestment in, 186; production, 278; sub- 
sidies, 81, 242, 243, 248 

Phillips, Dotun, 185, 239 

physical features, 87-90; elevational pat- 
tern, 90; landscape, 87; sedimentary 
strata, 87 

physicians: distribution of, 147, 148 

pidgin, 98 

piracy, 68, 280 

Plateau State, 315; health care in, 147; 

politics in, 74; religious violence in, 304 
Police College, 314 
Police Detective College, 314 
Police Dogs Service Training Centre, 314 
Police Mobile Force Training School, 314 
Police Service Commission, 312 
Police Staff College, 291 
political activity, 111; ban on, 66 
political alliance, 53 
political associations, 232 
Political Bureau, 82, 230, 236 
political disillusion, 52-53 
political education, 233 
political instability, 256 
political office, 121 

political parties (see also under individual par- 
ties), xxiv, xxix, 161; under constitution 
of 1979, 110, 219, 226, 227; ethnic 
groupings in, 110, 208; financial back- 
ing of, 160; influence of, on tradition- 
al culture, 103; limit to two, 230, 232; 
minority, 44; regionalism of, 210; re- 
quirements for registration as, 71, 
227-28 



386 



Index 



political reform, 222, 224, 226 

political unrest, xxix, 201, 302, 318; 
casualties of, 57; under Gowon, 57; un- 
der Ironsi, 57; in Sokoto State, 75; in 
Tivland, 51; in Western Region, 50, 55 

politicians: corruption by, 173; under 
Third Republic, 232 

Popular Movement for the Liberation of 
Angola (Movimento Popular de Liber- 
tacao de Angola— MPLA), 69, 247 

population {see also census), 87, 92-93; age 
distribution in, 96, 142, 143; annual 
growth rate of, 94-96; control program, 
149-50; distribution of, 90, 93, 137; in 
Lagos, 93; in middle belt, 137; in 1953, 
93; in 1963, 94; in 1990, 92, 94; in 
1992, xxiv; rural, xxvi; sex ratio in, 138 

population densities, 93, 131; Yoruba pat- 
tern of, 132-33 

population growth, 168-69; in urban 
areas, 133-34 

Port Harcourt, 107, 131, 136, 274, 283 

Port Harcourt Airport, 192 

ports, 192-93, 258; cargo, 192; facilities, 
35 

Port Security Police, 311 

Portugal: Christian missionaries from, 28; 
contact of, with kingdom of Benin, 9, 
16; wars of, in Morocco, 15; decline of 
influence of, 16; role of, in slave trade, 
15-17 

Presidency, 241 

president (see also executive branch), 235; 

advisers to, 231; term of, 231 
press (see also media; newspapers), 66, 78; 

restrictions on, 221 
Prester John, 15 
prices, 170-71 

Prices, Productivity, and Incomes Board, 
201 

Primary Health Care plan, xxvi, 149 
prime minister, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 54, 
55, 211 

prisoners: classification of, 315-16; con- 
victed, 316; deaths of, 317; mistreat- 
ment of, 317 

prison system, 257, 315-17; admissions, 
315; amnesties from, 316; categories of 
prisoners in, 315-16; facilities of, 315, 
317; overcrowding of, 316; policies of, 
316; staff of, 315; population of, 315 

private sector, 161 

privatization, xxviii, 81 



Proceedings (U.S. Naval Institute), 280 
professional associations, xxix, 39, 241 
Progressive Parties Alliance, 229 
Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, xxiv, 
31, 133; administration of, 32; expan- 
sion of, 32; indirect rule of, 32; mission 
schools in, 141 
Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, 207 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refu- 
gees, 307 

Public Complaints Commission, 226 
public health, xxvi, 137, 150-52; AIDS, 
150, 151; acute diseases, 150, 151; 
chronic diseases, 150, 151; malnutri- 
tion, 150; parasitic diseases, 150, 
151-52 

public sector: size of, 161; spending, 46 
public works, 35 

purges: under Buhari, 77; of civil serv- 
ice, 239; under Murtala Muhammad, 
218 



Qadhafi, Muammar al, 263 
Qadiriyah brotherhood, 19 
Queen Amina College, 304 
Quick Intervention Force, 313 
Quran, 124 



radio, 193, 242 
Rafindadi, 78 

railroads, 191-92; construction of, 159, 
192; deterioration of, 192; maintenance 
of, 192; privatization in, xxviii; system, 
191-92 

Ramadan, 125 

Ransome-Kuti, Beko, 309 

Ransome-Kuti, Fela, 77 

Reagan, Ronald, 249 

recession: of 1978-79, 72; of early 1980s, 
xxv, 75, 164, 229; of late 1980s, xxvi, 
77, 81, 82 

reform, 222; of civil service, 219, 224, 
231; of land tenure, 177; of local 
government, 236; political, 222, 224, 
226 

regional groupings, 98-107 

regionalism, 44, 45, 208-9 

religion (see also under individual sects), xxiii, 
120-29; distribution in population, 
120-21; distribution of, in prison ad- 
missions, 316; in Hausa states, 13; 



387 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



opposition in, to colonial rule, 39; 
pluralism in, xxvi; rise of activist or 
fundamentalist movements in, xxxii, 
224; social implications of, 121, 205; 
among Yoruba, 105 

religion, indigenous, xxvi, 121-23, 206, 
302; ancestor spirits in, 121-22; in 
Igboland, 122; practitioners of, 122; 
secret societies in, 122; sorcery and 
witchcraft in, 122; spirits of the land in, 
121-22; in Yorubaland, 123 

religious: cleavage, 206, 209, 224, 255, 

302, 302-4; tensions, 129, 205, 219, 
224, 244; violence, xxx, 75, 201, 302, 

303, 320 

Rename See Resistencia Nacional 
Mocambicana 

Republican National Convention, xxix 

reserves, armed forces, 274-75 

Resistencia Nacional Mogambicana 
(Renamo), 267 

resource allocation, 184, 209 

revenue, 170; during civil war, 167; dis- 
tribution of, xxx, 166-67, 168, 225-26, 
230, 236, 237; oil, 157, 167; total fed- 
eral, 167 

Richards, Arthur, 44 

Richards Constitution. See constitution of 
1946 

Rio-del-Rey, 260 

Rivers State: creation of, 59; health care 
in, 147; politics in, 74 

Rivers port system, 192 

roads: construction of, 159, 191; main- 
tenance of, 191 

Romania, 284 

Royal African Company, 158 

Royal Navy: anti-slavery blockade of, 23, 
29; technical assistance from, 291 

Royal Niger Company, xxiii, 26-27, 31, 
32 , 311; access of, 31; noninterference 
policy of, 27; trade monopoly of, 27; 
treaties negotiated by, 27 

Royal Niger Company Constabulary, 29, 
269, 311 

Royal Nigerian Navy, 275 

Royal West African Frontier Force 
.(RWAFF), 35; control of, 270; inter- 
nal security by, 270; organization of, 
270; origins of, 32, 270 

rubber, 178, 179 

rural areas (see also farming): civic action 
in, 301; development in, 233; educa- 



tion in, 112; electrification plan for, 
163; families in, 99; farm production 
in, 99; gender division of labor in, 
138-39; health care in, 147, 148; hired 
workers in, 139; housing in, 112; in- 
come in, 170; infrastructure of, 112; 
middle class in, 1 14; occupations in, 99; 
peri-urban conditions, 114, 131; popu- 
lation, xxvi, 93; poverty in, 169, 171; 
towns in, 114; transportation in, 112; 
unemployment in, 65; women in, xxvi, 
118, 233 

rural-urban linkages, 137-40; history of, 
137; among Yoruba, 137-38 

rural-urban imbalances: in income, 170; 
in labor productivity, 170 

RWAFF. See Royal West African Fron- 
tier Force 



Sabo, 132 

Sacred Heart Hospital, 144 
Sahara Desert, 262 

Sahel, 178; drought in, 14-15; agriculture 
in, 178 

Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, 264 
salt trade, 14 

SAP. See structural adjustment program 
Sapele, 278, 284 

savanna (see also Northern Nigeria), 10, 
178 

savanna states, 13-15 

Sayfawa Dynasty, 13, 21 

scandals, 67, 75-76 

Schatz, Sayre P., 164 

schools: primary, 142-43; secondary, 

142; postsecondary, 143 
sculpture, 6 

Sea Power: Agenda for National Survival 
(Nigerian Navy), 280 

SEC. See Securities and Exchange Com- 
mission 

Second Republic, xxix, 73-76, 225-29, 
235; austerity under, 229; corruption 
in, 75-76, 77, 220, 228; duration of, 
xxv; economic programs under, 166, 
229; end of, 229; human rights in, 308; 
states under, 236; transition to, 225-28; 
weaknesses in, 74-75 

second-tier foreign exchange market 
(SFEM), xxvii, 200-201 

Second World Black and African Festival 
of Arts and Culture (FESTAC), 75, 163 



388 



Index 



secret societies, 122 

Securities and Exchange Commission 

(SEC), 195-96 
Securities and Exchange Commission 

Decree of 1988, 195-96 
Security and Civil Defence Force, 311 
security concerns, 258; African and 

regional, 258, 265-67; global, 258, 

267-68; local and bilateral, 258-64 
security forces, 224 

Senate, 48, 227; elections, 55, 74, 76; 

representation in, 238 
Senegal, 267; French troops in, 262; 

jihad in, 22 
Seventh Day Adventists, 128 
SFEM. See second-tier foreign exchange 

market 

Shagari, Shehu, xxv, 73, 74, 76, 166, 

228, 259, 267 
Shan go, 123 

sharia courts, xxx, 230-31; Alkali courts, 
126; under Lugard, 32; Muslim de- 
mand for, 224, 226 

Shaw, Flora, 3 

Shell Oil, 46, 187 

Shinkafi, Umaru, 310 

Shiroro, 188 

Sierra Leone, 24, 30, 47, 246; military 
cooperation with, 291; peacekeeping ef- 
forts in, 265, 267 

Sierra Leone Battalion (WAFF), 269 

Sklar, Richard, 205 

slavery, 3; British prohibition of, 33; and 
ethnic distinctions, 4; in local societies, 
25 

Slavery Convention (1926), 307 
slave trade, 131, 158; abolition of, 22-24, 
158; abolition movement, 23, 28; 
abrogated by Benin, 16; African role 
in, 17-18; alternatives to, 24-26; by 
Borno, 11; duration of, xxiii; European 
role in, 16-17; influence of, 3, 158; to 
Latin America, 23; outlawed by Britain, 
xxiii, 19, 22-23; Portuguese role in, 
15-17; suppression of, 24; volume of, 
17; war to supply, 22 
slaves: emancipation of, 32, 34; ethnic 
groups of, 17; flight of, 34; number of, 
17, 23-24; returned, 105 
SMC. See Supreme Military Council 
smuggling, 76, 221, 235, 259, 261, 266, 

280, 289, 318 
Social Democratic Party, xxix, 225, 232 



Socialist Working People's Party, 304-5 
Society of the Descendants of Oduduwa 

(Egbe Omo Oduduwa), 39, 42 
Sokoto, 130, 131, 270, 273 
Sokoto Basin, 87, 90 
Sokoto Caliphate, xxiii, 3-4, 21, 27, 30, 

127; British desire to occupy, 31; under 

British rule, 32; creation of, 3,19, 100; 

division of, 21; extent of, 21; political 

system of, 206; slaves in, 4; sultan of, 

34; treaties with, 31 
Sokoto State, 43, 283, 315; health care in, 

147; irrigation projects in, 72, 75, 180; 

political unrest in, 75; politics in, 74; 

rainfall around, 92; yellow fever in, 150 
Solarin, Tai, 309 

Songhai, 10, 12; collapse of, 14; hege- 
mony of, 13 

Songhai Empire, 13-14 

sorcery and witchcraft, 122, 129 

south (see also north-south divergence), 
104-7; agriculture in, 178; cities in, 130; 
under Clifford, 37; education in, 142, 
208; ethnic groups in, xxv-xxvi, 98, 
104; fear of dominance by, 216; health 
care in, 147; land tenure in, 177; mis- 
sion schools in, 141; nationalism in, 38; 
orientation of, 18-19; rainfall in, 178; 
real estate investment in, 177; religion 
in, xxvi; urbanization in, 137; women 
in, 118-19 

South Africa, 256, 258; opposition to 
apartheid in, 244, 247, 258; as security 
threat, 263 

South Chad Irrigation Project, 180 

Southeastern State, 59 

Southern Cameroons Trust Territory, 270 

southern cities: arrangement of, 132; his- 
tory of, 132-33 

Southern Nigeria, xxiv 

Southern Nigeria Police, 311 

Southern Nigeria Regiment (WAFF), 269 

South West Africa People's Organization 
(SWAPO), 247, 267 

Soviet Union, 264; aid from, xxviii, 72, 
246; materiel acquired from, 282; rela- 
tions with, 244, 249; trade with, 197, 249 

Soyinka, Wole, 105 

Spain, 197 

Special Drawing Rights, 201 
state of emergency, 50 
state government, 235; under Second 
Republic, 236 



389 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



states, creation of, 217, 233; under 
Babangida, xxix, 82; demand for, 208; 
in Eastern Region, 61-62; under Go- 
won, 58; under Murtala Muhammad, 
xxv, 70, 218, 219; in Northern Region, 
61-62; reasons for, 237-38; under 
Second Republic, 226 

State Security Service (SSS), 309, 310 

steel production, 72, 229 

stock exchange, 195 

strikes, 308; of 1945, 159, 173; of 1964, 
173; in 1970s, 174; in 1986, 242; by 
physicians, 241, 305; in reaction to 
structural adjustment program, xxix; 
by students, 305; by teachers, 75; work- 
ing days lost to, 174 

structural adjustment program (SAP), 
111, 118, 157-58, 200-201; under 
Babangida, xxv, xxvii, 81, 200, 222, 
229, 233; benefits of, 222; under Bu- 
hari, 166; demonstrations against, 305; 
effects of, xxix, 170, 194; manufactur- 
ing under, 184; measures, xxvii, 162; 
reaction to, 243; unemployment under, 
172; World Bank support for, 81-82, 
171, 174, 198 

student: associations, xxix, xxxii, 38, 39, 
222, 243, 305-7; demonstrations, xxix, 
81, 243, 304, 305-6 

Student Pilot School, 293 

subsidies, 161, 167, 242 

Sudan, 22 

Sudan Interior Mission, 146 
Sudan United Mission, 146 
Sufi brotherhood, 126-27, 303 
Supplementary Convention on the Abo- 
lition of Slavery (1956), 307 
Supreme Court, 228, 235, 238 
Supreme Headquarters, 271, 272, 308 
Supreme Military Council (SMC), 62, 
78, 218, 222, 226; Central Planning 
Office of, 164; functions of, 271 ; mem- 
bers of, 62; under Murtala Muham- 
mad, 69; power of, 235 
SWAPO. See South West Africa People's 

Organization 
Sweden, 250; debts to, xxviii; role of, in 

slave trade, 17 
Systems Approach to Training, 292 



Tactical Air Command, 272, 282, 283, 
293 



Tactical Training Group, 293-94 
Tanzania, 247, 250, 264, 268, 291; mili- 
tary cooperation with, 291 
Taraba, xxx 
Taruga, 5 

Tatsine. See Marwa, Alhajji Muhammadu 
taxes, 33, 35-36, 46, 137, 153, 161, 170 
teachers, 75 

Technical Aid Corps, 248 
telephones, 193 
television, 193, 242 

Ten- Year Plan of Development and Wel- 
fare (1946-55), 162 

Texaco, 186 

textile production, 14 

Third Republic, transition to, xxxi, 
229-33, 236, 295; detention under, 
320; goals of, 229, 236; military under, 
298, 299, 301; recommendations for, 
230, 232; schedule for, 230 

Thompson, Tunde, 221 

threat perceptions, 258; France, 262; 
Libya, 263; South Africa, 263 

Tiga Dam, 114 

tin, 35, 159 

Tiv, xxv, 102, 103; lineage structure of, 

103; riots among, 215 
Ti viand, 51 

Togo, 246, 270; extradition agreement 
with, 321; military cooperation with, 
262, 267 

toxic waste, 266, 280 

trade (see also exports; imports), 13, 159, 
196-97, 278; attempts to open, 26; con- 
cessions, 245; deficit, xxvii, 197, 198; 
European merchants in, 25, 26; by 
Hausa states, 11; ivory, 158; local 
houses for, 25; restrictions, xxvii; sur- 
plus, 197-98; trans-Saharan, 10, 11, 
100 

trade unions, xxix, 241-42; ethnic affili- 
ations in, 111; political activism of, 66; 
strength of, 110-11 

trading partners, 197 

traffic: control, 136; jams, 136, 191 

Training and Doctrine Command, 291- 
92 

Training Command, 272, 282 
transportation, xxvii, 179, 188-93; air- 
ports, 192; development of, 163; infra- 
structure, 35; network, 139-40; ports, 
192-93; railroads, 191-92; roads, 191 
Transport, Ministry of, 164 



390 



Index 



Traore, Moussa, 264 
Treason and Other Offences (Special 
Military Tribunal) Decree (1986), 320 
Tribune, 242 

Trident Strategy, 280-82 
Tuareg, 14 



Udi Hills, 87 

Udoji Commission, 169, 170, 239 
Uganda, 31, 264; military cooperation 

with, 262, 291 
Ukiwe, Ebitu, 224 
Underwater Warfare School, 292 
unemployment, xxv, 172; of discharged 
soldiers, 65-66; in 1980s, 77, 82, 172, 
222; in 1970s, 65; rate of primary 
school graduates, 172; rate of secondary 
school graduates, xxvi, 172; rural, 65, 
115, 172; of university graduates, 113; 
urban, 172; and urban migration, 115; 
of youth, 172 
unification, 34-36 

UN India-Pakistan Observer Mission, 
250, 268 

UN Interim Force in Lebanon, 250, 268 
UNITA. See National Union for the To- 
tal Independence of Angola 
United Africa Company, 27 
United Middle Belt Congress, 51, 54 
United Nations, xxxi, 250; activities in, 
63, 245, 257; admitted to, 63; peace- 
keeping forces, 63, 250; peacekeeping 
missions, 268, 273 
United Nations Center for Development 
Planning, Projections, and Policies, 163 
United Nations Security Council, 268 
United Nations Trust Territories, 48 
United Party of Nigeria (UPN), 73, 74 
United People's Party, 49-50, 51; coali- 
tion of, with National Council of 
Nigerian Citizens, 50 
United Progressive Grand Alliance 
(UPGA), 54, 55, 212; election boycott 
by, 54; platform of, 54 
United States, 64; aid from, 64, 282; law 
enforcement agreement with, 321; 
materiel acquired from, 275, 278, 
284-85; military assistance from, 
284-85; relations with, 70, 244, 
249-50; trade with, xxvii, 197, 249 
United States Arms Control and Disar- 
mament Agency, 300 



United States Foreign Military Sales, 
284-85 

universities, 134, 229; federal control of, 

69; political activism of, 66, 81 
University College Hospital, 147 
University of Ibadan, 147 
University of Nigeria, 143, 306 
UPGA. See United Progressive Grand Al- 
liance 

UPN. See United Party of Nigeria 

urban areas, 241; food demand in, 139; 
health care in, 148; population of, 93; 
poverty in, 169; schools in, 134; wom- 
en in, 118 

urban centers: historical development of, 
130-33; rhythm of life in, 134-36 

urbanization, xxvi, 96, 111, 129-37; eco- 
nomic factors in, 137; since indepen- 
dence, 133-37; during oil boom, 136; 
population growth and, 133-34; among 
Yoruba, 137-38 

urban migration, xxv, xxvi, 4, 93, 110, 
115; demographic impact of, 138; ef- 
fect of economy on, 138, 170; in 1970s, 
65; social implications of, 130 

Urhobo, 107 

Usman dan Fodio, 19-22 

Vischer, Hans, 141 

volcanic rock, 87-90 

von Rosen, Carl Gustav, 60 

WAFF. See West African Frontier Force 
wages, 170-71; under colonial govern- 
ment, 172; declining, 198, 201; freeze 
of, 171; military, 81, 288 
War Against Indiscipline, 77, 221, 319 
Warri, xxviii, 22, 206, 277; oil refinery, 
185 

Water Resources, Ministry of, 179 
welfare, 152-53; of elderly, 152; family, 
152; insurance plans for military per- 
sonnel, 289; problems in, 152 
West African Currency Board, 194 
West African Economic Community 
(Communaute Economique de 1'- 
Afrique de l'Ouest— CEAO), 265 
West African Frontier Force (WAFF), 
269-70 

West African Students Union, 38 
Western alignment, xxxi, 245, 249 
Western Naval Command, 272, 277 



391 



Nigeria: A Country Study 



Western Region, 41, 51, 216; economic 
advantage of, 211; education in, 142; 
export commodities of, 46; federal 
powers in, 45; legislative elections in, 
55; political unrest in, 50, 55, 236; role 
of Action Group in, 48-49; role of Na- 
tional Council of Nigerian Citizens in, 
53; role of Nigerian National Demo- 
cratic Party in, 53; secession threat of, 
209; self-government in, 45, 208, 236; 
Yoruba power in, 62 

Western Sahara, 264 

West Germany. See Germany, Federal 
Republic of 

Williams, Rotimi, 226 

women: in armed forces, 288; attitudes 
of, toward polygyny, 120; education of, 
118; elite, 118; employment of, 118; 
feminist movement among, 120, 243; 
as household heads, 119; marriage of, 
1 18-19; as percentage of prison admis- 
sions, 316; political influence of, 11; 
roles of, 118-20; rural, xxvi, 118, 233, 
243-44; single, 119; southern, 118-19; 
urban, 1 18; as victims of economic ex- 
ploitation, 119-20 

Women in Nigeria, 243 

women's associations, xxix, 243-44 

working class, modern: living conditions 
of, 116; occupations of, 116 

working class, traditional: living condi- 
tions of, 115-16; occupations of, 115 

workers: traditional skilled, 115; un- 
skilled, 115 

World Bank, 162, 198, 222; aid from, 
xxv, xxviii, 72, 81-82, 179, 182, 200; 
classification of Nigeria by, 157; esti- 
mate by, of population, 94; structural 
adjustment program, 157-58 

World Bank-International Finance Cor- 
poration, 171 

World Development Report, 157 

World Federation of Trade Unions, 173 

World Health Organization (WHO), 151 

World War I: economic development 
during, 35; impact of, on medical serv- 
ices, 146; West African Frontier Force 
in, 270 

World War II, 40-41 , 159; labor unions 
during, 172; Royal West African Fron- 
tier Force in, 270 

X-Squad, 67 



Xande, 306 

Yan Isala, 303 

Yan Tatsine. See Maitatsine 

Yaounde, Cameroon, 261 

Yaounde University, 261 

Yola, 21; religious violence in, 303; Royal 
West African Frontier Force in, 270 

Yoruba ethnicity; origins of, 7 

Yoruba kingdoms (see also Yoruba peo- 
ple), 6-7; art of, 6; community organi- 
zation of, 6; elections in, 7; hierarchy 
in, 7; history of, 104-5; king (oni) in, 
7; monarchies, 7; political origins of, 
6; religion among, 6, 123, 128; revenue 
for, 7; as slaves, 17; slaves among, 4 

Yorubaland, 22, 34, 51; cities in, 130, 
131, 132; education in, 106; extent of, 
104; population of, 104; religion in, 
123, 129 

Yoruba language, 193, 227 

Yoruba people (see also Yoruba king- 
doms), xxiii, xxvi, 3, 54, 98, 104, 238; 
associations of, 39; in colonial militia, 
270; domination by, under British, 208; 
education of, 105; elite, 105; elitism 
among, 106; ethnic consciousness 
among, 38; in Federal Military 
Government, 61; intraethnic rivalries 
among, 42; marriage of, 108, 119; mis- 
sionaries among, 28; political parties of, 
41, 42, 73, 210, 228; power of, 62; 
religion among, xxvi, 105; residences 
of, 133; as slaves, 105; urbanization 
among, 137 

Yoruba wars, xxiii, 22, 29, 132, 206-7; 
British attempts to end, 29, 158; as 
source of slaves, 17 

youth groups, 39, 40 

Yugoslavia, 284 

Zaire, 258, 262, 264, 267 
Zambia, 247 
Zamfara, 14 

Zaria, 14, 99, 130; mission schools in, 
141; religious violence in, 303, 304, 
320; Royal West African Frontier Force 
in, 270 Zaria Dynasty, 20 

Zimbabwe, 247, 250; military training 
for, 262, 291, 292 

Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the 
South Atlantic, 268 



392 



Published Country Studies 



(Area Handbook Series) 



D3\J~D3 


Afghanistan 


J Jv O / 


Greece 


550-98 


Albania 


550-78 


Guatemala 


550-44 


Algeria 


550-174 


Guinea 


550-59 


Angola 


550-82 


Guyana and Belize 


550-73 


Argentina 


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550-176 


Austria 


550-21 


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Bangladesh 


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550-31 


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550-61 


Burma 


550-182 


Italy 


550-50 


Cambodia 


550-30 


Japan 


550-166 


Cameroon 


550-34 


Jordan 


550-159 


Chad 


550-56 


Kenya 


550-77 


Chile 


550-81 


art* q "WnrtVi 


550-60 


China 


550-41 


Korea, South 


550-26 


Colombia 


550-58 


Laos 


550-33 


Commonwealth Caribbean, 


550-24 


Lebanon 




Islands of the 






550-91 


Congo 


550-38 


Liberia 




VjUsld XVICa 


jju oj 


Libya 


550-69 


Cote d'lvoire (Ivory Coast) 


550-172 


Malawi 


550-152 


Cuba 


550-45 


Malaysia 


550-22 


Cyprus 


550-161 


Mauritania 


550-158 


Czechoslovakia 


550-79 


Mexico 


550-36 


Dominican Republic and 


550-76 


Mongolia 




Haiti 






550-52 


Ecuador 


550-49 


Morocco 


550-43 


Egypt 


550-64 


Mozambique 


550-150 


El Salvador 


550-35 


Nepal and Bhutan 


550-28 


Ethiopia 


550-88 


Nicaragua 


550-167 


Finland 


550-157 


Nigeria 


550-155 


Germany, East 


550-94 


Oceania 


550-173 


Germany, Fed. Rep. of 


550-48 


Pakistan 


550-153 


Ghana 


550-46 


Panama 



393 



550-156 


Paraguay 


550-53 


Thailand 


550-185 


Persian Gulf States 


550-89 


Tunisia 


550-42 


Peru 


550-80 


Turkey 


550-72 


Philippines 


550-74 


Uganda 


550-162 


Poland 


550-97 


Uruguay 


550-181 


Portugal 


550-71 


Venezuela 


550-160 


Romania 


550-32 


Vietnam 


550-37 


Rwanda and Burundi 


550-183 


Yemens, The 


550-51 


Saudi Arabia 


550-99 


Yugoslavia 


550-70 


Senegal 


550-67 


Zaire 


550-180 


Sierra Leone 


550-75 


Zambia 


550-184 


Singapore 


550-171 


Zimbabwe 


550-86 


Somalia 






550-93 


South Africa 






550-95 


Soviet Union 






550-179 


Spain 






550-96 


Sri Lanka 






550-27 


Sudan 






550-47 


Syria 






550-62 


Tanzania 







<rU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1992 311-824/60006 



394 



PIN: 006969-000 



